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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates a recent UK Government Intervention established to develop 
Micro- and Nano- Technologies (MNTs) for technology-based economic growth. While 
the need for such innovation policies is well recognised, there is also a need to 
understand the key challenges to developing effective policy interventions for the 
innovation process that will create sound economic leverage (Harvey, 2010). 
A new method that helps us understand the innovation process at the organisational 
level has been developed, by working across disciplines and synthesising different 
methodologies. Constructs adopted from the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme (MIRP) were used to gather and analyse data. The methodological approach 
followed was a fusion of the Interactive Process Perspective (IPP) and Institutional 
Theory (IT). This method has been used to further explain the complexities of the 
innovation process by demonstrating the co-operation and contestation between actors 
from different interest groups in terms of agency and structure. 
Evidence of how innovation centres exhibit different characteristics relating to their 
local context along with the specific actors populating them is provided. Those actors 
bring their own institutional logics, belief systems and associated practices to their 
centres. The importance which the local context of an MNT Centre has within the extra-
local context of the state intervention is shown to have a major bearing on its original 
purpose. 
For practitioners some important points have been raised: the intended purpose of the 
MNT government intervention was shown to evolve across MNT centres; the key 
influential actors of each centre demonstrably followed different institutional systems of 
reasoning, which in some cases resulted in internal conflicts.  
As demonstrated in this study, the ingrained institutional thinking and reasoning of 
actors can be difficult to change for the intended purpose of an intervention, once 
funding has already been awarded. 
  
 ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
Personal: 
First and foremost I would like to thank my wife Ceri for her unfaltering support 
throughout this PhD journey. Her encouragement and positive outlook on life have 
been, and continue to be, a constant source of inspiration for me. During this passage of 
time my two wonderful sons were born: Aidan Tomas Joseph and Niall Ciaran. They 
make me laugh daily, and keep that all important work-life balance in check 
(particularly important when undertaking a PhD). 
Thanks are due to my in-laws, Lian and Kieran, who have journeyed regularly from 
North Wales to play with the boys and allow me time to continue this pursuit, when my 
wife has been working (as the medical type of doctor). Words cannot describe how 
much help they have been, particularly when my second son surprised us by coming 7 
weeks early during the final write-up phase, whilst visiting them. This was an incredibly 
challenging time for my wife and I, and I have no doubt that without their support, the 
completion of this PhD would have been very difficult. 
Further thanks to my sister-in-law Kate, and brother-in-law Colm, who have been 
incredibly supportive throughout. 
A big thank you to Auntie Fel. for her understanding of the PhD journey and impartial 
guidance that buoyed me over the final hurdles. 
Professional: 
Thanks are offered to my current colleagues: those in the Medical Applications Group 
who have been good listeners; and those who regularly grilled me in preparation for my 
Viva Voce examination.  
To my former colleagues, and peers: Toni, your encouragement throughout has been   
sterling; and Laura, it’s your turn next!  
Thanks are due to my supervisors Dr Tim Edwards and Dr Luigi De Luca, for stepping 
in during the eleventh hour; a task lesser folk might not have taken, but I am grateful for 
your hard work and professionalism in helping me attain this PhD. 
This research would not have been possible without the contributions from those 
interviewed throughout the MNT government intervention. The need for anonymity 
does not allow me to thank those individuals by name, however I am very grateful for 
the time kindly afforded me to understand and investigate this area of immense interest 
to me. 
And last, but not least, thanks and credit is due to the Business School PhD office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or 
any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in 
candidature for any degree or other award. 
 
 
Signed …… ……………………… (candidate)       Date …20/02/2012 
 
 
STATEMENT 1 
 
This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
PhD. 
 
Signed …… ……………………… (candidate)       Date …20/02/2012 
 
STATEMENT 2 
 
This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where 
otherwise stated. 
Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.  The views expressed are my 
own. 
 
Signed …… ……………………… (candidate)       Date …20/02/2012 
 
 
STATEMENT 3 
 
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and 
for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations. 
 
Signed …… ……………………… (candidate)       Date …20/02/2012 
 
 
 
 
  
 iv 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract………………………………………………………….................. i 
Acknowledgments………………………………………………................. ii 
Declaration……………………………………………………...….…....... iii 
Table of Contents………………………………………………................. iv-xi 
List of Figures……………………………………………........................... xii 
List of Tables……………………………………………............................ xiii-xiv 
List of Abbreviations……………………………………............................ xv 
  
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1  Purpose of this Study 1 
1.2  The UK Micro-and Nano- Technology (MNT) Capital Facilities 
Programme 
1 
 1.2.1 Background to the Strategy 1 
 1.2.2 Fields, Technology & MNT Government Intervention 3 
1.3  MNT in the Context of a UK National Innovation Intervention 4 
 1.3.1 Strengthening Comprehension of  MNT Programme using the 
Interactive Process Perspective (IPP)  
 
7 
1.4  Introduction to the MIRP Constructs and their Adoption in this Study  
9 
 1.4.1 Background to MIRP 9 
 1.4.2 The MIRP Framework 10 
1.5  Methods and Design 13 
 1.5.1 Rationale for Choice of Research Method 14 
1.6  The Academic Contributions of this Study 17 
1.7  Key Findings of this Study 17 
1.8  Outline of Thesis 18 
1.9  Summary 20 
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review – Emerging & Disruptive Technologies 
 
2.1  Disruptive Technologies 21 
 2.1.1 Emerging and Disruptive Technologies 22  
 2.1.2 Origins of Disruptive Innovation Theory 22 
 2.1.3 Antecedents to Christensen’s Theory of Disruptive 
Innovation 
25 
 2.1.3.1 Schumpeter: Process of Creative Destruction 25 
 2.1.3.2 Foster: S-Curves 26 
 2.1.3.3 Abernathy and Clark: Winds of Creative Destruction 27 
 2.1.3.4 Anderson and Tushman: Technological Discontinuities & 
Dominant Designs 
28 
 2.1.4 Contemporary Theory on Disruptive Innovations 30 
2.2  Organisational Challenges 32 
 2.2.1 Need for Appropriate Strategy or Clear Purpose 32 
 2.2.2 Recommended Strategies for Organisations Developing 
Disruptive Technologies 
33 
 2.2.3 Resources, Knowledge and the Ability to Learn 36 
 v 
 
2.3  Structured Responses to Challengess Faced when 
Developing EDTs 
38 
 2.3.1 Use of Key Gatekeepers 38 
 2.3.2 Collaboration and Cross-linking of Departments 39 
 2.3.3 Incumbents and the Need to Work with New Entrants 40 
 2.3.4 Incumbent Firms and Bureaucratic Structures 41 
 2.3.5 Overcoming Bureaucratic Structures – Decoupling 42 
 2.3.6 Ways Incumbents can Overcome Issues of Bureaucracy 
and Structure 
43 
2.4  Technology Origins of the Sample Literature 44 
2.5  Summary 46 
 
Chapter 3 – Systems of Innovation 
 
3.1  Systems of Innovation 47 
3.2   Boundaries of Systems of Innovation 48 
 3.2.1 National Systems of Innovation 48 
 3.2.2 Background of National Systems of Innovation 49 
 3.2.3 Benchmark National Systems of Innovation Models 50 
 3.2.4 Layered National Systems of Innovation Models 52 
 3.2.5 Regional Systems of Innovation 54 
 3.2.6 Sectoral and Technological Innovation Systems 55 
 3.2.6.1 Sectoral Systems of Innovation 56 
 3.2.6.2 Technological Systems of Innovation 56 
3.3  Innovation Policies  
 3.3.1 Science Policy 58 
 3.3.2 Technology Policy 59 
 3.3.3 Innovation Policy 60 
3.4  Government Interventions 62 
3.5  Inhabited Institutions in relation to National Systems of Innovation 67 
3.6  Key Themes in the Systems of Innovation Literature 68 
 3.6.1 Universities as Important Contexts for Systems of Innovation 68 
 3.6.2 Challenges to Systems of Innovation 70 
 3.6.3 Foresight Activities 70 
3.7  Gaps in the Systems of Innovation Literature 71 
 3.7.1 Importance o Effective Policy Initiatives 71 
 3.7.2 Limited Sample of Field Studies 72 
 3.7.3 Evaluating Policies 72 
 3.7.4 Understanding the Levels of Systems of Innovation in more Detail 73 
3.8  Links to Institutional Theory 73 
 3.8.1 Actors and Agency 74 
 3.8.2 Institutional Levels 74 
 3.8.3 Context 75 
3.9  Locating the MNT Government Intervention in relation to the 
Systems of Innovation and Innovation Policy Literature 
76 
3.10  Summary 76 
 
 
 
 
 vi 
 
Chapter 4 – Bridging Literature  
 
4.1  Theoretical Perspectives 77 
 4.1.1 Process Theory 77 
 4.1.2 Actor Network Theory (ANT) 78 
4.2  Institutional Theory – an Overview 80 
4.3  Viewing the MNT Government Intervention through an Institutional 
Theory Lens 
 
82 
 4.3.1 Introduction to the Institutional Theory Literature 82 
 4.3.2 Institutional Isomorphism 84 
 4.3.3 Criticisms of Isomorphism 86 
 4.3.4 Decoupling 87 
 4.3.5 Institutions 88 
 4.3.6 Scott’s Institutional Pillars 88 
 4.3.7 Legitimacy (as agency) 91 
 4.3.8 Role of Legitimacy 92 
4.4  Institutional Logics and the MNT Government Intervention 95 
 4.4.1 Introduction to Institutional Logics 95 
 4.4.2 Logics at different Levels 96 
 4.4.3 Actors, Action and Agency 96 
 4.4.4 Embedded Agency 98 
 4.4.5 Collective Identities and Identification 99 
 4.4.6 Classification and Categorization 100 
 4.4.7 Institutional Logics and Field Logics 101 
 4.4.8 Types of Field Logics 101 
 4.4.9 Dominant Field Participants 102 
4.5  Differences in Actor Perceptions 103 
4.6  Micro-Politics and Contestation in Innovation 104 
4.7  Summary 105 
 
Chapter 5 - Methodology  
 
5.1  Social Science Research Perspectives 107 
 5.1.1 Ontology 107 
 5.1.1.1 Objectivism 108 
 5.1.1.2 Constructionism 108 
 5.1.2 Epistemology 108 
 5.1.2.1 Positivism 109 
 5.1.2.2 Realism 110 
 5.1.2.3 Empirical Realism (or ‘direct realism’) 110 
 5.1.2.4 Critical Realism 110 
 5.1.2.5 Interpretivism 111 
 5.1.3 Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions for this Study 111 
5.2  Research Gaps and Research Questions 112 
5.3  Research Questions 114 
5.4  The Research Design 116 
 5.4.1 Establishing the Research Venue through Pilot Interviews 116 
 5.4.2 Research Venue 120 
5.5  Research Strategies and Situations 123 
 5.5.1 The Case Study Research Strategy 126 
 vii 
 
 5.5.2 Limitations of the Multiple Case Strategy 129 
 5.5.3 Data Gathering 129 
 5.5.4 Interviewing 129 
 5.5.5 Issues of Data Access 130 
 5.5.6 Introduction to the Minnesota Innovation Research Programme 
(MIRP) 
135 
 5.5.7 Background to MIRP 136 
 5.5.8 The MIRP framework 136 
 5.5.9 Coding and use of Research Constructs 138 
 5.5.10 Method for selecting Research Constructs 138 
 5.5.11 Data Management 144 
5.6  Research Ethics 144 
5.7  Reflection on Data Access 145 
5.8  Chapter Summary 147 
 
Chapter 6 – Presentation of Organisational Field: the UK Micro- and Nano- 
Technology Network 
 
6.1  Background to the Department of Trade and Industry’s Micro- and 
Nano- Technology (MNT) Manufacturing initiative 
149 
 6.1.1 The MNT Network 150 
 6.1.2 Raison d’etre of the Micro- and Nano- Technology Centres 151 
 6.1.3 How were the Host Organisations Selected? 153 
6.2  Nature of funding for the UK Micro- and Nano- Technology 
Network 
157 
6.3  Fit with Organisational Theory 158 
6.4  Data Accessed within the MNT Government Intervention 158 
6.5  Chapter Summary 158 
 
Chapter 7 – Major Case Study 
 
7.1  Introduction 159 
7.2  Background to the Major Case Study: ‘Mercury’ 160 
 7.2.1 Organisation Structure 163 
 7.2.2 Products and Services offered by Mercury 165 
7.3  Primary Data 166 
 7.3.1 Type of Actor 167 
7.4  Secondary Data for Mercury 168 
 7.4.1 Measurement of Centres 169 
 7.4.2 Mercury’s ‘Traffic Light’ Performance 169 
 7.4.3 Proposed Financials for Mercury 170 
7.5  Semi-Structured Interview Data for Mercury 172 
 7.5.1 Purpose – Relating to the MNT Government Intervention 172 
 7.5.2 Purpose – Relating to Mercury 178 
 7.5.2.1 Intended Purpose 178 
 7.5.2.2 Resulting Purpose 179 
 7.5.3 People 184 
 7.5.3.1 Actors and Perception of Success 187 
 7.5.3.2 Business Actors 192 
 7.5.3.3 Academic Actors 193 
 viii 
 
 7.5.3.4 Actors with Academic and Business Backgrounds 195 
 7.5.4 Context 196 
 7.5.4.1 Positive Aspects of Mercury’s Context 197 
 7.5.4.2 Negative Aspects of Mercury’s Context 200 
 7.5.5 Collaborations 203 
 7.5.5.1 General Comments Concerning Collaborations 212 
7.6  Outcomes – Secondary Data 213 
7.7  Outcomes – Primary Data 215 
7.8  Summary 216 
 
 
Chapter 8 – Cross-Case Comparison of the MNT Centres 
 
8.1  Conceptualisation of the MNT Network as a Field 218 
 8.1.1 Understanding of the MNT Network as a Field 219 
8.2  Comparative Case Data 219 
 8.2.1 The Actions of the Additional Stakeholders 220 
 8.2.2 Comparative MNT Centres and Associated Actors 221 
 8.2.2.1 Mr Gillette, Lucretia 221 
 8.2.2.2 Dr Nobel, Liber 222 
 8.2.2.3 Dr Alvarez, Bacchus 222 
 8.2.2.4 Dr Apgar and Professor Pelton, Ulysses 223 
 8.2.2.5 Dr Russell, Concordia 223 
 8.2.2.6 Dr Tesla, Rhea 224 
 8.2.2.7 Mr Singer, Cardia 224 
 8.2.2.8 Mr Cole, Minerva 225 
8.3  Practice versus Praxis of MNT Actors (business, academic and 
state) 
228 
 8.3.1 Generic Purpose of the MNT Government Intervention (Practice) 228 
 8.3.2 Purpose – Relating to Individual Centres (Praxis) 230 
8.4  Roles 233 
 8.4.1 Local Field Logics 234 
 8.4.2 The Role of Centre Directors – in terms of Outcomes 239 
 8.4.3 The Assimilation of Outcomes by Centre Directors 240 
 8.4.4 The Assimilation of Failed Outcomes by Centre Directors 241 
 8.4.4.1 Communication 241 
 8.4.4.2 Business not Sustaining (financially) 242 
 8.4.4.3 Lack of Business Peope Leading/ Working in the Centres 242 
 8.4.5 The Assimilation of Outcomes by Actors with a Hybrid 
background 
 
 8.4.6 The Assimilation of Outcomes by State Actors 246 
8.5  Context 248 
 8.5.1 University Context versus Industry Context 248 
 8.5.2 Commercial Credibility to Customers 254 
 8.5.3 Embedded Centres versus Standalone Centres 255 
 8.5.4 Keep Control separate from Larger Organisations 255 
 8.5.5 Organisational Confusion  256 
 8.5.6 Collaborations 257 
 8.5.6.1 Closing of MNT Network and Replacement with Nano KTN 257 
 8.5.6.2 Importance of Collaboration for some Centres 259 
 ix 
 
8.6  Reflection on using the MIRP Constructs 260 
8.7  Summary 260 
 
Chapter 9 – Discussion 
 
9.1  Introduction 262 
9.2  The Academic Contribution of this Study  262 
9.3  Adding to the Empirical Data Store 263 
9.4  Establishing Relationships between the Findings and Initial 
Research Questions 
264 
 9.4.1 Findings in relation to Research Question 1 264 
 9.4.2 Findings in relation to Research Question 2 264 
 9.4.3 Findings in relation to Research Question 3 265 
 9.4.3.1 Context 265 
 9.4.3.2 Purpose 266 
 9.4.3.3 People 267 
 9.4.3.4 Outcomes 267 
9.5  Reflective Discussion: MIRP Literature and Government 
Interventions 
268 
 9.5.1 Contributions to the MIRP findings 268 
 9.5.2 People and Context 268 
 9.5.2.1 Findings in Relation to Angle’s First Proposition 269 
 9.5.2.2 Findings in Relation to Angle’s Second Proposition 269 
 9.5.2.3 Findings in Relation to Angle’s Third Proposition 270 
 9.5.2.4 Findings in Relation to Angle’s Fourth Proposition 272 
 9.5.3 Outcomes 272 
 9.5.3.1 Management Paradox 273 
 9.5.3.2 Resource Controllers 274 
 9.5.4 Collaborations 275 
 9.5.5 Contribution to the Existing MIRP Framework 276 
9.6  Reflective Discussion: Emerging and Disruptive Technology 
(EDT) Literature 
277 
 9.6.1 Development Time for New Technologies 278 
 9.6.2 Curiosity-Driven Research 278 
 9.6.3 Newness of Technology 279 
 9.6.4 Roles 280 
 9.6.5 Cross-linking between Actors 281 
 9.6.6 Incumbent Firms and the MNT Network 282 
9.7  Reflective Discussion: Systems of Innovation (NSI) Literature 283 
 9.7.1 Effective Technology Policy Interventions 284 
 9.7.2 Metamorphosis of MNT Network to KTN Network 284 
 9.7.3 Relation to Institutional Model 286 
9.8  Reflective Discussion: Institutional Theory (IT) Literature 287 
 9.8.1 MNT Centres and Isomorphism 288 
 9.8.2 Institutional Logics and the Local Context 289 
 9.8.3 Legitimacy 289 
 9.8.3.1 Institutional Entrepreneurs 290 
 9.8.3.2 Structural Overlap 291 
 9.8.3.3 Competing Institutional Logics 291 
9.9  Summary 292 
 x 
 
 
 
Chapter 10 – Conclusions 
 
10.1  Introduction 293 
10.2  Key Findings 293 
10.3  Contributions for Practice 294 
 10.3.1 MNT Centre Context 294 
 10.3.2 Longevity and Retrospection of Technology Policies 296 
 10.3.3 Reconstruction 297 
 10.3.4 Organisational Size 297 
 10.3.5 Success versus Failure (Lucretia versus Mercury) 298 
10.4  Recommendations to Practice in the Field 299 
10.5  Limitations of this Study 301 
 10.5.1 Difficulty in Deconstruction 302 
 10.5.2 Suitability of the Research Methodology 302 
 10.5.3 Sampling of Data and Access 303 
10.6  Future Research 304 
10.7  Summary 306 
 
 
  
 xi 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY………..…………………………………………….. 
 
307-329 
APPENDICES …………………………………………………………...  
  
Appendix 5a – Anonymised Example Map from Pilot 1………….. 
330 
 Appendix5b – Pilot Interview Template 331 
 Appendix 5c – Additional Research Strategies and their Suitability 
for this Research Study 
332-335 
 Appendix 5d – Meta-table of results 336 
 Appendix 5e – Ethical Approval Process 337 
 Appendix 5f – Approved Ethics Form 338 
 Appendix 5g – Interview Ethical Consent form 339 
 Appendix 5h – MNT Centre Data recorded quarterly by the TSB 340 
 Appendix 6a – Archive documents outlining the Assessment 
Criteria used for selecting suitable recipients of funding for this 
Capital Facilities Programme 
341 
 Appendix 6b – A graphical overview of the MNT Centres 
accessed, along with the Cross-field Actors 
353 
 Appendix 6c – A graphical overview of the MNT Centres 
accessed, along with the Cross-field Actors, and with details of the 
Data Collected. 
354 
 Appendix 7a – Criteria used by External Auditors to Audit MNT 
Centres, Quarterly 
355 
 Appendix 7b – Extract from one of the TSB’s ‘Micro- and Nano- 
Technology Centres Communication Documents’ 
356 
 Appendix 7c – Table of Additional Supplier/ Customer Interviews 357 
 Appendix 8a – Table 8-5 – Role-ordered matrix: linking actors, 
roles, logics and agency (complete version) 
358-365 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure Title Page 
1.1 Geographic location of the MNT Centres 4 
1.2 A Flow-Chart Illustrating the Methodology followed in this 
Study 
16 
2.1 Key Citations Over Time from the 30 Sample Tests 23 
2.2 Timeline of Evolution of Disruptive Innovation Theory 24 
2.3 The Technology Cycle 29 
3.1 The Benchmark NIS Model 51 
3.2 Layered Institutional Model 53 
3.3 Relationship between Science, Technology, and Innovation 
Policy 
61 
4.1 Representation of Key Concepts within the Institutional Theory 
Literature 
81 
5.1 A Graphical Overview of the MNT Centres Accessed, along 
with the Cross-Field Actors 
122 
5.2 Final Interview Template 133 
5.3 Paper Development of Research Constructs 141 
5.4 Electronic Development of Research Constructs 142 
6.1 Proportion of Capital Facilities Grant Contributions in relation 
to the Sample Case Centres Accessed 
155 
6.2 Timeline for the Creation of the Micro- and Nano- Technology 
MNT Manufacturing Initiative 
156 
7.1 Organisational Structure of Mercury 163 
7.2 9-box Traffic Light Performance Measures used by the TSB 169 
 
 
 
 xiii 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table Title Page 
1.1 Original Constructs used in the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme 
11 
1.2 Research Questions 13 
2.1 Strategies for Developing Disruptive Innovations 36 
3.1 Examples of Different Types of Interventions 62 
4.1 Scott’s Three Pillars of Institutions 89 
4.2 Legitimation Strategies 94 
5.1 Influential Innovation Policies 113 
5.2 List of Pilot Interviews 117 
5.3 Research Strategies and their Suitability for this Research Study 125 
5.4 Summary of the Interviews carried out for the Study 128 
5.5 Some Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Qualitative 
Interviewing 
131 
5.6 Original Constructs used in the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme 
137 
5.7 List of Codes generated from Inductive Analysis of Pilot Case 
Interview Transcripts 
139-140 
5.8 Sensitising Constructs chosen for this Study 143 
6.1 Extracts from the Original MNT and Current MNT Public 
Domain Sources Describing the Purpose of the MNT Programme 
152 
6.2 List of Micro- and Nano- Technology Centres 154 
7.1 Stakeholders Interviewed Concerning the Mercury Case 166 
7.2 Proposed Income and Expenditure as on Mercury’s Project 
Application Proposal in 2004 
171 
7.3 Role-Ordered Matrix: Linking Actors, Roles and Action 188-191 
7.4 Positive and Negative Associations of Mercury’s University 
Context 
198-199 
7.5 Extracts from Mercury’s Tender Document Relating to 
Collaborations 
203-204 
7.6 Types of Collaboration Existing in Mercury (positive and 
negative associations) 
206-210 
7.7 Extracts from Mercury’s Tender Document Relating to the 
Outcomes 
214 
8.1 Additional MNT Field Stakeholders Interviewed 220 
8.2 Descriptions of Comparative Cases 226-227 
8.3 Perceptions across the Organisational Field of the MNT 
Government Intervention Purpose (grouped into themes) 
229 
8.4 Actor’s Perceptions of the Purpose of Individual MNT Centres 231 
8.5 Comparisons of Institutional Logics for MNT Centres 235 
8.6 Role-Ordered Matrix: Linking Actors, Roles, Logics and Agency 238 
8.7 General Themes Emerging from ‘Context’ for the Cross-Field 
Actors 
249-252 
9.1 Main Features of the Novel Approach using IPP and IT 
Theorisation in Comparison with the Interactive Process 
Perspective 
263 
9.2 Propositions Resulting from Angle’s Findings from the MIRP 269 
 xiv 
 
Programme 
9.3 Relationship of Study’s findings with Groenewegen and Steen’s 
(2006) model 
286 
 
  
 xv 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
MNT Micro- and Nano- Technology 
MIRP The Minnesota Innovation Research Programme 
DTI Department of Trade and Industry 
SME Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
TSB Technology Strategy Board 
RDA Regional Development Agency 
NDGB Non-Department Government Body 
NSI National System of Innovation 
NIS National Innovation Systems (alternative description for NSI) 
IPP Interactive Process Perspective 
SERC Science and Education Research Council 
TCS Teaching Company Scheme 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer 
CC Clayton Christensen (scholar in the disruptive technology 
literature) 
EDT Emerging and Disruptive Technologies 
UK United Kingdom 
NTBV New Technology Business Venture 
IP Intellectual Property 
RQ Research Question (i.e. 1, 2 or 3) 
SI Systems of Innovation 
R&D Research and Development 
IPR Intellectual Property Rights 
OMC Open Method of Co-ordination 
ITRI Industrial Technology Research Institutes 
BMEC Biomedical Engineering Centre 
KTP Knowledge Transfer Partnership 
NSSI National Super System of Innovation 
ANT Actor Network Theory 
TENS Techno-Economic Systems 
IT Institutional Theory 
RHA Regional Health Authority 
CRC Cooperative Research Centres 
PLC Public Limited Company 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
EDM Electrode Discharge Machining 
E&Y  Ernst and Young 
ROI Return on Investment 
MEMS Micro Electro Mechanical Systems 
MST Micro Systems Technology 
NDA Non-Disclosure Agreement 
KTN Knowledge Transfer Network 
RTD Research and Technology Development 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
1.1 Purpose of this Study 
This thesis concerns itself with presenting an understanding of a government 
intervention which was designed to develop emerging technologies for commercial 
exploitation. The investigation’s ultimate aim is to make realistic practice and policy 
recommendations for future effective government innovation interventions.  
The contribution is in the investigation of a nascent field – that of micro-and nano-
technology (MNT) – and the examination of the key factors attributed to the innovation 
and management of a recent government intervention. More specifically, constructs 
adopted by the Minnesota Innovation Research Programme (MIRP) are investigated to 
see how they interact in terms of agency and structure. The findings from this study will 
add to the existing body of knowledge in this field by enabling conceptualisation of 
innovation in a meaningful context and by the narration of a specific government 
intervention and how it shaped the innovation process. 
Clarification Note on the Terminology Used in this Thesis 
The MNT capital facilities programme is described using a number of definitions 
throughout this thesis. These include: the MNT National System of Innovation/ 
Intervention; the UK MNT government intervention; the MNT intervention. These 
terms are used interchangeably to describe the same thing. 
The 24 facilities that were created are referred to as MNT centres. 
This MNT network was created to provide UK businesses with access to the latest range 
of MNT services and capabilities within key sectors.  This enabled UK industry to gain 
a ‘step up the ladder’ without the initial burden of investing in expensive capital 
equipment and facilities. 
1.2 The UK Micro- and Nano- Technology (MNT) Capital Facilities 
Programme 
1.2.1 Background to the Strategy 
The micro- and nano-technology (MNT) Capital Facilities Programme describes an 
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innovation intervention implemented by the UK Government to provide the UK with a 
network of micro- and nano- technologies. It was established to provide a: 
‘market-orientated focus for the facilities, people and organisations engaged in 
micro and nanotechnologies in the UK...[to help] lower entry barriers and to 
drive the widespread market development and exploitation of these 
technologies...building a prosperous, world-class MNT sector in the UK’ (DTI, 
2005, p.5).  
This initiative was launched as a result of findings from the UK Advisory Group on 
Nanotechnology. This group was appointed in June 2001 to establish a UK 
nanotechnology strategy, and consisted of both academic and industry experts. It was 
chaired by Dr John Taylor who was Director General of the Research Councils at that 
time. The resulting report for the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) became 
known as the ‘Taylor Report’.  
The Report began with the stark warning that ‘any industry that fails to investigate the 
potential of nanotechnology and to put in place its own strategy for dealing with it, is 
putting its business at risk’ (DTI, 2002, p.6). The strategy put forward was specifically 
designed to ‘support the academic research and industrial capability necessary to allow 
the UK to benefit from the commercial potential of nanotechnology’ (House of 
Commons, 2004, p.3). The advisory group was charged with: 
‘...reviewing the current state of nanotechnology applications in industry in the 
UK, and proposing if appropriate, actions to accelerate and support increased 
industrial investment in nanotechnology exploitation’ (DTI, 2002, p.7). 
In July 2003 one year after the Taylor Report, Lord Sainsbury (then Minister for 
Science and Innovation) announced that ‘a package of funding for nanotechnology 
worth £90 million over six years, along with the establishment of a micro and 
nanotechnology (MNT) network to direct the spending of this money’ was being made 
available (House of Commons, 2004, p.5). This funding was split into £50 million for 
applied research and £40 million for capital projects. This study is concerned with the 
latter of these, i.e. the creation of a regionally dispersed network of MNT facilities (also 
known as the MNT Capital Facilities Programme). Each centre is concerned with the 
development of new manufacturing processes, technologies and in some cases, 
products. 
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The aim was to maximise the investment wherever possible; as such, centres were 
expected to match-fund any grants received (i.e. generate equivalent income from 
customers, suppliers and host organisations), while also leveraging existing MNT 
facilities. For example, university centres already investigating MNTs were funded; 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the MNT area were given funding to 
develop aspects of their capabilities that could be used on an open-access basis by other 
companies; in a number of cases, large global organisations were funded to add new 
equipment or fund services to allow them to work with external customers, rather than 
internal customers alone. 
1.2.2 Fields, Technology & MNT Government Intervention 
The MNT government intervention is envisaged as a nascent organizational field for 
this research study. Scott (2001) describes an organizational field as a range of 
organizations that make up a recognised area of life. In terms of this government 
intervention, the field is based around the aforementioned MNT centres (or key 
suppliers), along with the other organizations involved. These include: state agencies 
(the Department of Trade and Industry, DTI; and the Technology Strategy Board, TSB); 
resource and product consumers (i.e. customers such as UK SMEs and other MNT 
centres); and other organizations that produce similar services or products. 
This intervention involves the development of emerging technologies, which also 
include new manufacturing processes, technologies, and in some cases, products. All of 
these are a common focus of attention/or unit of analysis for innovation research. The 
MNT government intervention began from a national innovation system and resulted in 
the formation of 24 new or complimentary UK wide MNT centres. Complimentary 
refers to funding of existing technology centres - where possible - to stretch the funding 
further. In the main, these were universities and small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). In some cases, investment went to departments in global organisations. In a 
handful of cases, funding went to completely new organisations. 
Twelve Regional Development Agencies (RDAs), and Devolved Administrations were 
also involved in setting up these centres (DTI, 2005). With this involvement, a 
regionally dispersed network of centres evolved. Figure 1.1 below displays the 
geographic location of these centres. Nearly all of these organisations were established 
to develop new MNT manufacturing equipment, technologies or products. There are a 
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few exceptions, e.g. where a centre concentrates on characterisation (i.e. measurement) 
of micro- and nano- scale components or parts (an essential part of the development 
process).  
A wide range of actors constitute the MNT organisational field. Initially, there were 
those involved in lobbying the government for the policy, which in turn led to those 
developing the policy and implementing it. These include individuals, as well as non-
departmental government bodies (NDGBs) such as the DTI. Following the allocation of 
funding, centres were created, bringing new actors into the field. These actors came 
from a range of different professional/sector backgrounds; ranging from professional 
academics to exacting businessmen/women. All of these individuals brought diverse 
skills, motivations and organising principles to the government intervention.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 - Geographic Location of the MNT Centres (Source: TSB, 2011) 
1.3 MNT in the Context of a UK National Innovation Intervention  
The first research question in this study asks ‘how do networks such as the MNT 
network function?’ The second research questions asks ‘how can we describe the 
existence of these networks and stakeholder values and understandings of the role of 
public interventions?’ Essential to an understanding of these questions is the need to 
understand how the MNT network functions at the level of individual MNT centres and 
on the national intervention level.  
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There are numerous studies in the literature concerning government intervention (also 
known as national systems of innovation (NSIs)).  Fromhold-Eisebith (2007) describes 
how the concept of the NSIs established ‘...a new integrated, institutional and 
evolutionary way of thinking about innovation support...when debating what determines 
successful technology-orientated economic development’ (p.217). 
Balzat and Hanusch (2003) describe them as a ‘...subsystem of the national economy in 
which various organizations and institutions interact with and influence one another in 
the carrying out of innovative activity’ (p.197). It is about a systematic approach to 
innovation in which the interaction between technology, institutions, and organizations 
is central.  
The MNT government intervention in this study is a key example of a technological 
policy intervention (i.e. government intervention) at the national level (i.e. in the UK). 
The MNT government intervention was built on a defined socio-economic need (i.e. to 
benefit the UK economy and society). One of the key challenges for governments is 
in developing effective policy interventions for the innovation process that will 
create economic leverage (Harvey, 2010). In order to do this, it is important to identify 
the appropriate conditions for intervention, which in turn requires a clear understanding 
of the obstacles that need to be overcome in order to make the policies effective (Fri, 
2003). 
One of the barriers associated with developing effective policy interventions is that 
many empirical studies in the literature only focus on successful examples of 
institutions and organizations. Denrell (2003) argues that this is due to the economic 
process, which means that unsuccessful firms are replaced by individuals and firms with 
good performance records, resulting in a limited sample of firms for research.  
The main case selected for this PhD study is an example of a ‘failed’ MNT centre 
(in terms of not achieving the objectives of the MNT programme). The purpose of the 
MNT government intervention is detailed in later chapters. The main objectives for each 
centre were to be open-access, and to generate commercial revenue in order to be self-
sustaining at the end of the grant funding. Coupled with this is the importance of 
providing help for UK manufacturers wishing to develop MNTs. 
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Such in-depth exploration of an unsuccessful organisation will contribute to bridging 
the identified literature gap. This has the potential to remove some of the under-
sampling bias of the empirical data, and will add richer data to the plethora of 
successful examples in the literature. According to Fri (2003), public policy which is 
intended to promote technological innovation, should aim to achieve results by 
overcoming three main obstacles; firstly, where the innovation’s main benefits are of 
ancillary value to the innovator; secondly, where technological innovation will not 
attract capital; thirdly, where the innovation is easy to copy.  
These obstacles were highlighted by Cohen & Noll (1991, p.18-22) in their research 
into six major government-funded technology projects. Regarding MNT government 
intervention, the second of these obstacles is a clear driver for this policy.  In addition, 
elements of the first obstacle were intended to be addressed with this intervention- i.e. 
by having publicly-funded centres developing MNT technologies, the flexibility to 
develop technologies that may not have an instant application, is facilitated. This 
contrasts with commercial organisations that require the technology to enter the market 
successfully and provide a return on investment (Fri, 2003). When customers do not buy 
enough of the product that produces a return on investment (ROI) for the innovator, then 
the innovation fails. Innovators are less likely to carry out the innovation if the rewards 
are insufficient (Fri, 2003, p.60). 
There is also the need for policies to create a demand for innovation, i.e. ‘demand 
creation’. Fri (2003) describes this as problematic and suggests that an alternative 
option for policy-makers is to develop technological options that would be useful if and 
when the demand finally emerges. The latter option is inherent within the UK MNT 
government intervention policy; i.e. that it is extremely difficult to forecast the 
applications of an emerging technology such as MNTs, thereby making demand 
creation difficult. Therefore, by opting to develop a range of MNT options through a 
series of MNT centres, the hope is that the infrastructure will be in place when demand 
emerges. Fri adds that policy intervention: 
‘must bring the costs/risks of innovation into line with the available benefits, or 
must attach to the public benefit a value that gives the private sector an incentive 
to engage in the innovation process’(p.66). 
This approach and some factors which affect its success are evaluated in this PhD study.  
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The discrete literature gap that was identified in the field of policy intervention was 
outlined above. A further opportunity for investigation arises with respect to the 
organizational contexts of the MNT intervention. Klein and Koslowski (2000) underline 
the fact that: 
‘for too long, micro-researchers have routinely neglected the effects of the 
organizational contexts within which individual behaviour occurs…to neglect 
these systems’ structure in our conceptualization and research designs is to 
develop incomplete and mis-specified models’ (Klein and Koslowski, 2000, 
p.232). 
This is mirrored in a case example provided by Dodgson et al. (2005) which highlights: 
‘the importance of considering organizational and cultural change as much as 
technological change innovation. Technology and organization coexist in 
innovation: they are two sides of the same coin’ (Dodgson et al. 2005, p.80).   
Considering the literature gap that was identified, the MNT government intervention 
presented itself as an ideal example of a publicly-funded NSI for investigation. This 
example allowed richer insights into a nascent field of technology, whilst providing a 
better understanding of the barriers faced by the major case study investigated. 
Furthermore, following Harvey’s (2010) observation that one of the key challenges for 
government is in developing effective innovation policies, then the findings have the 
potential to guide the design of future innovation policies. 
1.3.1 Strengthening Comprehension of MNT Programme Using the Interactive 
Process Perspective (IPP): One of the most prolific UK government interventions is 
that of the Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP). These partnerships were formerly 
known as the Teaching Company Scheme (TCS). Both are knowledge transfer 
programmes and have been in operation in the UK since 1975 (Peattie, 1993; Edwards, 
2001; Millward et al. 2004). The Teaching Company Scheme was established by the 
Science and Education Research Council (SERC) and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) to ‘bridge the gap between industry and academia’ (Peattie, 1993, p.60). 
The scheme has a number of stated aims, of which one is to improve industrial methods 
by the effective implementation of advanced technology and new ideas (Peattie, 1993). 
This aim is closely aligned to the subject matter of this thesis - i.e. the investigation of a 
UK micro- and nano-technology government intervention (MNT intervention).  In 
common with the TCS programme, the MNT intervention facilitates (in part) the 
transfer of advanced technologies from academia to industry.   
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Edwards (2000), also discusses existing attempts to analyse the complexities of such 
government interventions, using the TCS model as an example. Significantly, he 
highlights the need for a more explanatory theorisation of government interventions. 
Such a view depends on understanding the nuances between agency and structure. 
Edwards (2000, p. 462) introduces the Interactive Process Perspective as a way to 
investigate these nuances. He suggests that ‘an interactive process perspective provides 
a framework that shows how the accomplishment of innovative activities (action) 
depends on the mediations constituting the contingencies of the institutional setting 
(structure)’. Put simply, individuals (human agents) are both influenced by pre-existing 
forms of structuring (i.e. the institutional setting), yet are also empowered to interpret 
what should be done in the future (i.e. their action). 
The adoption of an interactive process perspective evidently allows a deeper 
understanding of the MNT intervention in relation to the multiple structures it exhibits. 
Structure is important in the study of organizations, because an organization's structure 
shapes its flexibility, its capacity to change, and its innovations. It is patently an 
important issue for management (Outhwaite, 2006, p.627). 
In a review of the innovation literature, Slappendel (1996) describes how contexts, in 
terms of different levels of analysis, are adopted in different studies of innovation. She 
arranges these levels into individuals (i.e. an individual person); organisations (which 
include innovation within and by organisations); industries; and finally, national 
systems. Her study concentrates on the national systems level, also described as the 
extra-local context, and organizational level, also termed the local context (Hallet and 
Ventresca, 2006). The national systems levels/extra-local context concerns the MNT 
government intervention which is a national programme. The organizational level/local 
context applies to the MNT centres. This work builds on Pierce and Delbecq’s (1977) 
identification of three theoretical perspectives in the innovation literature. Of these, the 
interactive process perspective provides a way of comprehending the scope and 
influence of individual actors within the context of the MNT government intervention. 
The first of these is the individualist perspective. Second is the structuralist perspective, 
and third is the interactive process perspective (Slappendel, 1996). The links between 
these levels are evidently important and are also investigated in this PhD study. 
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1.4 Introduction to the MIRP Constructs and their Adoption in this 
Study 
Large scale research programmes such as the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme (MIRP) were embarked upon in order to investigate the complexity of 
innovation processes further. The Minnesota Innovation Research Programme is 
introduced in this section for a number of reasons: 
Firstly, as it is one of the major academic innovation research programmes in recent 
years, it was a natural starting point to appreciate how data can be collected to 
understand how organizations produce innovative products and services.  
Secondly, the MIRP research programme was designed to be flexible and cover a wide 
range of organisations developing a diverse array of products and services. Such a 
flexible approach appealed to the investigation of the MNT network which comprised 
of organisations developing a range of products/ technologies. Examples of products/ 
services developed in the case studies from MIRP included: studies of technological 
developments (e.g. cochlear implants); administrative innovations (e.g. public policy 
innovations); and studies of the adoption of innovations. A thorough review of this 
study including the methods used and research findings was carried out and the 
strategies employed to frame data collection, have been applied to the investigation of 
the MNT government intervention. 
1.4.1 Background to MIRP 
The MIRP research programme was created to develop a process theory that explains 
innovation development (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). These researchers wanted to 
carry out a longitudinal research programme which took into account the temporal order 
and sequence of steps that take place when an innovative idea makes the transition to a 
concrete reality. They refer to theory building as producing:  
‘fundamental laws of innovating... useful for explaining how a broad class of 
processes, sequences, and performance conditions unfold along the innovation 
journey. A process theory may also identify certain paths more likely to be 
effective under certain developmental conditions’ (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990, 
p.31).                
They collected a common core of empirical data by using a consistent framework across 
a range of innovation study groups. In total, 14 studies were carried out, with different 
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research teams. The teams comprised 34 people (15 faculty and 19 doctoral students) 
from eight different academic departments and five schools in Minnesota, making it a 
considerable piece of research work in the area of innovation. Their work increased 
awareness of the need to investigate a wider range of characteristics of the innovation 
process, rather than being preoccupied with stage models, and generalisation.   
1.4.2 The MIRP framework 
Poole et al. (2000) describe the definition of innovation used in the MIRP study as  
‘the process of innovation..[is] defined as the development of new ideas by people 
who engage in transactions with others within a changing environmental context 
and who change their behaviours based on the outcomes of their action’  (p.100). 
This definition establishes the importance of a number of constructs which together 
constitute the MIRP framework. The investigation of these constructs allowed for a 
deeper understanding of the complex innovation process. These constructs provided a 
range of variables around which the development of the outcomes of innovations could 
be considered. In terms of the MIRP programme, outcomes were the result of studying a 
‘wide variety of product, process, and administrative innovations from concept to 
implementation or termination’ (Poole et al. 2000, p.108). This framework was also 
chosen because its concepts ‘constitute the central factors of concern to manage in 
directing innovations’ (Van de Ven et al., 2000, p.9). These constructs are; ideas, 
people, transactions (referred to as collaborations in this PhD), context and outcomes. It 
should be noted that ‘transactions’ later became ‘collaborations’ to make a distinction 
from MIRP’s method of capturing and recording each individual transaction. The term 
collaboration is used to emphasise the more macro view of transactions observed in this 
thesis between the MNT network actors. 
The original descriptions from Van de Ven and Poole (2000) are shown in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 - Original Constructs used in Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme (Source: Adapted from Van de Ven & Poole, 2000). 
Construct Description 
Ideas A coding of the substantive ideas that innovation group members 
use to describe the content of their innovation at a given point in 
time 
People A coding of the people/ groups involved in an activity, the roles and 
activities they perform at a given pointing time, and how they 
formulate problems and make decisions 
Transactions 
[collaborations] 
The informal and formal relationships among innovation group 
members, other firms, and groups involved in the innovation effort. 
Context/ 
environmental 
A coding of the exogenous events outside of the innovation unit in 
the larger organization and industry/ community that are perceived 
by innovation group members to affect the innovation. 
Outcomes A coding of success criteria and ratings by innovation participants 
of how well the innovation is progressing and accomplishing their 
expectations of effectiveness at a given point in time. 
 
The MIRP programme is a good example of a framework that has been used to develop 
far greater comprehension of the innovation process. It ‘not only sought to clarify 
connections between levels of analysis, but also examined these relationships over time’ 
(Slappendel, 1996, p.120). The constructs originally adopted by MIRP are very specific 
and separate in terms of the MIRP analysis. There is a previously unexploited 
opportunity to investigate how these constructs interact in terms of agency and structure 
in this study. The MNT government intervention researched in this study will be used to 
further understand the link between the action (collaborations/ outcomes) of the actors 
(people) of a government intervention with structure (context/ environmental). 
However, this study addresses an opportunity to further investigate the interactions 
between the MIRP framework (i.e. constructs) through an interactive process 
perspective. By investigating the UK MNT intervention using the MIRP framework and 
the theorisation that IPP offers, this work offers a potential contribution to the literature 
in terms of further understanding this complex innovation process. 
The interactive process perspective, and research methods used have been adapted from 
the MIRP programme as being the most suitable approach  to explain how and why the 
MNT government intervention has transpired the way it has: ‘it is the interactive 
process perspective that will be best able to explain how and why organizations have 
made .. [such] innovative transition[s]’ (Slappendel, 1996, p.124). 
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Furthermore, theorisation from the area of Institutional Logics has been introduced 
throughout this study to help explore the complexities facing different stakeholders 
engaged in innovation under the MNT government intervention. Such differentiation 
confirms the potential for greater contestation and negotiation in understanding such 
government interventions. 
There are a number of additional advantages to adopting the IPP approach for 
investigating government interventions. Significantly, IPP offers an increased 
understanding of the duality between organizational action and structure; agents and 
structure are independent and not a dualism (Giddens, 1984. The implications of this are 
that agents are able to influence structure and structure is able to influence agents in 
return. Structure refers to those arrangements by which agency is exercised (Scott, 
2001). 
For this PhD study, one can think of ‘governance structures’ in terms of the MNT 
government intervention - as a public support mechanism. Secondly, government 
interventions have many agents, and where there are multiple agents they have the 
potential to choose actions deliberately, and to carry them through effectively, even in 
defiance of established rules and prevailing powers (Whittington, 1992). Examination 
of the different MNT centre contexts will highlight how different actors follow the rules 
of the government intervention. Finally, the IPP method takes into account the range of 
stakeholders and associated organizational politics, which in turn shape action and 
structure. Such issues are commonly omitted from governments’ assessments of their 
interventions. 
This research study is not solely about perceiving MNTs as a network for government 
intervention; it is also about providing a theoretical lens to understand what is 
happening in that intervention. Within this research, there is an aim to evolve Edward’s 
(2000) proposition that the IPP is suitable for investigating innovation. This is 
undertaken by investigating a range of actors within the MNT government intervention 
to provide further evidence that IPP can be used in this way. Furthermore, this will 
result in offering a revised theorisation for investigating NSIs and government 
interventions. 
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1.5 Methods and Design 
The overall aim of the study is to investigate a national system of innovation in order to 
understand how such interventions function and more specifically, how and why 
particular aspects of these interventions affect their initial function. In addition, a broad 
investigation across different bodies of literature allows for the development of a 
revised framework based on theory not typically associated with the investigation of 
emerging technologies. That is, theorisation is adopted from the area of innovation 
process theory (i.e. MIRP programme); the National Systems of Innovation literature; 
and Institutional Logics.  
Three research questions drive this research study, which are informed by a 
comprehensive, multi-disciplinary literature review, and a number of inductive pilot 
cases. 
Table 1.2 – Research Questions 
Research  
Question 1 
(RQ1) 
How do government interventions such as the MNT network function? 
 
Research 
Question 2 
(RQ2) 
How can we describe stakeholder values and understanding in relation to 
the role of a nascent government intervention? 
Research  
Question 3 
(RQ3) 
How do the the following aspects of innovation management: purpose, 
process, people, collaborations, context and outcomes influence the 
success of emerging technologies in different organisational settings? 
 
Research Question 1 starts the study with a general focus, following the initial pilot 
research study and the literature review.  Saunders et al. (2009) describe how this 
approach often leads to further detailed research questions: 
‘ It is often a useful starting point in the writing of research questions to begin 
with one general focus research question that flows from your research idea. This 
may lead to several more detailed questions or the definition of research 
objectives’ (p.24). 
                                                                                                                              
Research Question 2 leads the way for a descriptive understanding of the MNT network. 
Research Question 3 helps to focus the investigation to a number of important 
constructs and particular areas of interest for examining the chosen UK MNT 
government intervention. Construct selection is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 (the 
Methodology Chapter), with the associated methodological decisions and justifications. 
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1.5.1 Rationale for Choice of Research Method 
Trott (2008, p.74) describes how ‘the study of organisations and their management is a 
very broad subject and no single approach provides all the answers’. This study adopts 
the approach most suited to the research questions, research venue, resources and access 
available. In addition, several authors have described the difficulties of gathering data 
for organisations in the early stages of technological innovation. Klofsten (2002) 
describes how ‘…traditional business ratios are insufficient to assess newly-started 
fast-growing firms…in certain stages of growth, these firms have such strong dynamics 
that traditional business ratios do not suffice to paint a true and fair picture of the firm’s 
current situation’(p.76).  He adds that often, such newly-started firms do not have 
appropriate data from such an early stage. Not all of the organisations involved in this 
study are ‘newly-started’. However, the specific MNT centres investigated in this study 
are new, and evidence of ‘strong organizational dynamics’ was displayed in many of 
these centres.  
The OECD
1
  in their guidelines for collecting innovation data – describe how ‘access to 
knowledge and technology can depend to a large extent on the connections between 
firms and organisations. This is particularly the case for the tacit knowledge that is held 
in the minds of people…direct interactions with the people with tacit knowledge or 
with access to routines is required in order to gain access to these types of knowledge’ 
(OECD, 2005, p. 32). A qualitative research methodology was decided upon. 
This follows the methods used by authors such as Khilji (2006) who carried out a series 
of interviews, describing how they ‘offered the research team the flexibility to probe and 
highlight organizational and other contextual issues that would have remained hidden 
had a questionnaire survey been used’ (Khilji, 2006, p.532). Another example is that of 
Jones-Evans (1997, p.15) who found this method to be the most appropriate when 
dealing with the technical entrepreneurs and strategies of new technology-based 
ventures, of which the local contexts are similar. 
The MNT Network has been treated as an organisational field using institutional theory. 
MNT centres are treated as purposive cases, with one major case study and eight 
comparative MNT centres. Senior actors were interviewed within these centres and, for 
                                                 
1
The Oslo Manual - Guidelines for collecting and interpreting innovation data – Published by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 
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triangulation purposes, a wide range of cross-field actors were also interviewed. 
Secondary data (where accessible) have also been used, e.g. proposal documents for the 
main case study, and reports/ literature in the public domain.  
Initially the use of secondary financial data such as Return On Investment (ROI), 
turnover of the centre etc. was sought. However the release of such data was opposed by 
the overseeing non-departmental government body (the Technology Strategy Board, 
TSB).  
As the data gathering process was underway it became evident that such hard financial 
measures might mask the realities of this MNT network, whereas the IPP process 
presented an in-depth understanding of the harder-to-measure aspects of a state 
intervention. For example, an MNT Centre may be performing well on paper (in terms 
of financial measures), but it is the reasoning behind this performance in terms of actors 
and agency in the local context of their centre that is of interest to this study. 
As such, the interviewing approach proved most successful in gathering data. Interviews 
were structured around sensitising constructs developed from initial inductive pilot 
interviews, along with an existing framework from the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme (MIRP). The resulting constructs (also described as ‘codes’ and/or 
‘themes’) were as follows: purpose, process, people, collaborations, context and 
outcomes. These interviews were transcribed and coded according to these constructs. 
Thematic analysis and pattern-matching of the data was used to analyse findings, 
develop theory and contribute to this area of research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
The research method used enabled an example government intervention to be 
understood and an explanation of the key factors attributed to this intervention in a 
multitude of organisational and institutional venues was provided. Although 
generalisations should not be made from the sample size obtained, the resulting findings 
do offer new avenues to explore for academics, policy makers and practitioners alike. 
A flow chart illustrating the methodology used in this study now follows. This process 
is illustrative; the actual process did not necessarily follow each step in a linear fashion. 
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Figure 1.2 - A Flow-Chart Illustrating the Methodology followed in this Study 
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1.6 The Academic Contribution of this Study 
A new method that helps us understand the innovation process in a recent government 
intervention has been developed, by working across disciplines and synthesising 
different methodologies. To understand innovation it is necessary to see how it is made 
possible in a meaningful (real world) context which is why the MNT government 
intervention was conceived using organisational field theorisation, with ‘local’ and 
‘extra local’ contexts (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). 
In addition, the Minnesota Innovation Research Programme (MIRP) constructs have 
been used to gather data on a recent UK government intervention. The methodological 
approach adopted is that of the Interactive Process Perspective (IPP) as described by 
Slappendel (1996). This approach overcomes the limitations of perspectives 
concentrating solely on individual action or objective structures.  
The method used has synthesised the Interactive Process Perspective with an 
Institutional Theory (IT) approach, and has been used to further explain the 
complexities of the innovation process by demonstrating the co-operation and 
contestation between actors from different interest groups. The Interactive Process 
Perspective pays attention to the understanding of how action and structure interrelate. 
The main features of the approach developed in this PhD add another viewpoint to the 
perspective of researchers investigating innovation at the organisational level. 
1.7 Key Findings of this Study 
A number of key findings in terms of practice have been made from the analysis of the 
MNT government intervention. Of particular importance are the following: 
1. The MNT government intervention failed. Furthermore there is no evidence that 
the DTI considered the issues of local context and organising principles of actors 
when developing this technology policy. The main focus appeared to be on how 
much ‘leverage’ could be achieved by building on existing MNT infrastructure. 
2. There was a central problem of ‘management paradox’ for this intervention. That 
is, within the organisational field conflicting logics were observed, along with a 
mixture of contested/ collaborative organising principles. The central problem in 
innovation management may be the management of such a paradox. For 
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example, Mercury provided many examples of conflicting organising principles, 
and in particular examples of actors reconstructing their views. 
3. Successful centres were those were actors were driven by a common purpose, 
and had associated inherent and common business thinking, reasoning and 
judgement processes. 
4. The notion of conflicted interpretation has been shown to be extremely 
important for government interventions and a significant predictor of eventual 
outcomes. 
5. Context - The associated institutional logics of local and extra local contexts 
could not be avoided when trying to achieve a successful MNT technology 
policy. 
1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured and presented over ten chapters: Chapter 1 introduces the topic 
and provides a rationale for the study. It recognises the UK MNT government 
intervention under investigation; provides a brief introduction to the literature; outlines 
the findings and contributions, and gives an overview to this study.  
The Literature Review spans the next three chapters: 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the literature concerning emerging and disruptive 
technologies. The challenges faced by organisations developing such new technologies, 
and how they try to manage and organise this innovation process are identified and 
discussed. The outcomes of this Chapter are then compared with the findings from this 
study in the Discussion Chapter. 
Chapter 3 introduces the literature on Systems of Innovation (SI) and its boundaries 
(national, regional, and sectoral systems of innovation). The use of Innovation Policy as 
a way of developing the innovation systems of a country is presented, and how 
government interventions can be enacted to stimulate this. In addition, the MNT 
government intervention is located within this body of literature. 
Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of the theoretical lenses that were considered for this 
study. The chosen lens of Institutional theory is then considered; the chapter considers 
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how key concepts from the Intuitional Logics and the wider Institutional Theory 
literature can be applied to study of a government intervention, and also how they can 
add to an understanding of actors and their actions within such a venue. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the study’s overall research approach and commences with a 
discussion of my ontological and epistemological views in relation to this research 
project. Appropriate research strategies and methods are then identified and critiqued 
for this study. 
Chapter 6 provides a detailed background to the UK MNT Government Intervention. A 
timeline and key events in the evolution of this intervention are provided in order to set 
the context. 
Chapter 7 then introduces the major case and presents the associated findings. Chapter 8 
presents the data from the cross-case comparisons and wider MNT stakeholder 
interviews.  
Chapter 9 opens up a dialogue around the study’s findings in relation to the academic 
literature used to investigate the research questions. Furthermore, the academic 
contributions which result from this study are discussed. 
Chapter 10 is the final chapter, and discusses how the findings from this study 
contribute to practice. In addition, a number of practice-orientated recommendations in 
the form of seven propositions are put forward. Evidence from this study is used to 
support each of these propositions. The chapter concludes by discussing the limitations 
of this study along with avenues for future research. 
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1.9 Summary 
This initial chapter presented this study of a UK micro- and nano- technology 
government intervention concerned with developing emerging technologies for the 
benefit of the UK economy. The issue under consideration – the MNT network – was 
described, which illustrated a complex field with multiple actors influencing the 
innovation process. The interactive process perspective used in this study was identified 
as a lens through which such interventions could be further explored and clarified. The 
scope, aims, objectives and research questions of the study were also briefly introduced. 
The research methodology was presented, along with a rationale for using the 
Minnesota Innovation Research Programme framework. A number of key findings and 
potential contributions were also outlined. 
The stage is now set to present the next chapter – Chapter 2 - which details the 
associated literature linked to one particular facet of this broad subject area – i.e. 
emerging and disruptive technologies. 
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review – Emerging & Disruptive Technologies 
This chapter provides an overview of the growing literature concerning emerging and 
disruptive technologies and the difficulties and challenges faced by organisations 
developing, managing and organising them. 
The MNT government intervention was created by the UK government to develop the 
emerging and disruptive technologies in the field of micro- and nano- technologies. The 
purpose of reviewing this body of literature is to understand how organisations manage 
the development of emerging and disruptive technologies, and the challenges they have 
faced along the way. This review includes research from a wide range of organisations, 
rather than those only developing technologies as part of a government intervention. 
This will allow comparisons to be made with the findings from the MNT case 
investigated in this PhD. 
2.1 Disruptive Technologies 
Clarification note on the terminology used in this thesis: The term ‘emerging’ has been 
used interchangeably with ‘disruptive’ when describing technologies throughout this 
thesis. Literature talks of technologies being viewed as the next disruptive technology. 
However, during the time in which they are being developed and have not shown 
themselves to have usurped existing technologies, they are technically still emerging 
technologies. In fact, Schumpeter said: 
‘It is hardly necessary to point out that competition of the kind we now have in 
mind [i.e. creative destruction/ disruptive innovation] acts not only when in being 
but also when it is merely an ever-present threat. It disciplines before it attacks. 
The businessman feels himself to be in a competitive situation even if he is alone 
in his field…’ (Schumpeter, 1943, p.74). 
Subsequently the use of one term over the other has been considered inappropriate when 
describing technologies such as MNTs which are seen to be potentially disruptive 
technologies. Therefore both terms have been used interchangeably in this study to refer 
to technologies which have the potential to become disruptive and those which are 
already disruptive.  
 
2.1.1 Emerging and Disruptive Technologies 
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Literature within this area (Foster 1986; Christensen 1997, 2004; Danneels 2004, 2006) 
commonly describes disruptive technologies. A contemporary definition of disruptive 
innovation follows from Christensen’s work: 
‘Disruptive innovation: an innovation that cannot be used by customers in 
mainstream markets. It defines a new performance trajectory by introducing new 
dimensions of performance compared to existing innovations. Disruptive 
innovations either create new markets by bringing new features to nonconsumers 
or offer more convenience or lower prices to customers at the low end of an 
existing market’ (Christensen et al. 2004, p.11). 
2.1.2 Origins of Disruptive Innovation Theory 
According to Christensen the publication of the first article describing the phenomenon 
of disruptive innovation was in the mid-1990s (Christensen, 2004, p.vii). He did not 
specify the article referred to but it is premised as that of Bower and Christensen (1995). 
However, results of a structured systematic review of the EDT literature (carried out by 
the author in the early stages of this study) highlights a number of seminal works which 
came before this article (Dorrington and Brousseau, 2008). The review followed a 
structured systematic review methodology (see Cochrane 1979; Petticrew and Roberts, 
2006; and Robeson, 2007). The sample papers searched as part of this review were then 
analysed in terms of the most frequently cited references. The resulting key citations 
can be seen in Figure 2.1.  
A contemporary study by Hang and Yu (2010) provides further evidence that the 
phenomenon of disruptive innovation did indeed find its foundations in seminal work 
by authors such as Schumpeter (1942) and Foster (1986). Yu and Hang (2010) carried 
out a reflective review on the extant literature on disruptive innovation theory. As part 
of this review they map a timeline of the evolution of disruptive innovation theory 
based on a series of technological innovation studies (based on early literature of 
technology discontinuity as well as on the papers and books of Christensen). This is 
reproduced in Figure 3.2.  
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show how the true origins of disruptive innovation are found in the 
works of the renowned economist Schumpeter (1943) who wrote extensively on the 
theory of economic development (refer to Schumpeter, 1943). 
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Figure 2.1 - Key Citations Over Time from the 30 Sample Texts (Source: Dorrington and Brousseau, 2008, 
Appendix A). Note: 1) ‘CC’ stands for Christensen 2) n=frequency of citations 
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Figure 2.2 – Timeline of Evolution of Disruptive Innovation Theory (Source: Reproduced from Yu and Hang, 2010, p. 436).
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2.1.3 Antecedents to Christensen’s Theory of Disruptive Innovation 
A number of the seminal authors - and works - highlighted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 are 
now discussed to provide a foundation of the disruptive innovation theory.  
2.1.3.1 Schumpeter: Process of Creative Destruction 
Fagerberg et al. (2005) provide a useful introduction to the work of Joseph 
Schumpeter: 
 ‘Schumpeter is considered a pioneer in the economic analysis of innovation, 
having concentrated more effort on this topic than any other economist in the 
first half of the twentieth century.  His insights have guided the subsequent 
development of the field, and helped to explicate the vital role of innovation in 
growth and competitiveness’ (p.87).  
Schumpeter focused on the role that innovation played in economic and social change. 
He created one of the most original and important works of the twentieth century - in 
terms of its impact on disruptive innovation theory - called ‘Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy’ (Schumpeter, 1943). He pioneered the concept of ‘Creative Destruction’ 
as part of capitalism and the evolutionary process it follows. 
The process of creative destruction describes how the step-changes in technological 
understandings and major scientific breakthroughs open up new markets (foreign or 
domestic), resulting in a process of: ‘industrial mutation…[which] incessantly 
revolutionises the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, 
incessantly creating a new one’ (Schumpeter, 1943, p.73). 
Underpinning this concept is the: 
‘fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion [and] 
comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or 
transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organisation that 
capitalist enterprise creates’ (Schumpeter, 1943, p.73). 
Schumpeter described how the competition which really counts in capitalism is that 
from the new commodity, the new source of supply, and the new type organisation, 
rather than the competition in terms of organisational profits and existing outputs.  
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That is: 
 ‘…competitions which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and 
which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing 
firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as 
much more effective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with 
forcing a door’ (Schumpeter, 1943, p.74). 
In order for many businesses to increase the longevity of their technology base they 
restrict output to conserve their established position in the market, and maximise 
profits. Use of legislation or intellectual property provide examples of how output is 
potentially restricted. However, gales of creative destruction considerably reduce their 
long-run scope and practices designed to increase longevity. 
2.1.3.2 Foster: S-Curves 
The next evolution in the theorisation of disruptive innovation came from the work of 
Foster (1986). Foster developed his theory of ‘S-curves’ from a survey of 250 R&D 
Vice Presidents spanning a range of industries over a number of years. His study was 
part of a research exercise at a leading management consultancy (namely, McKinsey). 
Where it lacked methodological rigor (i.e. there was no detailed description of the 
methodology in the text to reinforce the findings), it made up for in an empirically 
grounded discussion of how attacking organisations (attackers) can disrupt incumbent 
organisations (defenders) with new technologies. Moreover, a number of strategies 
that are deployed by both attacker and defender firms were discussed. One of the main 
contributions of Foster’s work to the EDT literature is the concept of S-Curves as a 
tool for forecasting a company’s technology for benchmarking purposes. 
S-Curves are graphs ‘…of the relationship between the effort put into improving a 
product or process and the results one gets back for that investment’ (Foster, 1986, 
p.51). Put simply, S-Curves plot the parameters of a technology over time; this allows 
one to see if they are in decline, or if there is s large amount of incremental innovation 
left. In his book he describes how: 
‘it is essential to keep an eye on the limits (and parameters) of technologies, 
processes and machines – i.e. which ones will become obsolete?’… In the world 
of business' limits determine which technologies, which machines and which 
processes are about to become obsolete. They are the reason why products 
eventually stop making money for companies’ (Foster, 1986, p.51). 
27 
 
This highlights the importance of tools or processes (such as S-Curves) which allow 
organisations to keep an eye on the technological terrain before new ‘gales of creative 
destruction’ take them by surprise. The S-Curve concept helps to visualise 
Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction by focussing on parameters in relation to 
specific technologies.  
It should also be noted that authors such as Benkenstein and Bloch (1993) do highlight 
issues with the potential simplification of S-curves, in relation to the sole focus on one 
technology. Benkenstein and Bloch (1993) make the point that in reality systems can 
be made up of a  number of technologies, in which case it is important to look at the 
technological advances in the interrelated  fields. 
2.1.3.3 Abernathy and Clark: Winds of Creative Destruction 
Abernathy and Clark (1985) added to the theorisation of disruptive technology 
through their classification of innovations according to how radical they are compared 
to current technology. Continuous improvements are often characterised as 
'incremental' or 'marginal' innovations as opposed to 'radical' innovations (e.g. 
introduction of totally new type of machinery) or 'technological revolutions' 
(consisting of a cluster of innovation that together may have a very far-reaching 
impact). 
Building on this scheme of classification, Abernathy and Clarke further added to the 
literature by producing a framework for analysing the competitive implications of 
innovation (1985). They based their framework on the theory of ‘transilience’; i.e. the 
capacity of an innovation to influence the established systems of production and 
marketing. This framework was used to categorise innovation into the following four 
types: 
1. Niche creation – opening new market opportunities through the use of existing 
technologies (conserve and strengthen established designs) 
2. Architectural – lays down the architecture of the industry 
3. Regular – Involves change that builds on established technical and productions 
competences and that is applied to existing markets and customers  
4. Revolutionary – Innovation that disrupts and renders established technical and 
procustion competence obsolete, yet is applied to existing markets and customers. 
(Source: summarised from Abernathy and Clark, 1985). 
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Parallels can be seen with the contemporary literature, where the category 
‘revolutionary’ grew in it importance and became known as ‘disruptive’ (see 
Christensen 1997, 2004; Danneels 2004, 2006). Schumpeter (1984) describes how the 
capitalist engine is kept in motion by ‘a history of revolutions’ (p.73). 
Abernathy and Clark’s work further demonstrated how innovation types could be 
plotted on a ‘transilience map’. They used examples from the US motor industry to 
demonstrate this. Essentially case examples were positioned in one of four quadrants 
representing the above four innovation types. 
Abernathy and Clark summarise one of their main contributions to the literature from 
this seminal paper as showing how ‘the categories of innovation are closely linked to 
different patterns of evolution and to different managerial environments’ (Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985, p.3). Each type of innovation imposes a different nature of change on 
a firm, and as such the successful pursuit of different kinds of innovation will require 
different kinds of organisational and managerial skills: ‘The transilience map may thus 
illuminate the managerial environments required to nurture innovation and technical 
progress in each node’ (Abernathy and Clark, 1985, p.20). They further describe how 
the climate for organisations developing such technologies must be one ‘that 
encourages a sense of competitive assault’…. [and]… ‘management must be capable 
of sustaining a consensus about long-term goals through investments in new 
technology and innovation’ (p.21). 
2.1.3.4 Anderson and Tushman: Technological Discontinuities & Dominant 
Designs 
Foster’s seminal text (1986) talked about the fourth era, called ‘management of 
discontinuities’; where organisations must be aware of the limits (technology limits), 
and prepare for when their technologies/ products will reach their limits, and how their 
products will change. Foster described how an understanding of the science and 
technology helps to gain the understanding of the limits. 
Anderson and Tushman (1990) introduce the term ‘technological discontinuities’ in 
relation to industry and how it evolves through technological cycles. They draw on 
Schumpeter’s theory by describing how at rare and irregular intervals in every 
industry, innovations appear that 'command a decisive cost or quality advantage and 
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that strike not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms, but at 
their very foundations and their very lives' (Schumpeter, 1942, p.84)'. Through the 
introduction of the term 'discontinuous' in relation to technological evolution, 
Anderson and Tushman added a new perspective to the evolving theory of disruptive 
technology. Furthermore, in their seminal paper (Anderson and Tushman, 1990) they 
introduced a cyclical model of technological change. This model is re-produced in 
figure 2.3, and describes the process following the emergence of a discontinuous 
technology. Anderson and Tushman (1990) introduced this model and tested it on 
longitudinal studies of technology across a number of industries, including the 
minicomputer industry, cement and glass industries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 – The Technology Cycle (Source: adapted from Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990, p.606) 
Figure 3.1 shows how a discontinuous technology first emerges in the technology 
cycle. This then triggers a period of change (or 'era of ferment'), as companies develop 
their own versions of at technology in search of market dominance. 'Several versions 
of the breakthrough technology appear, both because the technology is not well 
understood and because each pioneering firm has an incentive to differentiate its 
variate from rivals' (Anderson and Tushman, 1990, p.612). They describe how a 
dominant design then emerges. For variation and selection to cumulate in an 
evolutionary process, there must be a retention mechanism: a successful variation 
must be preserved and propogated (Campbell, 1969). Anderson and Tushman describe 
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how a dominant design marks the end of the era of change (or ferment), where a 
dominant design results as a '...single architecture that establishes dominance in a 
product class' (Anderson and Tushman, 1990, p.613). It is this single architecture 
which results in dominant designs as industry, manufacturers, suppliers, customers 
and regulatory agencies competing to decrease the uncertainty associated with 
variation during the era of change. lays the way for industry to reduce variation. This 
in turn enables competitors to introduce their own products, and an era of 'incremental 
change' then occurs, where the dominant designs are elaborated upon. Eventually this 
era is broken by as another technological discontinuity occurs, and the whole cycle 
begins again. This adds further detail to the evolutionary cycle introduced by 
Schumpeter (1943). 
In addition, Tushman and Anderson's work (1986) further characterised technological 
discontinuities as 'competence-enhancing' or 'competence destroying'. A competence 
destroying discontinuity 'renders obsolete the expertise required to master the 
technology that it replaces. A competence-enhancing discontinuity builds on know-
how embodied in the technology that it replaces. They provide sixteen examples of 
technological discontinuities in their study which are either competence-enhancing, or 
competence-destroying.  
2.1.4 Contemporary Theory on Disruptive Innovations (1990s and 
onwards) 
Christensen’s work has dominated the disruptive innovations literature since the 
1990s, as highlighted particularly well in Figure 3.2 (Source: Yu and Hang, 2010).  
Whilst this area has been led by Christensen, there: 
‘seems to be a lack of constructive criticism of the core concept of his theory, 
namely ‘disruptive technology,’ as well as its mechanisms and effects on firms 
and industries.’ (Danneels, 2004, p. 246). 
However, more recently, a number of authors have challenged this theory (Danneels, 
2004; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006; Markides, 2006; Tellis, 2006); in particular 
the explanation used for a disruptive technology is described as ‘ambiguous’ (Tellis, 
2006). The sampling for his empirical validation covered a wide range of product and 
technology types. Christensen used the scope and application of the term ‘disruptive’ 
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to portray anything from magnetic disk drives (Christensen, 1997) through to ‘Black 
and Decker’ power tools, Honda motorcycles and Canon copiers (Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003). Markides (2006) elucidates how these examples are not of disruptive 
technologies, rather, examples of ‘companies scaling up a niche market into a mass 
market’ (p.24). 
In order to address this confusion, Danneels (2004) suggests that a disruptive 
technology is ‘a technology that changes the basis of competition by changing the 
performance metrics along which firms compete’. Tellis (2006) goes further by 
proposing new terms to aid clarification of disruptive technologies (i.e. those which 
are platform innovations, technology innovations and component innovations). Box 
2.1 displays his interpretation of Christensen’s theory of disruptive innovation in a 
more comprehensible format.  
 
The MNT government intervention is concerned with developing manufacturing and 
engineering technologies and as such, this review concentrates predominantly on 
research undertaken within these fields. Examples previously explored in this 
literature relevant to the MNT field include; solid-state data transfer devices and 
computer memory, desktop printers, integrated circuits (Markides, 2006; Hung and 
Chu, 2006). 
 
 
1. A new disruptive technology initially underperforms the dominant one along the 
dimensions mainstream customers in major markets have historically valued. 
2. But the disruptive technology (a) has other features a few fringe (and generally new) 
customers value. Products based on disruptive technologies are typically (b) cheaper, 
(c) simpler, (d) smaller, or (e) more convenient than those established on the dominant 
technology. 
3. (a) The leading firms’ most profitable customers generally do not want and indeed 
initially cannot use products based on disruptive technologies. So (b) disruptive 
technologies are first commercialized in emerging or insignificant markets. (c) 
Incumbents conclude that investing in disruptive technologies is not a rational 
financial decision for them. 
4. The new disruptive technology (a) steadily improves in performance until (b) it meets 
the standards of performance demanded by the mainstream market. 
5. At that point, (a) the new (disruptive) technology displaces the dominant one and (b) 
the new entrant displaces the dominant incumbent(s) in the mainstream market. 
 
Box 2.1 – Key Points of Christensen’s Theory of Disruptive Innovation (Tellis, 2006) 
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2.2 Organisational Challenges 
An important theme addressed in the EDT literature addresses the challenges 
organisations encounter when developing such emerging technologies. 
In order to understand how the MNT government intervention has addressed such 
challenges or otherwise through its creation, it is important to firstly review existing 
work in this area. A number of organisational challenges/ difficulties relevant to the 
MNT case are discussed in the literature. These include: the need for an appropriate 
strategy or clear purpose; recommended strategies for EDTs; and resources, 
knowledge and ability to learn. 
2.2.1 Need for an Appropriate Strategy or Clear Purpose 
A number of authors make the point that there needs to be a continuous plan or long-
term strategy in place for an organisation to successfully develop disruptive 
technologies (Assink, 2006; Holmes and Glass, 2004; Palumbo, 2001; Cravens et al. 
2002). From a literature review examining the inhibitors of disruptive innovation, 
Assink (2006) describes how disruptive innovation should not be seen as one time 
effort. His review suggests that it requires a continuously developing absorptive 
capacity to improve the overall innovation capability of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990, are key exponents of absorptive capacity). Kaplan (1999) further describes how 
a long-term view is needed: ‘although the challenge is immense, this continuous 
innovation - and the ability to manage discontinuous change – is critical to the long-
term growth’ (Kaplan, 1999, p.17). Holmes and Glass (2004) describe how innovation 
is not ‘just a nice-to-do’, but also a real priority. They emphasise that great 
technology
1
 is the only thing that allows you to protect your profit margins. In the case 
of a National System of Innovation (NSI), the importance of technology as a driver for 
economic growth is also outlined (Woolley, 2008; Harvey, 2010). This focus on 
money and profit is echoed by Palumbo (2001) who purports that one way around this 
is to ‘monetize the technology’. In other words, make sure that the technology alone is 
not the goal. In terms of the MNT government intervention, one of the ways in which 
                                                          
1
 ‘Great’ technology refers to innovations resulting from an organisation’s research and development, 
which are successfully adopted by consumers. Examples of such successful technologies are provided 
by Holmes and Glass (2004) as that of Apple’s iTunes Music Store, supported by their iPod music 
player.  
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they tried to monetize the technology was the clear requirement for each centre to 
make revenue, and become self-sustaining. 
2.2.2 Recommended Strategies for Organisations Developing Disruptive 
Technologies 
Scholars within the EDT literature provide a number of recommendations for 
developing organisational strategies to make disruptive technologies successful. Due 
to the wide ranging nature of cases investigated in this area there are many different 
routes for success. One highly emphasised strategy is the need to couple an 
organisation’s technology effort with business factors early on in the new technology 
development process. Loutfy and Belkhir (2001) - describing the corporate innovation 
process at a large global OEM – maintain that the ideal point to do this is whilst the 
technology is in its infancy stages, and can be shaped by the emergent market needs. 
Such a tight coupling is almost always absent from dedicated corporate research 
centres and requires a strong partnership between research and business development 
professionals (Loutfy and Belkhir, 2001). Henderson (2006) adds to this, suggesting 
more emphasis should be placed on the role of market-facing competence in shaping a 
firm’s response to disruptive innovations. 
Kaplan identifies a framework to help organisations identify potential opportunities 
for developing discontinuous (i.e. disruptive) innovations. This framework is 
presented in table 2.1, and puts forwards a number of strategies; radical cannibalism; 
competitive displacement; market invention and industry genesis. Those of most 
relevance to the MNT government intervention are radical cannibalism and industry 
genesis. 
Radical cannibalism differs depending upon the organisation’s perspective. For 
example an organisation may choose to scale down certain technologies with a view 
to replace them with newer technologies. Alternatively there is competitive radical 
cannibalism which allows an organisation to offer new technologies/ offerings to 
customers and redefine the industry parameters. The latter is of more relevance to the 
MNT intervention through the creation of a number of MNT centres to develop new 
technologies for making the UK more competitive. Industry genesis is another 
strategy of relevance to organisations in the MNT government intervention. It 
describes the development of ‘new to the world’ technologies, which create their own 
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markets and offerings for users. This is the umbrella under which most scholars would 
place disruptive technologies. Industry genesis ‘is also the most challenging 
discontinuous innovation strategy – most are never able to do it.. remained theoretical 
rather than practical option for corporate strategists’ (Kaplan, 1999, p.19). Problems 
existing with this strategy include; the unknown nature of competition (it doesn’t exist 
yet, so one can only guess who future competitors may be); new forms of customers 
will emerge (those which may not value the technology currently, until it actually 
exists); markets are not definable. Herrmann et al. (2006) cast doubt over the 
significance of needing customer acceptance for the basis of new product design. 
‘Over the short-term, the required orientation of business actions towards the 
wishes of customers may be entirely correct. However, in the medium- to long-
term companies in the high-tech sector, in particular, run the risk of failing to 
notice relevant technological changes because customers cannot assess these or 
reject them at first glance’ (Herrmann et al. 2006 p.37). 
The impossibility of future prediction is also outlined by Paap and Kaatz (2004). 
However, they do suggest that preparing for it by focusing on the drivers of the 
technology is possible.  
Andries (2006) describes the ambiguity of business models when developing 
emerging technologies – and how traditional planning is not viable ‘we saw that a 
New Technology Business Venture (NTBV) cannot define the set of all relevant 
business models from the outset, owing to the presence of uncertainty and ambiguity. 
Changes to its original business model are thus needed as initially unavailable and 
unknown information becomes known’ (Andries, 2006, p.34). He suggests that 
adaptation in NTBVs is thus required despite environmental change. He adds that 
ventures have to search for their place in the environment, and sometimes even have 
to find the most appropriate environment. 
To overcome difficulties of uncertainty Kaplan (1999) suggests two strategies: firstly 
to miniaturise technologies, and secondly to combine functionalities of seemingly 
disparate technologies. The first of which aligns with the development of ‘micro’ and 
‘nano’ technologies – i.e. technologies enabling the creation of smaller devices. A 
very recent example is that of solid-state memory sticks (Universal Serial Bus – 
USBs). The second strategy - to combine functionalities of disparate technologies – 
refers to the creation of new methods of meeting combinations of customer needs, 
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which when satisfied together result in new business opportunities (Kaplan, 1999, 
p.20). A recent example is the development of Smart Phones, e.g. the Apple iPhone, 
or Google Nexus. An older example is that of the first scientific calculator combining 
integrated circuits and light emitting diodes. 
An alternative strategy is that suggested by Holmes and Glass (2004) which is to 
manage a portfolio of opportunities. Managing a portfolio of opportunities refers to 
the management of risk in order to optimize profits. In terms of emerging 
technologies, Holmes and Glass suggest that this relates to the considering of three 
dimensions: markets, time and source (2004, p.8). Market refers to the target 
customers; time defines the period over which the emerging innovations must be 
completed; and source refers to the need for investing in resources which add value to 
the market over a given time. The government can be viewed as having done this with 
the MNT intervention; market being the micro- and nano- technologies; time referring 
to the grant periods; and source in relation to the need for providing a route for UK 
companies to access MNT resources to add value to this market. 
Drew (2006) describes the use of scenario planning in order to identify disruptive 
technologies and map them out, building the appropriate paths and organisational 
capabilities for them. Other scholars such as Phaal et al. (2006) have described 
technology roadmapping tools to help develop new technology strategies successfully. 
Whether the MNT centres have used such tools as part of their innovation process, or 
strategy development will shed further light on this debated area, where one school of 
thought clearly believes forecasting is impossible (Paap and Kaatz, 2004), and others 
that it is manageable (Drew, 2006; Phaal et al. 2006). This disagreement in the 
literature further adds to the difficulties faced by policy makers when developing 
national systems of innovation based on disruptive technologies.  
Table 2.1 highlights a number of strategies described by Kaplan (1999) for developing 
disruptive innovations. The Industry Genesis category can be seen as particularly 
relevant to the need for the development of micro- and nano- technologies (referred to 
in DTI, 2002a).  
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Table 2.1 - Strategies for Developing Disruptive Innovations (Source: Kaplan, 
1999, p.19). 
Strategy Approach Focus 
Radical 
Cannibalism 
Hypothesize 
obsolescence 
What forces could lead to the demise of the 
business? 
Scan startups What emerging technologies could displace 
the current value you provide to the market? 
Competitive 
Displacement 
Elevate business 
charter 
What is the root end-user need that your 
business satisfies? 
Explore tangential 
industries 
How does the fundamental value you provide 
get satisfied within industries outside of your 
own? 
Market 
invention 
Expand customer 
boundaries 
If the entire world represented your customer 
base, how would you segment your markets 
and what needs could you satisfy within each 
segment? 
Identify systems What larger systems do your products operate 
within, and how might you incorporate a larger 
value set into your offering? 
Industry 
Genesis 
Miniaturize What value would your technology provide if 
it were 10-20 times smaller than it is today? 
Combine 
functionality 
What unique combinations of technology or 
functionality might provide a new form of 
value? 
2.2.3 Resources, Knowledge and the Ability to Learn 
The way resources are used in organisations and how organisations and its staff can 
learn new knowledge (known as absorptive capacity) is an important consideration for 
those developing EDTs (Assink, 2006; Herrmann et al. 2006). A thorough 
investigation into the effect that resource-based views have on the development of 
radical product innovations was carried out by Herrmann et al. in 2006. The term 
resource-based refers to the challenges which occur when actors are forced to use old-
technology investments when new technologies exist to develop radical product 
offerings. It is also tied in with the ability of an organisation and actors to discard old 
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knowledge and develop their learning capability toward newer technological offerings 
(Herrmann et al., 2006). In their paper they use pilot research to prepare surveys to 
senior managers from 53 companies, across a range of technologies (from software to 
image processing). 87 of the 109 managers surveyed responded. Their findings were 
subsequently considered more robust than a number of other research papers 
investigated in this sample of papers used for the EDT literature review
2
 (for example, 
papers by Hughes and Cosier, 2001; and Foster, 2000). Their results show that the 
willingness of those responsible to abandon existing knowledge (unlearn), collective 
experience and actual investments strongly determines radical product innovations. 
One of the main limitations they found was the focus of an organisation to abandon an 
investment – reiterated by the work of Assink (2006), and Tellis (2006). Assink 
suggests further barriers to innovation: organisational rigidity and the existence of 
dominant designs; the inability of organisations to unlearn; the attitude organisations 
take to risk (i.e. risk averse); and the management of the innovation process and a lack 
of infrastructure to push it through in time.  
In order to overcome barriers to radical product innovations, Herrmann et al. (2006) 
recommend that: 
‘a company should concentrate on power and technical promoters who, because 
of their technical and personal authority, are able to bring new product-ideas to 
fruition. Hence, it is necessary for top managers to allow corresponding 
personalities in the company, and to give necessary power to individual 
innovation managers’ (Herrmann et al., 2006, p.39). 
Loutfy and Belkhir describe how one global OEM used the equivalent of innovation 
managers for upfront selection (2001). Lee and Park (2006) further emphasised the 
need to look at stakeholders when investigating research and development linkages in 
a national innovation system: ‘the performance of an innovation system increasingly 
depends on the intensity and effectiveness of the interactions between the main actors 
involved in the generation and diffusion of knowledge’ (Lee and Park, 2006, p.1048). 
These observations introduce the notion of actors and roles into the EDT literature. 
The importance of actors and their role in the development of emerging technologies 
highlights a gap in the EDT literature. This gap is explored in this study, with the 
addition of theorisation from institutional theory. The Bridging Chapter describes how 
                                                          
2
 They were considered more robust because they had clear and justified research methods; 
unambiguous presentation of results based on a structured literature review; objective analysis of 
results; aware of limitations; and published in high impact factor journals. 
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the organisations developing emerging technologies are further understood (in the 
MNT intervention) through an institutional theory lens. This gap presented an 
important opportunity to further understand the roles of actors in the MNT case 
organisations, and how the aforementioned promoters are able to develop EDTs (or 
not). 
Lifelong learning of actors (employers and managers) is put forward as an important, 
but difficult to obtain requisite for innovation (Herrmann et al. 2006). Assink builds 
on this notion by describing disruptive innovation as more than just a one time effort 
that requires continuous development, and the need to develop absorptive capacity to 
improve the overall innovation capability of firms (Assink, 2006). 
Authors also describe the difficulties actors face when trying to gain access to 
physical resources (e.g. machines, equipment). Resources often have to be prioritised 
away from innovation to address short term gains; or business which trades the 
organisation’s future against more immediate but clearly needed gains (Loutfy & 
Belkhir, 2001; Dorrington, 2005). In order to make better use of capabilities, Cravens 
et al. (2002) suggest that management must make changes to the organisational 
structure, processes, and culture in order to maximise their long-run innovation 
success and overall business performance. This study investigates a wide range of 
contexts, and it is premised that use of resources may have an effect upon 
development of MNTs. For example, a commercial organisation may prioritise use of 
their emerging technologies differently from universities.  
2.3 Structured Responses to Challenges Faced when Developing 
EDTs 
A number of the challenges/ barriers faced when organisations develop disruptive 
technologies have been discussed above. This section will describe some of the ways 
in which organisations structure for and overcome these issues. 
2.3.1 Use of Key Gatekeepers 
Herrmann et al. (2006) through their analysis of senior managers across a range of 
innovation sectors, makes the case that the use of product champions led to a 
fundamental change in the organizations of nearly all of the companies he examined 
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(53 companies across six high technology sectors). He describes product champions as 
actors who are able to overcome barriers to disruptive technology development. He 
argues that they consist of two types; power promoters and technical promoters. The 
former are hierarchically positioned in an organisation to influence the organisation to 
apply sanctions against actors resisting innovation, whilst protecting those who are in 
favour of it. The latter actor – i.e. technical promoter – is able to drive forward an 
innovation process using their specific technical knowledge. For example, in the case 
of ‘SAP’ a global software specialist, a clear and sustained upgrading of the product 
management function was observed, i.e. the product management organisational unit 
was given greater significance, allowing the linking of research and development roles 
with responsibility (Herrmann et al., 2006). Other descriptions of such key roles 
include the term ‘gatekeepers’. Collins (2004) describes the use of gatekeepers to 
diffuse/ show the technologies from a large organisation’s laboratories as and when 
appropriate. He adds that improved disruptive innovation results from an increased 
amount of contact that R&D people are given, through mechanisms such as increased 
customer visits. 
2.3.2 Collaboration and Cross-linking of Departments 
Many authors refer to the need for collaborating both internally and externally when 
organising for emerging and disruptive technologies. A common finding is the 
importance of cross-linking departments in large global organisations from senior 
levels and below. Collins (2004) found that actors within a leading global company 
(Hewlett-Packard) use such a form of cross-linking of departments to ensure a high 
level of engagement with the technology teams throughout the business. Herrmann et 
al. (2006) go further by recommending that there should be organizational units such 
as product management which act at and across the business functions. 
Again focussing on the larger organisations
3
, researchers such as Kash and Rycroft 
(2003) talk of how ‘managing the innovation of complex technologies today is more 
about identifying and co-ordinating shifting bundles of resources held by multiple 
organisations, not always firms’ (Kash and Rycroft, 2003, p.29). They give examples 
of the need for cross-disciplinary actors to work together in a collaborative network. 
‘Managers of the innovation of complex technologies who do not appreciate that they 
                                                          
3
 A large number of the authors within the literature sampled used global organisations as their object 
of inquiry. 
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are managing networks not just their own organisation, operate at a great 
disadvantage’ (Ibidum, p. 30). Furthermore they suggest that systems are too complex 
for one person to understand/ master nowadays, therefore collaboration is needed. 
External collaborations are also discussed in the literature; Hemais et al. (2005) 
describe the case of foreign company joint ventures as one such way of structuring 
business. In their description of Brazilian polymer firms they describe how they form 
tripartite relationships to develop emerging technologies. However, they also report 
that this also means that the companies are dependent upon the decision-making of the 
international firms. 
2.3.3 Incumbents and the Need to Work with New Entrants 
Fagerberg et al. (2005) describe how ‘ever since Schumpeter associated the advent of 
revolutionary technologies with 'waves of creative destruction', there has been debate 
about the relative role of incumbent large firms and the new entrants in exploiting 
them’ (p.104); a number of these debates are now discussed. 
Linked to the notion of collaboration is the need expressed in the literature for 
incumbent firms to make links with smaller, entrant firms. Incumbent firms have the 
resources to serve their current markets; e.g. customer knowledge, sales and 
distribution changes, and brand and reputation. However they lack the ability to build 
the resources necessary to serve new markets (Danneels, 2006). Markides 
recommends that incumbent firms should not enter markets initially served by new 
technologies themselves, and rather they need to monitor these remote markets first, to 
assess how they might impact them. Incumbents should ‘create, sustain and nurture a 
network of feeder firms’ in order to achieve this (Markides, 2006, p.24). The premise 
is that the young entrepreneurial feeder firms are busy colonising new niches. The 
converse argument is also applied: that in order to carry out systematic innovation 
there is the need for new entrants to work in tandem with incumbents to gain entry. 
Entrants and incumbents can then create joint ventures which have the potential to 
reap major benefits (Dyerson and Pilkington, 2005). All of which leads to the question 
of ‘why do such emergent technologies represent such difficulties for incumbent firms 
with such bureaucratic structures?’ 
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Libaers et al. (2006) study the extent and intensity of the linkages between firms and 
university spin outs in the case of nano- technologies. The aim of their research was to 
further explore the process of technology transfer from Universities.  A university 
spin-out describes the process when a parent university transfers university-invented 
technology and expertise to another entity or to the market (Roberts, 1991). That is, 
they have been ‘spun-out’ from a university. This paper is particularly relevant to this 
study as a number of the venues selected for MNT centres are essentially spin-out 
organisations, in the sense that centres were created from existing research centres 
which were then developed into Limited companies.  
A number of findings of particular relevance to this investigation were reported by 
Libaers et al. (2006). Firstly, university spin-outs play an important but not dominant 
role in the development of nano-technology in the UK. In addition, their work 
describes how multinational companies and new technology-based firms are as, or 
even more important than spin-outs in the development of the nano- technology 
industry in the UK. Through the investigation of MNT centres from a range of venues, 
this study has the potential to add further to these findings. Particularly, considering 
that the UK state purposely established a number of centres on existing university 
facilities in order to ‘leverage’ existing facilities. The term ‘leverage’ is used to 
describe the idea that building on existing infrastructure will provide more economic 
gains than having to start from scratch. 
Through their qualitative examination of USO cases they discovered that a major 
disadvantage of developing emerging technologies in small firms was the added 
difficulty and resources they had to protect their intellectual property (IP). In fact, 
more often than not the firms under investigation revealed that secrecy and the 
development of tacit knowledge within the firm were seen as an alternative way to 
protect the IP that they created (Libaers et al. 2006). 
2.3.4 Incumbent Firms and Bureaucratic Structures 
Incumbent firms are large firms which have the resources to serve their current 
markets; e.g. customer knowledge, sales and distribution changes, and brand and 
reputation (Danneels, 2006). One might conclude that having access to more resources 
(including finance, manpower, etc.) provides a number of advantages to incumbents 
over small entrant firms for developing disruptive technologies. For example; greater 
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staying power; better equipped to develop complex, high quality and reliable products 
and services; relatively free from the distracting and exhausting funding game that 
new firms must deal with (Loutfy and Belkhir, 2001).  
In contrast to these views, other scholars describe how incumbent firms often lack the 
ability to build the resources necessary to serve new markets (Tellis, 2006; Assink 
2006; Danneels, 2006). Furthermore there is an argument that as a larger organisation 
they have to deal with the increased level of bureaucracy that comes with size. From 
his in-depth literature review, Assink (2006) suggests that this makes it difficult to 
challenge, provoke and engage in innovative activities. The MNT network has the 
potential to cast further results on this variation of views in the literature.  
2.3.5 Overcoming Bureaucratic Structures - Decoupling 
Corporate bureaucracy is one of the most frequent barriers to successful disruptive 
technologies within this literature review. Holmes and Glass (2004) provide examples 
of companies such as 3M, IBM and GE who understand that ‘new technologies often 
require creative business models’ which enable them to ‘empower their business units 
with autonomy and profit/loss responsibility’ similar to the way a start-up firm would. 
Therefore the natural approach appears to be disconnecting them from the 
bureaucratic structure of the parent organisation, so that they can adopt a more 
innovative/ entrepreneurial culture and reward structure. In the institutional theory 
literature this is called ‘decoupling’. It refers to the way in which organisations adapt 
to demands which are inconsistent or harmful to the organization, essentially to 
enhance their prospect of survival (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2010). In terms of the 
EDT literature scholars describe the physical creation of separate organisational units 
from larger host incumbents, in order to foster the development of disruptive 
innovations (Holmes and Glass, 2004; Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006; Danneels, 
2006). The development of disruptive innovations often requires new business models 
to unlock their value to the firm; ‘disconnecting innovation efforts from the corporate 
bureaucracy allows them to flourish and to adapt a more entrepreneurial spirit and 
reward structure’ (Holmes and Glass, 2004, p.10). In addition, the development of 
disruptive innovations may require new processes and routines, along with the 
creation of autonomous units which aid in breaking from current routines and 
processes (Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006). 
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In contrast, the realities of decoupling disruptive technology attempts from the larger 
bureaucratic firm environment does lead to other issues. Loutfy and Belkhir (2001) 
discuss some of the realities of developing independent companies in their analysis of 
12 cases within the Xerox Technology Enterprise (a corporate innovation process to 
commercialise new technologies). When venture capitalists were involved they 
discounted the technology greatly when calculating Xerox’s equity position and 
placed enormous premiums on the existence of a committed team that could deliver. 
Some of the new technologies described were incredibly promising, but there were 
issues of access to expensive infrastructure to overcome. Often equipment owned by 
other companies couldn’t be accessed, and to buy the equipment alone was not 
feasible. As such these technologies ended up being licensed out to the owners of such 
equipment. In other cases projects that were picked up internally often began well but 
then failed because of having to compete with larger projects for funding. For those 
technologies that were taken into independent organisations successfully, ‘unless a 
self-driven and passionate team is ready to dedicate itself completely to the project, 
the entire undertaking grows to nothing more than a stillborn entity. Creating a new 
business takes an inordinate amount of energy, dedication and personal sacrifice’ 
(Loutfy and Belkhir, 2001, p.16). In addition, they describe that teams who are just 
allocated to a project and may see it as their day job will not succeed. Libaers et al. 
(2006) add that small firms often find it expensive to file, defend, and monitor patents. 
Instead they often use secrecy or tacit knowledge (or first mover advantage) when 
developing disruptive innovations.   
2.3.6 Ways Incumbents can Overcome Issues of Bureaucracy and Structure 
Considering the large call from scholars for incumbents to decouple departments 
developing disruptive technologies, there still remain those who believe that ‘if they 
[incumbents] are able to create the kind of environment that will stimulate and 
nurture this wealth creating activity’ then success with emergent technologies in new 
markets is possible (Loutfy and Belkhir, 2001, p.27). Holmes and Glass (2004) ask the 
question ‘why do some incumbents succeed where others fail? They provide a list of 
potential reasons for this, the most relevant to this discussion being: 
 Disconnecting innovation efforts from the corporate bureaucracy allows them to 
flourish and to adapt a more entrepreneurial spirit and reward structure. New 
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technologies often require creative business models to unlock their value to the 
firm. 
 Interdisciplinary expertise required. 
 Strive for revolutionary inventions.  
 Consider IP as currency.  
 Innovation is not just a nice-to-do, but also a real priority. Great technology is the 
only thing that allows you to protect profit margins. 
 Internal profit sharing can help spark creativity in firms. 
Tellis (2006) proposes ‘leadership’ as the reason why some incumbents thrive and 
some fail. They agree that ‘new technologies can come from large incumbents 
championing new technologies’. Assink (2006) suggests that there are often 
infrastructure barriers, i.e. a lack of a means of pushing the innovation through in 
time. Hemais et al. (2005) found that the best companies within their sample that 
maintained their technological competitiveness were those who knew how to align 
their R&D processes with their current processes, and measure such alignment. 
2.4 Technology Origins of the Sample Literature 
The range of technologies observed within this literature sample suggests that the 
theory of disruptive technologies is considered by authors to be wide-ranging. This 
provides evidence for the argument presented by authors such as Danneels (2004) and 
Tellis (2006) who suggest that the theory is over-used, and sub-categories need to be 
defined. 
‘The term disruptive technology has been used disparately to apply to things such as; 
department stores, airlines, power tools, online businesses, and travel agents. A 
distinction needs to be made between ‘business model innovations’ and ‘technological 
innovations’. The similarities between the two have led some researchers to treat two 
types as one and the same’ Markides (2006). In fact, Danneels attempted to clarify 
this definition a few years earlier; ‘the core of the definition of a disruptive technology 
is this; a disruptive technology is a technology that changes the basis of competition 
by changing the performance metrics along which firms compete’ (Danneels, 2004).  
Christensen provided a response to a number of challenges to his original theory of 
disruptive innovation in his recent paper (Christensen, 2006). In this paper he asserts 
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that his theory has been applied to – and worked in- the following industries: 
‘hydraulic excavators, department stores, steel, computers, motorcycles, diabetes 
care, accounting software, motor controls, electric vehicles, education, and financial 
services’ (Christensen, 2006). However, he does provide the caveat that his theory can 
only be tested on a case by case basis. The literature within this study’s sample 
indicates that disruption theory would benefit from further categorisation; however, 
Christensen’s point is also noted that the extent to which they replace or add to the 
disruption theory, cannot yet be judged until deductive research is carried out. To be 
precise, Christensen is offering a challenge for any author to validate their claims with 
empirical research.  
Christensen’s original focus on low-cost, initially inferior products that attack an 
incumbent’s products from below has also been challenged by Utterback and Acee 
(2005), who make the point that not all disruptive innovations are ‘bottom up’ in their 
approach; many, for example calculators, are ‘top-down’. They purport that there 
should be a distinction between low-end (simple) disruptive technologies and high-
end ones (technologically more advanced). The addition of high-end technologies 
includes products such as calculators that were more expensive and complex than 
alternatives (i.e. slide rules) when they were first introduced; however, they were 
disruptive (reference to Utterback & Acee 2005, Table 1, p.8). Christensen has since 
acknowledged this in his paper of 2006. ‘For example, in about 2000 I realized that 
the phenomenon I previously had characterized simply as disruptive technology 
actually was comprised of two fundamentally different phenomena, which I 
characterized as low-end and new-market disruptions’ (described in Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003). 
Taking the above discussion of technology focus into account provides a useful 
platform on which to develop our understanding of technology in relation to the MNT 
government intervention under investigation. In order to understand how the MNT 
government intervention functions, and describe the existence of stakeholder values 
and the role of public interventions (i.e. RQ1), technology needs to be conceptualised 
in a way that it can be linked to the MNT organizations under investigation. The EDT 
literature described above generally follows the premise that technology is 
deterministic (Orlikowski, 1992); that is, it is objective and can independently 
influence human behaviour or organizational properties. While providing insight into 
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the often determining aspects of technology, this body of research largely ignores the 
action of humans in developing, appropriating, and changing technology. ‘As a 
consequence, this perspective furnishes an incomplete account of technology and its 
interactions with organizations’ Orlikowski, 1992, p. 400). This reinforces the need 
that this study addresses in terms of understanding the development of emerging 
technologies through an interactive process perspective. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter reviewed the literature concerning emerging and disruptive technologies 
(EDTs). The varied understanding of disruptive technologies in the literature has been 
discussed, along with the need to be more specific when selecting the products and/ or 
technologies under investigation.  
The main purpose of this review has been to understand the mechanisms used by 
organisations to manage the development of emerging technologies, and the 
challenges they have faced along the way.  
A gap has been highlighted for the investigation of organisations developing emerging 
technologies in relation to their specific contexts and in terms of the actors inhabiting 
them.  
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Chapter 3 - Systems of Innovation 
This chapter provides an overview of the systems of innovation (SI) approach, along 
with its relevance to this thesis. The concept of systems of innovation in general is 
introduced, along with the ways in which the boundaries of systems of innovation are 
addressed. This helps to locate the government intervention under investigation in the 
wider body of literature. The chapter begins with the SI concept in general terms, and 
then focuses on boundaries of SIs; including geographically (spatially), sectorally and in 
terms of activities.  
The chapter also discusses the way in which innovation systems are enacted through 
innovation policies, which of particular importance to this study, can lead to 
government interventions. 
3.1 Systems of Innovation 
Fagerberg (2005) highlights the systemic nature of innovation processes, and how firms 
do not normally innovate in isolation, but in collaboration and interdependence with 
other organisations. In other words they innovate as part of a wider ‘system of 
innovation’. 
‘Organisations’ may be other firms such as suppliers, customers and competitors. 
Alternatively, they may be organisations in the public sector such as universities, 
schools, and government ministries (Edquist, 2005, p.182). He describes how the 
behaviour of such organisations is shaped by institutions. He clarifies the terms 
‘organisations’ and ‘institutions’ as follows: 
 Organisations are seen as ‘formal structures that are consciously created and 
have an explicit purpose. They are players or actors’; 
 Institutions are ‘sets of common habits, norms, routines, established practices, 
rules, or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals, 
groups, and organisations. They are the rules of the game’.  
(Edquist, 2005, p.182). 
A system of innovation describes the determinants of innovation processes, that is: 
 ‘The important economic, social, political, organisational, institutional, and 
other factors that influence the development, diffusion, and use of innovations’ 
(Edquist, 1997, p.14).  
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Innovations refer to both product and process innovations within the SI theorisation. 
Products can be new or better material goods; process innovations are new ways of 
producing goods and services. Either may be technological or organisational.  
The SI approach has diffused broadly amongst the academic literature (see: Freeman, 
1987; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997; and Balzat and Hanusch, 2004). 
This approach has also been applied to policy frameworks used by regional authorities 
and national governments, as well as international organisations such as the European 
Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
(Edquist, 2005). 
3.2 Boundaries of Systems of Innovation 
The interactions which take place between organisations in system of innovation are 
bound at certain levels. For example, when they are within the borders of the nation 
state, then the term ‘national systems of innovation’ is used. 
Conway and Steward (2009) describe how the systems of innovation concept was 
originally adopted to analyse and understand systems of innovation at the national level, 
however ‘it has been increasingly employed in research and policymaking focused at 
the regional and sectoral levels’ (Conway and Steward, 2009, p.413).  
These boundaries are also referred to as spatial scales by researchers such as Fromhold-
Eisbith (2006). Identified levels within the extant literature include international, 
national, regional and sector levels. For example, Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones (2001) 
examine state firms and practices at a regional level, to understand how certain types of 
interest and activities are privileged. His focus in on the regional policies and how they 
have encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI). 
Another example is that of Woolley and Rottner (2008) who examine the 
implementation of policies at the state level related to nanotechnology, including a 
focus on entrepreneurs. His work tracks policy initiatives from 1985 to 2005 for 
nanotechnology. 
3.2.1 National Systems of Innovation 
A national system of innovation (NSI) is a subsystem of the national economy where 
various organisations and institutions interact and influence each other during the 
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process of innovative activity (Groenewegen and Steen, 2006). This is an important 
level to focus research on as most public policies influencing innovation processes or 
the economy as a whole are still designed and implemented at the national level 
(Edquist, 2005, p.199). 
It is about a systemic approach to innovation in which the interaction between 
technology, institutions, and organisations is central. ‘NIS thinking led to a structurally 
different view of how governments can stimulate the innovation performance of a 
country’ (Groenewegen and Steen, 2006, p.278). It moved away from the traditional 
linear way of thinking about innovation (i.e. thinking about the innovation process as a 
sequence of events), and emphasised a more holistic view on innovations. This view 
took into account the interactions and dependencies amongst the variety of actors; i.e. 
agents, organisations and institutions.  
3.2.2 Background of National Systems of Innovation 
In the early 1990s the NSI concept diffused more rapidly with the introduction of a 
number of seminal texts: firstly, ‘National Systems of Innovation: Towards a Theory of 
Innovation and Interactive Learning’ by Lundvall (1992); secondly, ‘National 
Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis’ by Nelson (1993). Both authors adopted 
different approaches to their investigations of NSIs; Lundvall’s (1992) book followed a 
more theoretical orientation than Nelson’s (1993) book, and was developed around 
themes, placing interactive learning, user-producer interaction and innovation at the 
centre of the analysis. On the other hand Nelson’s (1993) book focused on a ‘national’ 
approach rather than themes, and emphasised empirical case studies. His study spanned 
fifteen different nations and their associated innovation systems. The studies were 
selected in order to investigate different structures and focus. As such in comparison to 
Lundvall’s work, Nelson ‘advanced a more narrow approach, focusing on national 
R&D systems and organizations supporting R&D as the main source of innovation’ 
(Edquist and Hommen, 2008, p.5).  
More recently, authors such as Sharif (2006) have analysed the development and 
dissemination of the NSI concept through interviews with key advocates of the NSI 
concept, in order to understand how and why it has become so widespread in academic 
and policymaking circles. He describes the way in which the concept of NSI has come 
to mean different things to different people: 
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‘The practical application of the (National) Innovation Systems concept is 
embedded in social choices and negotiations about what counts as an innovation 
system, what should count as the delimiting criterion (whether on a national or 
some other scale), and how to draw borders. These social choices and 
negotiations are made each time the Innovation Systems concept is used, or 
developed further, by any individual or group depending on their location on the 
‘map’ of the larger field’ (Sharif, 2006, p.762).  
Considering Sharif’s observation that the NSI concept evolves, Niosi (2002) - on the 
other hand - does highlight how there is still a semantic core appearing in most of the 
definitions used. Conway and Steward reveal this semantic core (and variety) when they 
highlight a selection of definitions from key proponents of the NSI approach (Conway 
and Steward, 2009, p.418).  Of these, one of the most resonant for this study is that of 
Niosi et al.:  
‘A national system of innovation is the system of interacting private and public 
firms (either large or small), universities, and government agencies aiming at the 
production of science and technology within national borders. Interaction among 
these units may be technical, commercial, legal, social, and financial, in as much 
as the goals of the interaction is the development, protection, financing or 
regulation of new science and technology’ (Niosi et al. 1993, p.207). 
3.2.3 Benchmark National Systems of Innovation Models 
Groenewegen and Steen (2006) explain how many policy studies have tried to describe, 
understand and compare innovation processes of a country. One way in which they do 
this is to develop models of the innovation process. Figure 3.1 shows such a model 
developed by Bremer et al. (2001), cited in Groenewegen and Steen (2006, p. 279) 
which provides a useful conception of how a national system of innovation is made up. 
Polt et al. (2001) describe how this model is one of the dominant designs for 
comparative studies of national innovation systems. 
Figure 3.1 highlights the major building blocks of an NSI (in terms of creating practical 
policy). The key building blocks of this model include firms, universities, and other 
public research organisations. Together these organisations constitute the science and 
technology capabilities and knowledge fund of a country. 
The arrows in the diagram refer to the interactive learning and diffusion of knowledge 
amongst organisations. An essential building block shown at the top of figure 3.1 is that 
of ‘demand’, which refers to the level and quality of demand as an instigating factor for 
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a firm to innovation.  By their very nature, national systems of innovation often come 
into existence to address some form of demand, or ‘need’. 
Institutions are shown by the building blocks of ‘framework conditions’ and 
‘infrastructure’. These include: laws, policies, and regulations linked to science, 
technology and entrepreneurship. A broad range of policy issues are included in these, 
such as Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and economic instruments to stimulate 
mobility of labour between universities and firms. 
Groenewegen and Steen (2006) describe how benchmarking exercises of NSIs typically 
compare the indicators from such a dominant framework. They also explain that the 
figure demonstrates ‘…that in order to improve the innovation performance of a 
country, the NIS as a whole should be conducive for innovative activities in a country’ 
(Groenewegen and Steen, 2006, p.278).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – The Benchmark NIS Model (Source: Bremer et al. 2001, p.8). 
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3.2.4 Layered National Systems of Innovation Models 
Groenewegen and Steen (2006) draw attention to the need for a framework which 
allows for comparisons of NSIs along with their idiosyncrasies. They suggest 
connecting the levels which constitute the NSI model, and seeing it as an inter-
connected system of institutions and innovation patterns driven by the learning process 
of economic agents. They suggest conceptualising institutions first in hierarchical layers 
and then analysing the interactions between them. There are a number of advantages of 
adopting such a multi-level view in this research area. Fromhold-Eisbith builds on this 
in her 2006 paper, describing how systems at different spatial scales could be linked and 
co-ordinated for positive benefits.  
Fromhold-Eisbith (2006) further theorises the links between the international, national 
and regional levels, claiming that the three levels do not function independently of one 
another. They rely on each others’ strengths and specific system qualities in order to 
productively interact. This represents an important gap in the NSI literature; i.e. the 
need to investigate the different layers. Groenewegen and Steen (2006) explain how 
papers typically only look at the technology and firm level, and the national category is 
seen as a ‘leftover’. They suggest separating the layers that make up the NSI to see it as 
an inter-connected system of institutions and innovation patterns driven by the learning 
process of economic agents. 
Their research results in a potentially new framework for NSI policies to follow. 
Groenewegen and Steen (2006) propose the importance of viewing NSIs as a layered 
system and the need to investigate between layers. They suggest that existing theoretical 
contributions to NSI do not sufficiently conceptualise institutions or the dynamics of 
NSI over time. Therefore they propose the need to view NSIs as a layered system, with 
logics based on habits and routines. This is introduced as the ‘Layered Institutional 
model’, shown in figure 3.2. Groenewegen and Steen (2006) propose that this model 
overcomes the limits of copying other benchmark models such as Figure 3.1, which 
many policies do. They suggest that the dynamics of an NSI can be captured by 
analysing the interaction between levels/ layers, to provide more effective policy 
recommendations.  The fields of activity in this model are of differing importance to 
different countries, but all are useful to achieve systemic integration. 
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Groenewegen and Steen (2006) describe how there is a need for more precise 
theoretical analysis of how these innovation systems actually function and how they 
evolve over time. Using a number of observations from the literature they develop a 
layered institutional model, which is reproduced in Figure 3.2. In order for policies to be 
effective they suggest that there is a need to understand the layers and dynamics of an 
NSI, for future policy learning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 – Layered Institutional Model (Source: Groenewegen and Steen, 2006, 
p.279. Note: the dashed rectangles highlight a number of characteristics from this model 
which are also studied within this PhD).  
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economic agents. By separating these layers from the traditional benchmark NSI 
models, the institutional diversity in a system of innovation can be further understood. 
The first three layers make up the institutional environment. Layer 1 describes the 
informal institution (i.e. culture: values and norms) and technology.  
Layer 2 deals with the political system. Layer 3 refers to the formal rules of the game 
(laws, regulations, and policies). These can act to constrain or facilitate the development 
of innovation; e.g. regulations might come into force in one nation that require all new 
cars to be fitted with a new type of restraint for children using an emerging technology. 
This may lead to an increase in the development of restraint technology within one 
nation. 
Layer 4 shows the institutional arrangements (public and private organizations, 
contracts, and hybrids like networks).  Layer 5 displays creative, innovative learning 
that is embedded in habits and routines, which include strategic behaviour and the 
power base of actors, which can block innovative development, according to their 
existing interests or motivations. 
The arrows connecting the layers indicate how the higher layers not only constrain the 
lower ones but that lower layers within a certain range can influence higher ones. As 
such changes at one layer can reinforce one another, but also be conflicting. For 
example the culture, values and norms of an informal institution at layer 1 may 
influence/ shape the actions of an individual actor at layer 5. This is important because: 
‘These interdependencies are not universal but specific to national and sectoral 
systems’ (Groenewegen and Steen, 2006, p.284), and the benchmark models do not 
consider such interdependencies. 
To summarise, layered institutional models highlight the need for researchers and policy 
makers understand the institutional aspects of a system of innovation.  
3.2.5 Regional Systems of Innovation 
Scholars in this area of research believe it is important to define systems of innovation 
by pre-defined spatial/ geographical regions (see: Cooke et al. 1997; Oughton et al. 
2002; and Fleming et al. 2007). Conway and Steward (2009) describe how this research 
has built on work concerning the importance of ‘industrial districts’ and ‘regional 
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clusters’ (for example: Piore and Sable, 1984; and Rogers and Larson, 1984; 
respectively). They explain how such districts/ clusters are geographical concentrations 
of interconnected companies and associated institutions focused around a specialised 
area of economic activity. These include: end producers; universities; research 
laboratories; service providers; and a pool of highly skilled labour. 
Authors such as Asheim and Gertler describe how ‘the regional innovation system can 
be thought of as the institutional infrastructure supporting innovation within the 
production structure of a region’ (Asheim and Gertler, 2005, p. 299). They suggest that 
innovative activity is not a uniformly spread activity across the geographical landscape. 
Their research claims that the more knowledge-intensive the economic activity is, then 
the more geographically clustered it tends to be. For example, Silicon Valley in the 
USA  (in terms of information technology) and Motor Sport Valley in the UK (for 
racing car production). Authors such as Feldman conclude that the acquisition and 
transfer of knowledge from organisations in such close proximity adds to this 
geographic clustering: 
‘…knowledge spillovers from science-based activities are localised and 
contribute to higher rates of innovation, increased entrepreneurial activity and 
increased productivity within geographically bounded areas’ (Feldman, 1999, 
p.20). 
Conway and Steward (2009) describe how such processes are self-reinforcing, which in 
turn promotes the local accumulation of knowledge and expertise. 
However, Edquist points out that one of the drawbacks of using this type of boundary 
system is the question of which criteria should be used when identifying a ‘region’: 
‘For a regional SI, the specification of the boundaries should not only be a 
question of choosing or using administrative boundaries between regions in a 
mechanical manner (although this might be useful from the point of view of 
availability of data). IT should also be a mattter of choosing geographical areas 
for which the degree of ‘coherence’ or ‘inward orientation’ is high with regard to 
innovation processes’ (Edquist, 2005, p.199). 
The next section looks at bounding innovation systems from a sectoral perspective. 
3.2.6 Sectoral and Technological Innovation Systems 
Whereas levels of systems of innovation may be bound to regions or nations, sectoral 
and/or technological systems of innovation can navigate across geographical areas. 
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3.2.6.1 Sectoral Systems of Innovation   
This area of research looks at factors which affect innovation in ‘sectors’. One of the 
key advocates of the sectoral systems of innovation approach is Franco Malerba (2002). 
He defines a sectoral system of innovation as: 
‘a set of new and established products for specific uses and the set of agents 
carrying out market and non-market interactions for the creation, production, and 
sale of those products…[it] has a knowledge base, technologies, inputs… The 
agents composing the sectoral system are organizations and individuals… 
characterized by specific learning processes, competencies, beliefs, objectives, 
organizational structures and behaviours. They interact through processes of 
communication, exchange, cooperation, competition, and command, and their 
interactions are shaped by institutions (rules and regulations)’. (Malerba, 2002, 
p.250). 
Scholars in this area are interested in examining systems of innovation in sectoral areas 
(for example: Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Fri, 2003; Tether and Metcalfe, 2004; 
Malerba, 2005; Storz, 2008). They describe how innovation takes place in quite 
different sectoral environments, relating to different sources, actors and institutions. 
They recommend the investigation of systems at the sectoral level in order to 
understand and address ‘system failures’ of policies aimed at the innovation of specific 
sectors.  In particular: 
‘Sectoral analyses should focus on systemic features in relation to knowledge and 
boundaries, heterogeneity of actors and networks, institutions and transformation 
through coevolutionary processes. As a consequence, the understanding of these 
dimensions becomes a prerequisite for any policy addressed to a specific sector’ 
(Malerba, 2005, p.79-80). 
Major differences occur between different sectoral systems, and the affect that policies 
have may drastically differ across them. For example, the importance that networks 
have in relation to non-firm organisations (e.g. transfer agencies) varies from sector to 
sector. ‘Importantly, these sectoral differences imply that different policies are required 
to support and stimulate different sectors’ (Conway and Steward, 2009, p421). 
3.2.6.2 Technological Systems of Innovation 
This area of research is closely related to that of sectoral systems of innovation. Rather 
than looking at industrial innovation as a single national system, scholars in this area 
believe it is more useful to examine systems of innovation in several areas of 
technology (for example: Hughes, 1983; Carlsson and Jacobsson, 1994; Carlsson, 
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1995). They describe how causal connections between technological change and 
economic growth are poorly understood. They recommend a more dynamic approach in 
which technological change is viewed as taking place within the economic system, 
forming a base for industrial development and economic growth. That base is referred 
to here as the technological system. 
Researchers in the NSI field investigate innovation processes and the circumstances 
surrounding them, with a focus on institutions and actors (primarily in science and 
technology), as well as the role of technology policy at a national level. They are 
confined to a nation and its entities, and consider one system only. 
The technological system of innovation research is interested in what characteristics of 
an environment are making it conducive to technological innovation. As characteristics 
of technology systems vary considerably among various areas of technology (e.g. 
electronics, biotechnology, and nanotechnology), more than one system of innovation 
may be considered, and technological systems typically span multiple sectors 
Carlsson (1995) defines technological systems of innovation as: 
‘…consist[ing] of network(s) of agents interacting in a specific technology area 
under a particular institutional infrastructure for the purpose of generating, 
diffusing, and utilizing technology. Technological systems are defined in terms of 
knowledge or competence flows rather than flows of ordinary goods and services’ 
(Carlsson, 1995, p.7). 
In an earlier paper, Carlsson and Jacobsson describe how the main components of the 
technological system are: 1) the institutional infrastructure; 2) clustering of resources in 
the form of networks; 3) the economic competence of various agents (1994, p.236). 
Their study of technological systems and the diffusion of factory automation in Sweden 
led them to propose a number of conditions which would enable a functioning 
technology system (with rapid and extensive diffusion). These were: 
(1) a speedy and wide diffusion of basic engineering competence to all the 
components of the production system (large and small companies) which sets 
strict demands on the functioning of the educational system;  
(2) a mechanism for monitoring the technological  development globally where 
the emerging features of new production systems are identified at a very early 
stage; 
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(3) a well functioning communication system in industry (large and small 
companies) … In this communication system, we have underlined the role of well-
functioning bridging agents in the form of both collective research institutes… 
industry associations…and government agencies; 
(4) centres of excellence for the integration of the various technologies. These can 
be located in both supplier … and user companies … or even outside industry .. 
but the know-how produced in these centres must be accessible to the other actors 
in the industrial network. 
                  (Carllson and Jacobsson, 1994, pp.245-246) 
3.3 Innovation Policies 
Innovation systems are often enacted through innovation policies. This section discusses 
how innovation policies can be arranged into a number of initiatives which helps to 
make a distinction between types. The three types that are of relevance to this Thesis are 
‘science policy’, ‘technology policy’ and ‘innovation policy’. These are discussed in 
depth by Lundvall and Borras (2005), and are outlined below.  
3.3.1 Science Policy 
The emphasis of science policy is to allocate adequate resources to science, such that 
there is an effective spread of these resources between a range of suitable activities 
which contribute to social welfare. As such, science policies often focus on the quantity 
and quality of students and researchers. Scientific policies aim to achieve a mix of 
objectives, including national prestige and cultural values besides social, national 
security and economic objectives. 
Science policies are different from technology policies in that they need to cater for 
university scholars – who argue the importance of ‘freedom’ and ‘autonomy’ of 
academic research, i.e. that it is ‘value-free’. Weber (1948) describes how scientific 
communities have developed a certain outlook on the world which gives priority to 
‘scientific rationalities’ seeking value neutral, law-regulated knowledge often presented 
in the form of mathematical formulae or statistics (Weber, 1948). 
This argument is founded on the need to allow basic research to evolve, leading to new 
avenues for applied research and technical solutions. Lundvall and Burrás (2005) argue 
the importance that critical – impartial - science plays in modern democracy. That is, 
independent scientific knowledge allows important political decisions to be made in an 
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open, transparent and representative way. As such the economic impact of research 
flowing from such policies is likely to be less important than other types of policies (for 
example technology policies). 
The mechanisms used for science policy are generally based on budgetary decisions; i.e. 
the allocation of funds by governments to public research organizations, such as 
universities. In addition to this is the offering of subsidies for companies or tax relief 
(Lundvall and Burrás, 2005). 
3.3.2 Technology Policy 
The objectives of technology policy are not very different from those of science policy 
but – at least to begin with – it represented a shift from broader philosophical 
considerations to a more instrumental focus on national prestige and economic 
objectives. 
Technology policy typically emphasises science-based technologies as being the very 
core of economic growth. This can be seen in a number of recent UK government white 
papers, which innovation policies are built on: DTI, 2000a; DTI, 2000b; DTI, 2001; 
DTI, 2002; and Lambert, 2003. These are outlined further in table 5.1, chapter 5. Such 
policies are perceived to open up new commercial opportunities and typified by a high 
rate of innovation addressing rapidly growing markets. 
It is important to note that technology policies will differ depending upon whether a 
country is already an established ‘high-income’ country, or is a developing ‘catching 
up’ country. 
Technology policies typically define ‘strategic technologies’ and sometimes even the 
sectors producing them. Lundvall and Burrás (2005) state that one needs to be aware of 
a number of fundamental questions when developing technology policies, some of 
which are touched upon within this Thesis. 
 Is it legitimate and effective for the state to intervene for commercial reasons 
in promoting specific sectors or technologies? 
 What technologies should be supported? 
 At what stage should the support be given? 
 What limits should be set for public sector competence? 
 How can promoting a technology or sector best be combined with 
competition?                                             (Lundvall and Burrás, 2005, p.609) 
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Similar to science policies, technology policies focus on organisations such as 
universities, research institutions, technological institutes, and R&D laboratories. 
However, the departure from science policy is the progression from universities toward 
engineering (in terms of application); and from the internal organization of universities 
toward how they link to industry.  
3.3.3 Innovation Policy 
Innovation policy describes the broader policies which take into account the 
complexities of the real world and advanced capital economies. The main focus of 
innovation policy is on the creation of economic wealth and international competition. 
Lundvall and Borras (2005) present the relationship between science, technology and 
innovation policy in Figure 3.2. This figure indicates the elements of the innovation 
system still include universities, research institutions, technological institutes, and R&D 
laboratories.  
The main difference between innovation policy and science/ technology policy is that 
the focus of innovation policy shifts from the ‘micro’ university and technology sector 
view to the ‘macro’ focus of all parts of the economy that impact upon the innovation 
processes. Furthermore, innovation policy pays special attention to the institutional and 
organisational aspects of innovation systems; ‘Innovation policy calls for ‘opening the 
black box’ of the innovation process, understanding it as a social and complex process’ 
(Lundvall and Borrás, 2005, p.615). 
There are a number of recent UK innovation policies which link universities to 
companies in order to transfer technological knowledge and skills. Jones (2000) 
provides examples of recent policies: Firstly, the DTI’s Teaching Company Scheme 
(now ‘Knowledge Transfer Partnerships’); secondly ‘business links’; and lastly, the 
Carrier Technology Programme. All of which encouraged SMEs to improve their 
innovation capability. Typically these policies focus on the need to improve the 
competitiveness of rims operating in mature manufacturing sectors such as metal 
working, auto-components, and chemicals. As such they are unsurprisingly focused on 
technological innovation.  
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Figure 3.3 – Relationship between Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy 
(Lundvall and Borrás, 2005, p.615). 
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3.4 Government Interventions 
A national system of innovation ‘provides the framework within which governments 
form and implement policies to influence the innovation process’ (Metcalfe, 1997, 
p.289). Furthermore, ‘…we are increasingly seeing policy interventions aimed at 
directing, shaping, and influencing the configuration and activities of various systems of 
innovation, at the supranational, national, sectoral, and regional levels’ (Conway and 
Steward, 2009, p.415, emphasis added). These extracts emphasise how government (and 
policymakers) have the potential to intervene in a number of ways in terms of 
influencing the innovative capacity of organizations, regions, sectors, and the nation as 
a whole.  
Carllson and Jacobsson describe how the conventional prescription for dealing with 
market failure is government intervention (1994, p.242). 
Table 3.1 provides additional examples of how innovation policies address the ‘need for 
intervention’. Some relate particularly to government intervention, whereas others do 
not. A number of which are further illustrated. 
Table 3.1 – Examples of Different Types of Interventions 
Need for Intervention Example  
/level 
Develop economic competitiveness, using 
economic initiatives (i.e. programmes develop 
innovation or technology to improve economic 
status of area/ state) 
Harvey, 2010 
Analysis of how competition state plays out in 
stem cell science in Australia. 
/state 
Woolley and Rottner, 2008 
Empirically tests the relationship between 
innovation policy and new founded ventures in 
the US nanotechnology area 
/state 
Development of a specific sector of a nation 
 
Fri, 2003 
Survey of what has been learned from US 
government interventions for the energy 
systems sector 
/nation 
Develop a nation’s global competitiveness Casper, 2000 
Examination of the relative importance of 
national institutional frameworks as opposed 
to sector-specific policies common in 
Germany.  
Fri, 2003 
(as above) 
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Need for Intervention Example  
/level 
High-technology based economic growth 
(stimulate new industries from emerging 
technologies) 
Hung and Chu, 2004 
Investigation of Taiwanese examples of how 
policymakers can shape the development of 
emerging technologies in new industries. 
/nation 
Open method of co-ordination (OMC) 
For joined up thinking of policies across the 
EU nations (& to define targets). 
Kaiser and Prange, 2004 
Explains why the OMC method of co-
ordination has not gone very far in innovation 
policies across the EU. 
/international 
Regional development using Universities Charles, 2006 
Examines the ways in which universities 
engage with processes of regional 
development with a particular focus on 
innovation. Universities are labelled ‘civic 
institutions’. 
/regional 
Development of networks to achieve common 
innovation goals 
Rampersad et al., 2010 
Investigates the key factors leading to the 
effective management of innovation networks 
from a diverse perspective of actors. 
/network 
 
In her theoretical analysis of how the competition state plays out in stem cell science in 
Australia, Harvey (2010) describes the ‘competition state’. This refers to managing the 
innovation system such that opportunities for knowledge generation and 
commercialisation are maximised. She explains how states are – in theory at least – in a 
position to actively develop economic competitiveness. The inclusion of the term 
‘competition’ into this level description helps to clarify the reasoning behind this system 
of innovation.  
It is this reasoning of why systems of intervention are borne from policy which helps us 
as researchers to understand the interventions in more detail. Examples of how 
interventions are used for differing needs are shown in table 3.1. A number of these are 
now discussed in more detail. 
Of particular relevance to this PhD study are those interventions relating to high 
technology based economic growth policy interventions. One example from table 3.1 is 
that of Hung and Chu (2006). They describe the need in Taiwan to stimulate new 
industries from emerging technologies in order to stimulate successful high-tech based 
economic growth. They investigated how policymakers are able to shape the 
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development of emerging technologies, using examples from two case study industries; 
biochips and nanotechnology.  
Both sectors were developed through initiatives stemming from the Taiwan 
government’s Industrial Technology Research Institutes (ITRI). This institute was 
founded in 1973 as a non-profit R&D institute for national research. Its mission was to 
develop applied research with the aim ‘of accelerating industrial technology 
development in Taiwan to promote industrial growth and social well-being’ (Hung and 
Chu, 2006, p.106). In particular, ITRI provides services and technology transfer to small 
and medium sized companies. In 1999, the Biomedical Engineering Centre was created 
(BMEC) which concentrated on the Biochip area, helping early stage commercial 
research develop with teams made up of IP, marketing and legal experts. 
For the nanotechnology sector, the ITRI established the NanoTechnology Research 
Centre in 2002. This carried out R&D planning for scientific foundation, platform 
technology and applied technology research. As part of the nanotechnology 
development, the ‘Nano Train’ was set up along with the ‘NanoTechnology Labs’. 
Nano Train carried out symposia throughout Taiwan to discuss business opportunities. 
The Joint NanoTechnology Labs provided resources for domestic, industrial and 
academic research. Further collaborations were developed as part of the nanotechnology 
initiative. 
Drawing conclusions from these sector cases, they put forward three mechanisms to 
stimulate new industries from emerging technologies: firstly to encourage partnerships 
in the commercialization process; secondly to foster entrepreneurship and venture 
initiatives in the innovation system, and thirdly to sustain the commercialisation and 
new firm creation. They provide ‘open labs’ as space for joint technology-based 
activities between industry and researchers. It is worth noting that the 6 year plan in 
Taiwan was 21.5 Billion US dollars in comparison to the UK intervention of 90 Million 
UK Pounds. This clearly illustrates a large difference in terms of funding allocation to 
the MNT sector between different nations. 
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This difference may provide additional barriers to the resources available to the 
commercialisation of such technologies.  
‘Technology and innovation related policies can be thought of as a specific set of 
policies that aim to improve the ability of firms to compete by promoting 
technological improvements through the generation, diffusion and adoption or 
process, product and organizational technological changes’ (Bartzokas, 2001, 
p.13). 
 
Woolley and Rottner (2008) aim to provide an empirical test of the relationship between 
innovation policy and new ventures created at the US state level. They discuss 
economic initiatives, i.e. programmes to develop innovation or technology to improve 
economic status of area/ state. They discuss nanotechnology at the state-level, and his 
findings support the positive link between new firm formation and science and 
technology and economic initiatives. States with science, technology and economic 
initiatives had six times as many firms founded than those without. 
Furthermore ventures were seen to form earlier and more frequently when the state they 
are in had aligned innovation technology policies. Woolley and Rottner (2008) do 
however talk about the study being generalisable, but they have only looked at a number 
of variables, and issues of cultural differences and context are not referred to. 
Furthermore, the way they have used policy as a standard unit of analysis is 
questionable, as each policy is likely to differ vastly in each state. He also states that the 
relationship between innovation/ policy and entrepreneurship was overlooked until the 
1990s, which is clearly incorrect, as evidenced by examples in the literature discussed in 
the previous section. Therefore his findings are interpreted with caution. 
The notion of demand creation related to the technology and innovation policies is 
described by Fri (2003) as the only strategy that actually drives new technology into 
commercial use while providing the appropriate public good. However, he continues by 
saying that policies to create this demand are hard to achieve. He provides an alternative 
option for policy-makers: the development of technological options that would be useful 
if and when the demand finally emerges (Fri, 2003). The latter option is displayed in the 
UK MNT government intervention policy; i.e. it is extremely difficult to forecast the 
applications of an emerging technology such as MNTs, making demand creation 
difficult. Therefore by opting to develop a range of MNT options through a series of 
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MNT centres, then the hope is that the infrastructure is there when demand emerges. He 
adds: 
‘Policy intervention must either bring the costs/ risks of innovation into line with 
the available benefits, or must attach to the public benefit a value that gives the 
private sector an incentive to engage in the innovation process’ (Fri, 2003, p.66). 
It should be noted that although Fri’s paper provides some useful discussion points 
concerning demand creation and ways of overcoming the associated difficulties of such 
policies, it draws mainly from his personal experience and a number of historical 
examples. Further empirical evidence to reinforce his views (in terms of presenting the 
additional data that he has based his findings on) would benefit his work. 
The last example in table 3.1 highlights the development of networks to achieve 
common innovation goals; namely innovation networks. ‘Innovation networks are 
defined as a relatively loosely tied group of organizations that may comprise of 
members from government, university and industry continuously collaborating to 
achieve common intervention goals’ (Rampersad et al., 2010, p.794). The UK MNT 
government intervention was initially envisaged as an innovation network, to form a 
supply-chain for micro- and nano- technology development. This was overseen by the 
MNT Network, an organization led by Professor Hertz, which acted as a linking agent 
for the centres and potential customers alike. This facility was lost with the morphing of 
the DTI into the TSB. leaving a more loosely tied group of MNT centres, overseen by 
the TSB.  
However not everyone accepts the concept of NSI fully. According to Quere (2004), 
because there is no agreement on the role and frontiers of the institutional infrastructure 
supporting firms’ innovative behaviours at a country level, the NSI concept: 
‘appears very unclear and allows for a huge range of topics from the simplest 
requirements to firms’ innovation support, to the analysis of macro-institutions in 
their ability to provide suited incentives or resources to firms’ innovative 
behaviours’ (p.81).  
An important distinction is made by Quere (2004) who identifies the narrow versus 
broad definitions of NSI in the literature; that is, Nelson (1993) versus Lundvall (1992). 
He explains that NSI in a narrow sense refers to organizations and institutions involved 
in interactive learning at the firm level, e.g. R&D units or technology institutes with 
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academic actors. This is counter to the broad view where all components of the macro-
economic infrastructure influencing firms behaviours are considered.  
3.5 Inhabited Institutions in relation to National Systems of Innovation 
Taking a step back from the multiple views and categorisation of systems of innovation, 
the concept of inhabited institutions is useful to analyse a national system of innovation 
in either its local context or extra local context.  
Historically, organisational sociologists have not considered the local context of 
organisations, tending to consider the macro cultural logics of an institution instead 
(Hallet and Ventresca, 2006, p.213). The importance of how institutions are inhabited 
and how people do things together is discussed by Hallet and Ventresca (2006), with a 
need to develop research in this area. Their paper which discusses inhabited institutions 
describes – amongst other things – patterns of industrial bureaucracy; i.e. intellectual 
context, purpose and relevance. They describe how: 
‘Institutions are not inert categories of meaning; rather they are populated with 
people whose social interactions suffuse institutions with local force and 
significance’ (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006, p.213). 
By this, they are making reference to the importance of bringing people and their 
interactions into view. The work of Gouldner, in his book entitled Patterns of Industrial 
Bureaucracy  (1954) is discussed in detail. Of particular relevance to this study is the 
way in which this book captures how life is recognised as being embedded in obstinate 
social relations and contexts: Gouldner through the description of his case study, 
recognises the ‘local context’ that made up how the workers in the Gypsum Company 
viewed their work, and on the other had, the location of the Gypsum plant in the 
existing community relations, at what Gouldner termed the ‘extra local context’. 
(Gouldner, 1954). This theorisation is used during this PhD study; the MNT centres 
constitute the local context  within the MNT organisational field; and the wider MNT 
field (including state actors and cross-field actors) can be viewed as the extra local 
context. Through recognising the local negotiated orders that situate and define how the 
individuals within the MNT field view the world, it is presupposed that a deeper 
understanding of the UK intervention can be acquired. 
 
68 
3.6 Key Themes in the Systems of Innovation Literature 
On reading the systems of innovation literature, a number of key themes begin to 
emerge. Those most relevant to the topic of this thesis are now discussed. They provide 
a foundation to the question of what is it that the National Systems of Innovation theory 
can add to the investigation of a government intervention?  
3.6.1 Universities as Important Contexts for Systems of Innovation 
The focus of researchers on different levels of systems of innovations has already been 
discussed. In addition to this, there are a variety of organizational contexts which are 
also commonly investigated. One of the most common is that of universities, and how 
knowledge is transferred to and from local industry for the benefit of the economy.  
For example Charles (2006) examines some of the ways in which universities engage 
with regional development agencies focusing on innovation across Europe. In particular 
he looks at how regional systems of innovation engage universities, and how regulation 
and policy govern these engagements. Through the observation of a range of university 
systems of innovation across a number of European countries, he draws a number of 
findings. The system of innovation adopted is shown to be highly dependant upon the 
different national and regional contexts of each intervention. They are further affected 
by the different approaches to governance and innovation contexts within each 
university system. The central message he presents is that the university role needs to 
evolve out of these contexts and co-evolve with the regional innovation system itself. It 
is not just about the overall intervention programme – there are issues of regional fit 
too. This is an interesting conclusion, and perhaps brings into question the original 
focus of the UK MNT intervention which looked to create two or three main MNT 
centres (DTI, 2002). 
Whilst discussing university technology transfer and NSI, Feldman et al. (2006) 
describe how: 
‘many countries around the world are experimenting with new initiatives to 
promote technology transfer from universities, with varying results. The 
effectiveness of these initiatives and the degree to which these economies adapt is 
determined by the specific local context’ (Feldman et al., 2006, p.359). 
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The importance of transferring technological knowledge from universities to industry 
has been emphasised in UK government white papers over the last decade. Lambert’s 
review of business-university collaborations is a good example of such a paper 
(Lambert, 2003). Lambert explains that the main challenge for the UK in 2003 was not 
how to increase the supply of commercial ideas into business, but how to raise the 
overall level of demand by business for research from all sources. It proposed that new 
networks should be created among research-intensive businesses; along with 
suggestions that the government should look at ways of investing its support for 
business R&D to SMEs. Both of these proposals fit with the way the UK MNT 
government intervention moved from an initial conception of two large centres to the 
distributed model which aligns more with these proposals. One of the issues Lambert 
raised was the lack of clarity of intellectual property ownership (IP) in research 
collaborations. This problem was still an issue for the MNT centres created as part of 
the intervention investigated in this thesis. Problems with state-aid and use of equipment 
provided by the state for revenue generating activities appeared to be a hurdle for the 
model. 
Furthermore the Lambert review describes how ‘business is critical of what it sees as 
the slow-moving, bureaucratic and risk-averse style of university management.. [it] 
suggests ..the sector .. [should adopt] a voluntary code of governance.. to represent best 
practice across the sector’.  
The Lambert review provided support for the Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP), 
which is an example of a government intervention intended to shape part of the UK 
NIS. The purpose of the KTP programme is: 
‘to strengthen the competitiveness, wealth creation and economic performance of 
the UK by the enhancement of knowledge and skills and the stimulation of 
innovation through collaborative projects between business and the knowledge 
base’ (Regeneris Consulting, 2010, p.1, emphasis added). 
This is an example of how the UK government has developed a mechanism to increase 
competitiveness. Like the MNT government intervention, it is also overseen by the 
TSB. 
Academics have written extensively about KTPs which are ‘an important tool to help 
academics engage with business and a key vehicle to develop their understanding of 
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industry’ (Regeneris Consulting, 2010). Access is key to research, and the KTP 
structure is ideal for providing access to industrial data for academics. 
A recently commissioned government review of KTP states how ‘KTP has generated 
high levels of satisfaction amongst businesses, academics and associates. The impacts 
on business performance are significant. Although fairly diffuse, they appear to align 
reasonably well with firms’ motivations’ (Regeneris Consulting, 2010, p.ii). 
Furthermore the benefits from KTPs are not solely economic; feedback into academic 
teaching follows from knowledge gained during programmes, and new research themes 
emerge. 
3.6.2 Challenges to Systems of Innovation 
Of course not all systems of innovation run smoothly, and a number of authors have 
described some of the challenges faced. Harvey (2010) in her review of the emerging 
stem cell industry in Australia outlines some of the problems faced when a government 
tries to utilise innovation as a key to economic success: 
1. Innovation is a contested concept; the route to commercialisation is not clear-
cut. That is, hoping that the market will do the rest once a feasible idea has been 
developed. 
2. Successful innovation is not necessarily uniform across all industries, or indeed, 
all regions. A problem therefore arises with how to tailor policies for specific 
industries and regions. 
3. Evaluating the effectiveness of an innovation policy is by nature a complex 
process – innovation is flexible, adaptable and future-based. If the general 
philosophy behind the concept of innovation is the production of new and novel 
products and ideas, then in effect, a certain amount of unknowability exists in 
the innovation process itself. In other words, there are no guarantees that any 
new idea, product or process will have the desired market success. 
(Adapted from Harvey, 2010, p.76-77). 
The points that Harvey raises for the equally emerging stem cell industry in comparison 
to the micro- and nano- technology industry raise questions of how manageable such 
government intervention processes are? 
3.6.3 Foresight Activities 
Another prevalent theme which links to the systems of innovation literature is that of 
foresight tools, or roadmapping activities. Georghiou and Keenan (2006) describe 
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foresight activities as the expert workshops/ forecasting events which help to set 
priorities for future funding and technology and/or strategies. In their 2006 paper, they 
investigate what constitutes an appropriate evaluation strategy for national foresight 
activities, claiming that there is ‘no one-size-fits-all’ approach for evaluation. These are 
important activities which often include a range of field experts from academia, industry 
and public sector bodies. Phaal et al. (2006) describe how: 
‘a large number of approaches (‘tools’) have been developed by managers, 
consultants and academics to understand the practical and conceptual issues 
associated with the management of technology (see, for example, Gaynor, 1986; 
Twiss, 1992; Cotec, 1998). Such tools can take many forms, including matrices, 
grids, tables, graphs, checklists, taxonomies, lists and software, together with 
combinations of these forms’ (Phaal et al. 2006, p.336).  
Foresight activities are one way to involve experts from different fields in order to 
develop more effective policies. This is an interesting area in terms of planning for 
technology policies and/or strategies, however to maintain the focus of the Research 
Questions investigated in this PhD, it was decided not to pursue this. However such 
foresight activities clearly are of importance in setting up national systems of innovation 
that have potential to make a difference to the economy of the nation concerned. 
3.7 Gaps in the Systems of Innovation Literature 
Whilst carrying out the literature review for national systems of innovation, a number of 
important gaps and themes became apparent. A number of these have influenced this 
PhD research, and are now introduced. 
3.7.1 Importance of Effective Policy Initiatives 
The importance of policy initiatives in shaping the economy through innovation 
activities is outlined by Bartzokas (2001) in the following quotes: 
‘Policy initiatives have had a central role in the evolution of national science and 
technology capabilities, both in the development of underlying knowledge bases, 
and in the provision of the physical and knowledge infrastructures on which 
technological progress depends’ (Bartzokas, 2001, p.12). 
‘In a world increasingly characterized by high uncertainty, change, and 
innovation, stimulating new industries from emerging technologies is central to 
successful economic growth, employment, competition and sustainability’ (Hung 
and Chu, 2004, p.104). 
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However, even though this role is well understood, one of the key challenges for 
governments is in developing effective policy interventions for the innovation process 
that will create economic leverages (Harvey, 2010). In order to do this it is important to 
identify the appropriate conditions for intervention, which in turn requires a clear 
understanding of the obstacles that need to be overcome in order to make the policies 
effective (Fri, 2003). 
3.7.2 Limited Sample of Field Studies 
An important gap in the literature is the lack of detailed field studies of national systems 
of innovation. Many authors discuss NSI at a theoretical level, (Fromhold-Eisebith, 
2006; Quere, 2004; Groenewegen and Steen, 2006); others use historical cases (Consoli, 
2008; Hung and Chu, 2004); contemporary cases (Clarysse et al. 2007; Harvey, 2010; 
Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 2001; Kaiser, 2004); some present a narrative (Charles, 
2006; Fri, 2003); and others literature reviews (Casper, 2000).  
Of the contemporary extant literature reviewed for this chapter there appeared to be a 
gap for further detailed field study research. Only a handful used empirical methods 
(e.g. Rampersad et al. 2010; and Bartzokas, 2001).  
Furthermore, Quere describes the importance of the need for empirical field studies, due 
to the unavoidable differences which are apparent between SIs in different nations: 
‘The diversity of national systems of innovation largely results from the various 
types of interactions existing between national institutions and firms located in 
one specific country, which are an unavoidable inheritance from historical 
patterns. Consequently, learning from empirical observation is essential in 
assessing the adequacy of national institutional infrastructures in order to provide 
firms with appropriate incentives to favour innovation and economic growth’ 
(Quere, 2004, p.81).  
This PhD will therefore add to the NSI literature by investigating a contemporary UK 
government initiative in detail. The aim being a deeper understanding of the actual 
workings of such interventions, and the learning opportunities for the future. 
3.7.3 Evaluating Policies 
Authors such as Georghiou and Keenan (2006) highlight the need to evaluate policy 
instruments. A fundamental element is ‘asking why government needs to be taking 
action in an area. In the traditional framework of innovation policy an intervention 
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should be seen to be correcting a market failure such as asymmetric information, high 
uncertainty or inability to appropriate the benefits’ (Georghiou and Keenan, 2006, 
p.763). This is clearly an important area, however for the purposes of this thesis, the 
ongoing NSI is investigated, rather than the ex ante preparation work.  
3.7.4 Understanding the Levels of Systems of Innovation in more Detail 
The layered institutional model illustrated in figure 3.2 was developed by Groenewegen 
and Steen (2006) to further comprehend the layers and dynamics of systems of 
innovation for future policy learning. As well as differentiating between the institutional 
layers in this model, they described the NSI as ‘a socially embedded system ... [which 
was]...perceived as an interconnected system of institutions, and innovation patterns 
are driven by (interactive) learning processes of economic agents’ (p.280). The 
consideration of government interventions within a range of organisational contexts has 
the potential to provide fresh insights which consider the specific environments of 
organisations involved therein. 
Casper (2000) describes how: 
‘Static descriptions of existing institutional environments must be combined with 
micro-level accounts, tracing how firms, governments, and other actors within the 
economy experiment with, and at times re-configure, the institutional tool-kits at 
their disposal’ (Casper, 2000, p.911).  
3.8 Links to Institutional Theory 
‘National competitiveness requires the transformation of technological 
capabilities into actual economic profitability that largely depends on the socio-
institutional context into which those technological capabilities are embedded. As 
a consequence, economic growth also depends on institutional characteristics and 
not exclusively on access to scientific resources and technological capabilities’ 
(Quere, 2004, p.78). 
As per Quere’s above quotation, the success of a national system of innovation is not 
solely reliant upon having the correct access to scientific and technical resources and 
capabilities. An essential part of a NSI should consider the institutional characteristics 
associated with the intervention. A nation could have the most advanced technologies 
within a sector, but without the appropriate infrastructure and actors, they are highly 
unlikely to achieve their potential.  
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Findings such as Quere’s begin to highlight the importance of institutions for 
intervention policies, and starts to form a natural bridge to the institutional theory 
literature. 
3.8.1 Actors and Agents 
Further reading of the extant NSI literature also links national systems of innovation to 
the various actors in a nation who follow types of behaviours and relationships; or in 
institutional theory terms this describes logics. The actors are acted upon by institutions 
and policies within their nation that influence the generation, production, absorption, 
diffusion and use of innovation enhancing know-how. Feldman et al. describes how the 
systems of innovation approach: 
‘..shifts the focus away from single factors such as investments in basic research 
or commercialisation towards the degree of integration, or institutional fit, among 
the social and economic actors who comprise the knowledge and innovation 
system’ (Feldman et al., 2006, p.360). 
Consoli and Patrucco  (2008) describe how their work links up with empirical studies 
identifying that ‘innovation is a distributed process generated through interactions 
among heterogeneous agents’ (p.701). In their historical analysis of a coordinated 
innovation effort for the automotive industry in Italy, versus a public-sector coordinated 
health product intervention in the UK, they argue a number of points. Firstly they 
discover that ‘technological change is a collective process generated by the 
coordination of dispersed capabilities across a variety of agents’. This connects well 
with the literature on institutional logics, and in particular agency, embeddedness, and 
collective identities and identification, which will add more depth to this study. 
3.8.2 Institutional Levels 
Groenewegen and Steen (2006) introduce the idea of the NSI as a layered system with a 
specific logic based on habits and routines. Their reasoning for this is to move away 
from the notion that a nation can simply copy a successful example (benchmark) and 
implement it themselves. Their multi-layer perspective is adopted to capture the 
dynamics of an NSI by analysing the interaction between the different institutional 
levels, with an aim to make more effective policies. 
Conversely authors such as Fromhold-Eisebith (2007) do put forward a model for NSIs 
which they call the National Super System of Innovation (NSSI). This model argues 
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that the three main levels of systems of innovation, i.e. regional, national and 
international, need to be considered in a general model like the NSSI. However, they do 
ponder as to how the question of an NSSI oriented strategy could actually be 
implemented. 
In both of these cases there is a recognition that there are various levels in an NSI, and 
this fits well with the idea of institutional levels, discussed in the institutional theory 
chapter, which will be adopted in this research. 
3.8.3 Context 
The most commonly described context when reading about national systems of 
innovation appears to be that of the University. Following the logic that many NSIs are 
built from existing university expertise, or look to transfer knowledge from universities 
to industry, then this is not surprising. Charles (2006) examines some of the ways in 
which universities engage with processes or regional development with a particular 
focus on innovation. He concludes that there are no standard recipes or packages that 
universities can follow in their individual regional innovation systems: ‘Different 
universities in different national and regional contexts with different governances and 
different innovation contexts will need to adopt different combinations’ (Charles, 2006, 
p.128). He continues by emphasising the role of a university in a region needs to evolve 
out of its own context and evolve in partnership with the regional innovation system 
itself. 
This is an interesting idea, particularly when many national systems of innovation 
appear to be developed with the ‘nation’ in mind, rather than specific regions, and the 
reality of developing nuances for each region might be too complex. His work does 
focus on regional interventions though, so the findings should be taken in that context. 
By linking NSI theory with institutional theory the organizational contexts within NSIs 
can be viewed using a new theoretical lens. This will add to the systems of innovation 
theory literature. 
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3.9 Locating the MNT Government Intervention in relation to the 
Systems of Innovation and Innovation Policy Literature 
The MNT government intervention in this study is a key example of a technological 
policy intervention (i.e. government intervention) at the national level (i.e. in the UK). 
It is part of the wider Technology Strategy Board’s UK systemic innovation policy 
instrument (described by Conway and Steward, 2009, p. 423). As such this intervention 
is seen to result from a wider national system of innovation, but is itself not 
representative of a national system of innovation. It is understood as a government 
intervention resulting from a technological system of innovation approach, and 
technological policy. 
This definition follows the notion of technology policies as being focused on 
establishing capabilities and capacity to produce contemporary science-based 
technologies, as well applying them (Lundvall and Burrás, 2005). 
3.10 Summary 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the ‘systems of innovation’ (SI) approach 
theorised in research and employed in policymaking (Edquist, 1997; Feldman et al., 
2006). Additional ways in which the SI literature is bounded has been discussed; for 
example national, regional, sectoral and technological. Particular relevance to this study 
is the work on sectoral and technological systems of innovation (Malerba, 2002; 
Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1995, respectively). The ways in which innovation systems 
are enacted through innovation policies which in turn lead to government interventions 
has been introduced, and the location of the study topic within this body of literature has 
been clarified. 
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Chapter 4 – Bridging Literature 
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the theoretical perspectives considered for 
this PhD study. It then moves on to introduce the key theoretical lens – institutional 
theory – selected for this thesis. A number of more specific literatures are also included 
at the end of the chapter for completeness. 
4.1 Theoretical Perspectives 
A number of possible theoretical perspectives were considered for this PhD study, with 
the key theoretical lens being selected as that of institutional theory. Poole et al. (2000) 
describe the importance of deciding upon a good theory: ‘… because it provides a 
systematic way to understand complex phenomena in the real world’ (Poole et al. 2000, 
p.65). Before presenting institutional theory in detail as the theoretical perspective 
underpinning this research, it is important to introduce those theories which were not 
selected but can be linked to this research topic, along with those which influenced the 
theoretical perspective adopted. Those theories were process (innovation) theory and 
actor network theory (ANT). 
4.1.1 Process Theory 
Poole et al. (2000) describe how process theory can be used to gather data that indicates 
how a process unfolds over time: 
‘Some of this data could be in the form of quantitative measurements of key 
variables but other data would consist of detailed descriptions of the events that 
constituted change and development of the entity under study’ (Poole et al. 2000, 
p.12). 
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) describe how process theory uses the concept of process 
in a number of ways in organisational research: 
1. As a logic that explains a causal relationship between independent and dependent 
variables; 
2. As a category of concepts or variables that refer to actions of individuals or 
organizations; 
3. As a sequence of events that describe how things change over time; 
 
(Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) 
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One of the main advantages of considering a process theory approach to research is how 
it acknowledges the role of actors in development and change. Elements of process 
theory influenced the methodology of this thesis, particularly with regard to 
understanding the role actors play as part of the change process of the intervention, and 
how their ‘plans and choices are premised on goals or visions of what the final product 
will be’ Poole et al. 2000, p.32).  Process theory, in terms of ‘processual analysis’ 
contributes a further facet to this research; i.e. ‘to explore the dynamic qualities of 
human conduct and organisational life and to embed such dynamics over time in the 
various layers of context in which streams of activity occur’ (Pettigrew, 1997, p.347).  
However, the use of event sequences, coding of events, and longitudinal elements of 
process theory were not adopted. The implications of following such a prescriptive 
process theory approach would have meant that a large amount of access to 
organisations would have been required in order to gather the data on critical events and 
conjunctions of events required to explain change as part of the causality requirement of 
process theory. This would have incurred time and resources beyond the scope of PhD 
study. Furthermore, the author wanted to gain a deeper understanding of the organising 
principles driving the actors in a government intervention, which process theory is less 
equipped to deal with. The MIRP programme is an example of how process theory has 
been used to track the development of a wide variety of products and process innovation 
from concept to completion. 
4.1.2 Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
Actor network theory (ANT) is another theoretical perspective that can be linked to the 
topic investigated in this thesis. It relates to scientific and technological networks and 
examines how particular definitions or configurations of science and technology 
succeed over alternative conceptions. Actor network theory incorporates the concept of 
‘techno-economic systems’ (TENS) and the ‘social construction of technology’. 
Conway and Steward (2010) describe how this helps to provide useful insights into the 
way in which power and influence may shape the innovation process. 
Callon (1991) describes techno-economic systems theory as grouped around three main 
poles: 
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 the ‘scientific’ pole (where empirical knowledge is produced; comprising of 
universities and other independent research centres);  
 the ‘technical’ pole (where this empirical knowledge is used for prototyping, 
model-making and testing; comprising of technical laboratories, development 
engineers, scientists);  
 the ‘market’ pole (where users or consumers generate, express or seek to satisfy 
demands or needs). 
Callon (1992) further describes how different poles have different membership goals 
and procedures; i.e. ‘which may be mutually exclusive… however, arrangements and 
links are made between the members of different poles, so that the outputs of various 
activities are exchanged with the members of other poles’ (p.74). 
As such, actor network theory is built on the idea that: 
‘various actors participate collectively in the conception, development, 
production, distribution and diffusion of procedures for producing goods and 
services’ (Edwards, 2001, p.226).  
The primary contribution of ANT to the relationship between networks and innovation 
is to show that not only can networks facilitate innovation, but they also constrain it by 
determining the kind of innovations produced, their subsequent interpretation, and their 
final use (Callon, 2002). 
The more traditional network approaches try to understand actors (which includes 
organisations) and the relationships between them (for example: Ahuja, 2000; Alasoini, 
2001; Arndt, 2000; Birley, 1987). In contrast, ANT adds further emphasis on a 
‘contextual’ understanding in relation to actors and their relationships, rather than a 
‘structural’ one (Conway and Steward, 2010, p.80). Its focus is on ‘the way in which 
they [individuals] define and distribute roles, and mobilize or invent others to play 
these roles. Such roles may be social, political, technical, or bureaucratic’ (Law and 
Callon, 1988, p.225). As such, ANT highlights the dynamic and political nature of 
interactions between actors. 
Actor network theory as a theoretical perspective was not considered for use in this 
thesis, but has some links to the findings of the thesis. That is, the importance of the 
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interplay between agency and structure described by ANT has also been highlighted 
using institutional theory. 
A key factor in the decision not to pursue ANT as a theoretical lens for this study was 
the way in which it affords equivalent status to both ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ actors. It 
is unique in the sense that it treats artefacts and technologies, as well as people and 
organisations as members of a network (Callon 1998; Latour, 1987). For example, 
computers and other technological artefacts are considered as ‘intermediaries’ in the 
interactions between human actors (Conway and Steward, 2010).  
Callon (1991) purports that ‘artefacts are not the enigmatic and remote objects to which 
they are often reduced…’ (p.137). He continues by inferring that they provide links 
between the user and the roles that the user plays. For example a human might observe a 
screen and then click a computer mouse.  
This theorisation of artefacts as ‘ordering human beings around by playing with their 
bodies, their feelings or their moral reflexes’ (Callon, 1991, p.137) does not align with 
the author’s ontological and epistemological position, and as such was not adopted. 
4.2 Institutional Theory – an Overview 
This section presents a brief overview of the key ideas and themes within the 
institutional theory literature (IT). The selection and justification of institutional theory 
as the key theoretical lens for understanding and describing the MNT government 
intervention is provided. 
This remainder of the chapter also synthesises the different bodies of literature 
discussed in this thesis and how they relate to the MNT case discussed. 
Figure 4.1 has been created in an attempt to synthesise a number of the complex 
theoretical ideas from the IT literature into one diagram. 
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Figure 4.1 – Representation of Key Concepts within the Institutional Theory 
Literature 
This figure demonstrates how an organizational field is made up of a range of actors. 
These actors can be individuals, organizations or institutions. Actors follow a number of 
logics within the organizational field, called field logics. However, Greenwood et al. 
(2010) make an important point that institutional logics do not come from the 
organizational field: the organizational field is the level of analysis, it is a place where 
institutional logics are played out. Through a number of mechanisms such as 
embeddedness, or collective identities, institutional logics may be reshaped and 
customized in the organisational field. Institutional logics stem from the institutional 
orders of the inter-institutional system. Fields vary in the shapes they take; Reay and 
Hinings (2005) demonstrate major changes in the Alberta Healthcare Organizational 
Field after a government intervention.  
Contested and collaborative logics are enacted within an organizational field, as 
illustrated in Reay and Hinings (2005). For example they describe how the Physician 
actors collaborated with hospitals, peers, other health professionals, pharmaceutical 
companies and so on, in the original Alberta Healthcare Field, to organise patient care. 
As part of the new Alberta healthcare intervention, the key government actor attempted 
to move the organisational field from dominance of the medical professionalism logic to 
a new institutional logic, that of business-like healthcare (Reay and Hinings, 2005). This 
resulted in contested logics between the newly created Regional Health Authority 
(RHA) actors focussed on business-like measures such as quality, efficiency, and the 
redefining of ‘patients’ as ‘consumers’. Such measures were contested with the medical 
professional logics of the Consultants. 
Logics 
Actors Actors Actors 
Field 
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Scott introduced one of the main models in institutional theory called the ‘three 
institutional pillars’. He describes how he created this model to help progress 
theorisation in this area ‘by distinguishing among the several component elements and 
identifying their different underlying assumptions, mechanisms, and indicators’ (Scott, 
2001, p.51). He argued that this increased analysis helps ‘identify important underlying 
theoretical fault lines that transect the domain’ (Scott, 2001, p.51). The three pillars 
constitute: regulatory, normative and cultural-cognitive. 
Furthermore the comprehension of decoupling and legitimisation will add deeper 
insights into this PhD research. 
4.3 Viewing the MNT Government Intervention through an 
Institutional Theory Lens 
This section relates important concepts from institutional theory to my PhD research, 
and addresses how the MNT government intervention can be viewed through an 
institutional theory lens. In turn, this theorisation is intended to answer the higher level 
questions posed in Research Questions 1 and 2: 
Research Question 1 
 How do networks such as MNT function? 
Research Question 2 
 How can we describe stakeholder values and understanding in relation to the role of a 
nascent government intervention? 
This research is not just about seeing MNTs as a network for government intervention, 
it is about providing a theoretical lens to understand what is going on in that 
intervention. One of the aims of my research is to evolve Edwards (2000) proposition 
that the interactive process perspective is suitable for investigating innovation, and more 
importantly government interventions. The aim is to move closer to a common 
theorisation for government intervention. 
4.3.1 Introduction to the Institutional Theory Literature 
Institutional theory offers insights into the continuity and conformity of organizational 
practices. It is essentially the dominant approach to understanding organizations 
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(Greenwood et al. 2010). The importance of understanding previous literature is 
outlined by Scott: 
‘.. knowledge of what has gone before is vital to information. The ideas and 
insights of our predecessors provide the context for current efforts and the 
platform on which we necessarily craft our own contributions’ (Scott, 2001, p.47). 
 
The foundations of institutional theory are found in the late 1970s to early 1980s. The 
building blocks of IT include the following concepts: institution, institutional context, 
institutionalization, and isomorphism. Influential works from this time include: Meyer 
and Rowan (1977); Zucker (1977); Meyer and Rowan (1983); DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Tolbert and Zucker (1983), and Meyer and Scott (1983).  
During the 1980s to early 1990s researchers favoured four main areas of study: 
processual, cross-category, cross-national and means of transmission. In terms of 
understanding the MNT government intervention, the latter two categories are of 
relevance. 
Cross-category research relates to the MNT centres as it compares the state or non-
profit agencies and commercial organizations. In the early 1980s the majority of studies 
stayed true to Meyer and Rowan’s definition of ‘institutionalized organizations’ as those 
with weak market forces (Meyer and Rowan, 1977), and subsequently only researched 
non-profit organisations and governmental organizations. A recent example was the 
paper by Tracey et al. 2010, in which the authors address the question of how new 
organizational forms are created. They investigate the creation of a non-profit homeless 
organisation. One of their observations is that researching across categories remains an 
unsolved problem within IT; as such, this presents an opportunity for comparing state 
agencies and commercial organizations through the use of the MNT case. That is not to 
say that researchers did not include commercial organisations as institutions, they did 
toward the end of the 1980s. However, authors such as Zucker (1977) and Powell 
(1991) were among the first authors to call for examination of all types of organizations. 
Although this PhD is not researching across different countries there is the potential that 
due to the different organizational types involved in the government interventions, then 
there are likely to be a range of cultural values and beliefs. Cross-national refers to the 
approach whereby researchers hypothesised the difference in social values between 
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different countries and their associated use of organizational practices. Studies such as 
those carried out by Lincoln et al. (1981) investigated attitudes of United States and 
Japanese workers in 28 Japanese-owned organizations based in the US. Their results 
rejected the old myth: 
‘of classical theory that what happens within organizations or between them and 
their environments is always linked to performance goals..’. Instead they suggest 
an emerging view that ‘organizational phenomena are shaped by the cultural 
values and beliefs, as well as the institutional arrangements, of the populations in 
which they are embedded’ (Lincoln et al, 1981, p. 114). 
The different MNT centre environments are linked to the original DTI goal; how they 
are shaped by organizational practices will be comparable to the aforementioned works. 
One criticism of the study carried out by Lincoln et al. is that they compared Japanese 
companies ‘within’ the US, rather than in their native environment. This is recognised 
by Lincoln et al. who suggest that by doing so would have made it ‘extremely difficult to 
separate differences due to national origin from differences in the firms themselves’ 
(Lincoln et al. 1981, p.97). An advantage of the reviewing the MNT centres is that they 
are only based within the United Kingdom, however due to the different organizational 
types involved it will be interesting to see whether cultural values and beliefs vary. 
4.3.2 Institutional Isomorphism 
Isomorphism is an important concept in the area of institutional theory
1
. This concept 
was originally introduced by Meyer and Rowan who argued that many post industrial 
organizations do not reflect the actual demands of their work activities, rather they still 
reflect the myths of their institutional environments (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p.341). 
Put simply, this suggests that isomorphism was understood as the relationship between 
an organization and its institutional context. Nevertheless, isomorphism continues to be 
used to describe the tendency for all organizations to respond in the same way.  
                                                          
1
 Boxenbaum and Jonsson (2010) provide a detailed review of isomorphism along with diffusion and 
decoupling. They describe a central idea of isomorphism which is ‘that organizations conform to 
‘rationalized myths’ in society about what constitutes a proper organization’ (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 
2010, p.78). These myths appear as solutions to the problem of organizing, and later become rationalized 
(i.e. justified actions when they are believed to make up the proper solutions to these problems). With the 
increased conformance of organizations to these myths, they become more entrenched leading to 
institutional isomorphism. 
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DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed that this is partly due to institutionalized ideas 
which put pressure on organizations to adopt similar structures and forms, hence 
resulting in them becoming increasingly similar. The concept that organizations in a 
similar environment over time come to share their appearance was not new; Weber 
(1952) already talked of the ‘iron cage of rationality’ and how competitive forces in 
society put pressure on organizations to become similar in structure and action. The 
very nature of the MNT centres belonging to a range of institutions and variety of 
contexts brings in to question whether isomorphism is possible with such an 
intervention. However the ways in which the mechanisms of institutional isomorphic 
change can occur might shed some light on the differences between centres. These 
mechanisms were outlined by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and suggest ways in which 
change can occur to bring isomorphism about. 
1) coercive isomorphism - stems from political influence and the problem of 
legitimacy [i.e. demands of the state or other large actors to adopt specific 
structures or practices, or else face sanctions. They are not only by official order, 
but can result from resource dependences, e.g. demands to adopt specific 
practices to be eligible for state grants, e.g. requirements of ISO certification to 
become a supplier]; 
2) mimetic isomorphism - results from standard responses to uncertainty [this often 
leads organizations to imitate peers that are perceived as successful or influential];  
3) normative isomorphism – is associated with professionalization [pertain to what is 
widely considered a proper course of action or moral duty, e.g. when there are 
signals from the organizational environment that the adoption of a particular 
practice or structure is a correct moral choice]’. 
 
(Source: DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p.150. Additional comments from 
Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 2010, p.80, in square brackets). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) make the point that the above typology is analytic, i.e. the 
types, like Scott’s three pillars, are not always distinct. They give the example of how: 
‘External actors may induce an organization to conform to its peers by requiring 
it to perform a particular task and specifying the profession responsible for its 
performance…Yet, while the three types intermingle in empirical setting, they tend 
to derive from different conditions and may lead to different outcomes’ (p.150). 
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 It is premised that the external state/ public body actors of the MNT field are likely to 
try and induce conformance of actors as per DiMaggio and Powell’s example. However, 
in the case of the MNT government intervention, the way the technology centres derive 
from different conditions and lead to different outcomes (as per above quote) is very 
important. The effect of all three levels of the government intervention network 
researched will add to this discussion of ‘intermingling’. 
The three mechanisms of change can also be used when considering an organizational 
field; i.e. they can show where isomorphic pressures emanate from in the field. 
Regulative pressures – such as the state – may come from above, whereas mimetic and 
normative pressures often come from horizontally positioned peer organizations or 
groupings. 
4.3.3 Criticisms of Isomorphism 
Having introduced isomorphism it is important to also discuss the reality that 
organizations might not respond in the same way, i.e. heterogeneous behaviour. A 
number of studies during the 1980s showed that organizations were not in fact 
responding in a similar fashion to institutional processes. This complexity was further 
observed during the 1990s, often consisting of competing institutional demands; ‘there 
was this growing interest in why and how organizations interpret and respond 
differently to their contexts’ (Greenwood et al., 2010, p15). Research Question 3 of this 
PhD asks: 
‘How (& why) do the following aspects of an innovation process: purpose, 
process, people, collaborations, context and outcomes influence the 
function/purpose of a public innovation intervention?’ (Source: Author). 
 
Aspects of this research question will investigate the notion of whether isomorphism is 
applicable to the framing of the MNT centres. Prior to the analysis stage, the fact that 
there are numerous settings for each centre in differing institutions suggests that 
isomorphism is unlikely to prevail. This is in line with Fombrun’s observation that ‘If 
isomorphism obtains, how then are we to explain the apparent variety of organizations 
that nonetheless co-exist within industries?’ (Fombrun, 1989, p.439). Moreover, when 
considering institutional contexts, Meyer and Rowan (1977) recognised that 
organizations meet institutional contexts containing multiple and inconsistent myths that 
allow for multiple yet equally legitimate responses. Fligstein’s work also reinforces this. 
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Fligstein showed that complex organizations constitute arenas of struggle where groups 
compete for power and selectively appeal to institutional pressures to legitimate their 
claims (Fligstein, 1985). The notion that organizations would become aligned with their 
institutional contexts thus becomes contested. However, having presented both views 
there is the opportunity to see which holds true for MNT centres.  
4.3.4 Decoupling 
The concept of ‘decoupling’ is also linked to the research on institutional isomorphism. 
This concept can be seen as: 
‘a rational response to demands for organizational adaptation that are 
inconsistent or harmful to the organization; by decoupling, organizations achieve 
legitimacy through espoused action but remain efficient or consistent through 
actual action, which enhances their survival prospects’ (Boxenbaum and Jonsson, 
2010, p.81). 
A number of the institutions hosting the MNT centres can be viewed as having 
‘decoupled’ their MNT centres from the host institution/ organisation. For example a 
number of universities created separate research centres; one SME created a new 
decoupled business; and a number of centres established themselves on science parks. 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) proposed that formal structure can be, and often is, decoupled 
from production activities. A number of examples of large organizations using 
‘decoupling’ to develop new and emerging technologies have been presented in the 
literature review of emerging technologies. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) argued for 
the creation of separate organisational units that can foster disruptive innovations. They 
reinforce the idea that in order to develop disruptive innovations, new processes and 
routines may be required, and by creating autonomous units existing processes and 
routines can be broken. Assink (2006) describes how a traditional ‘command and 
control’ management style ‘makes it difficult to ‘challenge, provoke and engage in 
innovative activities’. Such management styles are typically associated with large 
organisations, hence the need for autonomous units (sometimes called ‘start-ups’). 
Markides asserts that incumbent firms should create, sustain and nurture a network of 
feeder firms, which are kept busy innovating and colonising new niches. Palumbo 
(2001) provides the example of how Kodak spend $100 million per year on image 
related start-up firms. 
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The above examples from the emerging technology literature provide a link into the 
institutional theory literature in terms of the decoupling argument. They add weight to 
the theoretical discussion within the IT literature, by providing empirical case examples. 
4.3.5 Institutions 
Similar to the comprehension of ‘isomorphism’, the understanding of ‘institutions’ has 
been problematic amongst IT scholars in recent years. Researchers took the term to 
represent cultural models, the state (or its policies). Some authors even avoided the term 
and referred to presumed institutional effects (Greenwood et al. 2010, p.14). Scott 
illustrates this describing how ‘institution’ had acquired new meanings ‘much like 
barnacles on a ship’s hull’ (Scott, 1995, p. xiv). In order to reduce the ambiguity in our 
understanding of institutions Scott introduced elements to underpin institutions, called 
‘Scott’s institutional pillars’. 
4.3.6 Scott’s Institutional Pillars 
Scott’s pillars were an extremely important development during the mid-1990s to 
develop our understanding of institutions further. They ‘have become one of the most-
cited contributions in the institutional literature’ (Greenwood et al., 2010, p.15). These 
elements or ‘pillars’ were identified and seen to compose institutions. The analogy of a 
pillar is used because social scientists see institutions as resting on these ‘pillars’. Each 
of these pillars is seen as a vital ingredient of institutions. Scott explains that ‘one 
possible approach would be to view all of these facets as contributing, in 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing ways, to a powerful social framework, one that 
encapsulates and exhibits the celebrated strength and resilience of these structures’ 
(Scott, 2001, p.51). The MNT field is made up of a number of institutions including; 
state institutions (e.g. non-departmental government bodies-NDGBs, universities, 
RDAs); private global organisations (e.g. OEMs); and SMEs. 
Scott describes his belief that more progress can be made ‘by distinguishing among the 
several component elements and identifying their different underlying assumptions, 
mechanisms, and indicators. By employing a more analytical approach to these 
arguments, we can identify important underlying theoretical fault lines that transect the 
domain’ (Scott, 2001, p.51). Table 4.1 displays a summary of the three pillars of 
institutions: 
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Table 4.1 – Scott’s Three Pillars of Institutions (Source: Scott, 2001, p.52) 
 Pillar 
 Regulative Normative  Cultural-Cognitive 
Basis of compliance Expedience Social obligation Taken-for-grantedness 
Shared understanding 
Basis of order Regulative rules Binding expectation Constitutive schema 
Mechanisms Coercive Normative Mimetic 
Logic Instrumentality Appropriateness Orthodoxy 
Indicators Rules 
Laws 
Sanctions 
Certification 
Accreditation 
Common beliefs 
Shared logics of action 
 
Basis of legitimacy Legally sanctioned Morally governed Comprehensible 
Recognizable 
Culturally supported 
 
The first pillar is the regulative pillar; the second pillar is the normative pillar, and the 
third pillar is the cultural-cognitive pillar. 
The regulative pillar describes how ‘institutions constrain and regularize behaviour’ 
(Scott, 2001, p.51). The NDGBs overseeing the MNT government intervention (DTI 
initially, then TSB) fit within this regulative pillar. Those theorists who subscribe to this 
pillar give prominence to explicit regulatory processes: rule setting, monitoring, and 
sanctioning activities. 
‘In this conception, regulatory processes involve the capacity to establish rules, 
inspect others’ conformity to them, and, as necessary, manipulate sanctions – 
rewards or punishments – in an attempt to influence future behaviour… may 
operate informally.. [e.g.] shaming or shunning activities, or .. highly formalized 
and assigned to specialized actors, such as the police and the courts’ (Scott, 2001, 
p.52).  
Specialized actors are seen as the TSB monitors and third-party consultants for the 
MNT intervention.  
Those seeing institutions as resting on the normative pillar place emphasis on normative 
rules. Normative rules are those: 
‘..that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into social 
life. Normative systems include both values and norms. Values are conceptions of 
the preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to 
which existing structures or behaviour can be compared and assessed. Norms 
specify how things should be done’ (p54-55). 
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Goals and objectives are defined for normative systems, along with appropriate ways to 
pursue them. The overall purpose (goals and objectives) of the MNT case are outlined 
in this thesis. Considering the range of institutions (contexts/structures) hosting the 
centres, it is conceivable that the normative rules will vary. Not all values and norms 
apply to all members of the institution; some apply only to certain actors or positions. 
Those which apply only to certain positions connote the idea of ‘roles’: 
‘conceptions of appropriate goals and activities for particular individuals or 
specified social positions… these.. are .. normative expectations.. of how the .. 
actors are supposed to behave.. the expectations are held by other salient actors 
in the situation and so are experienced by the focal actor as external pressures.’ 
(p.55). 
Roles align with and build upon the ‘people’ construct used in the MIRP programme; it 
adds an understanding of actors’ actions and agency rather than just taking a more 
descriptive look at the roles and activities they perform during the innovation process. 
Furthermore the MNT case offers an opportunity to investigate actors with backgrounds 
from a number of institutional settings. The unique nature of the MNT intervention 
brings together actors from different traditional institutions in a way that other 
government technology creation actions do not.  
The cultural-cognitive pillar stresses the ‘centrality of cultural-cognitive elements of 
institutions: the shared conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the 
frames through which meaning is made’ (p.57). Those viewing institutions through this 
pillar place importance on the mental processes of perception, memory, judgement and 
reasoning of human existence. Generally speaking this pillar postulates that what an 
actor does is influenced by their internal representation of their environment. 
Scott’s pillars have generally been used in a selective manner by researchers in this 
area, as displayed in Mizruchi and Fein’s (1999) review of types of isomorphism. This 
review examined the fate of DiMaggio and Powell’s key essay on institutional 
isomorphism within the preceding literature (refer to DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
authors coded up 26 sample papers citing DiMaggio and Powell’s paper according to 
the type of institutional isomorphism followed by the author, and discussed the 
significance of each. Although this paper does not refer directly to Scott’s institutional 
pillars, it nicely displays the focus on individual elements of institutions adopted by 
authors, and presents an opportunity to frame the MNT intervention using a number of 
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the pillars. In particular, the regulative and normative pillars are likely to be of 
relevance considering the varied institutions involved in the MNT field. 
Not all institutional theorists agreed with Scott’s presentation of the three institutional 
pillars. Hirsch (1997) interpreted Scott’s initial presentation of the three pillars (Scott, 
1995), by stating that: 
‘Scott .. clearly rejects the counterstrategy of seeking ways to ‘view each of these 
facets as contributing, in interdependent and mutually reinforcing ways, to a 
powerful social framework’. This decision to look for, focus on, and so emphasize 
the differences between perspectives is unfortunate…Each vertical institutional 
pillar, self-contained and isomorphic, is set up by Scott to address, account for, 
and explain actions and behavior [in or at a range of levels of analysis]’ Hirsch 
(1997, p.1709). Scott answers this criticism as follows: ‘Far from wishing to 
‘rule-out’ or ‘discourage inter-pillar communication’ or to make the ‘cross-
fertilization of ideas unusual and unlikely’, .. my intent in constructing this 
analytic scheme is to encourage and inform such efforts’ (Scott, 2001, p.70). 
The point we can take away from this debate is that Scott’s pillars are analytical, not 
finite. They are a way of understanding common types of institutions. 
4.3.7 Legitimacy (as agency) 
A more recent subject of examination within the area of institutional theory is that of 
legitimacy
2
. According to Greenwood et al. (2010) this approach is often accompanied 
with a more agentic approach; that is, a focus on individuals and their actions. An 
agentic approach fits well with the IPP approach; more importantly the IPP approach 
also recognises the link of agency with structure. As with many terms in the IT 
literature, there are many interpretations of legitimacy by theorists.  
One useful definition for the purpose of this PhD thesis is that of Meyer and Scott 
(1983): 
 ‘…organizational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an 
organization – the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts 
provide explanations for its existence, functioning, and jurisdiction, and lack or 
deny alternatives … A completely legitimate organization would be one about 
which no question could be raised. [Every goal, mean, resource, and control 
system is necessary, specified, complete, and without alternative]. Perfect 
legitimation is perfect theory, complete (i.e., without uncertainty) and confronted 
by no alternatives’ (Meyer and Scott, 1983, p. 201, underlining added). 
                                                          
2
 Studies from authors such as Deephouse and Suchman (2010) provide a thorough review of legitimacy 
in organizational institutionalism. 
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The complexity of the relationship between legitimacy and performance has been 
demonstrated by authors such as Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002). The perceived 
legitimacy of each MNT centre by their actors and other field stakeholders is likely to 
have a bearing on how successful they are in developing micro- and nano- technologies 
to benefit the UK economy. Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) carried out a review of the 
impact of legitimacy on new ventures as well as sources of legitimacy for new ventures. 
They describe how the literature had previously focused on maintaining and repairing 
legitimacy in established organizations. Through the discussion of new ventures they 
describe how the complexity of the relationship between legitimacy and performance 
was demonstrated. Furthermore, they argue a number of points: (1) legitimacy is an 
important resource for gaining other resources; (2) such resources are crucial for new 
venture growth; and (3) legitimacy can be enhanced by the strategic actions of new 
ventures.  
4.3.8 Role of Legitimacy 
Scott’s institutional pillars framework is also considered by Zimmerman and Zeitz as a 
similar framework from which legitimacy can be derived. They offer an additional 
element to the framework, i.e. industry as a source of legitimacy. They purport that a 
new venture can use the industry’s standards, norms, practices, and technology; the past 
actions of industry members, and so forth to acquire legitimacy. When considering a 
very new industry, they describe the difficulties associated with it gaining legitimacy: 
‘A very new industry, however, may provide its component organizations little 
legitimacy, because the industry has little history, no established standards, 
strange or unacceptable norms, and novel practices… The new venture in a new 
industry must work even harder to establish its own legitimacy, for there is little 
knowledge about the industry, there are few recognized industry members, and 
there may be uncertainty as to the industry’s survival’ (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 
2002, p.421).   
 
The MNT centres examined in this study are typically small in nature, with a few 
exceptions. The above quote from Zimmerman and Zeitz is particularly relevant when 
we consider how they are part of the new micro- and nano- technology industry, which 
has no established standards/ norms, and follow novel practices. The paradox is that the 
government intervention was created in order to develop this industry in the UK, 
however one of the barriers is the newness of this industry, and the expense associated 
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with capital equipment and developing novel practices. Furthermore the legitimacy of 
each host will have a bearing on how well the centres establish themselves. Legitimacy 
is therefore an important component of the individual MNT centres researched in this 
study, along with the overall government intervention. In terms of the individual 
centres, legitimacy will be important for potential customers wishing to use the new 
technologies. The question of setting up open access MNT centres in a range of contexts 
will be investigated. Are there particular settings that add legitimacy for potential 
customers, and potential uptake of technologies, increasing the view of the new sector?  
The MNT case offers an opportunity to add to Zimmerman and Zeitz’s literature on 
legitimacy in smaller/ new ventures. 
Zimmerman and Zeitz put forward four strategies for acquiring  legitimacy: firstly, 
conformance as strategy; secondly selection; thirdly manipulation and lastly creation. 
More detail of these legitimation strategies are presented in Table 4.2. 
Underpinning Table 4.2 is Zimmerman and Zeitz’s proposition that ‘A new venture can 
take purposive action to increase visible consistency with the environment by 
conforming to, selecting, manipulating, and/or creating the environment in which it 
exists’ (p.426). Zimmerman and Zeitz present some very interesting propositions, 
however they do not back these up with empirical findings or data. This thesis presents 
the prospect of building on their theoretical take on legitimacy in newer ventures/ 
smaller organizations using the MNT case. 
Denrell (2003) adds to the legitimacy debate by suggesting that many empirical studies 
in the area only focus on successful examples of institutions and organisations. 
Basically Denrell (2003) argues that this is due to the economic process which means 
that unsuccessful firms are replaced by individuals and firms with good performance; 
resulting in a limited sample of firms for research, leading to an undersampling of 
failure. When carrying out my case selection for this study, I included where possible, 
those organisations which are suggestive of failure, or appear to be unsuccessful. This 
has the potential to remove some of the undersampling bias of the empirical data, and 
will add richer data to the plethora of successful examples in the literature. Denrell 
provides the following example: 
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‘Consider, for example, the advantages of outsiders and newcomers in the 
development of radical innovations. Suppose that newcomers and outsiders are, 
on average, less informed about the potential of alternative technologies. This 
implies that newcomers and outsiders will make less informed choices about the 
allocation of their R&D resources. Such uninformed choices usually lead to false 
starts. However, they may also lead the firms to do research in areas that few 
informed firms are investigating because these areas are correctly evaluated as 
having very low potential, and thus low expected returns. If such areas turn out to 
be promising, however, they may produce radical innovations. As a result of this 
mechanism, a large proportion of the most radical innovations may be developed 
by outsiders and newcomers. Thus, if most of the false starts produced by 
newcomers and outsiders cannot be observed, it is easy to come to the conclusion 
that newcomers and outsiders have an advantage in producing radical 
innovations’ (Denrell, 2003, p.236). 
 
Table 4.2 – Legitimation Strategies (Source: Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p.423) 
Strategy Definition Example 
Conformance Conformance involves ‘following the 
rules’. A new venture that conforms 
does not question, change, or violate 
the social structure. There is little 
room for strategic choice. 
Conformance is the least strategic of 
the four strategies and is often used 
by new ventures. 
Addressing regulations. A new 
venture conforms to the government 
regulations to which it is subject, 
such as when it registers with the 
SEC, as is required to publicly sell 
stock. 
Selection Selection involves locating in a 
favourable environment (Scott, 
1995). Selection is more strategic 
than conformance. 
Selecting where to locate a new 
venture. If the technology is new 
and/or unfamiliar, the new venture 
may seek to locate near ventures 
using related technology or engaging 
in related activities, such as software 
ventures locating in Silicon Valley. 
Manipulation Manipulation involves innovation 
and/or a substantial departure from 
prior practice. The innovator ‘must 
often intervene pre-emptively in the 
cultural environment in order to 
develop bases of support specifically 
tailored to the distinctive needs’ of 
the organization. Manipulation is 
more strategic than selection and is 
difficult for new ventures. 
Manipulating norms and values of 
society, such as changing the vale 
that a company publicly offering its 
stock should generate a profit at the 
time of initial offering. 
Creation Creation involves the creation of the 
social context – rules, norms, values, 
beliefs, models, etc. Creation is 
especially evident in the introductory 
stage of new industries. It is the most 
strategic of the four strategies. 
Creating new operating practices, 
models, and ideas, such as Amazon’s 
introduction of retailing books online 
to the mass market. 
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4.4 Institutional Logics and the MNT Government Intervention 
This section builds on a particular area of institutional theory called institutional logics
3
. 
Some of the fundamental concepts of institutional theory that allow the framing of the 
MNT government intervention originate from the area of institutional logics. These 
include: logics (at different levels); actors, action and agency; embedded agency; 
collective identities; classification and categorisation; field logics; and dominant field 
participants. They will allow us to understand, describe, and consider what is going on 
in this national system of innovation at a number of levels (individual, organizational, 
and field level). 
4.4.1 Introduction to Institutional Logics 
Institutional logics provide categories, beliefs and motives – i.e. organizing principles – 
that inform members of how to conduct themselves in the field (Delbridge and 
Edwards, 2007; Reay and Hinings, 2005). Institutional logics provide a way of 
understanding the MNT case which brings together a range of very different people. It 
allows conceptualisation of people in terms of actors, with different demands, relating to 
the actions of others. Different actors will follow multiple logics that allude to different 
organising principles, which in turn shape field-level behaviour (which also links to the 
aforementioned idea of legitimacy, but at an individual level). 
In order to comprehend individual and organizational behaviour Sage et al. (2010) 
suggest it must be located in a social and institutional context, and this institutional 
context both regularizes behaviour and provides opportunity for agency and change 
(pp.101-102). An institutional logic is why a particular social world works. Institutional 
logics include the socially constructed historical patterns of material practices, 
assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce 
their material substance, and organize time and space, and provide meaning to their 
                                                          
3
 Alford and Friedland originally introduced the notion of institutional logics (Alford and Friedland, 
1985) to describe contradictory practices and beliefs, which are an essential part of modern western 
societies. They identified three institutional orders, with different practices and beliefs: capitalism; 
bureaucracy and political democracy. In 1991 they developed these further (Friedland and Alford, 1991) 
to five institutional orders: capitalist market; bureaucratic state; families; democracy; and religion. Each 
has a central logic, which constrains both the means and ends of individual behaviour. These institutional 
orders are made up of three levels: individuals, organisations and society. They can constrain action, but 
also enable agency and change. 
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social reality (Thornton & Ocasio, 1991). 
4.4.2 Logics at Different Levels 
Institutional logics may develop at a variety of different levels (e.g. organization, 
markets, organizational fields, geographic communities). Society can be conceived as 
being made up of three levels: institutions (in contradictory and interdependency with 
one another); organisations (in conflict and co-ordination with one another); and 
individuals (in conflict and co-ordination with one another). Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) explain that rather than privileging one level over another, the institutional logics 
view suggests while individual action is embedded within institutions, institutions are 
socially constructed and therefore made up by the actions of individuals and 
organizations. In other words, this illustrates the importance of researchers adopting a 
cross level view within their research. This is critical in order to identify effects of 
mechanisms across levels of analysis which makes the theory more precise as well as 
more general.  However, there is a need to be clear at which level the analysis occurs: 
societal, organizations, markets/ industries, inter-organizational networks, and/or 
organizational fields. Actors from a range of levels constituting the MNT field are 
investigated for this research. The adoption of such a cross-network approach aims to 
add to empirical examples of cross-network research. 
4.4.3 Actors, Action and Agency  
Actors - The convention in social science publications is to refer to ‘actors’ rather than 
people and groups (Meyer, 2010). He adds how ‘in every social science field except 
anthropology.. ‘new’ institutionalist theorizing appeared, with models again envisioning 
people and groups as embedded in larger structures and cultures of one sort or another’ 
(Meyer, 2010, p.792).  
Actors interact continuously within a field, sometimes in antagonistic ways (Reay and 
Hinings, 2005, p.345). ‘Actors can hold different orientations although it is also likely 
that a given orientation will predominate in certain structural contexts’ (Delbridge and 
Edwards, 2007, p.200). Following the concept of actors allows us to ask questions such 
as ‘how might the key actors conceive the MNT government intervention?’ Actors 
conform to rules and resources, which are used to bring about action in everyday 
interactions. As established earlier, rules introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and 
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obligatory dimension into social life. Resources on the other hand are the facilities 
drawn upon by agents, organized as properties of social systems. The concept of actors 
is also referred to as ‘agents’ (i.e. actors who possess agency, or can bring about action). 
 A number of additional agents discussed in the literature and of particular relevance to 
the MNT field include: government agencies, management consultants (Ghoshal, 1988) 
and senior executives (Harrison, 1987
4
) in transmitting or communicating institutional 
values and beliefs. Harrison recommends the increased use of boards to develop a firm’s 
strategic interests. He argues that boards can help maintain legitimacy, and links the 
director to accountability in the increasing global environment. The use of committees 
in MNT centres will be observed in the research. They are likely to be of the monitoring 
type, and called ‘steering groups’. The role they play in strategy can add to this research 
in terms of smaller organizations. 
Meyer’s aforementioned definition of actors referring to people and groups embedded 
in larger structures and cultures of one sort or another will be used in this thesis to 
describe the individuals that constitute the MNT network. This includes a number of 
organizations and state institutions. In the main the term actors will be used to describe 
individuals, and organization for the MNT centres, or public-sector agencies. 
Action - Action reaffirms rules and resources. Someone performs an action when what 
s/he does can be described as intentional. ‘Actions are practical conclusions drawn from 
intentions and beliefs; ‘action’ and ‘rationality’ are interrelated… Social actions are 
always part of larger systems and of processes of intersubjective understanding, and 
this raises the question of the role of the acting subject (‘human agency’) in the 
processes by which actions are coordinated’ (Outhwaite, 2006, p.1). 
Agency - All actors possess some degree of agency. According to Scott (2001), agency 
is an actor’s ability to affect the social world. The level of agency varies among actors 
and among the types of social structure. Agency is carried out by altering rules or 
distribution of resources. According to Giddens, agency presumes a non-determinant, 
                                                          
4
 Whilst investigating senior executives, Harrison (1987) discusses the different types of board 
committees and their strategic use (or non-use). He introduces two types of committee: firstly the 
monitoring or oversight  committee. This protects shareholders by providing an objective, independent 
review of corporate affairs. Secondly, he describes the management support or operating committee, 
which advised management and the board on major business decisions (e.g. executive committees and 
finance committees). 
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voluntaristic theory of action (Giddens 1979). This means actors are able to intervene in 
the world or refrain from such interventions (with the effect of influencing specific 
process of affairs). Actors (also known as ‘agents’) have the ‘potential to choose actions 
deliberately and to carry them through effectively – even in defiance of established rules 
and prevailing powers’.  
4.4.4 Embedded Agency 
The concept of embedded agency arises from the difficulty of trying to isolate the 
impact of agency from other factors. Holm asks ‘How can actors change institutions if 
their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very institution they 
wish to change?’ (Holm, 1995, p.398). Through conceptualizing society as an inter-
institutional system (i.e. as existing  between institutions) DiMaggio (1988) outlines 
three ways that this question can be addressed; firstly via institutional entrepreneurs; 
secondly through structural overlap; and lastly the idea of competing logics. Due to the 
heterogeneity of organisations in the MNT field and emerging nature of the MNT sector 
it is premised that actors running such centres will display embedded agency to a lesser 
or greater extent. 
Institutional entrepreneurs - these are agents that can create new and modify old 
institutions because they have access to resources that support their self-interests 
(DiMaggio, 1988). Institutional entrepreneur-ship may also refer to the role that an 
organization plays in institutional change (Battilana, 2006). 
Structural overlap - occurs when individual roles and organizational structure and 
functions that were previously distinct are forced into association. Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) carried out research which found that elite organizations are more 
likely to come into contact with competing and contradictory logics because they bridge 
different organizational fields. The area of micro- and nano- technology is a specialist, 
‘elite’ area, that covers a wide-ranging area of technological applications. As such the 
emerging MNT field is likely to attract actors from a wide range of backgrounds. This 
fits with Greenwood and Suddaby’s (2006) argument that contact with institutional 
logics in multiple and different organizational fields increases the awareness of and 
experiences with contradictions in logics, which lowers constraints and embeddedness 
of actors and enables central actors to become institutional entrepreneurs. A number of 
MNT cases investigated are a hybrid of different institutional logics, and a certain 
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amount of structural overlap is presumed to exist. 
Competing institutional logics – ‘Competing logics are not, by themselves, an 
explanation for change in institutional logics, but an antecedent or a consequence… 
moreover competing logics can facilitate resistance to institutional change’ (Sage et al. 
2010, p117). They include mechanisms such as environmental selection, pressures, 
political contestation and social movements. Considering political contestation as one 
example, when the MNT government intervention was taken over by the TSB (from the 
DTI) a number of competing logics appear to have ensued. During pilot discussions 
concerning the use of the MNT intervention as the object of enquiry for this PhD, it was 
clear that new political contestations were already becoming apparent. The MNT 
Operations Manager described how many of the MNT centres were ‘pushing back’ at 
the increased levels of auditing. 
Dominant logics – Reay and Hinings describe how: 
‘studies of organizational field change that highlight institutional logics tend to 
associate a dominant or prevailing logic for the field with identifiable eras or 
equilibrium points over time’ (Reay and Hingings, 2005, p.354). 
They illustrate this during their study of institutional change within the Alberta 
healthcare system. They show that although the Alberta state try to enforce a business-
like logic as part of a radical government-led health reform, in reality the existing logic 
of medical professionalism continues to be an important logic in the field
5
. In addition, 
their research shows that although new dominant logics may arise as part of a change 
process, the previously dominant logic will continue to be an important factor in the 
field.  
4.4.5 Collective Identities and Identification 
This section asks the question of ‘how do logics shape individual and organizational 
action?’ Institutional logics can affect individuals and organizations through the idea of 
collective identities. In essence this describes the way that individuals can identify with 
collective identities of a group/ organization, industry or population
6
. As individuals 
                                                          
5
 Reay and Hinings (2005) could have used the term market logics rather than business-like logics in their 
paper, because essentially they are talking about the same type of logic, but introducing a new term that 
may add confusion. The market logic is already well defined in the institutional literature. 
6 Although Zilber (2006) draws our attention to the point that not all participants subscribe to one of these 
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identify with the collective identity of the social groups they belong to, they are likely to 
co-operate with the social group, by its norms and its prescriptions. As social groups 
they seek to protect the interests of the collective and its members against contending 
identities (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). As collective identities become institutionalized, 
they develop their own distinct institutional logic, and these logics prevail within the 
social group (Jackall, 1988). Examples include distinct logics such as ‘market’ logics 
and ‘professional’ logics. Through investigating actors from different societies with 
collective identities - e.g. emerging groups from the MNT field (professional 
academics, market-focused groups, and state-focused groups) – the findings from this 
work will add to a deeper level of understanding of each category. Ideologically, each 
collective identity would be striving to achieve the same purpose that the government 
intervention was set up to address. However, in reality this is not the case, and the 
institutional logics theorization will help to uncover this.  
This is particularly relevant for the MNT intervention, as in theory all of the MNT 
centres involved were set up for a common activity, along with the associated individual 
actors. This is not to say that they all follow a common activity, or purpose though. 
4.4.6 Classification and Categorisation 
Institutional logics help agents in organizations to classify social actors, organizational 
forms, products and organisational agendas. Changes in institutional logics lead to the 
creation of new categories (Sage et al., 2010, p.113) and to changes in meaning of 
existing categories. Categories are seen as a basic unit of cognition and are a necessary 
component of mindful, agentive behaviour. Put simply, categories show how actors 
mentally acquire knowledge through their thoughts, experience and senses. Unlike the 
terms ‘schemas’ and ‘scripts’ which imply mindless cognition of actors, ‘categories’ 
present thoughtful cognition. The actions of individuals cannot be divorced either from 
the activity of different individuals or from organizational structure from within which 
they operate; i.e., the structural, normative, and symbolic as necessary and 
complimentary dimensions of institutions.  
The institutional logic approach views any context as potentially influenced by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
categories alone, which can reveal different organising principles around a common activity. 
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contending logics of different societal sectors, e.g. in the Reay & Hinings (2005) study, 
the healthcare field in Alberta is shaped by institutional logics of the market, logics of 
the democratic state, and professional logics of medical care. Institutional logics are 
different depending upon whether you are looking at individuals and organizations, and 
which contexts are being observed, which markets / industries they belong to, and the 
population of these. For this PhD a common market is looked at: the emerging MNT 
network. Organisations and actors have been selected from this common market to add 
to the comparability of the findings. 
4.4.7 Institutional Logics and Field Logics 
Field level logics refer to the consideration of logics at the organizational field level, 
and are very useful for us in terms of understanding the MNT government intervention. 
 ‘An important distinction is [made] between those, such as Thornton, who retain 
the idea that logics at the field level are nested within higher-order societal 
institutional logics, i.e. the ‘institutional logics’ of Alford and Freidland, and 
others (the majority) who identify logics within a field without referencing their 
societal patronage’ (Greenwood et al. 2010, p.21).  
Essentially they describe the same thing, i.e. the organising principles that inform 
members of how to conduct themselves in the observed level of analysis.  The link 
between the intersocietal logics and field logics has not been clearly defined in the 
literature, hence the aforementioned ambiguity by Thornton. 
The following section will describe logics in relation to the organizational field level, 
however the understanding is that the definitions may also apply at the higher level as 
well. However, Thornton and Ocasio (2010) also point out that a clear implication of the 
logic construct is that there will be variation across sectors, fields and historical periods.  
4.4.8 Types of Field Logics 
A number of types of field logics have been outlined in the literature, and some of the 
main ones are now listed.  
 Content – describes when logics are challenged as actors interpret beliefs from 
different perspectives. Reay and Hinings (2005) provide an excellent example of this 
when they discuss how actors with a medical logic challenge the introduction of a 
business-like health logic. They describe how this leads to a field with co-existing 
102 
logics, leading to ‘pragmatic collaboration’. 
 Penetration - the degree to which logics permeate fields. 
 Linkage – the extent to which logics connect laterally and vertically. 
 Exclusiveness - when fields are dominated by one or more logics. In mature fields 
actors aware of their involvement in a common enterprise are defined by a clear set of 
rules and values. Hasse and Krucken (cited in Greenwood et al. 2010, p554) reinforce 
this when discussing how academic entrepreneurship is perceived and processed 
according to the distinct logics of different societal systems and their organizations.  
It has been suggested that in emerging fields like the MNT government intervention, 
social relations and logics are more likely to be weakly formed and established 
(Delbridge and Edwards, 2007). As a follow on to this, the logics within MNT centres/ 
field actors based in developed institutional contexts may be more exclusive (borrowing 
from the already existing institutional logics). This remains to be seen with the MNT 
intervention investigated herein. 
The ‘exclusiveness’ logic is considered to be important in the MNT government 
intervention as the MNT centres have been created in a wide range of institutional 
contexts, e.g. from large global private companies, to small SMEs and universities. 
Exclusive logics are likely to be seen by actors in the large institutions such as 
universities  
There is of course an alternative to the exclusive type of logic which is the ‘not 
exclusive’ type. Not exclusive logics may contain secondary logics competing for 
adherence to or of multiple belief systems. Again, with the range of actors and different 
settings for the MNT centres in the government intervention, it is perceived that this 
logic is more apt. In the MNT field there are likely to be more pluralistic systems, that 
is, more contentious. Within them there the existence or toleration of a diversity of 
ethnic groups or cultures and views in the society is to be expected. 
4.4.9 Dominant Field Participants 
The concept of dominant field participants describes the strength and unity of the most 
dominant field participants. They have the ability to affect the organizational field 
logics. Examples include groups of professionals or trade associations. Professionals 
are groups who lay claim to formal knowledge and exercise control by defining the 
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following characteristics: 
 Cultural-cognitive and normative (relating to standards, norms) frameworks (Scott, 
2001, p.129). 
 They propose distinctions/ fabricate principles/ guidelines for action that define 
arenas within which they claim jurisdiction and exercise control. 
 'Ideas are their weapons' 
 Governance structures must be created and jurisdictional claims defended – often 
with the aid of the state – if professional power is to be realised (Scott, p.129).  
These can also be seen as a group of collective identities. 
4.5 Differences in Actor Perceptions 
The differences between the perceptions of objectives an actor has in an organisation, 
and how they define success has also been studied by a number of authors in the 
innovation literature, and are of relevance to this thesis. 
Mass and Testa (2008) investigated the different perspectives held by actors within a 
sample of Italian SMEs. They identified the three main innovation stakeholders as: 
entrepreneurs, academics and policy makers. Through interviews with these 
stakeholders their results showed the existence of very deeply ingrained and different 
perspectives in relation to innovation. The perceptions of different actor groups varied 
from the simple definition of innovation, right though to how effective innovation 
policies are, and the role of intermediary institutions. ‘Sometimes, these views show 
diverging goals among the stakeholders and consequently, contrasting opinions on 
effective supporting policies’ (Mass and Testa, 2008, p.393). 
Garrett-Jones et al. (2005) carried out research into the common purpose and divided 
loyalties observed for academic and government researchers involved in an Australian 
government intervention which set up collaborative research centres. The researchers 
draw upon 30 in-depth interviews with actors across these Australian Cooperative 
Research Centres (CRC). The CRC centres were set up with cross-sectoral 
(government, academic and business) and cross-disciplinary teams for a ‘…well-defined 
national social, economic or environmental objectives in view’ (Garrett-Jones et al. 
2005, p.535). Their research concluded that: 
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‘…CRCs appear to be hybrid organisations, drawing upon the practices and 
cultures of all their participants.. [developing into] .. organisational styles, 
perspectives, approaches and mechanisms that are substantially different from the 
sum of their constituent parts… This CRC ‘culture’ reﬂects, ﬁrst … the need for a 
consensual approach to marshalling the resources of the CRC towards common 
objectives. Second, concurrently, it requires the CRC to somehow accommodate 
the disparate ‘cultures’ of the participants, comprising the individual researchers, 
their research units or scientiﬁc disciplines and their ‘host’ organisations’ (p.543-
544).  
4.6 Micro-Politics and Contestation in Innovation 
For completeness, it is important to recognise that there is a wide body of academic 
literature concerning micro-politics and contestation also in existence. A number of 
pertinent works from this area are now discussed, which may have a bearing on the 
investigation of a nascent government intervention. 
Edwards (2007) investigates micro politics in an organisation undergoing a crisis event; 
the event concerned was that of the change of ownership in a Knowledge Transfer 
Partnership (KTP) organisation. He investigates the creation and sharing of knowledge 
in this context, and how the ability of an actor to adopt knowledge is linked with how 
they cope with the uncertainties that emerge from crisis events. During these times 
‘actors can transform their social context in ways that allow them to overcome the 
politicisation of tasks’ (Edwards, 2007, p.391). Put simply, this study proposes that the 
ability (individual and collective) to introduce new meaning is not only related to 
knowledge acquisition through the introduction of new practices or systems, but also 
relies upon the socially embedded nature of knowledge, i.e. legitimisation in the local 
context. It should be noted however, that the findings of this study are only based on a 
single case, which reflects one context. A review of additional contexts would have 
added strength to the findings.  
Hislop et al. (2000) investigated the role of knowledge in networks and networking for 
two companies implementing computer-based systems. Through the examination of the 
decision-making processes during the early search and evaluation phases, the political 
nature of networking and knowledge utilisation practices became apparent amongst the 
various interest groups. 
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Their study shows: 
‘how power and politics shaped a wide range of issues such as the framework 
within which the scope of change was discussed, issues of agenda formation, the 
type of people involved in (and excluded from) decision-making processes, the 
value that was attached to particular bodies of knowledge, and the way meaning 
was managed to justify the decisions made’ (Hislop et al. 2000, p.400). 
The paper concludes that the development and utilisation of networking and knowledge 
resources has a dual character, in providing access to (often embodied and tacit) 
knowledge and artefacts necessary for the implementation of change, and as political 
tools in support of particular interests.  
Swan and Scarbrough (2005) investigated three cases of networked innovation, each of 
which involved the development of new technologies. Their paper discusses the 
political dynamics that shape networked innovation, with an aim to understand 
networked innovation processes by identifying and relating the characteristics of 
networked innovation to the productive, or constraining effects of different dimensions 
of power (power of resource, meaning and process). 
Additional authors in the area of innovation politics describe the importance of elite 
actors within organisations who are able to facilitate the journey of innovations through 
an organisation. Smith (2007) describes the importance of senior gatekeeper roles 
within organisations that ‘champion’ the products through, and ensure that they 
overcome any hurdles. Kelley (1976) introduced the notion of ‘organisational elites’ 
who are ‘those actors within the organisation or organisational network who are 
qualified by ‘the rules of the game’ and their positions of power, to oversee the 
activities of the organisation’ (p.66). They may not have the power to control the 
decision-making completely, but they are never excluded from any major decision. 
4.7 Summary 
Dodgson et al. (2005) stated that ‘Technology and innovation can only properly be 
understood in the context of the particular social and cultural environments in which 
they are developed and used’ (p.19). This chapter has introduced and explored 
institutional theory as a lens through which the development of emerging micro- and 
nano- technologies can be understood in relation to the UK MNT government 
intervention. Greenwood et al. (2010, p.28) describe how the institutional theory 
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literature has gained from a combination with, or incorporation of, other theories. This 
PhD will add the perspective from process innovation research (i.e. the MIRP studies), 
along with findings from the disruptive technology literature to institutional theory. 
 
One of the main points that comes across when reviewing literature on institutional 
theory, is that there are many contested definitions within the field, and during its 
evolution. Greenwood et al. (2010) describe this in the following: ‘Institutionalism's 
proliferation, however, comes at the expense of linguistic specificity. Even the term 
'institutional' defies precise definition, leaving it open to alternative conceptual 
constructions that are adapted to the topic at hand' (2010, p.31). Because of this, the 
last few sections of this chapter have attempted to clarify the aspects of institutional 
theory of relevance to the cases being studied. 
Furthermore this thesis uses a ‘failed’ example as its major case. This looks to add 
further empirical evidence to the institutional theory literature, and address the 
‘undersampling’ bias outlined by Dunrell (2003).  
The following chapter describes the methodological considerations and decisions made 
in order to answer the Research Questions for this PhD. 
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Chapter 5 – Methodology 
This chapter begins with an outline of social science research perspectives which are an 
important foundation for a researcher when considering the way the design and carry 
out their investigations. The importance that a researcher’s world view has on the type 
of research data they collect and how they analyse it is discussed. 
The chapter then introduces the research gaps identified during the literature review, 
along with an exploration of the research questions which were developed as a result.  
Through consideration of the author’s research perspective, a suitable methodology is 
selected to answer the research questions. This includes a discussion relating to the 
research venue investigated, along with the research design, strategies and methods 
chosen to study this venue. 
5.1 Social Science Research Perspectives 
A researcher’s ontological and epistemological viewpoints are crucial in terms of how 
he or she views the world; this in turn, will affect the way the researcher designs and 
carry out the research work and the theoretical frameworks that are adopted (Morse, 
2008). This is explained by Saunders et al. (2009) in the following:  
 ‘...the philosophy you adopt will be influenced by practical considerations. 
However, the main influence is likely to be your particular view of the 
relationship between knowledge and the process by which it is developed’ (p.34) 
By outlining the main research perspectives along with that chosen by this researcher, 
the reader is enabled to further understand the way the data was collected and analysed 
within this study.  
5.1.1 Ontology 
Ontology, put simply, is how each individual pictures reality. It is concerned with the 
nature of existence. The main point concerning ontology is: 
‘whether social entities can and should be considered objective entities that have 
a reality external to social actors, or whether they can and should be considered 
social constructions built up from the perceptions and actions of social actors’ 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.19). 
There are two main ontological positions: that of objectivism and constructionism. 
108                                                      
5.1.1.1 Objectivism - social phenomena and their meanings exist independently of 
social actors, e.g. ‘the thesis you are reading now really exists, and one can see it and 
feel it’. 
5.1.1.2 Constructionism – social phenomena and their meanings are a direct result of 
social actors. Constructionism implies that social phenomena and categories are not 
only produced through interaction, but that they are also constantly being altered, e.g. 
‘is this table really here? Or has it been created by my perception of my surroundings, 
and what I understand to constitute a table’?  In summary, ontological assumptions are 
the foundations for theories about what exists (i.e. ‘what is reality?’) (Sayer, 2000).  
In terms of my ontological position, I adopted elements from both of the above: I 
believed that physical artefacts do indeed exist, such as this physical thesis that you are 
now reading. However, I also believed that individuals (actors) bring their own meaning 
to an environment and this meaning can be affected by that environment. The bridging 
literature chapter has discussed this in terms of the interaction between actors and 
structure. 
5.1.2 Epistemology 
Epistemology concerns the question of what is regarded as acceptable knowledge in a 
discipline (Johnson and Duberley, 2009). It is the theory of knowledge; moreover, it is 
used to refer to the methods of scientific procedure which lead to the acquisition of 
knowledge (how we come to have knowledge of the external world).  An important 
issue within this context is the question of whether the social world ‘can and should be 
studied according to the same principles, procedures, and ethos as the natural sciences’ 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.13).  
Within social science business research, there are a number of important epistemologies 
that need to be considered. Saunders et al. (2009), list these as follows: positivism - 
working in the tradition of the natural scientist; realism - which asks whether objects 
exist independently of our knowledge of their existence; interpretivism - understanding 
differences between humans as social actors; and axiology - what roles do our values 
play in our research? Rather than describe all of these in detail, those most relevant to 
this PhD study were now introduced. Some reflection on the influence each position has 
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on my PhD research, and my epistemological agreement (or otherwise) with these 
categories, was also presented. 
5.1.2.1 Positivism - is ‘objectivity, prediction, researcher detachment, the production of 
true and wide ranging laws, [allowing] generalisation from a sample to make universal 
claims’ (Gurney, 2006, p.1707). Within positivism, human behaviour is described in 
terms of cause and effect (Ibid). The positivist researcher undertakes research in (as far 
as possible) a ‘value-free’ way (Saunders et al. 2009). Research tends to be of a 
deductive nature - i.e. theories are first made (using existing theories to develop 
hypotheses) and these are then tested. They are tested to confirm or refute and lead to 
further theory development.  
Typical methods used in positivism include self-completion questionnaires, structured 
interviews, simulation, experiments, and the use of secondary data. Positivists are 
concerned with sample size- i.e. the larger the sample, the better the generalisability of 
the results. As such, they are keen on statistical methods to apply their results to the 
wider populations and to validate their data sets. Johnson & Duberley ( 2009), suggest 
that for positivists, quantitative methods involving highly-structured measurement and 
large samples (e.g. surveys), are deemed far more important than qualitative methods. 
This study is based on the author’s understanding of positivism which agrees with 
Saunders et al. (2009), who pose the question of ‘...whether data presented in 
statistical form, are any more deserving of authority than those presented in a 
narrative…’ (Saunders et al. 2009, p113). Having carried out the aforementioned pilot 
interviews in organisations developing emerging technologies, it became clear that the 
use of qualitative methods in the local nature of the venues and actors involved was 
more than sufficient to provide the detailed understanding required.  
I was interested in finding out the details of a government innovation intervention. More 
quantitative methods (such as surveys) would be limited to determining the political or 
emotional perspectives of the MNT government intervention under investigation (i.e. 
reflexivity - who you are, your culture and your expectations - all of which are 
important when investigating such a government intervention. Saunders et al. (2006, 
p.116), state that ‘insights into the complex world are lost if such complexity is reduced 
entirely to a series of law-like generalisations’. This is important in this study which 
adopts an interactive process perspective to consider the action of actors in relation to a 
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state government intervention. This statement reaffirms the aim of understanding and 
explaining the range of MNT centres within the MNT government intervention, an 
understanding that would negate sweeping generalisations. 
5.1.2.2 Realism: Like positivism, realism frames that the social science world can and 
should apply the same approach as the natural sciences to data collection and 
explanation (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The philosophy of realism is that there is a reality 
quite independent of the mind (Saunders et al. 2009) - i.e. reality exists separately from 
how we describe it. For example, ‘rocks exist and are there, regardless of how we 
describe them’. There are two forms of realism; empirical realism (or direct realism) 
and critical realism. 
5.1.2.3 Empirical Realism (or ‘direct realism’): Direct or empirical realism says that 
‘what you see is what you get: what we experience through our senses portrays the 
world accurately’ (Saunders et al. 2009, p.114). Empirical realists assume that through 
the use of scientific research methods, we can understand and explain reality. 
Consequently, empirical realists do not entertain the belief that there are underlying 
structures and generative mechanisms that can produce observable events. Generally 
speaking, empirical realists can only have a conversation about something they can 
actually see and point to.                                             
The pragmatic approach of this epistemological stance appealed to the researcher. 
However, following the belief that the way people see the world and subsequently act, 
was considered an important issue for organisations trying to achieve a set business 
purpose. Through examination of the MNT government intervention within this PhD 
study, there was a need to conceptualise underlying structures and mechanisms that had 
a role in driving the behaviour of individuals. A direct realist perspective would reject 
this and suggest that the world is relatively unchanging; that it operates in the business 
context and at one level only (the individual, the group or the organisation) (Saunders et 
al. 2009). The other type of realism – critical realism – was therefore more appropriate 
to my understanding of research. 
5.1.2.4 Critical Realism: Critical realists start from the assumption that there is a clear 
distinction between the objects that exist independently and the scientists who study 
them. In addition, critical realists are perfectly content to admit into their explanations 
theoretical terms that are not directly amenable to observation (Bhaskar 1998: Bryman 
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& Bell, 2003). Critical realists reject the view that the world is created by the minds of 
human observers. They attempt to explain observable phenomena and their relations by 
identifying underlying structures. However, such structures are often unobservable, e.g. 
labour markets. 
5.1.2.5 Interpretivism: Interpretivism is at the extreme end of the spectrum to 
positivism. Interpretivists ‘share a view that the subject matter of the social sciences – 
people and their institutions- is fundamentally different from that of the natural 
sciences. The study of the social world therefore requires a different logic of research 
procedure, one that reflects the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order’ 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.15). Social reality has a meaning for people and their 
behaviour alters relative to their actions and those of others. The interpretivist 
researcher is interested in getting into the head of the people to interpret their actions 
and their view of the world in which they live. 
Interpretivism uses small research sample sizes, in-depth investigations, and is on the 
whole qualitative. Authors typically adopt an empathetic stance toward those being 
investigated. The challenge is to understand their world from their point of view 
(Saunders et al. 2009, p.116). This is very important for complex business 
environments. Interpretivism is highly suited to the research environment chosen for 
this study, as it enables the viewing of innovation as a function of particular contexts, 
motivations and people coming together at a point in time. 
5.1.3 Ontological and Epistemological Assumptions for this Study 
This study adopts the epistemological perspective of interpretivism as the most 
appropriate based on the discussion of ontological and epistemological viewpoints 
above in relation to the state intervention investigated, along with the author’s own 
viewpoint.  This study also undertakes a qualitative approach to address the Research 
Questions which require description and explanation of the state intervention under 
investigation. 
The following section introduces the observed literature gaps and research questions. 
The discussion is then brought back to methodological considerations at the practical 
data gathering level; that is, considerations of research strategies, design and so on. 
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5.2 Research Gaps and Research Questions 
In order to understand the theoretical contributions already made concerning the area of 
government interventions, and in particular those addressing emerging technologies, the 
academic literature was searched
1
. A large amount of research has discussed existing 
publicly funded schemes such as the Knowledge Transfer Partnership
2
 (KTP). These 
range from the investigation of advanced manufacturing technologies using KTPs as 
comparative cases (Walters and Dorrington, 2004); organizational change through 
academic/ business collaborations (Peattie, 1993); to using them as case examples for 
developing theoretical perspectives to model the implementation of new 
products/processes (Edwards, 2001). However, despite this wide range of interest there 
is a gap in the current literature concerning publicly funded schemes developing 
emerging technologies in nascent fields. 
Tovstiga and Birchall (2005) describe a number of important features of a new 
economic order of which one is the development of new and disruptive technologies, 
which are: 
‘..rewriting the rules of competition as they transform value chains, usher in new 
business models, and create new sources of value. Incumbents are left vulnerable 
as new players redefine competitive advantage that is often short-lived’. They 
further describe how nanotechnology is ‘a good example of how the technology 
revolution is being driven by new modes of knowledge production’ (Tovstiga and 
Birchall, 2005, p.9). 
This illustrates another gap: that is, the importance of understanding how high-
technology based economic growth designed to stimulate new industries from emerging 
technologies would benefit from further investigation. Particularly when one considers 
the recent emphasis that the UK government has placed on developing economic 
growth based on innovation. A large number of UK government white papers and 
reports were written concerning this around the time of the MNT Programme. They 
covered a range of sectors, both public and private. Each has its own recommendations 
and strategies for the ‘UK’s innovation future'. Important examples of these published 
in the lead up to the MNT government intervention can be seen in Table 5.1, and are 
included as they emphasise the importance placed on innovation by the UK 
Government at the time the MNT Programme was established. 
                                                 
1
 Areas researched include: Emerging/disruptive technologies, National Systems of Innovation (NSI)/ 
government interventions and Institutional Theory 
2
 Formerly known as the Teaching Company Scheme (TCS). 
113                                                      
 Table 5.1 – Influential Innovation Policies 
Title Priority Reference 
Excellence and Opportunity Focus on the government investing in a strong 
science base. Addresses the need to develop 
higher education research and development 
into industry. 
DTI, 2000a 
Foresight 2020 Identified the key issues that will shape the 
future of UK manufacturing and the actions 
required to address them. 
DTI, 2000b 
Opportunity for all in a World of 
Change 
About the vital next steps that Government, 
businesses and individuals must take to secure 
economic success in the decade ahead. 
DTI, 2001 
Taylor Report The field of nanotechnology and its 
applications is crucial to the future 
competitiveness and productivity of the UK 
economy, and to the well being and prosperity 
of its people. 
DTI, 2002 
Lambert Report 
Universities will have to get better at 
identifying their areas of competitive strength 
in research. Government will have to do more 
to support business-university collaboration. 
Business will have to learn how to exploit the 
innovative ideas that are being developed in 
the university sector. 
Lambert, 2003 
 
There appears to be a cycle of policy creation leading to innovation interventions, 
without robust discussions of their performance (Georghiou, 1998). This is particularly 
the case for the MNT intervention, and this PhD aims to address the function of this 
particular government intervention. The term function is firstly understood as a way of 
describing the purpose of the MNT government intervention in terms of why it was 
established by the UK government. The original purpose was the creation of a network: 
‘to provide a market-orientated focus for the facilities, people and organisations 
engaged in Micro and Nanotechnologies in the UK. The Network is helping to 
lower entry barriers and drive the widespread market development and 
exploitation of these technologies – building a prosperous, world-class MNT 
sector in the UK’ (DTI, 2005). 
The MNT network in relation to this purpose can then be investigated by validating the 
interpretation of this from individual actors, along with observing the influence their 
actions have on their local MNT centres, and the extra local context of the MNT 
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intervention. The connections between these actors will vary in terms of who is 
involved and in what capacity. The actions of all stakeholders, organisations and the 
structure of the MNT network are therefore implicit in the understanding of this MNT 
government intervention. 
The Taylor report emphasises the importance of nanotechnology as a disruptive 
technology: 
‘A distinctive feature of genuinely disruptive technologies is that they can have 
very many different applications. This is particularly true for nanotechnology… 
Disruptive technologies are those that displace older technologies and enable 
radically new generations of existing products and processes to take over’. (DTI, 
2002a, p.17). 
The MNT centres investigated within this study are developing micro- and nano- 
technologies. However, the characteristics of the human agents involved in this process 
will differ, e.g. experience, frustrations, and other interpretations of the extra local and 
local context within which they are bound. This is important as it complements the link 
between agency and structure presented in the interactive process perspective approach 
(IPP) i.e. agency and structure are not independent.  
Through a deeper understanding of a recent government intervention, this work adds to 
the innovation policy and practice debate, building on the NIS literature. 
5.3 Research Questions 
This PhD study endeavored to answer a number of research questions highlighted from 
a review of the literature and a number of inductive pilot case studies. 
Research  
Question 1 
(RQ1) 
How do government interventions such as the MNT network function? 
 
Research 
Question 2 
(RQ2) 
How can we describe stakeholder values and understanding in relation to 
the role of a nascent government intervention? 
Research  
Question 3 
(RQ3) 
How do the the following aspects of innovation management: purpose, 
process, people, collaborations, context and outcomes influence the 
success of emerging technologies in different organisational settings? 
 
Research questions 1 and 2 are descriptive, and provide an opportunity to understand 
and explain the MNT network in more detail. Research question 3 then drives the 
analysis of a number of key constituents of the MNT government intervention (i.e. 
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constructs). 
Research Questions 1 and 2 are deliberately designed to provide the study with a 
general focus, following the initial pilot research study and the literature review process. 
Saunders et al. (2009) describe how this approach often leads to further detailed 
research questions: 
‘It is often a useful starting point in the writing of research questions to begin 
with one general focus research question that flows from your research idea. This 
may lead to several more detailed questions or the definition of research 
objectives’                                                                                                                             
(p.24). 
Research Question 3 helps to focus the investigation to a number of important 
constructs and particular areas of interest for examining the chosen UK MNT 
government intervention. Constructs are used in this research study to describe key 
variables from the extant literature that are of interest in terms of describing and 
understanding the research venue. In addition to those constructs adopted from the 
literature, a number were also developed following the pilot interviews. The term 
sensitising construct is also used in this thesis, which refers to the embryonic stage of 
construct development, as described by Poole et al. (2000)
3
.   
Furthermore Research Question 3 has a particular focus on the effect of different 
contexts on the development of technologies as part of the MNT government 
intervention. This research is particularly interested in explaining the role that different 
contexts have within a government intervention. For example, the comprehension of 
how different actors interpret the purpose of the government intervention in relation to 
their local organisation and the purpose of the wider MNT network. This work aims to 
shed further light on how a nascent network such as the MNT network functions. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The background to constructs and sensitising constructs is described in Poole et al.’s book on 
organizational change and the innovation processes – theory and methods for research (Poole et al. 2000). 
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5.4 The Research Design 
This section now describes how the research was carried out in order to answer the 
aforementioned research questions. 
A research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. The 
choice of research design reflects decisions about priorities given to the components of 
the research process (Bryman and Bell, 2003). A research method on the other hand, 
describes a tool or technique that is used to collect data; for example, a structured 
interview template or a survey questionnaire. This section begins by discussing the pilot 
data collection which led to the choice of research venue central to this study, and how 
it is researched by using an appropriate research design. The philosophical 
underpinnings of this research are also introduced within this chapter. 
5.4.1 Establishing the Research Venue through Pilot Interviews 
Prior to the decision to investigate the MNT government intervention a number of pilot 
interviews were carried out to help understand organizations developing emerging 
technologies in a variety of different environments. These pilot cases were carried out in 
parallel to early reviewing of the literature, and followed an inductive theoretical 
approach. Researchers generally adopt one of two theoretical perspectives when 
carrying out their investigations; the inductive or the deductive approach. Inductive 
theory is the outcome of research, i.e. the process of induction involves drawing 
generalisable inferences out of observations (i.e. theory building). Deductive theory is 
made on the basis of what is known; the researcher creates a hypothesis, and then tests 
it. The hypothesis is confirmed or unconfirmed and then the theory is revised (theory 
testing and modifying). This study uses an inductive approach throughout. 
Purposive sampling refers to the interactive process carried out by a researcher when 
directing their data generation, analysis, theory and sampling activities (Mason, 2006). 
The pilot venues for this study were selected purposively to include organisations 
developing emerging technologies in a range of venues. In particular the pilot cases 
were selected according to their organisational size, e.g. global, SME, a university 
centre, and a start-up company. This particular form of sampling refers to ‘polar’ or 
‘extreme’ case sampling; that is, the deliberate choice of extreme cases. Such extreme 
cases are expected to yield especially valuable information about the topic of interest. 
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These deviant cases provide interesting contrasts with other cases, thereby allowing for 
comparability across those cases (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). According to Mason 
(2006) the investigator should first determine a dimension of interest, then generate a 
distribution of cases on that dimension, and then locate extreme/ deviant and other 
relevant cases on that distribution 
For the pilot study, the dimension of interest was organisations developing emerging 
technologies. The location of deviant cases was made according to the different sizes of 
organisations and the different organisations they offered for investigation. The 
expectation was that they would offer a wide range of different examples of how 
organisations manage the innovation of emerging technologies. Access was successfully 
granted to four pilot organisations, and key individuals were identified and interviewed 
within them. The selection provided examples of one global company; one medium 
company and two small companies. Interviews were carried out in all four pilot 
organisations, and mapping workshops in a number of them. 
Table 5.2 – List of Pilot Interviews 
           Pilot Org. 
 
Data  
collection 
Pilot 1 – 
Global Company 
Capital equipment 
manufacturer 
Pilot 2 – 
SME 
Fibre processing 
equipment 
Pilot 3 – 
University-based 
MNT technology 
development 
Pilot 4 – 
Start-up Co. 
Flexible 
displays 
Mapping workshop 2 days Half day Not carried out Not carried out 
Semi-structured 
face to face 
interviews 
 Marketing 
Director 
 Project Manager 
(2 hours in total) 
 Technical 
Director 
 Business 
Development 
Manager 
(3 ½ hours in total) 
 Business Manager 
(1 ½ hours over 
two interviews) 
 Integration 
Manager 
 (3 hours, over 
two 
interviews) 
Pilot 1 is an example of a capital equipment manufacturer, which is part of a private 
global organisation; it designs and manufactures silicon wafer production equipment, 
which encompasses an element of emerging technology development. A workshop was 
carried out to ‘map-out’ the innovation process followed to develop their products and 
technologies. A similar mapping process was used as documented in previous work by 
the researcher, seen in (Francis et al. 2008). This process essentially walked a range of 
stakeholders through the innovation process followed for a recent example of their 
products. The time taken for each action was recorded along with decision points along 
the way (see Appendix 5a). This mapping process appeared promising, and was 
therefore tried again in Pilots 2 and 3. In actuality, maps were only drawn in pilots 1 and 
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2; when an attempt was made to map the process in pilot 3, the products were too 
emergent to allow a sensible route to be followed. 
Pilot 2 is an example of another private capital equipment manufacturer, but on the 
SME scale. They develop specialist laser-based equipment for the precision cutting of 
optical fibres. A similar research mapping method was followed in this venue. 
However, due to the more emergent nature of the technology, and smaller 
organisational size, the attempt at mapping/ drawing out the process flow was found to 
be less useful. The reason for this was that the innovation process in this smaller 
organisation with less formal processes, and a greater level of newness of the 
technologies under development, was idiosyncratic.   
Out of all four examples Pilot 3 was the only example of a publicly-funded 
organisation. Its majority shareholder was a University, and it developed emerging 
micro- and nano- technologies. This university context provided quite different insights 
to those of the commercial pilots, which are further discussed in this chapter. 
Pilot 4 is an example of a small organisation developing a mobile communication 
device using a novel flexible display. Two interviews were carried out in this pilot with 
the Manufacturing Director. 
In the case of pilots 1 and 2, flow charts of the innovation process were created with 
inputs from key stakeholders at each junction of the flow chart. Appendix 5a shows 
examples of these. The initial reason for creating such a chart was to observe the key 
actors and their actions (grouped into design phases) involved in the innovation process. 
This method worked well for Pilot 1, however for Pilots 2 to 4, which were smaller 
organisations (10s of employees in comparison to 100s/1000s), this method did not 
work. The main reason being that the smaller companies displayed less formal 
development processes. This was particularly evident in Pilots 2 and 3; there was a 
‘reactive’ element to the development process, i.e. actions were typically a reaction to 
events/ circumstances rather than planned events. Participants attributed this to the 
novelty and high market risk of the technologies under development. Pilot 1- although 
developing emerging technologies – was part of a global organisation with established 
procedures, and with existing products on the market already. 
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Within each pilot organisation senior technical managers and/or directors were 
interviewed using a semi-structured interview approach. The template for this approach 
can be seen in Appendix 5b. 
The questions asked were mainly open in construction, in order to discuss a range of 
issues pertaining to innovation management that had emerged as potential gaps from the 
literature review. A number of questions also asked the participants to describe 
examples of successful and unsuccessful developments of new technologies, and how 
the related innovation processes were managed. Some example products or projects 
were discussed during interviews and workshops. 
The pilot cases were analysed using thematic analysis of the transcripts. The theory 
behind coding and ways in which to carry out coding in a systematic and reproducible 
fashion was understood from the renowned work of Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 55-
72). In pragmatic terms, each transcript was read in detail and portions of the text were 
given codes inductively as part of the reading and analysis process. The reason for this 
was to see which themes emerged as important for organisations developing innovative 
technologies. This approach was chosen as the most suitable for investigating the 
organising principles of individual actors in relation to their actions and understanding 
of the MNT intervention, particularly in relation to their organisational venue. As part 
of the selection of research methods a thorough examination of different research 
designs and strategies was undertaken (refer to section 5.6). 
There were two further important outcomes from the pilot interviews: 
 Firstly, the choice of the research venue. 
 Secondly, a list of inductive themes was generated – these were linked to the MIRP 
literature and constructs. Over forty of these were produced, refer to table 5.7. 
These were linked together to create the research strategy. 
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5.4.2 Research Venue 
Details of the pilot cases can be seen in the transcript addendum. Rather than spend time 
detailing all the findings from each of these, of which only one was subsequently used, 
this Chapter describes how they refined the focus of study and research strategy used. 
Pilot 3 was one of the 24 MNT centres created as part of the UK MNT government 
intervention. It introduced the government intervention and how it was established to 
develop emerging micro- and nano- technologies in the UK. The interviewee was the 
Business Manager and the MNT Centre was based in a University (it later became the 
main case for this study, i.e. Mercury). Out of the pilot venues, the scale and scope of 
the MNT intervention offered the best opportunity for conceptualising innovation in a 
meaningful context. Pilot 3’s interviewee talked openly and widely about the MNT 
government intervention, which highlighted both positive and negative points of trying 
to commercialise new technologies as part of a national system of innovation. 
Considering the large amount of UK state investment into these centres, the reasons 
why some centres had been successful and others not warranted investigation – coupled 
with the need for further empirical evidence in the NSI literature (Fri, 2003; Quere, 
2004; and Harvey, 2010). This had the potential to add empirical evidence of a nascent 
field, whilst offering the opportunity to provide evidence and knowledge for future 
national innovation policies. 
Further discussions took place with Pilot 3. During these discussions, it became 
apparent that Pilot 3 offered a unique opportunity to understand the difficulties faced by 
an organisation developing emerging technologies as part of a government intervention. 
The Business Manager described a number of barriers to the success of the centre; for 
example, there appeared to be internal contestation between individuals in the centre, as 
well as the reporting of similar issues between other centres and the governing body. 
The reporting of Pilot 3 as having been considered failing by the governing body (The 
TSB), by the Business Manager, presented an opportunity to find out why it was 
unsuccessful in the view of the state governing body. 
A review of the innovation and EDT literature showed that few authors selected 
‘failing’ examples of organisations for the main cases. Typically, organisations which 
are successful were chosen, so that ‘best-practice’ could be discovered and disseminated 
(Thornton, 2002). I saw this as an opportunity to investigate an organisation which 
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appeared to be turbulent and would provide a good example of the ‘real’ difficulties 
faced when developing emerging technologies. Small Co. was subsequently renamed 
‘Mercury’ and became the main case for this PhD study. 
Access was granted to this main case, which allowed a within-case analysis in order to 
gain familiarity with the data collection and allow for preliminary theory generation, 
before moving on to the comparative case studies (Eisenhardt, 2007). 
Scott’s (2001) definition of an organizational field is drawn upon for this study; that is: 
a field which is made up of a set of diverse organizations engaged in a similar function 
and constituting a recognised area of life (Scott, 2001). In terms of this government 
intervention there is a field made up of a range of diverse organisations, established for 
the same purpose (i.e. function) which can be seen as having made up the MNT 
Network.  
Scott (2001) describes how organisations within a field can be categorised as state 
agencies, resource and product consumers, and other organisations that produce similar 
services or products. In terms of the MNT government intervention, the fit with these 
categories are as follows:  
- key suppliers - i.e. the MNT centres 
- state agencies – Non-departmental government bodies, i.e. the DTI and the TSB 
- resource and product consumers – customers (i.e. UK SMEs), and other MNT 
centres 
- other organisations that produce similar services or products – i.e. those 
organisations not funded through the MNT intervention, but developing MNTs. 
 
Furthermore, the individual actors within these organisations are understood as an 
essential part of this field. This study draws on data from a wide range of actors within 
the above organisations, and across the MNT field.  
Figure 5.1 displays a snapshot of the MNT organisational field in terms of those 
organisations accessed, and individuals interviewed within this study. Clearly the full 
MNT field diagram would be far too unwieldy to try and represent at the detailed level 
of figure 5.1. This figure is used to demonstrate the levels of organisations, and where 
the actors fit in relation to one another and the field. 
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Figure 5.1- A Graphical Overview of the MNT Centres Accessed, along with the Cross-Field Actors 
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Pseudonyms have been used for organisations and actors alike. Further details of 
individuals are provided in the major case, and cross-case comparison chapters. 
The specifics of the research design selected are now addressed. 
5.5 Research Strategies and Situations 
Following the literature review, identification of gaps, and choice of research venue, 
the next step was to consider the research philosophy, research strategy and situation; 
all essential to developing a successful research methodology.  
A research strategy is the general plan of how the researcher will go about answering 
the research question(s) (Saunders et al. 2009). Research strategies are informed by 
the research question(s) and/or objectives, the extent of existing knowledge (e.g. the 
academic literature), the time and resources available to the researcher(s), and the 
philosophical underpinnings of the researcher. Strategies can be used together, for 
example, an online survey might be used as part of a case study. Details of research 
strategies by a number of different authors were studied when considering the most 
suitable strategy to answer the research questions (e.g. Yin, 2003; Saunders et al. 
2009; Bryman and Bell 2003; Silverman, 2006). They included: processual research, 
surveys, archival analysis, history, case study, action research, grounded theory and 
ethnography.  
Table 5.2 on the next page displays the research strategies that were considered most 
suitable for answering this study’s research questions. The reason for this was to avoid 
elaborating on every potential strategy and my consideration of them (as outlined in 
Appendix 5c). Three strategies are presented here: case study, grounded theory and 
processual research.  
Case study: This strategy answers research questions in the form of ‘how, and why?’ 
A case study is defined by Robson as a ‘a strategy for doing research which involves 
an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context using multiple sources of evidence’ (Robson, 2002, p.178). The researcher 
is concerned with the complexity and particular nature of the case in question. 
Multiple case studies provide opportunities for comparison of data (bearing in mind 
the contextual issues that these case studies present) (Yin, 2003). Multiple, small 
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targeted case studies are useful for gathering rich data that can be used for describing, 
understanding, and explaining specific contexts.  
There are three classifications of case study generally referred to: exploratory, 
descriptive, and explanatory (Yin, 1994). Exploratory refers to the process of finding 
out what is happening. It is not driven by proposition, however it is driven by a 
purpose. The ideas of exploratory research is to help clarify and understand a research 
problem, and further identify research questions/ hypotheses for subsequent study 
(Yin, 1994, p.22). Descriptive case studies, are those which provide a comprehensive 
account of the phenomenon under study, within its context. Robson states that the 
objective of a descriptive case study is to ‘to portray an accurate profile of persons, 
events or situations’ (Robson, 2002, p.59). This may come before an exploratory stage 
of research, or be an extension to it. Explanatory cases are used to test ‘cause and 
effect’ relationships between variables (Saunders et al. 2003). Yin (1994, p.4) 
provides an example of explanatory cases, which shows how they do not necessarily 
require statistical analysis (as might be understood when discussing cause and effect).  
Grounded Theory- Similar to the case study strategy, a grounded theory approach asks 
‘how and why?’ questions. Theory building is carried out by researchers using a 
combination of inductive and deductive strategies, but is more associated with the 
inductive approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Researchers adopting this approach 
begin without an initial framework. They develop theory from initial observations and 
data, which eventually leads to the generation of predictions. These are then tested 
using further observations. 
Processual Research- Along with the above two approaches, processual research also 
asks the ‘what?’ question along with ‘how and why?’ The purpose of processual 
research is to explain the what, why and how of the links between context, processes 
and outcomes (Pettigrew, 1997). 
Table 5.3 describes the appropriateness of the above research strategies in relation to 
their suitability for this study. The multiple case study approach along with elements 
of the processual research approach was selected for this study. Further justification 
for this decision is now made. 
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Table 5.3 - Research Strategies and their Suitability for this Research Study 
 
Strategy How suitable is this strategy for… ? 
The Research 
questions and/or 
objectives? 
The 
existing 
literature? 
The resources & 
time? 
The researcher’s 
world view/ and 
comments  
Case 
study 
 
Innovation is a 
complex process; 
taking into account 
MNT centres in a 
range of contexts 
increases the 
complexity of this 
process. Case 
studies are 
concerned with 
investigation of 
such complexity, 
they allow deep and 
rich analysis of 
single organisations 
(Yin, 2003).  
External validity 
can be questioned 
when investigating 
single cases: use of 
triangulation using 
multiple case 
studies can 
overcome this.  
A robust 
case study 
strategy 
would add 
to the 
existing 
body of 
knowledge. 
Often cases 
within the 
EDT 
literature 
area are 
published in 
more 
anecdotal/ 
narrative 
forms, 
lacking true 
case study 
rigour. 
Triangulation is one 
way to increase 
external validity, but 
takes more time and 
resources. 
Gathering in-depth 
data from case 
studies is time-
consuming in 
comparison to postal 
/ electronic surveys, 
however the richness 
of data collected is 
essential when 
investigating such a 
nascent area, such as 
the MNT 
government 
intervention. 
This strategy 
appeals to my 
critical realist 
ontology. The use 
of multiple case 
studies leads to 
common findings 
which may 
provide insights 
into future 
innovation policy 
design (whilst 
understanding the 
limitations of the 
sample size. Case 
studies can be 
complemented by 
a mixed methods 
approach if 
desired. 
Grounded 
Theory 
 
Would be suitable, 
however this 
research is looking 
to contribute to 
policy and practice, 
not theory 
development alone. 
Not 
typically 
seen in the 
literature for 
EDTs. 
Organisations prefer 
to have an outline of 
what the research 
access is for, 
therefore a truly 
grounded theory 
approach might be 
off-putting (e.g. 
participant 
observation). 
The author 
prefers a more 
structured 
approach to data 
gathering. Access 
and trust would 
be major hurdles 
in companies 
developing 
emerging 
technologies with 
related issues of 
Intellectual 
Property (IP). 
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Strategy How suitable is this strategy for… ? 
The Research 
questions and/or 
objectives? 
The 
existing 
literature? 
The resources & 
time? 
The researcher’s 
world view/ and 
comments  
Processual 
Research 
Suited to the 
investigation of 
processes within a 
range of different 
contexts, addressing 
a number of 
different outcomes 
(Pettigrew, 1997). 
Highly relevant to 
the RQs. 
Potential to 
build on the 
MIRP 
research 
work. 
Scholars such as Van 
de Ven et al. (2000) 
offer a formulaic 
approach for process 
research; i.e. 
longitudinal 
recording of events 
and actions, for an 
organisational 
process. This 
generates a vast 
amount of data in 
order to overcome 
difficulties of 
generalisation which 
can occur with the 
smaller sample sizes 
typical of 
organisational 
research. Resource 
hungry. 
Approach appeals 
to researcher’s 
world view, with 
the 
acknowledgement 
that an adapted 
method without 
the highly 
prescriptive 
recording of 
temporal event 
data. This PhD 
study does not 
attempt to 
emulate such a 
depth of data 
collection.   
 
5.5.1 The Case Study Research Strategy 
The case study strategy was chosen as the most suitable research strategy for 
addressing this study’s research questions. This strategy was interlinked with some 
elements of processual research (namely the use of constructs for gathering data). 
There were a number of reasons for this decision. One of which was that the use of 
case studies followed the interpretivist epistemology understood by the researcher. 
Clearly the research has been influenced by practical considerations as outlined 
throughout this chapter, however as Saunders et al. explain: 
‘..the philosophy you adopt will be influenced by practical considerations. 
However, the main influence is likely to be your particular view of the 
relationship between knowledge and the process by which it is developed’ 
(Saunders et al. 2009, p.34). 
Furthermore, the logic underpinning the use of multiple case studies is also based on 
replication and can be seen to provide a stronger case for theory building than single 
cases (Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 2007). 
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Yin (1994) states that: 
‘Multiple cases are likely to result in better theory... The choice is based 
less on the uniqueness of a given case, and more on the contribution to the 
theory development within the set of cases… multiple cases are chosen for 
theoretical reasons such as replication, extension of theory, contrary 
replication, and elimination of alternative explanations’ (Yin, 2003). 
To achieve this it is necessary to select each case on the basis that it either predicts 
similar results (which is a literal replication), or as in this study, that it produced 
contrasting results for predictable reasons (Yin, 1994). That is, MNT centres 
demonstrating a range of local contexts were approached for selection from the overall 
24 centres. When making this selection, the questions ‘what is this similar to, what 
does it contradict, and why?’ (Eisenhardt, 2007, p.544) was asked. This resulted in 
nine accessible centres, constituting a range of venues, including: universities, SMEs, 
global organisations, and science parks. It made sense to choose cases such as 
extreme situations (i.e. in terms of contexts) in which the ‘process of interest is 
‘transparently observable’…thus, the goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases 
which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory’ (Pettigrew, 1997, p.537).  
These were understood to contain competing logics and conflicts of purpose amongst 
actors, and their resulting actions, based on the findings from interviews with the 
Business Manager from Pilot number 3.  
The following variables were kept constant through the very choice of the MNT 
intervention as the research venue: 
(i)  All were developing, measuring or researching MNTs, with a view to helping UK 
PLC ‘step-up’ the MNT technology ladder, in comparison with other countries; 
(ii) They were UK based and in a nascent field; 
(iii) All were either SMEs or SME-sized cost centres within larger companies (and 
acting as SMEs); 
(iv) They all received a government grant as part of the UK MNT Capital Facilities 
Programme for the provision of MNT facilities to UK firms on an open-access basis; 
(v)  Without public funding, they would not have existed; 
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(vi) Each centre should have become self-financing by the end of the grant period 
(with the exception of medical and characterisation centres); 
(vii) They were overseen by non-departmental government bodies (NDGBs); 
(viii)  Each centre should add value to the wider UK economy. 
In turn, this allowed for a more robust comparison across cases, and added to the 
validity of findings. 
The MNT government intervention was created to develop a new emerging sector of 
technologies, namely micro- and nano- technologies. This is a nascent sector, and as 
such, is less firmly established in the academic literature. The use of case studies 
allows for an inductive, deeper understanding of organisations developing these 
technologies, which has the potential to pave the way for future research (which may 
then be able to use more generalisable strategies when the sector is more developed). 
The use of a case study approach allowed for a range of research methods to be used 
which included both primary and secondary data collection. For example, 
interviewing individuals within a case, or gathering reports or public-domain 
documents, or even financial records, can all be used to add to case data. A final 
observation from this Table was the need to gain early access to cases in order to 
gather data. In terms of the MNT centres, this was one of the most problematic aspects 
of this research study and was detailed later in this Chapter. 
Table 5.4 – Summary of the Interviews carried out for the Study 
Type of Interview 
 
MNT local context  
(i.e. interviews in 
MNT centres) 
MNT extra local context 
(i.e. state actors and cross-field 
actors) 
Total 
Semi-structured 
face to face 
 16 6 22 
Semi-structured 
telephone 
 3  3 
 
6 
Total 19 9 28 
 
Table 5.4 outlines the total number of interviews carried out for this study. The 
preferred interview strategy was to conduct interviews face-to-face, travelling to the 
participant’s venue. This provided a better understanding of the venue of the MNT 
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centre being investigated. However, in a number of cases this was not possible, and 
telephone interviews, with follow-up email correspondence had to suffice.  
5.5.2 Limitations of the Multiple Case Strategy 
Clearly, this strategy had limitations; there was only one researcher to visit each 
organisation and different organisations provided differing levels of access. Therefore, 
the logistics of visiting many centres on a limited budget needed to be considered. 
However, the researcher felt that it was essential to gain an understanding of a wide 
range of organisations to further validate the understanding of innovation management 
processes (in the tens, rather than hundreds). The positivist person with a natural 
science view of the world might argue that hundreds - if not thousands – of data sets 
are required for generalisation. The author’s counter argument was that he was not 
trying to produce statistical generalisations from a large sample population, but rather, 
was trying to overcome the single sample criticism often aimed at qualitative research. 
The investigation of tens of cross-field actors - using rich data collection techniques 
such as interviewing – addressed the key elements of an organisation’s processes that 
constituted ‘success’ or ‘failure’ within each such organisation.  
5.5.3 Data Gathering 
Due to the complexity of the innovation processes for emerging technologies, the 
author believed that the best way to gain an overall understanding of an organisation 
and its innovation processes was to locate key senior figures within each organisation, 
and then conduct expert interviews. Interview data – in narrative form - were the main 
empirical data collected for this thesis. The term empirical stems from empiricism, 
which in this instance refers to the importance of direct contact with social reality 
‘…writers on qualitative research frequently stress the importance of direct experience 
of social settings and fashioning an understanding of social worlds via that contact’ 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.467). Secondary sources were used for validation where 
appropriate, for example Government White Papers and Company Reports.   
5.5.4 Interviewing 
An important challenge to consider when conducting interviews is that of limiting bias 
(Silverman, 2006). According to Eisenhardt the use of ‘numerous and highly 
knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives’ 
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(Eisenhardt, 2007, p.28). Senior, knowledgeable informants were targeted during the 
initial contact with each of the MNT Centres. Generally speaking, these were the 
Centre Directors (whose titles ranged from ‘CEO’, ‘Director’ to ‘Manager’). 
5.5.5 Issues of Data Access 
Access was afforded to nine Centres (and Centre Directors) out of twenty-four, which 
was considered satisfactory, bearing in mind the difficulties of gaining access to data 
concerning the MNT government intervention. Furthermore, seven actors were 
interviewed within the major case, and an additional ten cross-field actors were also 
interviewed. In all cases, only knowledgeable, senior actors were interviewed. That is, 
actors of a senior role, with experience and responsibility for running an MNT centre 
were selected for interview. The twenty-eight interviewees provided experiential 
knowledge from a range of different backgrounds, working in business environments, 
academic environments, or in some cases, both. Such a multiplicity of perspectives 
was deliberately sought in order to answer the research questions more 
effectively to enable the triangulation of data (Poole et al. 2000). 
Semi-structured interviewing: A semi-structured interviewing approach was used to 
gather data across the organisational field. Some advantages and disadvantages of 
qualitative interviewing were reported in the literature and a summary of these can be 
found in Table 5.5: 
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Table 5.5 – Some Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Qualitative 
Interviewing 
  
Advantages Disadvantages 
Pilot interviews aid understanding of  
research environment & clarify  interview 
structure. 
Time consuming. 
Researcher can gain deeper understanding 
than a ‘tick-box’ survey questionnaire. 
Access to individuals (particularly senior 
staff). Poor responses from staff that have been 
‘instructed’ (i.e. stonewalling answers). 
Open questions can expose new avenues. The participant’s mood-may be having a bad 
day. 
Ability to deconstruct large research 
questions into smaller sub-questions-easier  
for interviewee. 
Is the view of the ultimate boss the ‘God’s eye 
view’ – or is anybody’s, for that matter? 
Recording can provide a complete record of 
interview. 
Researcher could use leading questions to gain 
certain responses or bring own bias to 
interview. 
Interviewing an individual removes any peer 
pressure present in focus groups or group 
interviews (as well as use of anonymity). 
Some respondents try to guess the answers or 
may have their own agenda & want to answer 
their own questions; or they may interpret 
them differently to how they are intended. 
Multiple interviews provide a means for 
triangulation and validation of data. 
Recording can be obtrusive & take time to 
transcribe. 
 
Interviews can be carried out in a structured, semi-structured or unstructured way 
(Saunders et al., 2003), all of which have advantages and disadvantages in their use. 
The interview template designed for this study used a semi-structured approach, with 
predominantly open questions being used, and a small number of closed questions.  
Semi-structured interviews are suitable to address ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
(Saunders et al., 2003). When conducting a semi-structured research, ‘the researcher 
has a list of questions on fairly specific topics to be covered, often referred to as an 
interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of leeway in how to reply’ 
(Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.343). They allow the interviewees to respond to questions 
in their own words and put their own views across. Generally, all of the questions are 
asked in a similar way, with similar wording from interviewee to interviewee. 
However, they do not necessarily follow on exactly as outlined in the interview 
schedule.  
Because semi-structured interviews were flexible in nature, they allowed me to ask 
questions which may not have been included in the guide. Figure 5.2 shows the final 
template used, and a number of prompts and probes in the form of bullet-points can be 
seen as a reminder of further questions to elicit responses from interviewees. Whilst 
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interview data is more difficult to compare than structured interviews or survey 
methods, the use of a semi-structured approach offers the opportunity to triangulate 
the data from a range of cross-field participants in order to support reliability and 
validity (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).  
In order to carry out semi-structured interviews, an interview template was designed 
to provide consistency and structure throughout each interview. An important 
consideration when preparing the format of a semi-structured interview is how to ask 
the questions. There are two main types of questions that can be asked; either ‘closed’ 
questions or ‘open’ questions (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.156). Closed questions are 
the most commonly used type of questions as they are easier to analyse and can take 
many forms (Bryman and Bell, 2003; Outhwaite, 2006) For example, one of the 
closed questions asked at the end of my interview script was ‘do you think that 
publicly-funded initiatives such as nanotechnology centres help industry to exploit 
emerging technologies?’. As this example shows, they can be easily quantified and 
often, questions only require a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. Closed questions help to 
confirm the interviewee’s thoughts, and validate other questions asked. In this 
example, the answer to this question typically prompted further questioning. Closed 
questions can take a more prescriptive form too, where interviewees are asked a 
question and presented with a list of answers to choose from. However, this approach 
was considered too restrictive for the purposes of my research questions. The purpose 
of gaining access to senior, knowledgeable experts in the MNT field was to gather a 
deeper understanding of the field, rather than have them merely ‘ticking boxes’.  
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Figure 5.2 – Final Interview Template 
134                                                      
‘Open questions’ are those where respondents are asked a question and can reply 
however they wish. In the main, the questions in this study’s template guide were 
designed to be deliberately open, in order to gain a deeper insight from the expert 
being interviewed, rather than try and force them down the path of closed questioning 
(i.e. ‘yes/no’ answers to pre-ordained questions). This helped to overcome the issue of 
interviewer bias. One of the major advantages of open questions is that the 
interviewee often expands upon the questions asked and gives additional information 
that may not have been considered when creating the interview template. Further 
advantages of open questioning are outlined by Bryman and Bell (2003, p.156), which 
further justified my decision to use open questions: 
a)  Respondents were not forced to answer in the same terms as those foisted on them 
by the closed questions: 
b)  The questions did not suggest certain kinds of answer to respondents. Therefore, 
respondents’ levels of knowledge and understanding could be ascertained. The 
salience of issues for respondents could also be explored: 
c)  They proved useful for exploring new areas (such as the nascent MNT field). 
However, as with all methods, there are potential disadvantages to using open-ended 
questioning. They are time-consuming for data collection and analysis; interviewees 
are likely to talk for longer than they would if asked closed questions. Answers are 
transcribed (for robust data collection) which is immensely time consuming, and then 
require ‘coding’. ‘For each open question entails reading through answers, deriving 
themes that can be employed to form the basis for codes, and then going through the 
answers again so that the answers can be coded for entry into a computer spreadsheet 
[or programme]’ (Bryman and Bell, 2003, p.157). Interviewing coupled with open 
questioning requires greater effort from respondents. Moreover, access needs to be 
elicited, which is difficult when not all respondents are willing to meet with a 
researcher to discuss their business. These difficulties aside, I still considered these 
obstacles worth overcoming in order to gain deep and rich data for my study. 
The initial interview template was trialled with a number of ‘friendly’ interviewees, 
and feedback from my supervisors. Actually running through an interview with the 
template enabled important decisions to be made. For example, the introduction slides 
used needed some refining (e.g. the removal of academic jargon), when introducing 
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the research to the participants. The time allocated was tested to see if it was 
sufficient, and altered where necessary
4
.  The template was then redesigned for field 
use. The pilot interview template can be seen in Appendix 5b, along with the final in 
Figure 5.2. The final template was redesigned more in the form of questions and 
prompts. This was to make the template easier to refer to and keep the interview more 
fluid, allowing for a more natural conversation to ensue. 
The expert interviews were based around a number of sensitising constructs relating to 
the research questions for this PhD study. These constructs provided a way of 
ensuring that the data gathered linked to existing literature, whilst also ensuring a 
focus for the data being gathered. Sensitising constructs were used in order to code the 
data (i.e. transcripts) resulting from the interviews. 
These constructs were adapted from the previously mentioned Minnesota Innovation 
Research Programme (MIRP). 
The following sections provide further information to this research programme 
pertinent to the research methodology for this study. An introduction to the theoretical 
constructs introduced from this research is provided. The way in which they have been 
utilised for this research study is then explained. 
5.5.6 Introduction to the Minnesota Innovation Research Programme (MIRP) 
Large scale research programmes such as the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme (MIRP) were embarked on to investigate the complexity of innovation 
processes. When considering suitable research strategies for this study, the MIRP was 
considered for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, as it is one of the major academic innovation research programmes in recent 
years, it was a natural starting point to appreciate how data can be collected to 
understand how organisations produce innovative products and services. 
Secondly, the MIRP research programme was designed to be flexible and cover a 
wide range of organisations developing a diverse array of products and services. 
                                                 
4
 The issue of time is highly important when those being interviewed are senior members of the 
organisation being researched. Access to many of the interviewees was on the understanding that the 
interview would not exceed a certain duration (typically an hour, although most participants usually 
provided more time once a rapport had been established). 
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Examples include studies of technological developments (e.g. cochlear implants); 
administrative innovations (e.g. public policy innovations); and studies of the adoption 
of innovations. Methods from this programme have been transferred to the 
investigation of the MNT government intervention. 
5.5.7 Background to MIRP 
The MIRP research programme was created to develop a process theory that explains 
innovation development (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). The researchers wanted to 
carry out a longitudinal research programme which took into account the temporal 
order and sequence of steps that take place when an innovative idea makes the 
transition to a concrete reality. They refer to theory building for producing 
‘fundamental laws of innovating useful for explaining how a broad class of processes, 
sequences, and performance conditions unfold along the innovation journey. A 
process theory may also identify certain paths more likely to be effective under certain 
developmental conditions’ (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990, p.313). They collected a 
common core of empirical data by using a consistent framework across a range of 
innovation study groups. In total, 14 studies were carried out, with different research 
teams. The teams comprised 34 people (15 faculty and 19 doctoral students) from 
eight different academic departments and five schools in Minnesota, making it a 
considerable piece of research work in the area of innovation. Their work increased 
awareness of the need to investigate a wider range of characteristics of the innovation 
process, rather than being preoccupied with stage models, and generalisation. 
5.5.8 The MIRP framework   
Poole et al. (2000) describe the definition of innovation used in the MIRP study as 
follows:  
‘the process of innovation.. [is] defined as the development of new ideas by 
people who engage in transactions with others within a changing environmental 
context and who change their behaviours based on the outcomes of their actions’ 
(Poole et al. 2000, p.100). 
This definition establishes the importance of a number of constructs which when 
investigated allow for a deeper understanding of the complex innovation process. The 
focus on ideas leading to outcomes is still a priority, however the range of variables 
around this are also now considered. In terms of the MIRP programme, outcomes 
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were the result of studying a ‘wide variety of product, process, and administrative 
innovations from concept to implementation or termination’ (Poole et al. 2000, 
p.108). They were also selected ‘because they constitute the central factors of concern 
to manage in directing innovations’ (Van de Ven, Angle and Poole, 2000, p.9).  
These constructs are; ideas, people, transactions (referred to as collaborations in this 
PhD), context and outcomes.  
The original descriptions from Van de Ven and Poole (2000) are shown in table 5.5.  
Table 5.6 – Original Constructs used in the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme (Source: Adapted from Van de Ven and Poole, 2000) 
Construct Description 
Ideas A coding of the substantive ideas… that innovation group 
members use to describe the context of their innovation at a given 
point in time.  
People A coding of the people/ groups involved in an activity, the roles 
and activities they perform at a given pointing time, and how they 
formulate problems and make decisions 
Transactions* 
[collaborations] 
The informal and formal relationships among innovation group 
members, other firms, and groups involved in the innovation 
effort. 
Context/ 
environmental 
A coding of the exogenous events outside of the innovation unit 
in the larger organization and industry/ community that are 
perceived by innovation group members to affect the innovation. 
Outcomes A coding of success criteria and ratings by innovation participants 
of how well the innovation is progressing and accomplishing their 
expectations of effectiveness at a given point in time. 
*Note: this later became ‘collaborations’ to make a distinction from MIRP’s method 
of capturing and recording each individual transaction. The term collaboration is used 
to emphasise the more macro view of transactions observed in this thesis between the 
MNT network actors. 
In summary, the adapted constructs from MIRP provide this research with peer-
reviewed, credible methods for gathering and ordering data from the government 
intervention. However, it is the interactive process perspective that will allow analysis 
of this data and the link between agency and structure to be made. 
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5.5.9 Coding and use of Research Constructs 
The literature review for this study covered a range of different areas and brought to 
the surface a number of important concepts to help in understanding and describing 
the identified MNT government intervention. Van de Ven et al. (2000), describe these 
as research constructs. The use of such research constructs are seen as a way of 
guiding the data gathering and analysis for this study. ‘The development of research 
constructs involves an iterative process of developing initial conceptual categories, 
observations, and progressive redefinition and refinement of categories’ (Van de Ven 
et al. (2000, p.68).  
5.5.10 Method for Selecting Research Constructs 
A staged approach was followed in order to develop the final sensitising constructs 
within which this research would be framed. Interview templates were created around 
these constructs to ensure that data was collected in accordance with the major focus 
of this research. In addition, these constructs acted as the key categories with which to 
code interview transcripts and analyse data. Tracey et al. (2004) provided an example 
of how qualitative data were grouped into 1
st
 order themes (constructs), then refined 
further into 2
nd
 order themes, and finally, to a number of aggregated theoretical 
dimensions. I followed a staged approach also, where the 1
st
 order themes were 
adopted from an initial literature review. These consisted of: ideas, people, 
transactions and context, which were adopted from the MIRP Programme introduced 
in the literature chapters. In addition to these, I selected purpose, process and people, 
which were discussed a number of times in the relevant literature. 
The pilot interviews were then carried out and transcripts created, from which the 2
nd
 
order codes were created. These codes were generated by re-reading the transcripts 
and generating a list of codes using an inductive process. 48 codes were generated 
from this process, which can be seen in table 5.7. These codes were then printed out, 
and aligned with the aforementioned constructs selected from the literature. A 
retroductive approach then followed, where I matched up the inductive codes with the 
literature codes in order to move to the 3
rd
 stage of coding development. This was 
carried out using ‘post-it’ notes, coloured pens and a large piece of paper. Figure 5.3 
displays photographs showing evidence of this process, along with an electronic 
version in Figure 5.4. 
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Table 5.7 – List of Codes Generated from Inductive Analysis of Pilot Case 
Interview Transcripts 
Code generated Comments recorded as part of the inductive 
coding process 
COLLABORATION  
Collaboration – SIGNIFICANCE How does collaboration help UK industry? What 
is its significance? 
Collaboration – UNIVERSITY Collaboration with a university 
Collaboration with INDUSTRY 
DRIVER 
What was the driver for this interaction (or was 
it forced? e.g. requirements for a grant) 
Collaboration with  PUBLIC 
SECTOR 
Comments on whether new technologies 
developed within public-sector funded research 
organisations affect industry. 
Collaboration with UNIVERSITY 
DRIVER 
What was the driver for this interaction? 
Collaboration with INDUSTRY Any collaboration with an industrial company? 
COMMERCIALISATION IN 
INDUSTRY 
 
Commercialisation in Industry 
ACTORS 
 
Commercialisation in Industry 
BARRIERS 
 
Commercialisation in Industry 
DRIVERS 
 
Commercialisation in Industry 
RISK 
e.g. Pilot 2: the risk of entering the Chinese 
market 
COMERCIALISATION IN UNI  
Commercialisation in Nano’s 
ACTORS 
Drivers/ barriers for actors 
Commercialisation in Nano’s 
BARRIERS 
e.g. no VC funding/ IP issues/ NDAs etc. are 
barriers. e.g. for Pilot 2 NDAs prevent them 
selling some machines/technologies. 
Commercialisation in Nano’s 
DRIVERS 
 
COMMERCIALISATION IN 
UNIVERSITY 
Understanding the realities of commercialisation 
in universities 
Commercialisation in Uni’s 
ACTORS 
Drivers/ barriers for actors in universities 
Commercialisation in Uni’s 
BARRIERS 
Barriers to commercialisation  in universities 
Commercialisation in Uni’s 
DRIVERS 
Drivers for commercialisation in universities 
(e.g. to get funding to carry on ‘me-too’ work.. 
no interest in commercial gains) 
INFERENTIAL CODES  
CAUSAL LINK Iniital causal links observed (use ‘sets/ nvivo 
features for this’) 
PATTERN Initial patterns observed 
THEME Emerging themes – need to sub-code 
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Code generated Comments recorded as part of the inductive 
coding process 
INNOVATION 
MANAGEMENT 
Coding to innovation management in.. 
Innovation Management – 
INNOVATION TYPES 
Types.. use of typology for new product 
introductions, i.e. ‘new to world’, ‘incremental’ 
etc. (this could easily be captured in the 
summary table for each piece of research) 
Innovation Management – 
PROCESSES 
Themes relating to IM processes (does this 
duplicate previous ‘themes’ code?) 
Innovation Management – 
FLEXIBILITY 
Relates to flexibility given to those developing 
the new technologies (i.e. are people ‘free to go 
off and invent?’) linked to context & people. 
Innovation Management – IDEA 
GENERATION 
Links to MIRP’s ‘idea’ concept. Any idea 
generating sessions? / workshops? 
Innovation Management – 
RETROSPECTIVE 
A retrospective view of the innovation 
management process. Is there anything that 
would be done differently in future? [too vague - 
remove] 
Innovation Management – ROLES reference to any role/ responsibility changes. 
Are there any product champions? 
Innovation Management – 
SUCCESS MEASURES 
What is success? What are the characteristics of 
success? [include project ex’s] 
Innovation Management – 
FAILURE MEASURES 
What is failure? … and characteristics? [include 
project ex’s] 
MARKET ORIENTATION Where are their markets? background….position 
in pecking order/ value chain. 
Market BRAND Is the company well-known? [put in info. table] 
Market  COMPETITION Codes to competition etc. who are their rivals? 
Market CUSTOMERS (Need and 
Frequency) 
Why do they buy the product (need) and 
freqency of purchase. 
Market PRODUCTS Their products/ technologies 
Market CURRENT STRATEGY Do they have a strategy? Where do they want to 
go? what is their philosophy? What is their 
pricing structure plan?.. 
Market FUTURE STRATEGY  
QUERIES  
Queries – PUZZLES Are these needed? 
Queries – SURPRISES  
SITUATION ANALYSIS A case report could be created for this 
Situation CULTURE Culture in the organisation (attitudes etc.) 
Situation ENVIRONMENTAL Issues relating to the external environment: to 
political, to economic, to social, to 
technological.. [PEST analysis] 
Situation FINANCIALS Financial analysis: comparison with 
competitors, industry 
Situation STRUCTURE  Overall structure.. hierarchical/ flexible; lines of 
responsibility; lines of authority; issues of 
communication flow etc. 
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Figure 5.3 – Paper Development of Research Constructs 
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Figure 5.4 – Electronic Development of Research Constructs 
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This process enabled the construction of categories or themes with which the research 
questions could be answered (Morse, 2008). These were termed ‘sensitising 
constructs’. The selected sensitising constructs were: purpose, process, people, 
collaborations, context, and outcomes. They are described further in Table 5.6 below. 
The constructs selected (i.e. codes) in Table 5.8 therefore, guided the analysis, rather 
than constrained it. While these constructs were likely to change as the study evolved, 
they provided however, a way to describe the complex nature of government 
interventions. For example, the generation of sub-codes was likely to follow as some 
quite subtle differences between cases needed to be catered for. 
Table 5.8 – Sensitising Constructs chosen for this Study. 
Sensitising Construct Interpretation for this PhD study 
Purpose Organisational purpose, the value for the customer. 
a) Generic Nanocentre purpose (the interviewee’s understanding 
of the overall purpose of nanocentres) 
b)  Individual Nanocentre Purpose (issues relating to  the purpose 
of  an individual centre) 
c) Perceived Government purpose & measures -> interviewee’s 
perceptions of the Government view. 
Note: this category includes the perception of success and failure 
within an organisation. 
Process What processes are needed to achieve your purpose?  The actions 
that create value. Flexibility of role. 
Product Lifecycle method? Stage-gate?  
People How to engage people to agree on purpose? What drives them? The 
people/ groups involved in an incident, the roles and activities they 
perform at a given time. 
a) Academics (researchers) 
b) Industrialists (experience levels) 
Collaborations The formal & informal relationships among innovation group 
members; other firms & groups included in the incident. 
Context Environment (type of organisation, structure). 
The circumstances that form the setting for an event. External events 
outside of the innovation department (in larger organisation and 
industry) that interviewees perceive to affect the innovation process. 
Outcomes Provide evidence of results, either positive [+] or negative [-] and 
mixed [+/-], (neutral or ambiguous news, indicating elements of 
success and failure). 
Understanding of success and failure. 
 
Outcomes in terms of positive or negative differed between research informants 
within the pilot studies; consequently, participants in the main cases were also asked 
to provide positive and negative empirical examples (i.e. successful or failed 
enterprises). The rationale here was that the researcher wanted to see if the differing 
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stances were linked to the organisational environment and other aspects of the 
constructs under investigation. 
5.5.11 Data Management 
Due to the selected semi-structured interviewing process, a massive amount of 
narrative data were produced in the form of transcripts. This data needed to be 
analysed in a manageable way. The use of sensitising constructs and coding in order 
to link data to existing literature and the research questions of interest in this study, 
was outlined above. Once the interviews were transcribed, the electronic files were 
manually read and portions coded to those shown in Table 5.6. With the use of a 
generic qualitative software programme, the coded files could then be analysed for 
themes and data analysis (The programme used was ‘NVivo Version 8’, produced by 
QSR International. Alternative programmes could also have been used). While such 
software was useful, large meta-tables of the data were also produced in order to aid 
thematic analysis and pattern-matching
5. A large table (or ‘meta-table’), was created 
for comparison of the data from actors within each MNT centre. This meta-table was 
printed out on an A1 sheet of paper, which was referred to for data analysis and 
reduction purposes. This table was developed following advice on data reduction from 
Miles and Huberman (1994, p.10). Due to the large amount of data and size of this 
Table, it has been reproduced in the Appendix 5d. 
Analysis of the non-MNT centre based actors was carried out by comparing coded 
sections of transcripts with the other actors - i.e. all extracts from transcripts coded as 
‘purpose’ were printed and compared together. This process allowed for a large data 
set to be managed and used in a valid and credible way for qualitative analysis. 
5.6 Research Ethics 
Due to the emerging nature of the technologies being developed within each MNT 
Centre, and the sensitive nature of some of the questions being asked, an appropriate 
confidentiality agreement was signed prior to conducting interviews. Bryman and Bell 
(2003), describe the purpose of confidentiality agreements as ‘[defining] what type of 
                                                 
5
 In reality, the use of large meta-tables created in spreadsheets was essential to pattern-matching and 
thematic analysis of data. These were printed on A1 sheets and joined together so that analysis across 
all of the cases was possible. 
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information you can have access to and to establish what information you are and are 
not able to disclose about the company’ (p.51).  As such, I ensured that due process 
was carefully followed in terms of gaining ethical approval and carrying out the 
research for this study (see Appendix 5e and 5f). With every interview, the five 
minute introduction slides were presented, which incorporated issues around 
confidentiality. Interviewees were then asked to sign the individual consent form to 
show that they agreed with the interview conditions (see Appendix 5g). 
Any information that I gathered during my research was subject to a moratorium 
period, participant anonymity and the use of a number of pseudonyms. There was also 
due cognisance given to the fact that ‘ethical issues frequently arise from a clash 
between personal and professional interests’ (Punch, 1986, p.53). This suggests that a 
keen researcher must be careful not to overstep the boundaries of what can and cannot 
be published. Consideration of whether the use of pseudonyms was sufficient for 
some companies was also important. Hofstede’s (1984) research into a well-known 
organisation did its best to hide its identity; however, due to the company’s size and 
uniqueness, the data would have had to be distorted to fully hide it. For the 
organisations and individuals discussed within this PhD study, pseudonyms were 
used. Furthermore, any details concerning location and specific metrics - such as total 
grants – were rendered anonymous as much as possible. Where Reports have been 
used that contained potentially identifying data, then this data were redacted (i.e. 
blacked out in order to remove it). 
5.7 Reflections on Data Access 
In any research study, access to data is of paramount concern. A large amount of 
primary data was collected for this study using the methodology outlined in this 
present Chapter
6
. Those responsible for each MNT Centre (generally the CEOs, 
Directors or Managers) were targeted for contact. A series of introductory e-mails 
                                                 
6
28 interviews were analysed across the MNT organisational field. This comprised multiple hours of 
data and many miles of travelling. Although not included in the Thesis, further interviews and 
workshops were carried out as part of the research journey. These included: one MNT centre customer, 
one MNT centre supplier (and its competitor), and a interview at IMEC (an equivalent government 
intervention in Leuven, showing an MNT intervention focused on one large centre rather than the 
distributed model in the UK. Although not used due to space limitation, these were important in further 
developing my ideas for this research study.  
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were sent to each Centre, followed by telephone calls to discuss my research and 
potential access to each centre.  
In total, nine Centres were kind enough to allow some access for my research study, 
with one of these (Mercury) providing full access. In some cases, a determined effort 
was required in order to obtain interview access. I was keen to interview one 
particular Centre - referred to as 'Liber' in later Chapters – as a number of interviewees 
had described it as a particularly successful example of an MNT centre. Initial contact 
with MNT Centre 'Liber' included an e-mail and a follow-up telephone call with the 
Centre’s Director; however, access was denied. The Director apparently did not see 
the need for my research. However, a subsequent conversation he had with another 
interviewee from the main case Mercury gave this Director more confidence in my 
research, and an interview was finally arranged.  
 
Another example is that of the Centre Bacchus which was part of a larger global 
organisation. Due to the size of the organisation and limited information of the MNT 
Centre it hosted in the public domain, it was very difficult to locate the particular 
Centre Director. Eventually, he was contacted and access was secured. In other cases, 
it was just a case of a telephone conversation to build a rapport with the participant. In 
cases where some participants were less positive about being interviewed due to their 
time commitments, I was able to arrange some telephone interviews. These followed 
exactly the same template and process as the face-to-face interviews. The only 
disadvantage was that I was unable to visit the actual sites and gain a bit more 
contextual background information. 
At the start of data collection process, a meeting with the NDGB responsible for the 
MNT centres was arranged. This meeting was to discuss potential access to the centres 
in the MNT field with the MNT Operations Director – Mr Morgan.  
At the start of data collection process, a meeting with the NDGB responsible for the 
MNT centres was arranged. This meeting was to discuss potential access to the centres 
in the MNT field with the MNT Operations Director – Mr Morgan. He was able to 
provide basic data such as the financial value of grants allocated to each centre, along 
with a number of useful contacts. However, he explained that the TSB was unable to 
provide more detailed data for each centre in relation to the audits that they carry out 
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via the management consultants ‘Ernst and Young’. Mr Morgan explained that this 
was due to the restrictions written into the contract between each MNT centre and the 
TSB (and formerly in the original DTI contracts). In addition to correspondence with 
Mr Morgan, a senior auditor from Ernst and Young was also interviewed (Mr. Rubik).  
Through the cross-case analysis, I was made aware of a report that the TSB had 
recently commissioned from a third-party MNT consultancy. The objective of this 
report to benchmark the UK MNT centres with world class facilities, and was referred 
to as the Yole Report (named after ‘Yole Développement’, the consultancy 
commissioned for the report). Having been made aware of this report I asked Mr 
Morgan for a copy of this data. Unfortunately, I was informed that all aspects of this 
report were considered commercial-in-confidence. I therefore contacted the centres 
individually and the auditors for secondary data. However, I had limited success in 
this. Therefore I put in a Freedom of Information (FoI) request in to the Information 
Commissioner's Office (ICO) in order to obtain this report. The outcome from this 
process was a copy of a couple of pages of the Yole report, but no commercially 
confidential data. 
On mature reflection, my own perseverance and commitment as well as the suitability 
of my research approach, allowed me to eventually gain enough rich data to 
investigate the research questions in sufficient depth for this PhD study. As such the 
failure to obtain the Yole report had no impact on this research. 
5.8 Chapter Summary 
This Chapter began by discussing my ontological and epistemological views in 
relation to this research project, with clarification of my research perspective as being 
that of an interpretivist.  
The research gaps and research questions were introduced along with the research 
design. The way in which the research venue was established - following an 
interpretive approach – through a number of pilot organisations first, sets the scene for 
a description of this study’s research venue.  
Research strategies and situations have been critiqued in order to answer the research 
questions, along with a discussion of how they relate to the interpretivist research 
position adopted. 
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In summary, this study adopted a case study research strategy which gathered data 
using a semi-structured interview approach. The influence that the MIRP framework 
had on the data gathering process and coding of research constructs is described in 
detail. The development and use of codes enabled the linking of data to the extant 
literature along with cross-case analysis. 
The next chapter provides detailed background information for the research venue; 
that is, the ‘UK MNT government intervention’. 
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Chapter 6 - Presentation of Organisational Field: the UK Micro- and 
Nano- Technology Network 
6.1 Background to the Department of Trade and Industry’s Micro- 
and Nano- Technology (MNT) Manufacturing Initiative 
In June 2001 an advisory group on nanotechnology applications was appointed to 
establish a UK nanotechnology strategy. This advisory group was called the UK 
Advisory Group on Nanotechnology Applications, and was chaired by Dr John Taylor. 
The resulting DTI report – known as the ‘Taylor Report’ - began with a stark warning 
that ‘any industry that fails to investigate the potential of nanotechnology, and to put in 
place its own strategy for dealing with it, is putting its business at risk’ (DTI, 2002, 
p.6). The evidence behind the report came from the advisory group, consisting of both 
academic and industry experts; chaired by the Director General of the Research 
Councils.  
The strategy put forward was: ‘specifically designed to support the academic research 
and industrial capability necessary to allow the UK to benefit from the commercial 
potential of nanotechnology’ (House of Commons, 2003, p.3).  
Furthermore, the advisory group were ‘..charged with reviewing the current state of 
nanotechnology applications in industry in the UK, and proposing, if appropriate, 
actions to accelerate and support increased industrial investment in nanotechnology 
exploitation (DTI, 2002a, p.7). 
The Taylor report also describes how nanotechnology is a disruptive technology: 
‘A distinctive feature of genuinely disruptive technologies is that they can have 
very many different applications. This is particularly true for nanotechnology. For 
example, nanoparticles technology alone can influence a large number of 
products and services (see Figure 1 below). Disruptive technologies are those that 
displace older technologies and enable radically new generations of existing 
products and processes to take over. For example, optical data storage, through 
such devices as compact disks, has changed the face of home entertainment and 
computing; digital cameras based on solid-state memory and imaging 
technologies are replacing photographic film’ (DTI, 2002a, p.17). 
A month after the Taylor report, the government released its science strategy ‘Investing 
in Innovation’ (DTI, 2002b). In this report there was further attention drawn to the 
importance of nanotechnology to the economy.  
150 
 
 
In July 2003, one year after the Taylor report, Lord Sainsbury of Turville (the then 
Minister for Science and Innovation), announced ‘a package of funding for 
nanotechnology worth £90 million over six years, along with the establishment of a 
Micro and Nanotechnology (MNT) Network to direct the spending of this money’ 
(House of Commons, 2003, p.5). This funding was split into £50M for applied research 
and £40M for capital projects. The latter concerning the creation of a regionally 
dispersed network of MNT facilities.  
6.1.1 The MNT Network 
The purpose of the MNT Network is described as follows: 
‘The UK Micro and Nanotechnology (MNT) Network has been established by the 
DTI and the 12 Regional Development Agencies, and Devolved Administrations 
working together, to provide a market-orientated focus for the facilities, people 
and organisations engaged in Micro and Nanotechnologies in the UK. The 
Network is helping to lower entry barriers and drive the widespread market 
development and exploitation of these technologies – building a prosperous, 
world-class MNT sector in the UK’ (DTI, 2005). 
A number of important benefits – which are directly linked to the creation of the MNT 
capital facilities programme - were to result from this network: 
 Improved access to the critical mass of world-class knowledge and facilities in 
the UK and overseas. 
 Facilitation of a complete supply-chain and better use of facilities, to take ‘blue-
skies research’ through to high-volume and high-value-added manufacture by 
UK companies. 
 Identifying the demand for, and working with stakeholders to provide the new 
facilities needed to build the UK MNT capability. 
 Encouraging a coordinated approach to applied research programmes and 
business support. 
(DTI, 2005) 
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6.1.2 Raison d’être of the Micro- and Nano- Technology Centres 
The MNT Capital Facilities Programme describes the second part of the UK MNT 
manufacturing initiative, where £40 million was allocated to provide UK businesses 
with a new network of MNT facilities. The presentation by the MNT Network Director 
at the MNT manufacturing initiative information day (Clare, 2004), broke this figure 
down into £30 million for capital costs, and £10 million for running costs. He 
emphasised that in order to be successful ‘additional industry money’ was required to 
succeed.  
The MNT Capital Facilities Programme is referred to as the ‘UK MNT government 
intervention’ or the ‘MNT intervention’ throughout this thesis. The 24 facilities created 
are referred to as MNT centres. 
This MNT network was created to provide UK businesses with access to the latest range 
of MNT services and capabilities within key sectors; thus enabling UK industry to gain 
a ‘step-up’ the ladder, without the initial burden of investing in expensive capital 
equipment and facilities. 
In 2007 the DTI became the Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform 
(DBERR). As part of this metamorphosis, the Technology Strategy Board (TSB) was 
formed. The TSB was established in July of this year as a non-departmental 
Government body (NDGB). The aim of this new NDGB was to promote ‘business 
investment in, and use of science, technology and innovation in the UK, with the aim of 
increasing economic growth and improving quality of life’. The TSB are now 
responsible for overseeing the MNT Programme. 
Table 6.1 provides extracts from public domain sources which outline the intended 
purpose of the MNT government intervention. 
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Table 6.1 – Extracts from the Original MNT and Current MNT Public Domain 
Sources Describing the Purpose of the MNT Programme. 
Extract from original MNT network website, April 2004. 
In the context of the UK MNT Network, Capital Projects are defined as projects which 
implement: 
‘Industry/market facing UK based facilities which provide cost-effective open access 
for organisations and individuals to capabilities, processes and associated knowledge 
leading to marketable products, and services’. 
The objective of Capital Projects fund is to invest in the development of UK technology 
infrastructure to: 
 Accelerate the commercialisation of MNT for the wider benefit of the UK economy; 
 Provide open access on equitable commercial terms to Microsystems and Nano 
Technology platforms and associated knowledge. 
 Develop a critical mass of capability whilst avoiding duplication of provision. 
 
The intention of these Capital Projects Calls is thus to deliver open-access MNT 
facilities of national significance. 
(DTI, 2004) 
 
Extract from TSB website, 2009 
’The aspiration was for a distributed network of world-class manufacturing facilities 
with focus on strategic areas for the UK. The facilities were structured to cover the 
continuum from micro to nano scale. The facilities generally built on existing 
University or business expertise, and were established with the intention of becoming, 
in time, self financing (with the exception of the nano-medicine and metrology fields, 
where a measure of ongoing public support is likely to be required)’ (TSB, 2009). 
 
In real terms the figure of £90 million was achieved through a joint investment of the 
UK Government with the UK Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) and the 
Devolved Administrations (DAs) of Wales and Scotland. One third of this money was 
allocated to collaborative R&D MNT projects, with two-thirds meeting the cost of 
capital infrastructure.  
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6.1.3 How were the Host Organisations Selected? 
The TSB describes how ‘50 projects were approved through targeted competitions run 
in 2004-5’ (TSB, 2009).  
The centres were selected via a number of calls for proposals which were organised 
using an electronic submission process on the MNT Network website. As such little 
hard copy information is hard to come by. Fortunately, use of an internet archive search 
engine (Internet Archive, 2010) has allowed original documentation (albeit electronic), 
to be recovered. Appendix 6a contains print-outs of this secondary data, which outlines 
the assessment criteria used for selecting suitable recipients of funding for this capital 
facilities programme. 
Tender applications for each call were then reviewed by an expert selection committee, 
and decisions made. Following the initial call there was an additional - more selective – 
call, addressing technology areas that were not additionally addressed  
The majority of projects were funded for five years, with a number funded for two or 
three years. A number of projects will have reached completion in 2009, with the more 
recent ones continuing until 2012. 
24 Micro and Nanotechnology Centres were created (MNT centres), a list of which can 
be seen in table 6.2. Note that ‘SafeNano I’ and ‘SafeNano II’ are counted by the TSB 
as one centre.  
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Table 6.2 – List of Micro- and Nano- Technology Centres 
 
MNT Centre 
(anonymised) 
Local Context Government Grant Start Finish 
Centre A Existing SME £2m or under 2005 2010 
Centre B Existing SME £4m or under 2006 2011 
Liber Science Park £2m or under 2005 2010 
Centre C University £2m or under 2007 2012 
Centre D Existing SME £1m or under 2006 2009 
Lucretia University £3m or under 2005 2010 
Centre E University £1m or under 2006 2009 
Centre F University £1m or under 2006 2009 
Centre G University £5m or under 2006 2011 
Ulysses University Science Park £2m or under 2005 2010 
Centre H University £4m or under 2005 2010 
Concordia Science Park £4m or under 2005 2010 
Rhea Existing SME £2m or under 2006 2011 
Centre I Existing SME £3m or under 2006 2011 
Cardia R&D Centre £6m or under 2006 2011 
Centre J Spin-out from Government 
body 
£1m or under 2006 2011 
Centre K University £5m or under 2006 2011 
Mercury University £3m or under 2005 2010 
Centre L University £2m or under 2005 2010 
Centre M University £1m or under 2006 2009 
Bacchus Global Organisation £1m or under 2006 2009 
Centre N Science Park £2m 2007 2009 
SafeNano I Independent centre £1m or under 2006 2009 
SafeNano II Independent centre £1m or under 2008 2012 
Centre Q Science Park £6m or under 2008 2013 
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The MNT centres were established in a range of organisational settings. These settings 
consist of the following: 
 New businesses 
 Cost-centres within an existing business 
 Centres within a University School 
 Centres within a Science Park 
These are outlined in Table 6.2, which lists the micro- and nano- technology centres. 
Pseudonyms are used for issues of confidentiality, and grant figures are put into ranges. 
Graph 6.1 below shows the total amount of grant contributions received for those cases 
investigated within this PhD study. As the chart shows this sample represents over half 
of the government spend for the Capital Facilities Programme (i.e. MNT Centres). 
Figure 6.1 – Proportion of Capital Facilities Grant Contributions in relation to the 
sample Case Centres accessed 
 
A timeline for the creation of the MNT centres was produced by the researcher, and is 
shown in figure 6.2. This was validated by a number of key stakeholders within the 
MNT network. Figure 6.2 was attached to an email and validation and comment was 
asked for from a number of those involved at the planning stage of the government 
intervention. These included the architect of the centres, and many of the RDA actors. 
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Figure 6.2 – Timeline for the Creation of the Micro- and Nano- Technology (MNT) 
Manufacturing Initiative. 
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6.2 Nature of Funding for the UK Micro- and Nano- Technology 
Network 
The funding of MNT centres involved a large amount of financial support for the 
purchasing of expensive capital equipment. This introduces rules pertaining to state aid 
and the EC treaty (BIS, 2009), for reasons outlined in the following:   
‘One of the fundamental objectives of the EC Treaty is to create a single market in 
which competition is not distorted. If Member States were free to give subsidies, 
grants or other forms of favourable financial treatment to individual companies 
(or “undertakings”), there would be an inevitable risk that those “undertakings” 
would have an unfair advantage over competitors who do not benefit from State 
Aid… To eliminate this risk, the EC Treaty in principle prohibits subsidies which 
distort competition and affect trade between Member States in the EU. State aid is 
permitted only in limited circumstances where it can be shown to be necessary to 
achieve certain specified Community objectives’ (BIS, 2009). 
The TSB reinforce the need to avoid distorting the market with the MNT intervention 
programme. The current MNT Operations Director describes how they [government 
interveners] ‘..really only want to step in where help is needed - for example in this case 
there was deemed to be a prohibitively high cost of entry for the technologies. We can't 
meet the whole cost of running the centres through public funds, typically we fund 
around 50%. The centres must charge a commercial rate for their services and have to 
provide open-access (i.e. they can't use the equipment just for their own research or 
production ends). One of the reasons why we measure the centres as commercial 
enterprise is that we want technology to be proactively marketed - the idea is to 
stimulate wider commercial exploitation of the technology across UK businesses’ 
(emphasis added). 
 
The ‘commercial’ nature of the centres makes them very interesting for research, as they 
have been set-up in a range of organisational contexts, some of which are not typically 
geared towards generating commercial revenue, e.g. university research departments. 
Also there is a paradox of wanting to adhere to state aid regulations, but also wanting 
the centres to generate revenue; in a number of centres investigated, this has been the 
cause of some confusion. For example, if a centre is set in a large global organisation, 
then it the mechanisms for becoming ‘open access’ to external companies may prove 
problematic (e.g. shown in Bacchus later). At the other end of the spectrum, a university 
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might find that it is trying to be commercially focused, when traditionally the university 
institution is driven by knowledge acquisition and sharing. 
6.3 Fit with Organisational Theory 
It is important to clearly state the understanding of ‘organisational field’ and ‘field of 
action’ in relation to the studied intervention programme (i.e. the UK MNT Network). 
The MNT government intervention is understood as the ‘organisational field’ for this 
research study, where intervention refers to the policy initiative. The outcome of this 
intervention is understood in terms of the actors involved in this programme. The 
conception of the MNT government intervention as a field has been discussed already in 
the bridging literature chapter, and is further discussed in the cross-case comparison 
chapter.  
6.4 Data Accessed within the MNT Government Intervention 
A number of diagrams have been created to display the MNT centres accessed as part of 
this research. These can be seen in appendix 6b, and 6c. They are as follows: 
 Appendix 6b - A graphical overview of the MNT centres accessed, along with the 
cross-field actors. 
 Appendix 6c - A graphical overview of the MNT centres accessed, along with the 
cross-field actors, and with details of the data collected. 
Further details of individual actors and centres are provided in the main case study 
chapter and cross-case study chapter. The reason for this is to make it easier for readers 
to refer back to this important data in the most relevant and accessible location. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has provided detailed background information for the UK MNT 
government intervention. It has been included to enable a deeper understanding of the 
initial intentions of the MNT government intervention, and the historical events which 
have had an influence on its development. 
The next chapter presents the findings from the major MNT case study. 
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Chapter 7 – Major Case Study 
The previous chapter introduced the micro- and nano- technology government 
intervention. The creation of this MNT field and its associated actors constitute the 
object of inquiry for this PhD. The creation of the MNT field is understood in terms of a 
field of action with resulting outcomes from this government intervention understood in 
terms of the actions of actors within it. Following on from the conceptualisation of the 
MNT network as a field, the major case study is now introduced and findings reported. 
7.1 Introduction to Major Case Study 
The researcher was successful in gaining in-depth access to one of the MNT centres. 
The rationale for this access was to gain a more detailed understanding of a centre 
within its local context, and that of the extra local context of the MNT field. This 
organisation has been renamed „Mercury‟ for issues of confidentiality. Actors 
throughout the organization with a range of organizational responsibilities and roles 
were interviewed for primary data collection. Reference to secondary source documents 
were used to triangulate the perceptions of interviewed actors. 
During the data collection all constructs were used according to the original research 
design and data gathering strategy. However, it became clear during the analysis of data 
for the major case study that the data coded to the „process‟ construct did not provide as 
rich an insight as originally forecast; where „rich‟ refers to an understanding of any 
formalised processes followed by an organisation developing emerging technologies. 
The interpretivist approach adopted by the author was particularly interested in 
understanding innovation as a function of particular contexts, motivations and people 
coming together at a point in time. As such, the author excluded the discussion of 
results gathered from this construct as they offered little interpretive value to the 
research questions asked. 
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7.2 Background to the Major Case Study: ‘Mercury’ 
The following list provides an overview of both primary and secondary data collected 
within this case study. 
 11 interviews:  
 5 interviews with day-to-day staff 
 1 interview with Vice Chancellor of the University 
 1 interview with the Regional Development Agency manger for the region 
 1 interview with a former steering group member 
 1 interview with supplier (of in-kind/ matched kit) 
 2 customers 
 Mercury‟s project application proposal document (written June, 2004) 
 Details of the TSB „traffic-light‟ monitoring measurement system 
 Extracts from recent benchmarking report 
Mercury is hosted by a large UK university‟s engineering department. The university  - 
referred to as Venus - submitted its tender to the DTI MNT network capital facilities 
project in June 2004. The university department already offered a range of micro 
manufacturing and precision manufacturing technologies and expertise. They saw a gap 
in the micro engineering field for a number of bridging technologies to be developed for 
the benefit of the wider UK economy. This submission was in answer to the second call 
from the DTI for funded projects (see appendix 6a for the tender application process). 
The project application proposal document can be seen in the transcript addendum, it 
has been redacted to protect sensitive and identifiable information. This will be referred 
to as the „proposal document‟ throughout this chapter. The intended aim for „Mercury‟ 
is clearly outlined in the proposal document as follows: 
„The aim of the project is to establish unique facilities at Venus university to 
provide an industry facing micro-manufacture service in the UK for closing the 
existing „machining gap‟ between the „classical‟ micro machining technologies 
and semiconductor .. technologies..‟ (proposal document, p.1). 
The proposed project objectives extracted from the project application form are 
reproduced in the following list, in general terms: 
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1. to improve the access to the existing micro-manufacture facilities and expertise 
at the [university] and integrate this major resource into the MNT Network; 
2. to create and integrate a critical mass of batch fabrication expertise in the UK 
that will underpin the development of microtechnologies beyond the ones that 
rely on conventional .. tools and material. 
3. to provide specialist training alongside these unique facilities to address the 
existing shortage of people experienced and skilled in “classical” micro-
machining and micro-fabrication technologies… 
4. .. be a catalyst for the growth of a UK industry in precision…microcomponents 
5. ..will stimulate the development of a supply chain, become an attractor for 
investors and start-up companies thus providing valued high-technology jobs in 
[this region and the UK]. 
6. Furthermore in terms of collaboration, a strong indication that existing 
university links with European projects would benefit the MNT centre tendered 
for. 
The project was approved, and began in 2005. The grant period agreed was for five 
years, ending in 2010. The grant allocated was 2.59 Million GBP, to be matched with 
industry support and sales. In-kind support came from a number of suppliers – two 
manufacturing companies; one clean room company and one marketing company. Of 
these one of the manufacturing suppliers was also interviewed (at the beginning of the 
project). This supplier will be referred to as Luna within this thesis. 
Throughout the life of the project there was contestation between the professional 
academic actors leading the centre, the business manager and the state actors (i.e. TSB 
actors). This contestation was directly linked to the perceived purpose of the centre by 
different actor groups, which is discussed in detail in this chapter. A clear indicator of 
this was when Mercury was made into a limited company, in order for the University to 
demonstrate to the TSB that grant funding and activities would be „ring-fenced‟ solely 
for Mercury. In reality, this appeared to be more of a paper exercise, and interviewees 
described how Mercury remained in the same context, and continued in the same vein.  
In an attempt to redress the balance between key actor groups, a number of individuals 
were recruited to help. Firstly, in August 2008, Professor Stephenson asked Dr Newton 
to join the steering group, recognising that having someone with both academic and 
162 
 
business experience might be beneficial. He was also someone with a reputation of not 
shying from making hard decisions, which may be indicative of the period at which 
things began to become contested between the actor groups in Mercury. Dr Newton 
remained on the steering group until March 2009, when he had to step down due to 
other work commitments.  During this time, he described how the issue of running such 
a „commercial‟ centre in a university was extremely difficult. He emphasised the 
difficulties of having to follow strict state-aid rules whilst still generating revenue. 
Mercury continued to have problems and the TSB made it a condition of continued 
funding, that an external CEO would be appointed. Shortly after October 2008 this 
happened, and Dr Plunkett was recruited. This coincided with the only time at which 
Mercury received an „amber‟ rating for its progress (refer to figure 7.2) – at all other 
times the progress was red-flagged, which means „critical‟ or „off-track‟. 
In an unprecedented move, the TSB withdrew funding from the centre eight months 
before the project‟s completion date. Such drastic action would have been a last resort, 
because it is unlikely to reflect well on both Venus university and the government 
bodies involved. Angle (2000) describes how: 
„as situations deteriorate gradually, people adapt to the changes and are not 
motivated to act… In the extreme, innovative response to threats or opportunities 
become forestalled until situations change to a fairly drastic extent‟ (Angle, 2000, 
p.149). 
This may be an illustration of what happened for those actors within Mercury. 
The Technology Strategy Board MNT operations manager did make a point of saying 
that the TSB doesn‟t run the centre, only sponsor them. This action seems to suggest a 
stronger influence than just sponsoring a centre. However, at the time of writing, the 
centre has continued to trade. The business manager of Mercury explained how this was 
„in order to run-out the contracts.. [but]..once [they are] out of the system, that‟s it‟. 
For the difficulties mentioned above, Mercury provides an ideal case demonstrating 
failure of a government intervention. Often case studies only account for successful 
cases or organisations – Mercury therefore provides a chance to add further 
understanding of why interventions can and do fail. 
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7.2.1 Organization Structure 
The structure of Mercury is shown in Figure 7.1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 – Organisational Structure of Mercury. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the organisational structure as provided by descriptions from 
interviewees within Mercury. A simple hierarchical approach appears to have been 
adopted. The Business Development Manager - Dr. Rubin - explained that originally a 
flat line management approach was tried out for Mercury: 
 „we tried the flat line, when the project was launched everyone was project 
manager and it was up to them to liaise with the customers and get the deadlines 
but that didn‟t work as [it] wasn‟t structured enough… because a lot of what we 
do is ..[multiple processes] so things weren‟t being distributed correctly.. so they 
brought me in to try and control that‟ (Dr. Rubin).  
The proposal describes how an industrial advisory board was formed to include users 
and technology providers to direct the management of Mercury „as a service that is 
industry facing and at the same time sufficiently flexible to adapt quickly to changing 
demands and commercial priorities through: 
 Concentrating on areas that will have the highest impact on the 
commercialisation of MST (Micro Systems Technologies) products; 
 Positioning it correctly in relation to other MNT providers in the UK; 
 Engaging in long term partnerships with the client companies; 
 Adopting best practice methods and processes in its core operation; 
 Ensuring the marketing strategy is targeted upon priority industrial clusters and 
groups‟.  
 
  (Source: Proposal document, 2004, p.13, see transcript addendum, not in library copy) 
CEO 
Production Manager Business Development 
Manager 
 
5 project researchers 
technicians 
1 administrator 
Industrial advisory board (every other month) 16 attend (out of 30), 
include suppliers 
Board of Directors (2 university accountants, one CEO and one professor) 
Pham/  
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Considering the nature of the university as an institution: i.e. an institution for 
education, learning and discovery, the suggestion that one could be industry facing and 
flexible is questionable. Universities are large organisations with associated bureaucratic 
structures, the concept of flexibility does not easily fit. However, in terms of a research 
centre within a university, there is the potential that a flexible unit could be created as 
part of the larger organisation (university); this is analogous to the ideas presented in the 
EDT literature (e.g. Loutfy and Belkhir, 2001). If this is the case then the potential for 
Mercury to be flexible and commercially focused by detaching itself from the wider 
university bureaucracy was certainly possible. The issue and challenge of the organising 
principles of key actors within such an environment and the resulting issues are 
investigated in this thesis. 
Table 7.1 displays the pseudonyms of actors within Mercury, along with their 
associated roles. 
The industrial advisory board consists of actors from funding bodies, large private 
industries, and Mercury‟s suppliers. Newton explains how there are typically 16 
members at each meeting, out of a total membership of 30. 
„In a normal environment they would probably come along, review the past 
performance, look at the last 6 months figures, look at the last 6 months activity, 
and say things like ' have you thought about looking at this business centre', 'do 
you need this many people?', 'why aren't you going to more exhibitions?'.. the 
'steering' stuff. The critical friends stuff‟ (Dr Plunkett).  
For confidentiality reasons it was not possible for me to obtain a list of the members of 
the advisory board. In terms of funding bodies there will have been actors from the TSB 
on the board, and the suppliers mentioned earlier, including Luna. 
Initial plans were for the board to meet quarterly. Newton – a former steering group 
member - adds that the steering group „does have a lot of industrialists on it..[and is] 
quite a powerful group‟. He believes it to be an advantage to Mercury, considering the 
„sheer amount of talent ..on the group‟. The business development manager acted as 
secretary to the advisory board. 
The CEO, Dr. Plunkett, is the direct link to the board of directors from the steering 
committee. Alongside Plunkett, there are 3 additional actors; firstly the head of the 
university finance department; secondly one of his colleagues in finance; and thirdly 
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Professor Stephenson (lead professor and board member). For a short period Dr. 
Newton was also a director on this board. Three out of the four actors are university 
staff and one is an industrialist. The role of the board of directors is for „prudence and 
ensuring the business is run in an effective manner‟. The board meets once a month for 
three hours. According to Dr. Newton, it is „probably not as joined up as it should be‟. 
The board covers standard items; trading profit or loss balance accounts; minutes of the 
steering group meetings; compliance with all the public sector regulations; and 
generally due diligence. Dr. Newton describes how there is „a lot of bureaucracy 
involved in a company like this one, an awful lot more than you would in a typical [..] 
business‟. 
Below the board of directors sits the production manager and the business development 
manager. The production manager manages a number of researchers/ technicians, and 
the business development manager attends to marketing of Mercury. 
7.2.2 Products and Services Offered by Mercury 
Mercury as a centre offers a number of unique services. In order to protect the 
anonymity of the centre, the services and products it offers are described in general 
terms only. Needless to say the centre is developing emerging technologies; unlike a 
number of other centres, Mercury is focused on the micro scale of technology 
development. In some cases applications can include nanoscale machining, but in 
general the focus is in the micro range. One micrometer (or micron) is one-millionth of 
a meter, i.e. 1 x 10
-6
 m. In physical terms we can think of the diameter of a human hair 
as being 17 times larger than that of a micron. 
In terms of technology and services offered, Mercury was established to focus on 
reducing the gap between traditional micro machining technologies and semiconductor 
patterning technologies for non-silicon materials. Microbridge services include the 
development of technologies using mechanical or energy-assisted processes (e.g. laser, 
and electrode discharge machining - EDM). In terms of products, Mercury produce 
master/tool-making, as well as small scale production. They work on a range of metals 
and polymers. 
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The application of Mercury‟s technologies cover a wide range of sectors; including: life 
sciences (e.g. health); automotive; consumer products (e.g. mobile phone components); 
micro components (e.g. small gears) and micro-fluidics (e.g. micro pumps). 
7.3 Primary Data 
The most influential decision-makers within Mercury were interviewed face-to-face, 
and the data transcribed and coded for analysis. Table 7.1 lists those interviewed along 
with a description of their roles or association with Mercury. Only senior members of 
staff were interviewed to increase the quality (in terms of experience) of the data 
gathered. Six out of the ten have PhDs and one is working towards his. The other 3 are 
in very senior management positions. Mr Strauss – the related regional development 
agency manager - was involved in the selection of the MNT centres as part of the 
original selection panel, making his views particularly insightful. Dr. Dickson has 
strong business experience and academic experience; his position as Venus university‟s 
vice chancellor provides him with a wide range of experience. 
Table 7.1 – Stakeholders Interviewed Concerning the Mercury case 
Pseudonym Role/ link to Mercury Background 
/business, 
academic or both 
Interview 
duration(s) /mins 
[no. of interviews] 
Dr Plunkett CEO Business 77 [1] 
Dr Dickson Uni VC & steering 
group 
Both 30 [1] 
Prof. Stephenson Prof. 1 & board 
member 
Academic 62 [1] 
Prof. Pascal Prof. 2 Academic 50 [1] 
Dr. Rubin Business development 
manager 
Business 106  [3] 
Mr Anderson Production manager Academic 70 [1] 
Dr Newton Former steering group 
member 
Both 66 [1] 
Mr Strauss RDA manager/ 
managed link between 
development agency 
and Mercury 
State 30 [1] 
Mr Morgan TSB MNT operations 
director/  discussed 
details of Mercury 
Business 100 [2] 
Mr Rubik Management 
consultant for TSB/ 
discussed details of 
Business 130 [2] 
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Pseudonym Role/ link to Mercury Background 
/business, 
academic or both 
Interview 
duration(s) /mins 
[no. of interviews] 
Mercury 
7.3.1 Type of Actor 
Each interviewee has been categorised according to their background and bias toward 
industry/ business or academia or the public sector (i.e. state).  „People exhibit a strong 
bias toward incorporating incoming information in such a way as to make sense against 
the backdrop of personal schema or scripts‟ (Stotland and Canon 1972, in Angle, 2000, 
p.148). The bridging literature chapter put forward a way of conceiving the MNT 
government intervention through an institutional theory lens. This includes 
understanding the organising principles of actors borrowing theorisation from 
institutional logics. For the presentation of the findings from this main case study, the 
notion of collective identities will be used in order to help us understand the actions of 
the different types of field actors. That is, those who were driven by publications and 
research fitted into the „professional academic‟ category; those driven by reaching 
financial targets, commercialising technologies and making profit were deemed 
„industrial/ business‟. In some – rarer - cases individuals had been exposed to both 
environments, and have been labelled as „both‟ or „hybrid‟. 
Mr Anderson was an interesting case, as he felt he had more of a business leaning. 
However, the examples of his actions and the needs which drive him, suggested a more 
natural fit with the academic category. Another interesting example is that of Drs. 
Plunkett and Rubin. They have both worked predominantly in industry, however both 
gained PhDs whilst in industry so have some academic experience. Nonetheless, their 
background was clearly that of an industrial/ business nature. 
The following chapter builds a deeper conceptualisation of the MNT field using 
concepts from institutional theory as required to understand the increased number of 
field actors introduced. The initial higher level conceptualisation of actor types and 
collective identities has been used in the first instance for understanding the main case 
study, Mercury. 
Of the interviewees, the most guarded during the interviews were Mr Morgan and Mr 
Rubik. Notably these were the two actors responsible for overseeing and auditing the 
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centres, respectively. Coupled with the difficulty of gaining access to information from 
the TSB, and my resulting FoI request, this may be indicative of the policy of 
prevention of negative information being released, and an attempt at presenting any 
available information in a positive frame (Dornblaser et al., 2000). 
7.4 Secondary Data for Mercury 
7.4.1 Measurement of Centres 
Quarterly audits of the MNT centres are carried out by three monitoring officers. The 
monitoring officers are management consultants from Ernst & Young. An outline of the 
criteria which they use to assess each centre is provided in Appendix 5h. The source of 
this criteria list was an example review document for one centre. Unfortunately 
permission for including this full document was not granted. This list is purely to 
highlight the hard business measures favoured by the third-party consultants. 
At the end of each quarterly review a 9-box model is generated to provide a summary of 
that review. This 9-box model grades the MNT centres in terms of project risk and 
project performance. The grading system is referred to by many actors as the „traffic 
light‟ system, owing to the use of red/ amber/ green colours displaying progress. Mr 
Morgan – MNT operations director, TSB - describes how allocating a red means 
revenue down; green means on track (e.g. plans in place beyond the grant period); and 
amber suggesting somewhere in the middle. 
Following the assigned grades a number of resulting actions are implemented. 
Appendix 7a shows an extract from one of the TSB‟s „micro- and nano- technology 
centres communications‟ documents which provides evidence of this process. Figure 
7.2 displays the 9-box model used by the monitors, Appendix 7a displays the resulting 
actions from the monitoring review process considering a range of scenarios. 
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Figure 7.2 – 9-box Traffic Light Performance Measures used by the TSB 
7.4.2 Mercury’s ‘Traffic Light’ Performance 
Due to the „commercial in confidence‟ nature of the quarterly E&Y reports created for 
the TSB, access was withheld. However, by understanding the 9-box traffic light 
system, inferences can be made of Mercury‟s progress from descriptions given by the 
actors. The following statements show how Mercury had a turbulent time at best when it 
came to E&Ys interpretation of their progress: 
 „Mercury on the very 1st measurement was red. It stayed red for 22 months … for 
the vast bulk of the measured time or monitored time it was red. It has very recently 
gone amber‟ (Dr. Rubin, 10th October 2008). 
 9 months later, Rubin describes how Mercury are back to „red‟ status on the traffic 
light system. Why? He describes Professor Stephenson as the major problem. Rubin 
is having to sub-contract a lot of the work out to another centre or others in the host-
university department because he explains how his staff can‟t do the job on the 
machines. „They are researchers‟ (21st July 2009). This helps to confirm the 
organizational features that inform how technologies are adopted and used. 
 „…we have a commercial centre at [our] university, Dr. Jones [another University 
professor] has [another] commercial centre [in our university], neither of us 
produces commercial outcome yet he gets a green flag and we are always red or 
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amber… [because] …they [the TSB/monitors] are happy with the research 
happening there and the way that it is progressing, [there is] a huge amount of 
politics‟ (Mr Anderson).  
 „There's a 3x3 matrix, that if you fall into certain parts of that matrix you obviously 
look bad. So yeh they'd love you to commercialise the stuff that you're doing.. [but] 
your covenants surrounding that technology mean that you can't necessarily do it‟ 
(Dr. Newton). 
The last two examples agree with the findings of Dornblaser et al. (2000) who describe 
the difficulties associated with measuring outcomes from the innovation processes 
observed in the MIRP programme:  
„…when innovation implementation efforts went awry… [and results were 
disappointing], the external resource controllers tended to focus on input criteria 
…if outcome assessments of resource controllers and innovation managers did 
not converge, the assessments that mattered in determining the fate of an 
innovation were those of the resource controllers… observations on the relative 
power of evaluators were observed in both positive (continuation) and negative 
(termination) directions on innovation development‟ (p.202)  
The state actors in the TSB can be seen as analogous to the external resource controllers 
in the above, and the innovation managers seen as MNT Centre Directors. If so, then the 
above examples fit with the idea that as long as a centre pleases the state actors (i.e. 
TSB) then positive actions are bestowed upon the centres (i.e. little intervention); and 
conversely, if the centre does not fit the criteria of the state, then negative actions 
follow. This may also be a result of a breakdown of communication between the state 
and MNT centre actors, in terms of what the limits/ measurement criteria are for the 
centres. 
7.4.3 Proposed Financials for Mercury 
The project proposal states that „Mercury is cash neutral over the 5-year life of the 
project and the service becomes self-sustainable, after five years of operation at the 
moderate level of sales included‟ (proposal document, p.7). 
Table 7.2 displays the breakdown of the forecast income and expenditure at the time the 
proposal document was submitted; the data has been presented as a percentage of total 
funding to preserve anonymity. 
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The total funding over the duration of the project was estimated at 9.65 Million GBP; 
the total cash outflow was estimated as 9.61 Million GBP. A breakdown of figures 
making up the total income and outcome have been outlined. 
Table 7.2 - Proposed Income and Expenditure as on Mercury’s Project 
Application Proposal in 2004 (Source: adapted from proposal document, 2004, p.7) 
Organization Contribution / 
% of total 
funding 
Notes 
Income    
DTI MNT Programme 31.5 Actual figure awarded was £2.59 Million 
Other public sector:                  
RDA grant 
 
 
 
University department existing 
projects 
University 
 
 
 
7.8 
 
 
 
5.2  
 
10.0  
 
„Mercury service is important component of the 
[local RDA] MNT strategic plan‟. (p.9, Mercury 
application form) 
 
Projects with synergies to Mercury 
 
From a parallel manufacturing project grant 
 
Private sector: 
4 Development partners,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Companies for collaborative 
projects 
 
 
 
University department 
commercial income  
 
 
 
22.9 
 
 
 
 
 
7.0 
 
 
 
 
15.3 
 
 
 
 
Company A, company „Luna‟ (cash-back 
contributions covering 50% of the system 
development and maintenance costs). Clean room 
company contribution and marketing company 
providing in-kind support to the technology 
awareness of the transfer programme. 
The companies that will be involved in feasibility 
studies and pilot projects.. to develop new 
applications and demonstrators for Mercury (p.9, 
Mercury application form). 
In-kind and cash over the 5 years. 
From existing commercial services operated by 
the department. 
Total project funding („000s) 100 %   
Expenditure    
Equipment 46.4  
Staff  36.2 Operations manager and project engineers 
Running costs 8.4 Includes consumables 
Maintenance 5.7  
Marketing 3.2  
Total cash outflow 
(„000s) 
100 %  
 
A number of additional interviews were carried out with suppliers and customers of 
Mercury. Details of these are listed in appendix 7b. For the purpose of this chapter the 
internal stakeholders are concentrated on. 
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7.5 Semi-Structured Interview Data for Mercury 
The background detail of the major case study Mercury has now been introduced in 
order to provide important details before analysing the main interview data. This section 
will now introduce the findings from the interview data. This data is used to discuss the 
findings from Mercury in terms of the adapted MIRP constructs. These constructs 
provide a way of grouping the data so that it can be presented and initial analysis can 
begin. The constructs are: purpose, people, collaborations, context, outcomes and 
process. 
7.5.1 Purpose – Relating to the MNT Government Intervention 
When understanding and explaining the purpose of the MNT government intervention 
extracts from a number of key sources need to be considered. The original purpose of 
the intervention from the view of the government body who introduced it (DTI), and 
TSB were sourced. In addition, extracts from the project application proposal document 
are referred to along with interviewee quotes and actions to understand the extra local 
and local (in terms of Mercury) views of purpose.  
The DTI‟s purpose statement outlines the MNT government intervention as projects 
which implement: 
„Industry/market facing UK based facilities which provide cost-effective open 
access for organisations and individuals to capabilities, processes and associated 
knowledge leading to marketable products, and services‟ (DTI, 2004). 
Furthermore the objective of the Capital Projects was to: 
„invest in the development of UK technology infrastructure to: accelerate the 
commercialisation of MNT for the wider benefit of the UK economy; provide open 
access on equitable commercial terms to Microsystems and Nano Technology 
platforms and associated knowledge; develop a critical mass of capability whilst 
avoiding duplication of provision…The intention of these Capital Projects Calls is 
thus to deliver open-access MNT facilities of national significance‟ (DTI, 2004). 
Further public domain documents referring to the purpose of the MNT government 
intervention were searched for. However, surprisingly few papers/ hard-copy documents 
appear to be in circulation for the centres since the TSB took over. Fortunately archive 
websites enabled access to more background data during the DTI period. These were 
coupled with interviews from the architect of the centres (Prof. Hertz). The view from 
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the TSB for the purpose of the intervention was outlined on their website in the 
following statement: 
„The aspiration was for a distributed network of world-class manufacturing 
facilities with focus on strategic areas for the UK. The facilities were structured to 
cover the continuum from micro to nano scale. The facilities generally built on 
existing University or business expertise, and were established with the intention 
of becoming, in time, self financing (with the exception of the nano-medicine and 
metrology fields, where a measure of ongoing public support is likely to be 
required)‟ (TSB, 2009). 
This definition appears less authoritative than the DTI definition and comes across as 
vague. Due to the important position that the TSB hold over auditing and management 
of the centres, it was felt that further clarification for their view on the overall purpose 
of the centres should be investigated. As such Mr Morgan – the Technology Strategy 
Board‟s MNT operations director – was interviewed. He explained that the 
understanding of purpose of the MNT government intervention from the TSB‟s 
perspective is as follows: „to address a market failure‟ and create „open-access 
facilities, selling to the wider community‟. Mr Morgan described open-access: 
„in the broadest sense, i.e. to enable access to the technology for the wider 
community. Open-access does not mean „for free‟ and not for people to just walk 
in and use the equipment. The phrase „available for wider community‟ has gone 
into the offer letters‟ (Mr Morgan). 
Extracts from Mercury‟s tender document relating to the purpose of the intervention 
align with the DTI and TSB understanding of developing an MNT infrastructure: 
„The establishment of such capabilities will help companies, especially SMEs, 
overcome some of the problems associated with the cost of entry into micro-
manufacturing technologies…The proposed [MNT centres]…will enable 
companies to test a range of state-of-the-art or new technologies for micro-
machining and micro-fabrication in feasibility studies and pilot projects with the 
[MNT centres], and in this way to gain experience and confidence in their 
application in the context of their specific application requirements‟ (p.3, 
Mercury proposal document). 
This description also refers to the open-access nature of the centres, introducing the 
advantage to SMEs. 
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All three sources infer the development of MNT technologies to give UK companies 
global advantage. A UK white paper further emphasises the need for this intervention: 
„These benefits and opportunities will give UK manufacturing companies a 
competitive advantage in existing and new markets for micro- and nano-
technology-based products…Without such dedicated facilities as those proposed 
in this project, British companies will not be able to gain a significant presence in 
markets that will be vitally important to manufacturing competitiveness in the next 
10-20 years‟ (DTI, 2002). 
The actors interviewed within Mercury are in general agreement with the purpose of the 
MNT government intervention; i.e. a catalyst for MNT growth; to de-risk entry into 
MNTs for UK businesses; and to create open-access facilities for companies. 
Interpretations differed when the actors came to describe the purpose of their individual 
centre. The local situation they were in – i.e. a university-based MNT centre – clearly 
affected their interpretation. 
The majority accepted that the TSB required the centre to be revenue-generating, even 
when this contradicted their own aspirations/ motivations. This can be understood 
further using the concept of embedded agency - and more specifically - competing 
logics described using institutional theory. Holm asks „How can actors change 
institutions if their actions, intentions, and rationality are all conditioned by the very 
institution they wish to change?‟ (Holm, 1995, p.398). 
In relation to the university institution in which Mercury is situated, this asks the 
question of how traditional academic actors can alter their MNT centre to be revenue-
generating, and open-access. The local context of Mercury (i.e. a University venue) is 
an essential part of how its actors understand the purpose of the centre. Actors such as 
Prof. Stephenson, Mr Anderson and Prof. Pascal proved good examples of how 
traditional academic actors can become institutionalised by the institution within which 
they exist. All three emphasised the importance of developing high-risk technologies 
more in line with academic research as opposed to commercial applications, even 
though a number of times they each acknowledged the requirements from the TSB to be 
commercially-focused. The local environment of Mercury (i.e. university, with key 
decision-makers who are traditional academics) is in clear contestation with the extra-
local environment the DTI and TSB have tried to create with this intervention. 
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The state actors thought they could overcome the problems associated with the 
university as a local environment for this MNT centre by parachuting in a number of 
external business actors. They believed that this would increase the commercial focus of 
the centre; interviews with the business actors certainly showed a strong business steer. 
However, the ingrained institutional logics of a large, slow moving bureaucratic 
university system (Lambert, 2003) appeared only to result in further competing logics. 
Competing logics are not necessarily a barrier to change, but in the case of Mercury it 
would appear that „..competing logics can facilitate resistance to institutional change‟ 
(Greenwood et al,. 2010, p117). Relevant mechanisms for this resistance include 
environmental selection, pressures, and political contestation, the latter being 
particularly prevalent. 
Dr. Plunkett described his understanding of the idea behind the MNT centres: 
„The concept from the TSB.. and I do believe that they have changed their view 
during the process. But my very clear understanding is that the TSB is there to 
fund what I call „close to market research‟. So that means research that has real 
commercial drive, or „commercial pull‟. And that given 4 years and a significant 
amount of money, at the end of that you should have a spin-out business that 
should be able to stand on its own‟ (Dr. Plunkett, CEO, emphasis added). 
He adds that „research establishments ..have expertise .. „scientific rigour‟..that they 
can bring to a process, which a company could ..or would never do. But they don‟t 
have commercial flair‟ (Dr. Plunkett). He purports that by putting research 
establishments together with companies, then research can be directed in a 
commercial and timely fashion. He does add „..again that tends not to be the view of 
academics‟. Dr Plunkett illustrates an understanding of both academic and industrial 
institutions with his views. The use of research establishments for the scientific 
rigour they bring to the innovation process in collusion with industrial organisations 
is a very logical rationale for collaboration (as illustrated by the establishment of the 
MNT government intervention). The data from Mercury suggests that some actors 
have an ability to empathise with different institutional logics. In the case of Dr. 
Plunkett he was awarded an academic PhD, so has an understanding of the workings 
of academia, however has spent his career in business. 
Dr. Rubin was very clear about the purpose of the centres, stating „it‟s all about 
commercialisation and not about doing academic research‟. He further explained 
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that normal companies (i.e. small companies, unable to develop the capabilities 
themselves) would not be able to survive the set-up costs of such new technologies, 
and that is why the funding is there. 
„All 23 were issued with guidelines to set up the MNT Capital facilities. And it's 
all about setting up independently very much [with] a commercial drive in mind... 
so it talks about commercialisation of the technology, it doesn't talk about 
researching the technology, it talks about commercialising the technology. And 
these are the guidelines issued by the DTI and the MNT network‟ (Dr. Rubin, 
emphasis added). 
Conversely, Professor Stephenson stated that the „commercial [purpose] was not 
emphasised, and then it became the main [purpose]‟. He described how the DTI wanted 
to build on existing infrastructure to create capability for nano technology in the UK. He 
states that the DTI wanted them to „come up with new technologies to extend your 
offerings‟. He also emphasised the need to go for risky technologies, rather than 
something close to market. The issue with adopting technology close to the market is 
that the government is potentially subsidising competitors for companies already 
established in the market.  
Mr Strauss was part of the original DTI selection panel for the MNT centres. He 
describes how the panel were „looking at applications which were giving UK PLC a 
wide MNT provision for UK industry‟ (Mr Strauss). He describes how this included 
being „open-access‟ to industry and acting as a commercial business. Strauss says they 
also had to demonstrate a plan to become self-funding within 3-5 years. 
The descriptions so far from Mercury‟s actors display how confused the purpose of this 
government intervention becomes with multiple stakeholders in just one MNT centre. 
Mr Anderson (production manager) portrays this when describing the TSB review 
process (carried out by external consultants) versus their strategy: 
„..the review is working. I think that the strategy is different.. and it‟s one of the 
biggest frustrations I have, it is very [much an] individual interpretation …within 
personnel who are auditing you, they have an opinion on something.. or telling 
you how you should work.. [if you] then go on to the TSB‟s website .. it‟s the 
opposite to what they are doing… the university personnel as well. I can 
guarantee you, if you interview three of us, three senior managers of Mercury, 
two of them will have one opinion, one will have the other‟ (Mr. Anderson) 
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Mr Anderson‟s statement indicates that the actions of the external management 
consultants reviewing Mercury were misaligned with the description of the MNT 
government intervention in the public domain, some of which is shown in table 7.3 
Comparing Anderson‟s transcript to the TSB website and table, the confusion is likely 
to be linked to the financial, „self-funding‟ part of the statement. Anderson disagrees 
with the heavy commercial measure used by the consultants. This ambiguity is further 
compounded by the commercial auditors who confirm the disconnections between the 
actors. 
Anderson also refers to the different interpretation of purpose taken by his colleagues. 
The last line perhaps referring to the common views of the two professors versus the 
business development manager. Mr Anderson explains how this confused purpose 
causes problems with his role as production manager: 
„one of my biggest problems I have got as a manager … is getting people to work 
in it, because it‟s a grey area and for the life of me I can‟t understand.. like we 
are getting audited and we are getting heavy stripped [because] there‟s no 
commercial activity…It‟s the worst thing of the project, forget the pressures of the 
commercial output, it‟s this grey area.. you know, it‟s what do the TSB actually 
want? Do they convey that to their auditors correctly, because they are 
independent auditors..‟ (Mr Anderson). 
Mr Anderson refers to a potential issue of dis-connect in communication between 
important field actors when he refers to this grey area of how the TSB measure the 
centres. This confusion was also displayed during interviews with Mr Morgan and 
Mr Rubik (TSB actors), when both of them described the difficulty they faced when 
assessing the MNT centres. In an email received on the 11
th
 August 2009, Mr 
Morgan said the following: 
„A key question for me (maybe one your research can answer) is how to robustly 
quantify the effect of the centres on the wider economy? My concern with looking 
at the financial data collected by the monitoring system is that the return on 
investment will always appear very low because the boundaries are not being 
drawn widely enough‟ (Mr Morgan, MNT Operations Director, email 
correspondence, 11
th
 August 2009). 
The above discussion along with the extracts in this chapter highlight the 
significance of the conflicting interpretations of the MNT government intervention 
purpose. They show that actors have a contested view of the criteria used to measure 
the centres, such as „open-access‟ and „self-financing‟. This notion of conflicting 
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interpretations is an important finding within the MNT field. Elaborations on this 
across the wider MNT field are presented in the following cross-case analysis 
chapter. 
7.5.2 Purpose – Relating to Mercury 
A range of views have emerged concerning the commercial implications for the MNT 
centres. The nature of each actor‟s understanding of the purpose relating to Mercury, 
and how their individual actions play out through this understanding, enable further 
analysis of the university venue as one of the many venues selected in the MNT 
network. Extracts from Mercury‟s proposal document are used to illustrate how the 
intended purpose of the MNT centre aligns or otherwise with the views of individual 
actors. 
7.5.2.1 Intended Purpose 
The way in which Mercury‟s actors described their understanding of their centre‟s 
purpose was compared with data extracted from the initial tender document
1
. The most 
striking observation was the frequency of references to „commercialisation‟ and 
„industry‟; for example, „The aim of the project is to establish unique facilities at 
Mercury [in the] University to provide an industry facing micro-manufacture service in 
the UK…‟ (p.1, Mercury tender document). In addition, „Within the scope of the 
Mercury project it is envisaged the commercial usage of these facilities will increase to 
80% within the next five years benefiting from synergistic links with the [University‟s] 
ongoing R&D programmes‟ (p.2). These intentions were clearly published in an official 
document used to win the funding for Mercury. Somewhere along the timeline of the 
university being awarded the funding and Mercury evolving, this interpretation appears 
to have been shifted. Clear evidence for this is given through a number of actions taken 
by the TSB; firstly they made it a recommendation that funding would only continue 
with the appointment of an external CEO, with a business background to steer the centre 
back toward a commercial focus. Coupled with this was their decision that the steering 
group had to approve any major decisions made for the centre. The normal activity of a 
steering group is to „advise‟ and „steer‟, rather than be a decision-making body. Finally, 
                                                          
1
 i.e. the document was coded according to constructs, and data relating to intended purpose was 
extracted. 
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the funding was withdrawn from the centre – a major indication that the interpretation 
of Mercury by its actors differed from those of the state. 
The difficulty of Mercury in achieving the purpose required from the perspective of the 
state actors can be theorised by considering the resulting purpose of the centre, as 
understood by its actors, and in particular those senior actors who were able to drive 
their agenda through more forcibly than others. The next section provides details and 
examples which reinforce this finding.  
7.5.2.2 Resulting Purpose 
 
Interviewees did recognise that Mercury was not intended for basic research, and that it 
was a vehicle for commercially exploiting emerging micro- and nano- technologies; for 
example: 
 „to transfer processes from the laboratory into industrial applications‟ (Mr 
Anderson, production manager) 
 „Any work that‟s done is commercial. The commercial work comes first… there 
is a written agreement‟ (Dr. Plunket, CEO) 
 „..in Mercury we‟re not supposed to have basic research. Tends to be to assist us 
in the development of processes which can commercialise, because we are not 
paid to do basic research within that project. [more commercial?] „Yes, more 
applied‟ (Prof. Pascal) 
 
However, there appeared to be a contradiction for a number of these actors. For 
example, Mr Anderson talked of industrial application, yet he described one example 
where he deliberately went against the wishes of the CEO to attend an academic 
conference, which was unrelated to the day-to-day remit of Mercury. 
Professor Pascal, spoke of his experience of managing other programmes developing 
emerging technologies: 
„…you know my experience with the rapid prototyping work, which started life 
very similar, in a similar way to Mercury, it is still not standing on its own feet. 
You know, it still requires input from local Government and other sources. So I 
don't think Mercury would, be ..in at least the next 3,4, 5 years, be a standalone 
company that does not require any subsidy‟ (Prof. Pascal). 
This contradicted the CEO‟s view, who when asked about whether the failure of 
Mercury to become self-sustaining in the funded time was due to the riskiness of 
emerging technologies, said „[No] It's to do with management‟ (Dr Plunkett). This is 
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one example of the clear difference of thinking between the CEO with a strong history 
of a business logic versus the professional academic logic. Professor Pascal – although 
not technically still part of the management of Mercury at the point of interview – was 
the overall Director of the host department, and had a very strong influence on its 
direction along with Professor Stephenson. Professor Stephenson was the only actor 
who strongly asserted his disagreement with the commercial focus on Mercury, saying 
„..commercial was not emphasised, and then it became the main [objective]. They [the 
DTI/TSB] were saying it is open access, it was stated, open access..‟. Being in such an 
influential position in Mercury, along with his observed autocratic management style 
(during data gathering visits to Mercury), coupled with a strong, determined personality 
highlights the impact a senior actor can have on an organisation. 
The influential position of Profs Stephenson and Pascal, along with the fact that the 
majority of staff employed within Mercury had an academic background, and setting 
within a university all directed Mercury away from the state‟s purpose for the MNT 
intervention. The local context of the centre was seen to have an enormous effect on the 
actors and overall direction of the centre, in this instance. 
Of note is that Prof. Stephenson was instrumental in writing the proposal document for 
Mercury. This fits well with the notion that „people exhibit a strong bias toward 
incorporating incoming information in such a way as to make sense against the 
backdrop of personal schema or scripts‟ (Stotland and Canon 1972, in Angle, 2000, 
p.148). That is, Prof. Stephenson has altered his cognition of the original proposal to 
suit his own bias, and interests. Another reason for his behaviour may be linked to 
Dornblaser et al‟s observation that „in the fear of not obtaining startup capital, 
innovation managers committed themselves to courses of action and outcome criteria 
that had low probabilities of being achieved..‟ (Dornblaser et al. 2000, p.213).  
When asked „did the aforementioned proposal document say there would be a 
commercial focus?‟ controversially, Dr. Plunkett replied: „Oh yes..there was.‟ [they 
didn't follow it up?] „No. No, it's as raw.. it's as simple as that. They wrote a document, 
got their money and filed the document‟. This assertion was strongly reinforced by Dr. 
Rubin: the „capital facilities [programme] never was a research project.. it always 
was.. (Mercury).. always was a commercial project. It was 'hijacked' by.. by the 
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university people to satisfy their own academic requirements..It never was supposed to 
be academic‟. The term „hijacked‟ refers to the implication from Dr Plunkett that the 
university actors were awarded funding for a commercially-focused project, yet once 
awarded the funding directed it toward their own interests and purpose. 
It is important to understand that Dr Rubin is coming from a background of working in 
industrial institutions, however similar to Dr. Plunkett he has experience of studying in 
academia for a PhD, and has worked within industry projects linked to university 
research departments before. His comments highlight the antecedents of the project and 
make a link to the fact that staff working at the centre were hired academics, rather than 
sought-out business people. As such they have their own research interests (e.g. Mr 
Anderson working toward a PhD) and in many cases, little commercial experience. This 
is significant when considering that the review of the NIS literature showed a key them 
of universities as an important context for systems of innovation as a means of 
addressing an economic void (for example, Charles, 2006; and Rampersad et al., 2010). 
These results show that actually they may not be the most appropriate to generate 
innovation for commercial exploitation. The results of Mercury show that professional 
academics are driven by innovation; Dr Pascal even describes how „innovation is part of 
our daily activities [for a researcher]‟. The reason universities are good at innovating 
and not commercialising could be this lack of business logic as part of the institutional 
fabric of a university context. Universities have traditionally been established to further 
knowledge creation and educate people, not generate revenue. 
This in mind, the proposal document for Mercury clearly specified that researchers 
would be employed in the centre. This PhD study therefore raises the question that if 
universities are championed as important venues for government innovation 
interventions, then how individual actors (and their organising principles) align with the 
university venue also need to be considered when developing policy. 
Drs Rubin and Plunkett both joined the university department after Mercury had started, 
having come from industry-focused backgrounds; they no longer work there. Their 
comments (above) suggest that the proposal document was written purely with the 
purpose of winning the funding, so that senior academics could create actions fulfilling 
their own research agenda/objectives. 
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Prof. Stephenson does suggest that the DTI changed Mercury‟s objectives part-way 
through the government intervention programme. Dr. Dickson (the university vice-
chancellor) also agreed that the purpose had changed, although not in terms of a shift in 
commercial focus. In his words: 
„Well, yes, the purpose.. well certainly on Mercury, the purpose has changed. 
When it was started originally it was a facility that added to a number of existing 
facilities, and the offering would have been from all of those facilities together. 
Whereas in order to satisfy.. I suppose it was DTI initially, and then the TSB, 
they've had to put a fence around it and say that this project is a standalone 
project‟ (Dr. Dickson, university vice-chancellor).  
Rubin describes how the governing bodies „forced‟ the university to take things a „step 
further‟ and register Mercury as a limited company. This is an example of how the state 
actors (TSB) forced Mercury to adopt strategies to try and assert a specific viewpoint. 
As seen in the proposal document, this was not part of the original strategy. The 
justification for this was a: 
„lack of delivery on the commercial requirements of the project. It was thought 
that the best way to make it be more commercial was to have a limited company to 
run it‟ (Dr, Rubin). 
Although a number of actors expressed concern that „the TSB judges us on our 
commercial outcome[s]… but the technology is so advanced that there is a lot more to it 
than making money‟ (Mr. Anderson). Anderson did add that as the project went on the 
TSB became more sympathetic to these issues which may explain the one amber rating 
they did receive. 
Plunkett describes how other centres „set themselves out as a commercial 
organisation… and .. tended to focus therefore on the technologies that will bring 
money to the business‟. The inference here being that by focussing on closer-to-market 
technologies, it is easier to show commercial success (i.e. revenue). Dickson and 
Stephenson concurred with this view. 
Stephenson refers to the clear requirement of the government intervention to develop 
emerging technologies: 
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„Everybody can come and use this for a cost but [the DTI also ask] for risky 
equipment which [is] not currently commercially available.. [Furthermore] you 
can imagine the government subsidis[ing] the purchase [of equipment] and 
creat[ing] a competitor [to] somebody already established in the market. 
Immediately people start talking about this and that is why we went with 
technologies which were not available.  But some of the companies did not go for 
this…you have to go for risky [technologies], not something very close to the 
market [however] later on it was transferred and moved very close to the market 
or it is almost the market‟ (Prof. Stephenson). 
Plunkett adds:  
[on MNT centre Liber] „I think that some of the other centres are just.. they've set 
themselves out as a commercial organisation. Right, and they've tended to focus 
therefore on the technologies that will bring money to the business. Whereas 
Mercury is probably.. well it sits within the [university centre], the [university 
centre]has got quite a strong research portfolio‟ (Dr. Plunkett). 
Stephenson also stresses the concept of „open-access‟ as a key requirement of the MNT 
centres. 
This and the previous comments allude to the problems linked to institutional norms, 
i.e. state-aid and government funding. These norms reveal contradictions in rationale. 
 
„they [the TSB] want you to be more commercial but it‟s difficult when you‟re 
under state-aid regulations… it‟s a whole minefield that frustrates everybody.. 
[the university] aren‟t happy with the situation, the TSB certainly aren‟t happy 
with it because they‟re not getting what they want as their outputs, and our 
potential client base are either ignorant of what we can do because we haven't 
been quite commercial enough in marketing, or we haven't found a means of 
engaging them that satisfies every partner‟ (Dr. Newton). 
 
Such comments display the inherent difficulties faced by Mercury being based in a non-
commercial university and required to act as a business by the funding bodies. 
A number of criticisms of the intended purpose of Mercury were also voiced: 
 Rubin (business development manager) - Whereas the problem with Mercury has 
been the fundamental mis-interpretation of what the requirements are. And it's been 
interpreted – certainly in the first 2 ½ / 3 years as an academic research led rather 
than a professionally led project. 
 Plunkett (CEO) – „the original business case, business plan was flawed. Flawed 
fundamentally in two ways: one was unrealistic commercial [ways], commercial 
184 
 
income. The other area in which it was floored was in .. the way in which it 
interacted within the university.. so it sits within the university and relies upon the 
university, and somewhere there has to be a working relationship, and that 
relationship was never clearly defined. And that's really what I've spent the last 6 
months trying to do, bring some clarity to both‟. 
The vice chancellor went so far as to say that the University would not have created 
such an organisation by itself: „we wouldn't have put in money from [the University 
department] or indeed [the] university for that facility because it wouldn't have been 
seen as absolutely vital to our academic purpose, nor would it have been seen as a good 
commercial earner, so Government was really putting in money on the basis, well it 
might give extra facilities and ability to the UK manufacturing base.. that as I said a 
few times earlier is going to add value in other parts of the supply chain‟ (Dickson, 
emphasis added). 
This section has raised important issues in terms of the interpretations formed by actor 
groups in relation to the purpose of their MNT centre. Furthermore these understandings 
are linked to the university context within which their MNT centre is situated. This 
context brings with it institutional logics that define and shape the actions of the 
aforementioned groups, and how they cope with the competing logics of running a 
commercial centre in a research environment have been discussed. The contradictions 
exhibited by Prof. Stephenson are suggestive of how an individual actor, in a senior 
influential position, can steer the purpose of a centre according to their own logics and 
actions.  
Furthermore the  confusion produced as a result of the DTI transferring the MNT capital 
facilities programme over to the TSB has been highlighted. Building on the observation 
about actors and their interpretation of purpose – the next section will examine actors 
linked to outcomes in terms of success and failure, and the ensuing actions. 
7.5.3 People 
How the people aspect of an innovation process influences the function/ purpose of 
Mercury is discussed in this section. What drives them; their roles and individual 
actions.  
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One of the main issues (in terms of people) to be addressed by Mercury as outlined in 
its tender document was that of providing specialist training to staff and industry actors 
as a whole. The document talks of „[providing] specialist training alongside these 
unique facilities to address the existing shortage of people experienced and skilled in 
“classical” micro-machining and micro-fabrication technologies‟ (p.1, Mercury tender 
document). One of the mechanisms for this was the development of workshops and 
training courses with an aim to „provide hands-on experience in using the range of 
micro- machining and fabrication technologies available within the [university host]‟  
(p.14, Mercury tender document). Mercury – being positioned within a University 
department – should have provided the ideal environment for such training events. 
Gathering data on the success in terms of these objectives was not addressed in this 
research, although none of the interviewees emphasised any official training courses or 
workshops. Mercury is a research centre within an engineering department, but does not 
traditionally run undergraduate courses. This separation of Mercury‟s host research 
centre may have been one of the initial attractions for it to host the MNT centre, i.e. the 
perceived autonomy from the larger university.   
A key issue considered essential by Anderson was flexibility; he described how 
Mercury has „three key personnel who are very flexible in design terms that they can do 
processing, they know the market and the customers‟. This may be indicative of the 
level of flexibility required amongst staff when developing such new technologies.  Mr 
Anderson did however say that „other people aren‟t introduced to customers‟.  
He was referring to the more „academic‟ staff when he said this, as he describes when 
asked about staff backgrounds; 
„we haven‟t got the same blend of people throughout the six members of staff 
..[which is] as it has to be. We wouldn‟t dare expose some of the academic staff to 
the customers its not very academic and its not fair on the customer. academics like 
the project but they don‟t really want to work with the customer‟ (Mr Anderson). 
Prof. Stephenson says himself that he is „not a front person, it is really for there is some 
companies visiting us, a major company, maybe I will take part but mostly it is done by 
my colleagues‟. 
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The idea that academics do not wish to work with „customers‟ introduces an important 
concept for university-based MNT centres, i.e. whether academics can act 
commercially.  
When Dr. Dickson (VC) was asked to comment on the effect that actors with different 
backgrounds and aspirations have on organisations such as Mercury, he talked generally 
of the establishment of such a centre; 
„I think that it's difficult. We're comparing 'apples' and 'pears', and that's one of the 
difficulties with these centres. Because they came about for different reasons. I'm 
sure that those that are in an industrial setting came about because of a very 
clearly defined need for that particular manufacturer - and no doubt they were able 
to put a convincing case to DTI to say that if we had that centre in our facility that 
would add value to our products.. and that's a very clear case. In contrast those 
that are in a University environment, the outputs are going to be academic in the 
sense of papers, are going to be obviously work 'with' industry, but not necessarily 
just with one manufacturer in mind, and therein I think you have the challenge of 
judging a return on investment (ROI)‟ (Dr. Dickson). 
Mr Strauss describes how „in many cases the academic was trying to combine the two 
roles, and deviated from the original plans‟. Dr. Newton adds that there is just „a real 
conflict between commercialisation and academic pedigree‟.  
Dr Plunkett, the CEO brought in by the TSB to instil a more commercial focus to 
Mercury adds, „If you had started the project with the intention of making a commercial 
entity at the end of it, you would not have employed the staff that they employed at the 
beginning of the project‟. 
Dr. Rubin discusses the feasibility of having academics and business actors working 
together, and associated issues from his experience: 
„It's possible to have them sitting side-by-side, as partners. It's very much more 
difficult.. to get it to happen.. if academics are in charge. You've got to have 
business, industrial people.. people who have worked in industry and know what 
industry is all about. And if you have those people in charge or running the show, 
then it CAN happen within an academic environment. which is far less likely than 
if you've set up in the instance of Mercury..  independently of its host 
organisation, and staff it with the correct industrialists and have it working as a 
partner with its host organisation; rather than as a sub-set of the host 
organisation‟ (Dr. Rubin). 
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His justification for needing commercial actors running such centres is their focus on 
commercial demands and outcomes, coupled with the ability to have control over a 
centre‟s own resources to delivering these.  
In defence of academic actors he says: 
„unless they've worked in industry how would you expect them to know anything 
about what industry is all about?.. [it‟s] a completely differently world, culturally 
and philosophically. Everything about them is.. just.. unless you've had an 
academic who's spent many years.. I don't just mean 1 year.. a decade in industry, 
they will not understand what industry is about. And any project that is dreamed 
up by an academic that is supposed to be .. commercially focused will fail‟ (Dr. 
Rubin).  
He continually comes back to the notion of  'academic-style' activity versus 'industrial 
manufacturing' style activity: 
„Manufacturing is very much aimed at achieving a specific goal and a defining 
goal from the very start. Whereas research activity is very much more open-
ended: 'let's see what interesting things we can find out' rather than we have to 
make this particular structure‟ (Dr. Rubin). 
With reference to the above quotes, the dualism of actors and purpose appears evident. 
Considering the responses from academic actors versus business actors, clear 
differences emerge. The next sub-sections will consider the data concerning each type 
of actor (including those considered to have experience of „both‟ worlds). 
7.5.3.1 Actors and Perception of Success 
A role-ordered matrix – as described by Miles and Huberman (1994, p.125) - was 
created in order to emphasize the different backgrounds and roles of actors in terms of 
their perceptions of success/ failure. This can be seen in table 7-3. Additional columns 
have been added to firstly tease out the actions that are perceived to be driving the 
individual actors (direct quotes are used where possible). Secondly to provide examples 
of the contribution individual actors made to Mercury (and in some cases the wider 
MNT government intervention). The responses from the different actors were grouped 
and analysed. The most important elements of this table are now discussed in detail. 
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Name/ 
responsibility 
Academic/ 
business 
Understanding of outcomes for Mercury Actions  driving actor (perceived) Contribution to important 
events/ actions Success Failure 
Dr. Plunkett/ 
CEO 
 
Business „..regular, sustainable, 
commercial activity 
from repeat 
customers‟ 
Standalone business 
TSB stop the project. 
Or, reach end and not a 
sustainable business. 
To bring clarity to the business 
plans, and the relationship issues 
between Mercury and the host-
university department. 
Finding applications for new 
technologies (university to 
industry) 
Interfacing between academia and 
commercial world (including 
collaborative research) 
Formerly on the industrial 
advisory board, then hired as 
CEO of Mercury to fulfil 
„commercial‟ requirements set by 
the TSB. 
Dr. Rubin/ 
Business 
development 
manager 
Business Revenue generating 
(if useful for industry, 
then industry will pay 
for it). 
Helps small 
companies unable to 
develop capabilities 
themselves. 
Successful product 
applications. 
Standalone business 
(after grant funding). 
Not standalone. 
Industry perception as 
„a bunch of 
researchers..playing 
with ..technology..‟ 
rather than having 
„manufacturing 
disciplines‟ in place. 
Sub-contracting because 
„staff can‟t do the 
job…they are 
researchers‟. 
To help manufacturing. 
Achieving industrial manufacturing 
goals. 
 
Promoted commercial side of 
business. 
Fought the „academic‟ resistance 
to his understanding of 
Mercury‟s commercial purpose. 
Table 7.3 - Role-Ordered Matrix: Linking Actors, Roles and Action. 
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Mr Strauss/ RDA 
manager / part of 
MNT review 
panel 
Business Application of 
technologies 
(examples given in 
medical sector). 
 
„should have had 
business development 
people recruited to drive 
the business for them‟. 
Academics trying to 
combine two roles and 
deviating from original 
plans. 
Public-sector motivations? 
Marketing the regional 
technologies nationally and 
internationally. 
Awareness raising: understand 
technology/ implications of it/ 
translate those into local 
businesses. 
 
Part of MNT initial review panel 
for centres. 
 
Mr Morgan/ TSB 
MNT operations 
director 
Business DK [specific to Mercury] 
„Dominated by 
professors, it is not 
outward looking for 
business‟. 
Sanction: withholding 
the grant. 
Worst case: stop 
funding. 
[understood to refer to 
Mercury] 
Not to fund „further 
university investment‟. 
„It‟s not about 
subsidising Uni/firm 
development projects, 
they need to go out and 
charge a commercial 
rate‟. 
To look after the public-funding 
side of the MNT intervention. 
Overseeing MNT centres. 
Protecting the confidentiality of 
centres: he describes most 
documents relating to governance 
of MNT centres as „commercial in 
confidence‟. 
 
Withholding grant. 
Instrumental in appointing the 
commercially focused external 
CEO. 
Increased authority of industrial 
steering group (required sign-off 
for decisions concerning 
Mercury). 
Resetting of objectives. 
 Eventual grant cancellation. 
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Mr Rubik/ 
Management 
consultant for 
TSB 
Business DK „failing‟. Employed by third-party 
management consultants (duty to 
them first?) 
Auditing and measurement of the 
success of the MNT centres. 
Manages the review audit of 
centres and presents to TSB 
(includes data from Mercury). 
Prof. Stephenson/ 
Senior Professor 
Academic Adoption of 
technologies by 
companies 
Developing 
manufacturing 
platforms for 
emerging products. 
„we don‟t have anything 
to report along these 
lines‟ 
If a technology does not 
prove to have industrial 
application, this is still 
an outcome (general 
view for research 
centre) 
Curiosity-driven research (& 
winning grants to continue this 
work). 
Development of emerging 
technologies 
Influential in project proposal 
and winning the grant. 
On board of directors, and very 
influential in running of centre, 
and influencing initial academic 
focus of the business. 
University paid supplier [Luna] a 
settlement concerning Mercury‟s 
failure to uphold agreed actions: 
„Politically charged, issues with 
[Prof. Stephenson] senior 
professor upsetting the 
relationship‟ (ref. Dr. Rubin). 
Prof. Pascal/ 
Senior Professor 
Academic Income generation 
from companies. 
Achieving and 
exceeding project 
targets. 
Not meeting objectives. 
(in terms of research 
centre) „we haven‟t‟ 
[been unsuccessful]. 
„..I would say innovation is part of 
our daily activities‟. 
„Curiosity. We want to try new 
things, test and see if they work. 
And we feel happy when we've got 
something new.. and it's a creativity 
urge‟. 
Applied research. 
Influential in proposal and grant. 
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Mr Anderson/ 
Production 
manager 
Academic Customer happy. 
Researcher published 
from the project and 
Mercury has emerged 
and grown.  
„Hasn‟t necessarily 
got to be profitable to 
be counted as a 
success‟. 
When equipment lets us 
down (due to emerging 
status). 
Confusion of Mercury‟s 
purpose: less reliance of 
specialist/ researchers 
running equipment. 
High daily rates 
[*counters other actor 
views] 
„personally I‟m more concerned 
with the processes rather than pure 
profit‟. 
Example given of attending an 
academic conference without 
authorisation required by CEO: i.e. 
displays preference for the 
academic priority. 
Completion of a postgraduate 
degree and associated study.  
DK 
Dr. Dickson/ Uni 
VC & industrial 
advisory group 
Both Ability to connect to 
customers. 
Customer-demand: 
value add to their 
product or their own 
technologies. 
 
Significance between 
estimated income and 
actual income. 
Poor quality of planning 
in the centres; i.e. „over-
ambitious‟ not managed 
well. 
Interests of both industry and 
academia important. 
Need pull rather than technology 
push, e.g. TSB challenge-led 
projects, rather than MNT centres. 
Focus on next-generation big things 
(e.g. next gen aircraft wing) 
Need to add value to UK supply 
chain (often ROI only seen further 
down chain, which is not measured) 
 
DK 
Dr Newton/ 
former steering 
group member 
Both Payment for service. 
Output of some kind: 
could be machine 
setting/ report or 
study/ or generation of 
new knowledge. 
IP has potential to be 
sold. 
Failure to prove 
something is 
nonetheless a result. 
Project stopped half-
way through: no 
conclusion/ external 
community benefit/ no 
valuable experience for 
researcher. 
 
 
„The reason I came on here was to 
try and rebalance things.. and to 
take away some of the risk I think.. 
I'd quite happy call a decision that 
would go against one or other of 
the parties‟ 
Driven to help as a favour to the 
University. 
Concerns over breaching state-aid 
regulations. 
Invited to join steering group by 
Prof. Pascal: to provide an 
academic and business view. 
On board for 8 months (stopped 
due to work commitments, as this 
role was unpaid). 
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7.5.3.2 Business Actors 
When the business actors were asked how they understood the outcomes of Mercury in 
terms of success, agreement in a number of main areas was apparent. Firstly the need 
for revenue generating, commercial activity. Dr Plunkett describes „regular, 
sustainable, commercial activities and repeat customers‟ in terms of success, as well as 
a „standalone business‟ (Dr Plunkett). The development of „successful product 
applications‟ is added to this by Dr Rubin and Mr Strauss.  
Secondly, the ability to trade without grant support at the end of the DTI funding was 
understood as a successful outcome. The strong business logics of these actors aligned 
with the commercial purpose provided by the funding bodies for the MNT centres. 
From supplementary meetings with Dr Rubin, it became clear that promoting the 
commercial purpose of Mercury was met with resistance from the professional 
academics, who were senior (in terms of management position) within the university. 
Their position of authority and the university bureaucracy (from the point of view of the 
business actors) was seen as a barrier to running the centre in a commercial way. For 
example, the CEO and Business Development Manager felt constrained by the 
academic staff they had to use, because they wanted commercial staff. This meant that 
the Business Development Manager – rather than being able to employ the staff he 
wanted – had to sub-contract work because (in his view) „the staff can‟t do the job… 
they are researchers‟ (Dr Rubin). This was echoed by Dr Plunkett, and meant that 
rather than working together, staff were finding alternative ways of overcoming what 
they saw as obstacles. 
Failure was an acknowledged concept for the business actors. They conceived failure as 
either the business not becoming sustainable by the end of the grant, or the worst case 
scenario being that the TSB stop the funding. The RDA manager described how he 
believed that Mercury „should have had business development people recruited to drive 
the business for them‟ (Mr. Strauss). 
Interestingly, the proposal document does make reference to the type of staff Mercury 
would employ; these were „full-time graduate level researchers‟ (Mercury proposal 
document). This example therefore highlights the need for careful consideration of the 
actors employed for national systems of innovation within a university environment.  
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The more common actions across the business actors were; firstly to find applications 
for new technologies (including awareness raising to the market), and secondly to look 
after the public-funding element of the government intervention. The second driver 
comes from those industrialists (more specifically management consultants) employed 
by the TSB to audit the MNT centres. The first group of actors are concerned with the 
local context of their centre, whereas the latter group are concerned with the extra-local 
context of the MNT government intervention. As such, the context individuals are 
concerned with also has the potential to create conflict/ disagreement as to the actions 
required for the smooth running of a centre. The difference in the case of Mercury is far 
more noticeable when comparing the professional academics with the business actors. 
Two of the business actors were employed to refocus the direction of Mercury toward a 
commercial organisation. The business development manager was brought in early on 
to promote the commercial side of the business. Then over half way into the grant 
period, the TSB made it a condition of continued funding, that an industrial CEO should 
also be appointed. Subsequently a former member of the industrial advisory board, Dr. 
Plunkett, joined as part-time CEO. His role was to fulfil the commercial requirements 
set by the TSB. Both of these business actors had to fight „resistance‟ from the tenured 
senior academic staff in order to push the commercial remit. Dr. Rubin described how it 
was not uncommon to have „stand-up rows‟ with one senior professor in particular. All 
of which describes a turbulent environment for the actors within Mercury. 
Mr Morgan and Mr Rubik were responsible for overseeing the MNT centres and 
managing the review audit of the centres, respectively. Mr Morgan was particularly 
instrumental in withholding grant money and appointing the external CEO. As 
previously mentioned - the industrial steering group were also given increased authority 
in order to refocus the commercial direction of Mercury. 
7.5.3.3 Academic Actors 
The academic actors were less concerned with traditional business outcomes when 
interviewed. Professor Pascal did mention „income generation‟, but more in reference to 
it being one of the many deliverables of Mercury. He was much of the view that success 
meant „achieving and exceeding project targets‟. Professor Stephenson described the 
adoption of new technologies by companies, and the development of new technology 
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platforms for emerging technologies as successful outcomes. This aligned strongly with 
the clear actions driving him, i.e. interpreted as curiosity-driven research. His senior 
position and influence in the university research department, coupled with a forceful 
nature (observed by the researcher on more than one occasion) are seen as instrumental 
in the direction that Mercury took. This initial direction was toward academic outputs, 
and led to the eventual instatement of the commercial CEO and increased authority of 
the steering group. Furthermore, communications with one of the main suppliers – Luna 
– became „politically charged‟.. due to „issues with [Prof. Stephenson] senior professor 
upsetting the relationship‟ (Dr. Rubin). This agrees with Mr. Anderson‟s comment that 
some „other people aren‟t introduced to customers‟: suggestive that certain individuals 
were less interested at customer-facing roles. 
Mr Anderson described success in terms of making the customer happy, the researcher 
having published from the project, and Mercury having emerged and grown. He also 
stated that a project „hasn‟t necessarily got to be profitable to be counted as success‟. 
This view is counter to the business actors, and when discussing failure both senior 
professors adopt similar stances. When asked whether they could describe failure in the 
university centre and Mercury, both professors did not conceive failure to be an issue. 
Professor Stephenson and Professor Pascal said „we don‟t have anything to report along 
those lines‟ and „we haven‟t [been unsuccessful]‟, respectively.  
The main drivers for the three academic actors can be summed up as „curiosity-driven 
research‟ and „technology development‟. Professor Pascal states „innovation is part of 
our daily lives.. curiosity.. We want to try new things, test and see if they work. And we 
feel happy when we‟ve got something new… and it‟s a creativity urge‟. 
Mr Anderson also adds „personally I‟m more concerned with the processes rather than 
pure profit‟. An example was given where the CEO felt that his authorisation was 
required in order for Mr. Anderson to travel to an academic conference, in preference to 
the commercial work at Mercury. Mr Anderson decided to go to the conference anyway, 
showing a clear priority for his academic work. This follows Anderson‟s drive to 
complete his postgraduate degree and associated study. 
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7.5.3.4 Actors with Academic and Business Backgrounds 
Two actors in Mercury were categorised as having both academic and business 
backgrounds. Accordingly their views appeared to empathise with both world views. Dr 
Newton describes Mercury‟s success as covering a range of outcomes: 
„Payment for the service or on-going use of product so literally getting it to a 
proposition for the market which may or may not succeed or fail but actually to 
have produced something - machine setting, a study of material degradation, 
whatever it happens to be, but an output of some kind. A generation of new 
knowledge‟. (Dr. Newton). 
Dr. Dickson adds the „ability to connect to customers‟, and describes the „value-add‟ to 
customers‟ products and/or technologies. Failure for Dr. Dickson is where there is a 
significant difference between the estimated income and the actual income of Mercury. 
In addition he describes how: 
„there are questions about the quality of planning that takes place in the centre. In 
other words you've been over ambitious and you haven't managed it particularly 
well.. and I would think that's where there is a real issue.. and indeed Mercury I'm 
sure there was greater optimism at one stage than we now have‟ (Dr. Dickson). 
In terms of failure, Newton states that „failure to prove something is nonetheless a 
result‟, in agreement with the academic actors. Furthermore he describes a failure as if 
„it has not reached a conclusion and has not given the external community a benefit and 
by consequence hasn't given the researcher any valuable experience‟ (Dr. Newton).  
Dickson and Newton appear to be driven by the interests of academia and industry. Dr. 
Newton was asked by Prof. Pascal to join the steering board. He describes how: „the 
reason I came on here was to try and rebalance things.. and to take away some of the 
risk I think.. I‟d quite happy call a decision that would go against one or other of the 
parties‟ (Dr. Newton). He describes a clear strategy to „take-control‟ of the process. His 
experience of both world views was clearly important in his appointment. He 
maintained the voluntary role for eight months, but then had to stop due to work 
commitments. He was initially driven to „help the university‟.. and stated that he „found 
it very interesting.. of all the companies I‟ve worked with at board level, this is probably 
the most interest[ing].. [and] most frustrating.. [this is] the hardest to solve‟. He views 
Mercury as hard to solve in relation to the concerns he raises over breaching state-aid 
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regulations by running Mercury commercially. Dr. Newton brings up a very important 
issue here, which surprisingly is not raised so vociferously by others in Mercury. Dr. 
Plunkett does describe issues concerning MNT centres who in his view are developing 
technologies which are very close to the market already, and potentially unfair 
competition to existing organisations and he outlines the need for the MNT centres to be 
developing emerging technologies. 
7.5.4 Context 
This section takes a detailed look at Mercury‟s context, with a particular focus on the 
influence it has on how Mercury functions as a local MNT centre, along with its extra 
local context in the government intervention. Table 7.4 presents data from interviewees 
evidencing the positive and negative outcomes of Mercury‟s context (where „outcomes‟ 
are the achievement of the goals set out by the DTI for the MNT government 
intervention, i.e. commercial outputs). This data is then used to provide support for a 
discussion on the findings from the main case in terms of its struggle to be a limited 
company in a university environment. In addition the advantages of being located in this 
context are also discussed. 
Extracts from Mercury‟s tender document relating to context are displayed in appendix 
7c. The general point to note is that the proposal looked to build on existing facilities 
and experience located in the university host department. This includes recognised 
quality standards. A strong point of this argument was that the risk of establishing a 
centre is vastly reduced by locating at the existing facilities. 
This section presents data concerning how the context
2
 of Mercury influences its 
function as an MNT centre and part of the wider MNT government intervention. 
The advantage of investigating the context of Mercury is that it struggles to be a limited 
company within a university research centre. As such it has to deal with a somewhat 
multifaceted personality. The presentation of findings relating to the people construct 
display how context appears to be closely interrelated with the actors and their world 
                                                          
2
 Note: context meaning environment (type of organization, structure); circumstances that form the setting 
for an event. External events outside of the innovation department (if larger organisation and industry) 
that interviewees perceive to affect the innovation process. 
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views. The action of the actors and the link this has to the structure/ context they are in 
will be further explored in this section by referring to context. 
Table 7.4 categorises actors‟ comments about Mercury being based in a university. The 
positive and negative connotations of being in a university context are considered in 
relation to the original commercial DTI/TSB purpose of the intervention
3
. What the 
table illustrates is that in the main there are more negative comments of running this 
particular MNT centre in a university context. However there are a number of positive 
comments, which will be discussed first. 
7.5.4.1 Positive Aspects of Mercury’s Context 
Mr Anderson describes how the technology progressed more by being part of a 
university environment. Mr Strauss adds that the wide range of existing technologies 
within the host university adds to the services that Mercury can offer its customers. 
However he does describe how the setting also constrains Mercury. 
Dr Stephenson emphasises the advantages of running such a new technology centre in 
an established university in comparison to new start-up ventures. Firstly he describes 
the financial benefit in terms of being able to access university credit in order to 
purchase required equipment. From an employee perspective, he emphasises the 
attraction of having the university as an employer for would-be staff; e.g. good pension 
schemes. Lastly he describes how the university is an ideal context for developing 
emerging technologies, according to his perception of the original purpose of Mercury 
(i.e. to develop risky technologies, rather than commercial technologies). 
                                                          
3
 The UK Micro and Nanotechnology (MNT) Network .. established by the DTI and the 12 Regional 
Development Agencies, and Devolved Administrations .. to provide a market-orientated focus for the 
facilities, people and organisations engaged in Micro and Nanotechnologies in the UK. The Network is 
helping to lower entry barriers and drive the widespread market development and exploitation of these 
technologies – building a prosperous, world-class MNT sector in the UK (DTI, 2005) 
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Name/ background Positive Outcomes of Mercury’s Context* Negative Outcomes of Mercury’s Context* 
Mr Anderson/ 
academic 
 [if Mercury was set up on its own…] „I‟d probably 
think our project timelines would be shorter and 
more focused, being away from the university. but I 
don‟t think that the technology would have 
progressed to the level that it has, without the 
balance‟. 
 
 „..some people forget.. that Mercury has academic staff who 
are academically driven, they aren‟t just research staff 
because they want to publish and they have academic 
careers to work on‟. 
 Difficulty with getting academics to work on a commercial 
project. 
 „..we are getting audited and we are getting heavy stripped 
[because] there‟s no commercial activity‟.  
Dr. Dickson / both  Helps the university department earn some money 
from industry (although not the primary purpose). 
 The more applied research department hosting 
Mercury was able to boost the academic rankings of 
the other engineering research departments. 
 „.. in a university environment, the outputs are going to be 
academic in the sense of papers.. work with industry, but 
not necessarily just with one manufacturer in mind‟. 
 Working with one manufacturer makes it easier to judge 
return on investment.  
 Mercury undercharges (in comparison with industry) 
 „one of the disadvantages of having these facilities in the 
university is that manufacturers will think well they‟re 
going to do it cheaply anyway‟.  
Dr. Newton/ both   „I think it's caused us in the initial stages schizophrenia as 
to whether you're an academic or whether you are a limited 
company‟. 
 „.. prior to the appointment of Dr. Plunkett, there were part 
time members of staff, acting in the best interests of the 
company but not necessarily with hard nose commercial 
experience‟. Also appointment of industrialist Dr. Rubin to 
manage Mercury, considering all other appointments were 
from the university academic team. 
 „weakness of the structure, it‟s not marketing-orientated 
enough‟. 
Table 7.4 – Positive and Negative Associations of Mercury’s University Context 
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Name/ background Positive Outcomes of Mercury’s Context* Negative Outcomes of Mercury’s Context* 
Dr. Plunkett/ business   Fundamental problem trying to be commercial in a 
university. 
 Fostering of underperforming staff: „almost impossible to 
lose your job whilst working in a university‟. Contrary to 
industry. 
 
Prof. Stephenson/ 
academic 
 Buying power better, university accounts ensure 
credit immediately. Typically having to pay for 
everything in advance is a major problem for start-up 
companies. 
 HR, staff recruitment – working for university offers 
security. Difficulty of finding right people in a start-
up company. 
 University offers pension schemes, important to 
secure the staff: „If it is a company on its own, you 
will not find the staff‟. 
 University very appropriate for developing emerging 
technologies, if „it goes for the initial objectives‟ i.e. 
risky technologies, „you have the right environment 
to develop them‟. 
 „If [the objectives, i.e. technologies] are very close to the 
market, then the companies are the best [to develop] but it 
depends on the problem objectives‟. 
Mr Strauss/ RDA 
manager 
 Mercury needs the university facilities to widen their 
offering, but „the university itself constrains them for 
other reasons‟. 
 „In my experience the university infrastructure is a big 
constraining factor on the centre‟: 
 Barriers to intellectual property & becoming self-
sustaining. „It just seems the university structure prevents 
them from doing that. What we are trying to do here is get 
academics to act commercially and to become 
professional‟.   
*In terms of achieving the original goals of the DTI/TSB government intervention (i.e. commercial outputs). 
Table 7.4 – Positive and Negative Associations of Mercury’s University Context 
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7.5.4.2 Negative Aspects of Mercury’s Context 
Mr Anderson introduces the important link between academic actors and their actions in 
a university environment: „Mercury has academic staff who are academically driven, 
they aren‟t just research staff because they want to publish and they have academic 
careers to work on‟. With the exception of Rubin and Plunkett, all of the other actors 
employed for Mercury were transferred from previous university projects. The 
production manager is one example, and he states: 
„..with the environment we are in its one of the hardest things to balance because 
we all want to keep progressing as academics and not be totally focused on 
industrial work, its one of the hardest things we have on the project at the moment 
is getting people to work on it because with academics especially its taking them 
out of their comfort zones a bit. I say making money is one thing but without 
personnel its not [anywhere] tomorrow, not all people see the big picture of it‟ 
(Mr Anderson).    
As production manager one might assume that his actions would be driven by achieving 
commercial production as his position implies. However, this appears at odds with his 
focus on an academic career, and that of his university colleagues. He argues that if 
making commercial revenue is the most important thing for the TSB, then why do they 
bring it to a university?  
„It stops the argument there for me. You are not going to have a commercial 
company in a university. It‟s not fair to start‟ (Anderson). 
In terms of fairness he is referring to measuring a university with commercial indicators 
rather than academic ones (even though the purpose of the MNT centres were for 
commercial exploitation). The institutional context of Mercury – i.e. within a university 
– has an important bearing upon the institutional academic actors. As Mr Anderson 
alludes to, academic work and the need to publish to ensure the international standing of 
the home university are paramount for a university. 
Dr Newton sums this up in the following: „I think it's caused us in the initial stages -  
schizophrenia - as to whether you're an academic or whether you are a limited 
company‟. Actors are clearly confused as to the purpose of working in Mercury. They 
are torn between actions for their academic career development and commercial actions 
for Mercury.  
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This organizational schizophrenia is an important theme shown in table 7.4, and 
continued by Dr. Plunkett. He says: 
„where to start? It‟s got a fundamental problem in that trying to become 
commercial, whilst it‟s within a university and everybody is paid by the university 
brings a dimension to it that is difficult to manage because what I‟ve learnt is it is 
almost impossible to lose your job whilst working in a university.. you know.. 
whilst that project is running..it‟s almost impossible to get sacked. Whereas if 
you‟re in the „real world‟ if you are not performing to a relatively good level you 
are probably not going to be there. So it can foster underperformers‟.  
His views are informed by his business experience, and raise an important point about 
the performance of individual actors. Clearly the university context would appear a 
difficult one in which to transplant industrialists. Only two actors from a business 
background were brought in to realign Mercury toward the TSB‟s intended commercial 
focus. Newton explains that „Prior to the appointment of Dr. Plunkett, there were part-
time members of staff, acting in the best interests of the company but not necessarily 
with hard nose commercial experience‟. The other actor with business background is 
that of Dr. Rubin. Both no longer work at the university. 
When asked about different aspirations actors have in different contexts, Dickson 
referred to the initial tendering organisation and their needs for an MNT centre:  
„I think that it's difficult. We're comparing 'apples' and 'pears', and that's one of 
the difficulties with these centres. Because they came about for different reasons. 
I'm sure that those that are in an industrial setting came about because of a very 
clearly defined need for that particular manufacturer - and no doubt they were 
able to put a convincing case to DTI to say that if we had that centre in our 
facility that would add value to our products.. and that's a very clear case. In 
contrast those that are in a University environment, the outputs are going to be 
academic in the sense of papers, are going to be obviously work 'with' industry, 
but not necessarily just with one manufacturer in mind, and therein I think you 
have the challenge of judging a return on investment (ROI)‟ (Dr. Dickson). 
The implication Dr. Dickson makes here is that some of the industrial centres have 
clearly set themselves up as a centre working solely for one manufacturer, probably a 
large OEM. By doing so, clear revenue can be obtained, and there is the potential of an 
exit strategy at the end of the grant period (e.g. a buyout). A number of centres, e.g. 
Bacchus and Cardia potentially fit this description. One of the difficulties of running an 
MNT centre developing riskier technologies for an unknown customer base, will 
therefore be the difficulty in obtaining financial revenue. Prof. Stephenson „if [the 
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objectives, i.e. technologies] are very close to the market, then the companies are the 
best [to develop] but it depends on the problem objectives‟. In other words he is 
suggesting that it is easier to show commercial revenue when developing technologies 
closer to the market, rather than risky technologies, as in Mercury. The DTI were 
originally responsible for selecting the contexts and organisations for the MNT centres. 
Mr Strauss refers to the university bureaucracy as „a big constraining factor on the 
centre‟. He is referring in particular to the difficulties in exploiting intellectual property, 
one of the main ones being that the university has an external organisation through 
which IP must be administered. This adds bureaucracy and also reduces any incentive 
of return for Mercury or any related staff. With such emerging technologies, licensing 
of IP is an important route for developing revenue.  
Perhaps one of the most important themes coming out of table 7.4 is how difficult it 
appears to get „academics to act commercially and to become professional‟ (Mr. 
Strauss). Dr. Dickson explains how companies envisage that they will get a „bargain 
deal‟ by going to a university. He describes how companies can economically exploit 
universities because they know „you‟ve got a negotiation between someone who‟s a 
tough commercial individual, and an academic who doesn‟t see life in exactly the same 
way‟. Again, this introduces the notion of contestation, but this time between a centre 
and its customers. 
Mr Strauss was part of the DTI selection committee for the MNT centres. He was asked 
whether particular contexts were preferred for the MNT centres, or if a range was 
considered. He answered: 
„We just invited people to tender for this, we had no preconceived ideas of the 
structure of the organisations, they were a wide mix, some were private sector 
companies, some were university groups. The relationship within universities 
changes dramatically from [one] organisation to organisation. So we had no 
preconceived ideas, because we wanted as wide an MNT provision as we could, to 
satisfy the needs of UK businesses‟ (Mr Strauss). 
This suggests that the panel were not biased to any individual settings at the beginning, 
and perhaps unaware of the ramifications of one setting over another. 
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Overall the university context in which Mercury has been established appears to have 
constrained the commercially facing objective required by the TSB. One of the 
strengths championed throughout the proposal document for Mercury was that it would 
be able to leverage existing university experience and expertise. Conversely, this 
university context appears to have stifled the commercial exploitation of the emerging 
MNT technologies. The next section discusses how these collaborations have affected 
Mercury. 
7.5.5 Collaborations 
This section describes the collaborations associated with Mercury, and how actors 
within Mercury utilised additional collaborations to develop their services. The original 
tender document is referred to which provides an indication of how collaborations were 
originally conceived for the centre. In addition the positive and negative associations of 
different types of collaborations are discussed.  
The collaborations construct concerns how the formal and informal relationships among 
innovation group members; other firms and groups influence the function of the MNT 
government intervention (and Mercury more specifically). Extracts from this proposal 
document relating to collaboration have been summarised in table 7.5. Emphasis is 
placed upon existing collaborations with industry, European networks, the then 
proposed UK MNT network to facilitate the integrations of a complete MNT supply 
chain. Once again, these existing collaborations were seen as advantageous for 
Mercury, and a way of reducing risk by setting up a centre in a pre-established 
environment.  
Table 7.5 Extracts from Mercury’s Tender Document Relating to Collaborations. 
p.2 [Mercury will capitalise on existing European collaborations/ networks which 
the University co-ordinates], by establishing links to key technology and service 
providers in Europe. 
p.8 PLCs will be specifically targeted - possibly in concert with other elements of 
the MNT Network to promote a 'joined-up approach'. 
p.8 A major assisting factor in the sales development process is the active 
involvement of the equipment suppliers in Mercury. They will, in effect, act as 
'agents' for the Mercury service[s]. Mercury will act as a reference site for 
company Luna and company A, but their prospective clients will be charged for 
use of the service[s] at the same rate as other clients. 
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p.11 The commercial risk is effectively reduced by good knowledge of the needs of 
current clients/contacts and the extremely good connections of all of the partners 
to the MNT world and the linkage to the rest of the UK's MNT Network. The 
financial risk is minimal because of the public sector involvement and the cash-
back and in-kind arrangements between the partners. 
p.12 The [research centre] has won acclaim for its work in establishing lasting and 
fruitful partnerships with industry. 
p.13 The project will benefit from the support of Venus university‟s research and 
development section. 
p.14 Synergistic links with [a number of] networks, projects and centres in the UK 
and the EU will be created to multiply the impact of the proposed Mercury 
service. 
p.15 The links to these centres and major programmes will facilitate the integration of 
the complete supply chain related to product development stages from design to 
scale manufacture of micro-components in non-silicon materials. Also, these 
links will used as a mechanism for marketing the Mercury service to the wider 
community. 
The recognised collaborations along with the understanding of actors in terms of 
positive and negative influences on Mercury, are weighed up in table 7.6. Reference 
initials of the source of the data are provided (i.e. the actor‟s initials).  
A glance over table 7.6 indicates a fairly balanced view in terms of positive and 
negative influences of Mercury‟s collaborations. The strong links to the host university 
are emphasised by the senior professors, having spent a large amount of their careers 
building up the centre. 
Anderson and Stephenson highlight the importance of existing EU projects and 
networks from which Mercury benefits. Thinking even further afield, Anderson 
describes successful collaborations on medical devices with American universities, and 
the merging of a European conference with an Asian and USA counterpart. As a 
regional development manager, Mr Strauss talks of marketing Mercury and other 
regional centres on a global playing field. 
Anderson, Stephenson and Pascal refer to the collaboration with in-kind suppliers. 
There is a very positive side to this collaboration, which enables development of new 
machines and technology benefiting both Mercury and the supplier. For the university 
host and Mercury there is the additional benefit of funded equipment, for developing 
emerging micro technologies. For the suppliers it enables them to gather data of the 
product in use, and use the university as a showcase for marketing purposes. 
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On the negative side, these relationships and collaborations need to be managed with 
interests of individual parties considered. Newton explains how suppliers put pressure 
on Mercury to generate commercial payback through buying more parts, or by 
developing the technology and saleable intellectual property further. The importance of 
this has increased due to the pressures of the recent economic downturn.  
Suppliers are not always interested in developing the equipment, according to 
Anderson. He gave one example of a very large supplier who was less interested in 
developing a certain piece of equipment as it wasn‟t their core business, and offered less 
return. The different interest groups are able to play against the interpretative flexibility 
of the technology – being able to emphasise the potential for further development 
(academic) and the potential for new applications (commercial). Clearly such 
interpretative flexibility appears to facilitate competing interpretations and actions 
(Swan and Scarborough, 2005). This is compounded by the institutional context and 
appears to problematise the commercial concerns of nearness to the market. 
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 Table 7.6 – Types of Collaboration Existing in Mercury (positive and negative associations) 
Type of collaboration Positive influence/ comment [source: actor] Negative influence/ comment [source: actor] 
 
Host university  Strong European links already exist with the host-
university department, these can be accessed by 
Mercury [Pascal] 
 Mercury benefits from the networking with existing 
departmental EU research networks.. „finding more 
about the potential applications, developing 
applications, learning from their experience with their 
own regions, with customers, developing the 
technology: advantages‟ [Stephenson] 
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Type of collaboration Positive influence/ comment [source: actor] Negative influence/ comment [source: actor] 
 
Supplier (in-kind 
investment, e.g. 
equipment) 
 Work together to develop machines. Example given: 
processing parameters sent monthly to equipment 
manufacturers, for database & marketing [Anderson] 
 Suppliers contribute to cost of machine, and interested 
in developing new applications and use Mercury as a 
test be and reference site for their machines. 
Marketing for the supplier is important [Stephenson] 
 
 Not all suppliers are interested in developing the 
systems [Anderson] 
 Equipment from one supplier needed to work over a 
wider scale range than originally specified. The 
supplier didn‟t see any payback for developing further.  
 As economy worsens in-kind suppliers put pressure on 
Mercury to generate „commercial payback‟ through 
buying more parts or by developing their technology 
further (intellectual property). They want Mercury to 
grow the business quickly to create a revenue stream 
for them. Leads to „uneasy tension‟. [Newton] 
 „we do have one or two „so-called‟ partners. The 
suppliers of our equipment, they do give us funding to 
do the work‟. There is a poor relationship with Luna, 
„not worked too well‟[Pascal] 
 Dispute with Luna in terms of not achieving the 
specifications. 
European  Effective collaborations- help to concentrate research 
activities and learn from other EU colleagues 
[Anderson] 
 The host-centre has two major European projects.. 
setting EU infrastructure in this area.. brings Mercury 
together with other similar infrastructures 
[Stephenson] 
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Type of collaboration Positive influence/ comment [source: actor] Negative influence/ comment [source: actor] 
 
International  Merging of a European conference and International 
(Asia, US). Good for benchmarking and collaboration 
[Anderson] 
 Relationship with US university researcher to develop 
application. „He was very sympathetic to our problems 
[technical]‟. „He knew the medical side..we knew the 
engineering‟ [Anderson] 
 Market region‟s MNT centres internationally as an 
RDA. „They have a lot to bring to industry.. so help 
them market themselves both nationally and 
internationally‟ [Strauss] 
 
Customers/ users  Businesses looking into micro/nano technology „need 
to have collaborations with universities‟. Also more 
funding and expertise available [Anderson] 
 Industry collaborations generated from enquiries: need 
to educate customer on what Mercury can/ can‟t do: 
„got to get designers to be thinking differently‟. 
[Anderson] 
 Some good „classic collaborations‟ with companies, 
i.e. using expertise to develop their process [Plunkett] 
 New technologies require demonstrators, „educate 
with examples‟. Use of forums or groups, conferences 
and exhibitions. Face-to-face meetings to develop 
relations further with them [Stephenson] 
 Link to academic research-type institute puts some 
companies off collaborating. Poor perception of 
university commercial activities [Rubin] 
 „[bureaucracy and timescales fair comment] to a 
certain extent.. it‟s not universal by any means.. have 
turned around work very, very quickly‟. Some non-
repeat work takes too long, „tends to be patchy‟ 
[Rubin] 
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Type of collaboration Positive influence/ comment [source: actor] Negative influence/ comment [source: actor] 
 
Regional networks (e.g. 
RDA) 
 Involved in regional networks to gain more support for 
MEMS technology in the region [Anderson] 
 The KTNs should be networking the whole group of 
MNT centres, but „that‟s something the KTNs should 
be doing.. they‟re patently not doing it‟. An RDA MNT 
network did carry out such networking, but this has 
recently finished [Strauss] 
 Led to the RDA manager setting up his own regional 
network for the local MNT centres [Strauss] 
KTN networks   KTN emerged and overlapped with a lot of RDAs 
work. „I don‟t believe they represent the network as 
this particular group I sit on does‟ [RDA MNT 
network] [Strauss]. 
 KTNs failing prompted Strauss to set up his own 
network [Strauss]. 
Public sector (e.g. funding 
bodies) 
 Strong & deep collaborations needed with public 
sector, it gives funding security.. „good for the 
economy‟. Organisations like Mercury provide a 
service in terms of saying where those bodies should 
fund/ invest money  [Newton] 
 CEOs appointment strengthened links with RDA, TSB 
and in-kind suppliers [Newton] 
 „At the moment I think the system [i.e. public sector 
funding] is biased to not sharing, looking after 
yourself, and retaining as much knowledge as you can.. 
caveat.. the retained knowledge isn‟t used for 
generating an income.. purely retained knowledge that 
people use to do the next generation research‟ 
[Newton] 
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Type of collaboration Positive influence/ comment [source: actor] Negative influence/ comment [source: actor] 
 
Academic institutions/ 
Other MNT centres 
  Historically Mercury didn‟t collaboration with other 
universities. CEO actively promoting this because „why 
would you want to duplicate?‟ [Plunkett, CEO] 
 Mercury has a huge cross-over with Liber in terms of 
technological applications. „they‟ve also got their 
uniquenesses‟[Plunkett] 
 Other centres have duplication of key machinery, why 
so many? [Plunkett] 
Workshops  Run workshops to get industries to come to Mercury 
[Anderson] 
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Relations with one of the main suppliers, Luna, became increasingly fractious as time 
went on. Professor Pascal describes his dispute with Luna in terms of them not 
achieving specifications: 
„Luna were not competent in that area.. so .. the technical development of the 
machine has not been perfect.. and then they blame us for not providing them with 
data and so on and so forth‟ (Pascal). 
Conversely Plunkett said that the relationship was „an increasingly healthy relationship‟ 
one month after the above comment. However, in the final stages of Mercury, Dr. Rubin 
described how the university had to pay Luna a settlement concerning Mercury‟s failure 
to uphold agreed actions. These were probably in part due to the „Politically charged, 
issues with [Prof. Stephenson] senior professor upsetting the relationship‟ (ref. Dr. 
Rubin). 
When it came to revenue-generating collaborations with customers and/or users, there 
were a number of both positive and negative examples. On the plus side Mercury was 
seen to provide valuable expertise and process development capabilities required by 
external companies (Anderson and Plunkett).  However, a number of observed customer 
perceptions of commercial centres in universities were raised: firstly, Rubin described 
how commercial university activities are perceived as „extremely slow..[with a].. lack of 
urgency, lack of focus, a lot of bureaucracy, and [it‟s] just somewhere you don‟t go to 
get commercial work done‟. He does add that more enlightened customers realise the 
potential benefits of working with a university commercial centre, and how work can be 
turned around very quickly when necessary. 
A key issue was that the knowledge transfer networks (KTNs) created by the 
government to help manufacturing companies network and find resources etc. were seen 
to be lacking. Originally the MNT Network was created to provide access to a UK-
based micro- and nano- technology infrastructure. However this morphed into the 
Nanotechnology KTN, which is meant to network the whole group of MNT centres. 
Although, as Strauss explains: „that‟s something the KTNs should be doing.. they‟re 
patently not doing it!‟. 
An important point to pick up from table 7.6 is the relationship Mercury has with the 
rest of the MNT network. The proposal states „the commercial risk is effectively 
reduced by good knowledge of the needs of current clients/contacts and the extremely 
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good connections of all of the partners to the MNT world and the linkage to the rest of 
the UK's MNT Network‟ (proposal document, p.11). According to CEO, Dr. Plunkett, 
there was potentially a huge cross-over of technologies with other MNT centres and 
universities. Part of his revised strategy on entering Mercury was to address this issue, 
and he asked the question „why would you want to duplicate?‟ with regard to 
technologies that other centres have. He suggested the reason this occurred was that 
„academics are [in a] very published or be damned-type environment, so why would 
you want to share?‟. 
During the last interview with Dr. Rubin, the business development manager in August 
2009, a major collaboration was in development with another MNT centre, to bolster 
performance, and move from the recent „red flag‟ Mercury had once again received. 
This collaboration never came to fruition, despite drafting in Professor Hertz (the 
originator of the MNT programme), and other senior TSB actors. 
7.5.5.1 General Comments Concerning Collaborations 
A number of comments concerning collaborations in general were also discussed. These 
are now briefly described to further enrich our understanding of Mercury‟s 
collaborations. 
Dr. Plunkett emphasised the importance of collaborating with others who complement 
your services, rather than doing similar things: „you should be 1+1 = 3, 4, 5. That‟s 
what is should be, otherwise don‟t do it‟. He also describes how the development of 
new technology is more organic and how it requires close collaboration with the 
customers. „By definition organic organisations are those in which information flows, 
particularly lateral flows, are facilitated, expertise replaces position power as the basis 
on which input is evaluated, and decision authority is decentralized‟ Angle (2000). 
 
Dr. Rubin describes the importance of marketing to gain further collaborations. He 
explains how some companies find them, and that Mercury: 
„..has quite an active promotional/marketing campaign. I advertise, and have 
written many articles in trade magazines, journals, as well as articles appearing 
in academic type activity; I've spoken at various conferences..commercially-
driven type conferences, and that kind of thing… and then of course exhibitions, 
trade-shows where we actually exhibit‟ (Dr. Rubin). 
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Prof. Stephenson adds how a lot of time goes into developing these collaborations, and 
how such time is usually unpaid. 
7.6 Outcomes - Secondary Data 
The DTI and more recently TSB commissioned a number of audits and reviews to 
measure the numerous outcomes of the MNT centres. The majority of their data on 
Mercury is considered as „commercial in confidence‟ by the TSB, even though it 
pertains to a publicly-funded government intervention. 
The researcher made some inroads into gaining access to secondary data collected 
for the TSB‟s auditing purposes. These include: 
 The detailed proposal form for Mercury. 
 Documents relating to the „traffic light‟ system for summarising the progress of 
each MNT centre following each quarterly review. 
 One example of a quarterly review for Mercury. Unfortunately permission was 
not granted to reproduce this in detail, however descriptions of the 
measurement used within this document by Ernst and Young is presented in 
Appendix 5h. This provides an understanding of the more quantitative 
measures that the centres are subject to.  
Other than these documents, there is a paucity of information obtainable in the public-
domain for these centres. The difficulty of obtaining information has been described in 
the Methodology chapter in detail. 
The outcomes outlined in the proposal document are provided in Table 7.7. However, 
data pertaining to the achievement or otherwise of these outcomes has been difficult if 
not impossible to acquire. Often outcomes such as „generating some 100 engineers with 
micro manufacturing skills‟ are very open to interpretation, as are measuring the 
positive effect on UK industry. In particular sentences like „the likely financial impact 
on UK GDP will be in excess of £200 million by 2014 as the technology infrastructure 
created in this project will underpin the development of the next generation of MST-
based products‟ (proposal document, p.15) introduce outcomes that are incredibly 
difficult to measure/ prove.  
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Table 7.7 Extracts from Mercury’s Tender Document Relating to the Outcomes. 
p.4 … the proposed service.. will give industry and the UK unrivalled opportunities 
in the global markets for such products. The capital investments .. will facilitate 
the efficient manufacture of precision micro-components … enabling companies 
greatly to extend their product lines and make improvements to existing ones. 
This will make the products more competitive, stimulate the growth of a new 
type of manufacturing, generate new opportunities, encourage further inward 
investment, create new high value companies and jobs and hence assist the 
regional economic development. 
p.14 It is anticipated that over the next five years, Mercury will generate some 100 
engineers with micro manufacturing skills. In addition, Mercury will build upon 
the existing [university centre] consultancy activities… to provide UK industry 
with unbiased expert advice on … micro components and the cost effective 
implementation of micro technology. Over the next five years, Mercury is 
expected to assist some 150 companies in this way. 
p.15 The availability of the Mercury Service in the UK will underpin the development 
of next-generation MST-based products with a major commercial impact by 
2010. The value for money aspect …  readily be assessed from its potential 
impact compared to the proposed investment: an additional 1% share of the 
MEMS, Micro-fluidics and Photonics markets to UK PLC as a result of the 
ability competitively to design, prototype and produce products requiring … 
microcomponents would be worth at least 100 times the requested DTI funds. By 
extending the existing range of micro- tooling and fabrication facilities, the 
[university department] forecasts a £4.9 million net increase in its income over 
the next decade. The likely financial impact on UK GDP will be in excess of 
£200 million by 2014 as the technology infrastructure created in this project will 
underpin the development of the next generation of MST-based products. 
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7.7 Outcomes – Primary Data 
Outcomes in terms of different actors‟ understandings of success and failure have been 
discussed using a role-ordered matrix in table 7.3. This section will now provide further 
understanding of the outcomes of this MNT government intervention from the actors 
within Mercury. In order to facilitate this, at the end of each interview, the following 
question was asked: 
 
„Do you think that publicly-funded initiatives such as nanotechnology centres help 
industry to exploit emerging technologies?‟ 
 
In answer to the above, Dr. Dickson said „I think it‟s patchy [sigh]. The picture I get 
suggests that some have done very well and others have not‟. He adds the caveat that 
„maybe that‟s true of any portfolio of investments.. you know.. I don‟t think anyone is 
good enough to invest in many different centres and expect them all to thrive‟. 
Dr. Rubin said yes to the above question: 
„Especially those companies, who seem to be small companies, that can‟t afford to 
develop the capability themselves.. from micro SMEs to medium size SMEs with a 
few hundred people.. it tends to be only the huge, multinational companies, that 
have the resources to develop these type of capabilities in house. And they‟re the 
ones that keep quiet about it, don‟t want to give away their knowhow‟ (Dr. 
Rubin).  
In reference to Mercury in particular, Dr. Newton took the view that „they are good and 
their quality level is good, but potentially the delivery on-time mechanism.. may not be 
the best.. to some extent you‟ll sacrifice delivery accuracy for the quality of the machine 
setting or the quality of parts‟. 
Dr. Plunkett said that Mercury was technologically ahead of private companies: 
„the blunt answer to that is no I do not believe it is. And that's a real damning 
indictment on the organisation, but I don't believe it is. It might be academically, 
it might be. So we counter that by saying, yeh it probably has done some quite 
innovative research papers. But in terms of commercialisation now there are 
people who have technically commercialised it better than we have‟ (Dr. 
Plunkett). 
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7.8 Summary 
This chapter has presented a number of key findings from the major case, Mercury. 
Having presented these findings, an adapted version of the MIRP framework was used 
to organise the data, and provide evidence for these findings.  
The perceptions of actors have been shown to differ greatly in terms of actors from a 
business background in comparison to those with an academic world view. Data from 
the „purpose‟ construct enabled a comparison of the generic purpose and local centre 
purpose to be compared and contrasted amongst the actors. This was found to be 
particularly important when such perceptions inform an individual actor‟s logics, and in 
turn lead to actions which alter the original intention of – in this case - the government 
intervention.  
In terms of the „local context‟, building on existing infrastructure is often seen as an 
advantage for setting up centres or expertise. However, the evidence from Mercury 
appears to suggest a less favourable outcome. The local context of this MNT centre is 
that of a university research centre, heavily influenced by professional academic actors. 
Findings show that the employment of business actors into this environment to steer 
Mercury toward a commercial footing (as per guidance from the state actor – the TSB), 
leads to contestation, and competing logics. This is shown to have had an effect on the 
ultimate action taken by the TSB to withdraw funding, and close the centre early. 
In addition, the „extra local context‟ highlighted issues related to the transfer of one 
large intervention programme from one government body to another. In particular the 
purpose was seen to alter during this transition period for the main case. This led to 
contestation between the local field actors (i.e. those in the MNT centres) and the extra 
local field actors (i.e. the state actors in the government body- the TSB). The argument 
from one of the most influential actors within this centre was that the „goal posts were 
moved‟ during this handover. In other words, he felt that what the centre had signed up 
for initially was then altered, although evidence shown displays how this may not 
necessarily have been the case. 
The next chapter introduces the comparative MNT case centres, and analyses them 
according to the constructs, as this chapter has done. The common themes running 
217 
 
across the comparative cases will then be compared with the in-depth findings from this 
chapter, and discussed. 
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Chapter 8 – Cross-Case Comparison of the MNT Centres 
The presentation and analysis of the main case study data highlighted the relevance of 
those constructs selected to investigate the MNT government intervention. However, a 
deeper understanding of the MNT network (and government interventions in general) 
could be garnered with further data collection. This led me to investigate a number of 
comparative MNT case centres and associated actors. In turn this will allow the 
development of the findings from the major case, and generate further understanding of 
the MNT government intervention.  
The findings from the main case were structured according to the constructs used to 
gather the data. They were used to help explain the social phenomena within the MNT 
government intervention. These constructs initially consisted of those from the MIRP 
programme. They were then developed to include a number of others to provide a 
deeper level of abstraction with which to gather and analyse the MNT field data. Having 
structured the main case findings around these constructs, I found that equal attention 
was afforded to each category, which in turn distracted attention from the inductive 
theory building nature of presenting and understanding the findings. In order to 
overcome this the cross-case comparisons are presented differently, using comparisons 
of centre characteristics where appropriate. This presents the findings in a more suitable 
way for addressing contingencies, dynamics, boundaries and conventions. 
8.1 Conceptualisation of the MNT Network as a Field 
The institutional theory literature has been introduced in the extant literature chapters. 
Using the concepts discussed, the MNT government intervention can be understood as 
an organizational field using Scott’s notion of field (2001). There are multiple actors in 
a range of organisations in the MNT field. These include: key suppliers (MNT centres); 
state agencies (DTI, TSB); resource and product consumers (customers, e.g. UK SMEs 
and other MNT centres); and other organisations producing similar services or products. 
Through viewing the MNT case through an institutional theory lens the notion of 
institutional logics is also introduced, helping to conceive the way actors are able to 
interact continuously within the field. Institutional logics provide the categories, beliefs 
and motives – i.e. organizing principles – that inform members of how to conduct 
themselves in the field (Delbridge and Edwards, 2007; Reay and Hinings, 2005). 
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Institutional logics provide a way of understanding the MNT case which brings together 
a wide range of actors with different demands, relating to the actions of others.  
To understand the meaning of a field one must understand the actors who establish it 
and those within it who confer legitimacy. The MNT field presents an opportunity to 
cast insight on the emergence and legitimation of such a nascent field. 
8.1.1 Understanding of the MNT Network as a Field 
The MNT network has been understood as an organisational field borrowing concepts 
outlined in the extant literature. The MNT network is comprised of a number of 
organizations which comprise the MNT government intervention. Within the 
organisational field are the actors; three groups were identified during analysis of the 
main case study. These are academic, industrial and state agents. Arrows link the actor 
groups to their individual logics. Put simply, logics inform the actor’s actions. Action is 
mediated through the structure of the network and/or logics that inform the actors. 
Action is conceived as the outcomes which might be a mix of contestations and 
pragmatic collaborations. These actions have consequences, and for the case of the 
MNT government intervention, I have described these in terms of outcomes - 
particularly in terms of success and failure, from the perspective of different actors, in 
specific contexts. 
8.2 Comparative Case Data 
Table 8.1 below lists those additional MNT field stakeholders also interviewed to add 
further depth to the cross-field analysis. The position of each actor along with the links 
they have to the individual MNT centres is also provided in this table. Position is 
included to illustrate the potential an individual actor has to carry out actions upon their 
centre (or linked centre). For example, Mr Morgan - the MNT Operations Director – is 
in such a position that he was able to withdraw funding from centres deemed to be 
failing in their remit. This is evidenced by the early closure of Mercury. An additional 
example is that of Mr Gillette; he is in a senior decision-making position within his 
local MNT centre, however in the wider setting of the university within which it is 
located, he has limited influence on the university procedures. 
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Links to MNT centres helps to locate the additional field stakeholders within the overall 
MNT network field. For example, Mr Strauss is the local RDA for a number of MNT 
centres, however he is not responsible for the direct day-to-day running of the centres, 
but was involved in the initial setting up and tendering approval processes for the 
centres. 
Table 8.1 - Additional MNT Field Stakeholders Interviewed 
Field level Interviewee [position] Links to MNT centres 
 
Government advisor Prof. Hertz  
[architect of the MNT 
manufacturing initiative ] 
Led the selection panel for 
the centres 
Government body 
(e.g. TSB, Nano KTN) 
Dr. Daimler 
[a TSB Director] 
Part of original selection 
panel 
Government body Dr. Dickson 
[a member of TSB steering 
group] 
Linked to Mercury  
Government body Mr. Morgan 
[MNT operations director] 
Oversees all centres for the 
TSB 
Government body Dr. Teller 
[Nano KTN senior 
employee] 
Involved in knowledge 
transfer events and 
dissemination that the 
MNT centres are exposed 
to. 
Regional Bodies  Dr Strauss 
[RDA manager] 
RDA link for Mercury and 
Liber. Member of the UK-
RDA-MNT group. 
Regional Bodies Mr. Archimedes 
[RDA team manager] 
RDA link for Concordia. 
Member of the UK-RDA-
MNT group. 
Regional Bodies Mr Neumann Former RDA Director 
Member of the UK-RDA-
MNT group. 
Third-party (e.g. E&Y 
auditors) 
Mr Rubik  
[Management consultant] 
Organises audits of MNT 
centres for the TSB. 
 
8.2.1 The Actions of the Additional Stakeholders 
The additional stakeholders in table 8.1 – although not physically present in the actual 
centres – have had an influence in shaping their associated centre, or in certain cases the 
wider organisational field. For example, Professor Hertz led a UK trade mission to 
France and Switzerland in 1999 to observe how other countries were dealing with 
micro- and nano- technologies. This UK trade mission was a government funded tour to 
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other countries in order to observe their technological progress and compare findings 
with the UK. He took 20 experts from industry and academia on this trade mission. 
Professor Hertz described how it ‘became very obvious that what [the] French and 
Swiss [were] doing was far in advance of what [the] UK [was] doing. Little or no 
commercialization of MNT [was] taking place in the UK at all’ (Professor Hertz). The 
group of experts then decided to form the ‘Micro systems and nano technology 
Manufacturing Association’ (MMA), and lobbied government heavily to get funding for 
the technology. Chapter 6 outlines the rest of the process which led to the formation of 
the MNT government intervention; this example illustrates how certain actors have been 
able to influence the development of the field from the start. Drs Daimler and Strauss, 
and Mr Neumann were also heavily involved in the tendering process of the MNT 
centres, and were part of the original selection panel. The inclusion of such additional 
actors in the data collection was therefore important to provide a fuller understanding of 
the MNT organisational field. 
8.2.2 Comparative MNT Centres and Associated Actors 
Table 8.2 provides details of the MNT centres which are compared within this chapter. 
This table describes each centre, some basic background (so not to identify the real 
centre), along with those interviewed and the centre name. The following narrative 
builds on the information in the table to help contextualise the centres and the actors in 
more detail. The origins of the centres are discussed, along with more details of each 
centre’s Director. It became apparent from the interviews that the centres did not 
interact closely with each other in the field. Mr Gillette (Lucretia) and Dr Tesla (Rhea) 
did talk of working with other centres, however their comments related to ad-hoc 
relationships. 
8.2.2.1 Mr Gillette, Lucretia – Lucretia was is based on a university campus, much 
like Mercury, and Minerva. The management team – overseen by Mr Gillette – have all 
come from the industrial sector. Only one senior employee is from the academic world. 
Lucretia is in a standalone building within the university setting, and appears separate 
when you enter it. Again, this is similar to Mercury. Upon visiting the centre, the feeling 
is of entering company rather than a university. Mr Gillette is responsible for the 
management of the centre, ultimately reporting to the university (and one specific 
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professor). Lucretia does not take on PhD students/ other research students. Mr Gillette 
describes how they ‘..don't do a lot of research, what we do do is a lot of development. 
So we would take somebody's research and actually develop it into something else. With 
some customers that's all they require (Mr Gillette). Mercury, as a centre which is 
similar in venue, does cater for research students and PhDs. Lucretia is in a university 
setting, however clearly acting as a business. Mr Gillette runs the centre as a business, 
and describes how he manages to work around the slow moving, bureaucratic 
management highlighted by Lambert’s white paper in his review of business-university 
collaboration (DTI, 2003). When asked how the venue of Lucretia helped or otherwise 
the purpose of the centre, Mr Gillette said ‘It doesn't!  It doesn't really help. We have to 
manage our relationships. The university has  a number of different ways of doing 
things’ (Mr Gillette). 
8.2.2.2 Dr Nobel, Liber – As the pseudonym of this centre suggests (Liber meaning 
‘free’), one of the main aims Dr Nobel had with this centre was to set it up 
independently of the university, despite the university still having a major financial 
stake in the host company which was awarded the MNT funding. Having had a poor 
experience of working within a university environment in terms of developing new 
commercial technologies, Dr Nobel deliberately sought to move to a Science park as the 
venue for his centre. He explains how he moved from industry to a university  
‘specifically to set up a commercial operation; and after two years of that operation it 
was obvious that actually to run a commercial business operation within an academic 
building was impractical. So one of the main tenets of our proposal was that we would 
be a fully autonomous, commercial centre, run commercially and by a commercial 
organisation’ (Dr Nobel). 
8.2.2.3 Dr Alvarez, Bacchus – This was the only centre in the sample set in a global 
organisation. Upon searching for information about the centre and upon arrival, a visitor 
would find it difficult to extract the MNT centre from the main host organisation. That 
is, the MNT centre was not apparent, it was subsumed by the wider organisation. The 
fact that the centre was in the context of a large host organisation appeared to have 
hidden the individual centre. 
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Dr Alvarez described how the centre was formed: ‘the [DTI] said, well we have got 
certain big companies doing stuff but they tend only to do it for themselves, so let's set 
up some new ones but also don't let that go to waste, let's see if we can, and they called 
them high impact facilities.  Let's see if we can put a little leverage into some of these 
established facilities with good track records and say, would you work for other people 
and what would you need to do it?  And we said we would need more space to do 
projects for others.  So we extended our clean room to take that into account and the 
plan was also to hire new people, which we have done to the tune of 2’ (Dr Alvarez).   
Out of the sample in this study, Bacchus was unusual in the sense that it was given 
money to extend their offering outside of their global company. They worked with 11 
external customers throughout the life of their centre, which Dr Alvarez explains they 
were ‘heavily criticised over’. This may however be an effect of the difficulties 
associated with changing the traditional customers from internal to external customers. 
8.2.2.4 Dr Apgar and Professor Pelton, Ulysses – One of the centres based on a 
science park, Ulysses was set-up for characterisation (i.e. measurement) of micro- and 
nano- technologies. In line with the DTI’s original purpose statements, such centres 
were expected to be funded after the MNT grant finished, rather than become self-
sufficient. However, in this case the centre was run by Dr Apgar – who had both 
academic and industrial experience. He describes how the ‘main objective [of the grant] 
is to facilitate .. umm.. development in micro and nano technologies for the UK. That's 
the main objective: that's the Technology Strategy Board's objective’. However, ‘Our 
objective is obviously that, but my objective is to run a sustainable business’ (Dr 
Apgar). The manager of Ulysses was clear in his view that the centre should be self-
sustaining (even though not a requirement by the TSB), because he had a longer-term 
view for the centre, and wanted to be able to keep staff in employment and invest in 
new equipment for the future.  
8.2.2.5 Dr Russell, Concordia –Concordia was set-up on a university science park, and 
owned by the local university. He describes how the centre was initially run by an 
academic who ran the centre with ‘an academic view of what industry needs’. Dr 
Russell joined Concordia half way through its funded period to address problems with 
the direction of the centre: ‘The University didn’t want to renege on the original TSB 
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plan. All the premise was on the plans that had been built [based on an inaccessible 
big-pharma model]… [They Uni] tried hard to stick with the business plans: [written] 
by academics (similar to EPSRC bids)….[But there was].. no substance’ (Dr. Russell). 
Just as Mercury was forced to employ an external business actor, the same happened for 
Concordia. Dr Russell was employed as a consultant to improve the direction of 
Concordia, and in his own words: ‘The TSB used emotional black mail on me [to 
become the CEO, because].. I had been involved in original identification of the 
centres’. 
In comparison to Ulysses which was also based in a science park, the management in 
both cases from the beginning clearly differed according to the individual centre 
directors. 
8.2.2.6 Dr Tesla, Rhea – Dr Tesla was another actor who was involved in the original 
identification of centres. When discussing innovation and the difficulty with putting 
your resources in the right area, he described how he nearly didn’t set-up his MNT 
centre: ‘I actually nearly didn't take the money I have to tell you!. We had to be 
persuaded..bizarrely. I still sometimes go ‘why am I doing this?’ (Dr Tesla). This tone 
reflected his strong business logics and the need to run a profitable business and stay in 
business. The local context of his centre takes priority over the extra local context of the 
MNT network. This is a fundamental observation of an MNT centre run by an existing 
private SME, demonstrated in the following statement: ‘At what point do I start moving 
my brain to being back more [host company] - oriented [rather] than Rhea-orientated.. 
and  of course the sooner I get even the slightest sniff that they are  not interested 
anymore [i.e. the TSB, and their funding]..my brain will move..’ (Dr Tesla). 
In terms of the regional location of Rhea, it is based in a region that has built on a strong 
history of global chemical companies, and aligns with this expertise. This provides 
some evidence of the regional context issues that may need further policy consideration 
when developing such national systems of innovation.  
8.2.2.7 Mr Singer, Cardia – Cardia is based in an R&D centre (as part of a regional 
development agency centre). Mr Singer had a number of senior positions within the host 
regional development centre. His role (along with his team) was that of brokering 
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relations between MNT suppliers within the area and local companies, in order to help 
them develop their MNT capabilities. Originally the centre’s role was ‘to manage some 
key bits of capital assets which was seen as de-risking and reducing cost of entry for 
people’ (Mr Singer). This then changed to: 
‘bring in other non-funded people who could help by making available to 
potential entrants to the nanomaterials world, their technology, albeit on a paid-
for basis. And so we've steadily expanded the number of members of the alliance 
to about 30, 32 … So that anybody coming to us with a query on nanomaterials or 
a desire to get involved in the use of nanomaterials we can find a partner who can 
guide and do things for them – whatever’ (Mr Singer). 
This centre is interested in a more regional context than some of the aforementioned 
centres, which focus on the local context. 
8.2.2.8 Mr Cole, Minerva – Minerva is based on a university campus, in a similar 
venue to Mercury and Lucretia. However, Mr Cole described how he measured his 
centre’s success in terms of ‘Jobs created and saved, into [the] region..’ Further 
enforcing his focus on the local regional context, he explains how the centre is focused 
predominantly on one local global company. He described the driver for his actions as 
‘Creating more jobs [it’s] all about this’. 
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Table 8.2 – Descriptions of Comparative Cases 
MNT 
centre 
Interviewee(s) 
[position] 
Technologies Organization type Ownership Setting (context) TSB 
Grant 
/Million 
Start Finish 
Mercury Main case 
(described in chapter 8) 
Micro-machining 
Micro-fabrication 
University University University campus £2.5 2005 2010 
Lucretia Mr Gillette  
[Business Manager] 
Microsystems 
Nanotechnology 
MEMS devices 
Bio-nanotechnology 
Micro-fluidic 
technology 
University University University campus £2.54 2005 2010 
Liber Dr Nobel 
[Managing Director] 
Laser micro machining R&D centre  
(e.g. technium) 
Private micro 
SME (new) 
Science Park £1.75 2005 2010 
Bacchus Dr Alvarez 
[Director] 
MEMS devices 
Micro-fluidic 
technology 
Large firm Global 
organization 
Existing global 
organization 
0.375 2006 2009 
Ulysses Dr Apgar  
[Manager] 
Prof. Pelton  
[Science park manager] 
Characterisation (i.e. 
measurement) 
University University University science 
park 
£1.64 2005 2010 
Concordia Dr Russell 
[CEO] 
Nanto-coatings 
Nanotechnology in 
food & pharmaceuticals 
University University Science Park £3.51 2005 2010 
Rhea* Dr Tesla  
[Director] 
Micro-fluidic 
technology 
Independent firm Existing SME Existing SME £2.0 2006 2011 
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MNT 
centre 
Interviewee(s) 
[position] 
Technologies Organization type Ownership Setting (context) TSB 
Grant 
/Million 
Start Finish 
Cardia Mr Singer  
[Director] 
Brokerage for MNTs R&D centre (e.g. 
technium) 
Regional 
development 
agency (or other 
publicly funded 
body) 
Regional 
development 
agency centre 
(e.g. RDA) 
£5.8 2006 2011 
Minerva Mr Cole 
[CEO] 
Micro metal layering University University University campus £5.0 2006 2011 
* An organization called ‘Prosperina’ in the Republic of Ireland was interviewed who used Rhea to develop their laboratory instrumentation devices. Details 
of this in the transcripts addendum. 
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8.3 Practice versus Praxis of MNT Actors (business, academic and 
state) 
The purpose of the MNT government intervention from the view of the original state 
actor (DTI) and then the current state regulator (TSB) was introduced when describing 
the main case Mercury. Through comparing the findings from individual actors in this 
one case with the state views it became apparent that there are multiple logics being 
played out within this MNT field. Furthermore, this chapter adds a range of 
organisational structures into the mix which have a bearing upon individual actors. 
Hence the title ‘practice versus praxis’ – this refers to the theoretical purpose (or 
practice) of the MNT government intervention as per the original DTI description, in 
relation to the understood purpose through the actors in the field. The understood 
purpose refers to the ‘praxis’; that is, how the purpose of the MNT intervention is 
actually carried out. 
In the main case a number of different categories of actors were identified. These 
include business actors, academic actors and state actors; all of whom have their own 
associated institutional logics.   
8.3.1 Generic Purpose of the MNT Government Intervention (Practice) 
The generic purpose of the MNT government intervention in the eyes of the field actors 
is generally consistent. The use of the meta-table in the transcript addendum along with 
non-MNT centre based actors’ interview transcripts enabled the development of table 
8.3. Within this table a number of important themes emerge which align with the wider 
views of the field actors. Three themes are presented; firstly, there is the traditional 
economists’ view of the need to address a ‘UK market failure’; secondly, the need to 
‘de-risk’ entry for UK businesses into the area of micro- and nano- technologies; and 
finally the idea that both of these issues can be addressed by creating ‘open-access 
facilities’. These align with the themes found in the government intervention/ NSI 
literature (refer to table 3.1).  
Two particularly influential actors in terms of purpose of the centres - historically, and 
currently -  are Professor Hertz (originator of the GI) and Mr Morgan (TSB operations 
director), respectively. Professor Hertz instigated the original trade mission and 
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government lobbying which acted as the precursor to the MNT government 
intervention. As such he has been described as the ‘architect’ of the centres within this 
thesis. Mr Morgan represents a more recent actor with the responsibility of overseeing 
the MNT centres on behalf of the TSB, and as such is a very important stakeholder.  
Table 8.3 – Perceptions across the Organisational Field of the MNT Government 
Intervention Purpose (grouped into themes).  
UK Market Failure 
The Economist view; funding is required for the centres because there is a market 
failure.  
 The centres are not research, they are ‘purely commercially focused.. research is well 
looked after’ (Prof. Hertz, architect of centres). 
 Grant funding is given to fund the capital investment and then the centres are expected 
to move to sustainable businesses (Mr Morgan). 
 Competitor organisations to the UK had created impressive centres, which became 
‘divorced from the needs of industry (e.g. Chalmers, Sweden).. [the UK Government 
therefore..].. tried to link in the needs of industry better in the UK’ (Prof. Hertz). In 
other words a distributed model was used. 
 ‘Market failure & missed opportunity’ (Dr. Tesla, Rhea). 
 The UK had little MNT resources; therefore leverage those existing facilities and 
create a ‘hub & spoke’ network (Mr Neumann, former RDA Director). 
De-risk entry into MNTs 
Entry costs are too high for businesses to exploit MNT technologies, therefore MNT 
centres provide the opportunity to access these technologies, without having to purchase 
capex. 
 Emerging technologies: high risk. People do not want to invest, therefore need to be 
Government funded (Mr Neumann, former RDA Director). 
 Funding: it is accepted that it is there to pump money. Costs are higher than a normal 
company could survive with (Dr Rubin, Mercury). 
 The MNT centres can reduce the barriers of high entry costs to SMEs (Prof. Hertz). 
 De-risk entry into nanomaterials and fill supply-chain gaps (Mr Singer, Cardia). 
...by creating.. open-access facilities 
 Raison d’être for the TSB.. ‘selling to the wider community’ (Mr Morgan) 
 Open-access: Access to the technology for .. the wider community; not ‘free’ and not 
open access to walk in and use (Mr Morgan). 
The majority of interviewees (and actor categories) viewed the general purpose of the 
government intervention through commercial eyes. The only actors that differed were 
the academic actors within Mercury. They were the only ones who felt research was an 
important part of the generic purpose.  
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8.3.2 Purpose – Relating to Individual Centres (Praxis) 
Actors were asked to explain what they thought the purpose of their individual MNT 
centre was. The answers to this question offered a way of exploring the underlying 
organising principles of individuals in different MNT centre contexts. 
A review of the resulting data shows how the actors adopted a wide range of 
interpretations for the purpose of their centre. In theory the centres should all aspire to 
the aforementioned ‘generic purpose’.  However, even Mr Daimler - one of the TSB 
Directors - admitted that ‘different centres have different purposes’. This is not perhaps 
surprising, but what is really interesting is how the actors assimilated individual 
meaning within their centres. Table 8.3 displays this data grouped by categories of 
actors and context.  
The findings in table 8.3 reveal that the most significant theme appeared to be one 
which I will call ‘Darwinian bias’. I will use this term to describe how each MNT centre 
biases their individual purpose according to their context, along with the organising 
principles of those senior actors who were interviewed. This creates a notable 
disjuncture across the centres. Reviewing the centres from a university context in table 
8.3 it can be seen that the first (Lucretia) has a very strong business logic even though it 
is based in a university. Conversely, the senior professor running Mercury talks of 
developing ‘true emerging technologies’ which are unlikely to generate much 
commercial income, i.e. a more typical understanding of university research. It would 
appear therefore that in the case of Lucretia, the organising principles of the senior actor 
– Mr Gillette - responsible for the centre appears to have had a bearing on the MNT 
centre. Mr Gillette fits with the IT description of an ‘institutional entrepreneur’, as an 
agent who is able to mobilize resources to transform an existing institution (DiMaggio, 
1988). 
The three science park-based MNT centres are all overseen by senior actors that I have 
categorised as business actors. All of whom are driven by business logics, i.e. they talk 
about ‘commercially-led enterprises’, ‘focusing on a product’, and being ‘driven to 
cover costs’. Dr Apgar from Ulysses runs one of the characterisation MNT centres, 
which means that technically no revenue needs to be generated. However during his 
interview he described how he had a large amount of both industry and academic career 
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experience, which suggests that he is an actor driven by multiple logics. He has had 
experience of working within a number of different institutions. 
The last two examples in table 8.4 relate to one centre in an SME setting, and another in 
an RDA environment acting as a brokerage, Rhea and Cardia respectively. 
Table 8.4 – Actor’s Perceptions of the Purpose of Individual MNT Centres 
Category 
of actor 
Context Perception of individual MNT centre purpose 
Business University  host runs the centre within a research department which must generate 
revenue.  
 Generate revenue (high margins to recoup this, which may prevent open-
access to SMEs) 
 ‘to be a centre of excellence for MNT-scale technology’  
(Mr Gillette, Lucretia). 
Academic University  to develop true emerging technologies (rather than those which are 
commercial ready, and likely to generate more revenue, e.g. Liber?) 
(Prof. Stephenson, Mercury) 
Business Science park The original private company ‘UK-Liber’ was created to ‘match the 
requirements of DTI programmes out at the time for commercially-led 
enterprise’ (Dr. Nobel); i.e. a new organisation to match government calls 
for tender. 
Business Science park  [Science park/ business] Concordia – Dr Russell describes a ‘product 
focused’ purpose. Does this move away from the generic purpose of open-
access. Appears to be ran as more of a commercial business. 
Business Science park  Not to develop technologies but measure/ characterise them. 
 Less likely to generate revenue as other centres, but not expected to (the 
original remit suggests measurement centres and medical application 
centres are likely to require continued funding due to their nature) 
 Driven to cover costs, and run the centre in a commercial manner (Dr. 
Apgar, Ulysses). 
Business SME  The MNT centre enabled host to have an enhanced R&D capability (to 
increase longevity of host business) 
  ‘At what point do I start moving my brain to being back more []Rhea-
host]-oriented than Rhea-orientated.. and  of course the sooner I get even 
the slightest sniff that they’re not interested anymore ..my brain will 
move.. But [the TSB] probably won't mind.. because as long as it sustains 
.. [they’ll] probably be happy’ (Rhea). 
 Investment in R&D/ supply-chain relationships 
 Focus on emerging market which needs R&D (Rhea). 
Business RDA  [RDA/ business] Cardia* - Brokerage, driven by making business-to-
business collaborations, and partnering customers up, in order to push 
nanomaterials technology. 
Rhea provides a very good example of the influence context and a senior actor’s 
organising principles can have on the purpose of an individual MNT centre. Dr Tesla 
(founder of the host organisation, and director of Rhea) created Rhea as a research and 
development (R&D) centre which ran as a subsidiary project to the overall host 
company. In other words Rhea was deliberately decoupled from the host organisation. 
The centre provided Rhea with an enhanced R&D capability which provided the 
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opportunity for its users to develop their applications further in the host company. Dr 
Tesla made it clear that this was not an altruistic move on his part; his clear business 
logic led his actions as company director to tender for the MNT centre. However, he did 
explain that the running of Rhea did align with the initial open access requirements of 
the grant. Importantly though, coming to the end of the grant for his centre, he posed the 
question:  
‘At what point do I start moving my brain to being back more host-oriented than 
Rhea-orientated.. and  of course the sooner I get even the slightest sniff that 
they’re not interested anymore ..my brain will move.. But [the TSB] probably 
won't mind.. because as long as it sustains .. [they’ll] probably be happy" (Dr 
Tesla, Rhea)’.  
This is a good example of how the organising principles of a business actor are 
contingent upon both logics and context. 
One of the essential goals of the MNT government intervention was to ‘provide open 
access on equitable commercial terms to Microsystems and Nano Technology platforms 
and associated knowledge’ (DTI, 2004). This linked to the concept of open labs 
described in the literature by Hung et al. (2004). It is notable that none of the actors 
placed much emphasis on this aspect of their MNT centre. This provides a further 
example of how the initial objectives of the MNT government intervention brought a 
group of field actors together, who then – via their own institutional logics – have 
appeared to push themselves apart. The cross-case analysis shows that the initial 
identifiable objectives and goals of the MNT government intervention, over time, has 
led to conflicting interpretations. For example Professor Pascal (Mercury) described 
how he viewed his MNT centre as being one of the more unbiased centres for open-
access because of its positioning within a university. The suggestion was that his centre 
is able to provide unbiased/ impartial advice as he and his colleagues are not being 
driven by the same pressures as commercial organisations. Alternatively, Rhea saw an 
opportunity for signposting open-access customers toward their host organisation, 
providing the opportunity for future revenue generation. In a similar vein, Dr Russell of 
Concordia was very much focused along the lines of generating a product portfolio for 
exploitation. As such the general impression of allowing external actors to come and 
use the equipment was that it would detract from the business focus. However, Dr 
Russell was keen to get university research staff in to work at Concordia on short-term 
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projects as a route for knowledge sharing, and a way of giving academic researchers 
industrial experience. 
8.4 Roles 
Scott’s theorisation of institutions as pillars led the way for scholars to further 
investigate institutions (Scott, 2001). The normative pillar introduced the concepts of 
values and norms into institutional life. Norms specify how things should be done. 
However not all values and norms apply to all members of an institution, some apply 
only to certain actors or positions, i.e. roles
1
. Values and norms apply to all members of 
an institution, some apply only to certain actors or positions: Roles are the way we 
understand the goals/ activities that these particular individuals are likely to fulfil. This 
includes the way they behave, and the expectations from other important actors. The 
focal actor will also experience external pressure to conform to other actors’ perception 
of their role. Thinking about roles will therefore help us understand more about the 
actions of the actors. 
Roles add to the people construct explored by the MIRP categories by adding an 
understanding of actors’ actions and agency rather than taking a more prescriptive view 
of what they do during the innovation process. Essentially roles help us to understand 
what people do. 
The previous section discussed the way in which organising principles vary amongst a 
number of identified categories of actors in the cross-case sample (business, academic 
and state actors). In turn their actions have enabled the production of different MNT 
centres with different purposes, which I refer to as ‘Darwinian bias’ (i.e. they have 
evolved to suit their own purpose). The foundation for this Darwinian bias appears to 
be within centres rather than across centres, which leads to one important aspect of this 
cross-case analysis, i.e. how the actors have assimilated individual meaning within 
their centres, and how these local logics have worked through a centre. This section 
will now address this and related questions.  
                                                          
1
 Roles are ‘conceptions of appropriate goals and activities for particular individuals or specified social 
positions… these.. are .. normative expectations.. of how the .. actors are supposed to behave.. the 
expectations are held by other salient actors in the situation and so are experienced by the focal actor as 
external pressures’ (Scott, 2001, p.55).  
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8.4.1 Local Field logics 
A recent example of scholars who have investigated change within an organisational 
field is that of Reay and Hinings (2005). The field they investigated – healthcare - was 
already established, with a dominant institutional logic in place (physician-centred). 
However, in the case of the MNT national system of innovation, the field is nascent. 
Subsequently it had no existing dominant logic/s to begin with. In order to understand 
how the actors have assimilated individual meaning within their centres there is a need 
to consider institutional logics on a local level, i.e. the organising principles in the 
context of individual centres.  
The nature of the state intervention under investigation by Reay and Hinings (2005) 
afforded them a plethora of written, publicly accessible documents with which to 
characterise the logics for the field’s actors. Unfortunately, as discussed in the 
methodology, very little secondary information exists for the MNT government 
intervention. As such, greater emphasis had to be placed on the interview transcripts of 
actors in order to understand the local logics of key actors. A number of methods were 
used to ensure high quality of the data collected, including interviewing of the most 
senior members of each MNT centre (see methodology chapter). This process was 
inductive and carried out in parallel to the IT literature review. 
Responses and views from each actor’s interview transcript were then used to develop a 
summary of indicators relating to the belief systems and associated practices/ activities 
for the local institutional logics of the MNT field actors. Where accessible secondary 
data was also used to help attribute these logics to an actor (and the centre they 
represent). Table 8.4 shows the result of this analysis.  
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Table 8.5 – Comparisons of Institutional Logics for MNT Centres 
Logic Belief system 
(what goals or values are to be pursued 
within a field?) 
Associated practices/ activities 
(means for pursuing the goals and 
values) 
Business / Market  Customer is King 
 Commercial success  
 
 Develop technologies users want 
 Technical problem-solving 
 Inward-looking (i.e. Darwinian bias) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Extend supply chains and services. 
 Business strategy, clear organisational 
objectives. 
 Products on shelves, generation of 
income stream 
 Market awareness, understanding 
customers 
 Enjoyment of problem-solving; 
technology and product development. 
 Target driven to reach project goals. 
 Employing industrially experienced 
professionals; emphasis on creating the 
right team with a balance of skills. 
 Create ‘work-arounds’ when stifled by 
a large organisation’s bureaucracy 
 Collaboration through building 
networks, connections. Some linking of 
academia to industry. 
 Motivate staff, and drive forward (keep 
the highly skilled experts interested) 
Professional 
Academic 
 Curiosity-driven research 
 Technology development 
 Secure funding for future research 
 Academic publication 
 Career promotion (i.e. publish or be 
damned environment of academia) 
 
 
 Develop new technologies 
 Trying new things, testing and seeing if 
they work (failure is okay) 
 Dissemination through writing journal 
papers; presenting at academic 
conferences. 
 Achieve project targets (projects do not 
have to be profitable to be successful) 
 Grant applications 
State 
 
 
 
 Linking academia to industry 
 Safeguard public-spending 
 Develop economic competitiveness 
(on a global, state and/ or national 
level) 
 Create jobs 
 NSIs, government interventions 
 Auditing of NSIs etc. 
 Promote technology development for 
the benefit of UK markets and 
manufacturing. 
Management 
consultant 
 
 Driven by meeting targets 
 Overseeing public spending as a third 
party 
 see business logic 
 Treat MNT centres in a similar way to 
large organisations: i.e. use of typical 
business measures and audits 
 
In order to investigate the concept of roles further, it is important to harmonise the terms 
I have used so far for each senior stakeholder within the MNT centres. For each of the 
centres investigated for this cross-case comparison, the most responsible and senior 
member of each centre was identified and interviewed. The range of reported job 
descriptions included: CEO, Director, Managing Director, Manager, and Business 
Manager. The majority of these centres were small (tens of employees), and the levels 
of responsibility of those interviewed were similar in the sense that they were the ones 
ultimately responsible for running their MNT centre having the most influence in terms 
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of decision-making. As such are all classified as ‘Centre Directors’. The comparison of 
these eight Centre Directors provides a reasonable sample for this role.  
In addition to the Centre Director role, a number of others were also interviewed from 
the field participants which include: an NSI architect (i.e. the man responsible for 
setting up the MNT intervention); a Science Park Manager; an MNT Operations 
Director and one Management Consultant.   
A role-ordered matrix was created to present and analyse the findings from the cross-
field actors, and investigate the aforementioned roles, logics and the assimilation of 
outcomes for their centre. Table 8.5 displays the first part of this table, and the complete 
table can be seen in appendix 8a. This table is now discussed.  
Remaining actors from a number of other field organisations (e.g. RDAs) have not been 
included in this table, because they have been considered not to have such direct 
influence on the decision-making of these centres. The few influential cross-network 
stakeholders who have been included are considered to be ‘decision makers’, and their 
actions have a potential effect on the organisations in the field, which is why they are 
included. The decision makers include; Professor Hertz (government intervention 
architect), Mr Morgan
2
 (MNT Operations Director) and Mr Rubik
2
 (Management 
Consultant responsible for external auditing of the centres). They are included because 
their actions are likely to affect (or have affected) the outcomes of the centres, along 
with the internal actors for the centres. 
The concept of whether the type of logics that the actor was following was exclusive or 
not was deduced referring to the original transcripts. Exclusive describes the case where 
an actor’s logics all appear to be toward one coherent set of beliefs, for example Mr 
Gillette was heavily driven by business logics. Conversely, Dr. Alvarez was considered 
not exclusive, because his over-arching problem-solving logic appeared to be at odds 
                                                          
2
 Note: Mr Morgan and Mr Rubik have been categorised as ‘state’ actors. Technically 
they are third-party consultants seconded to work on the MNT government intervention. 
In the case of Mr Morgan he is seconded full time as the MNT Operations Director for the TSB 
overseeing the intervention. In the case of Mr Rubik he is a consultant overseeing the Ernst and Young 
auditing of the centres, contracted to the TSB. As they are both working for the state actor – the 
TSB – then they have been categorised as ‘state agents’. 
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with his business logics. Clearly he was part of a large commercial OEM, however he 
described how his R&D centre had to ‘play at business’ in order to satisfy the 
accountants. These comments alluded to secondary logics competing for adherence to 
multiple belief systems. 
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Table 8-6 - Role-Ordered Matrix: Linking Actors, Roles, Logics and Agency (see appendix 8a for full table). 
ROLE 
/ Category 
or actor 
 
CONTEXT 
/ Centre 
Assimilation of OUTCOMES for their MNT centre LOGICS 
/belief systems 
/Exclusive or not exclusive 
Examples of associated 
practices/ activities  
Success Failure 
Centre 
Director 
/Hybrid  
 
University 
science park 
/Ulysses 
 successful companies 
growing on back of 
Ulysses’ services 
 Repeat business 
 lack of clarification of 
expectations from both the 
centre & customer: there is a  
need to really understand 
what is being achieved. 
 Some customers set out in 
one direction, then realise no 
money to be made and change 
product line accordingly. 
 Business 
 
[Not exclusive] 
 
 Collaborations 
 Target-driven 
 Employing high skilled 
individuals 
 Helping start-up companies 
 Run the centre to generate an 
income stream (cover staff costs) 
Centre 
Director 
/Business  
 
University 
/Lucretia 
 Happy customer: 
 Repeat business 
 In top two of the Yole 
review 
 Don't win business ..or having 
won it, fail to complete the 
task. Why? We/ or customer 
didn't understand it/ scope it 
properly/ communication 
breakdown between 
organisations.  
 Caveat: failure is a valid 
outcome of research. 
 Business 
 
[Exclusive] 
 
 Employs his staff to achieve 
market targets. Avoid research, 
that’s for the academics.  
 TSB tried to change objectives; 
Mr Gillette invited the TSB board 
in to ‘explain’ Lucretia’s contract 
to them and how Lucretia did not 
have to pander to their added 
requirements. 
 Example of new business 
development manager being paid 
for results, and if he doesn’t 
perform he is out. Uni HR had a 
different view on performance-
related contracts, but Gillette tells 
them this is the way it is (like 
industry). 
 Target-driven 
 Rebellious 
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An overview of table 8.5 shows that eight different MNT centres have been included 
(comprising 9 interviewees). 7 out of the 9 centre actors interviewed were categorised 
as having a ‘business’ background. Two of these centres were based in university 
settings. An example from each centre context has been included; one university science 
park; two local development agency R&D centres; one university; one existing SME; 
one RDA; and one large global organization. Although only one actor is interviewed in 
each case (apart from Ulysses), those interviewed are senior level actors, more often 
that not qualified to PhD level. Their view is therefore considered to be more 
experienced, and of interest. The predominant role of those interviewed is that of Centre 
Director. 
8.4.2 The Role of Centre Directors – in terms of Outcomes 
The majority of Centre Directors in table 8.5 have been categorised as having a business 
world view. Only one of the Centre Directors was considered to have a hybrid 
classification (i.e. business and academic backgrounds). The business actors follow the 
‘commercial’ view of the world as do the business actors already outlined in Mercury. 
For example, Mr Gillette talked about satisfying the needs of customers ‘giving  our 
customer what he requires, at a price he can afford, which is commensurate with the 
task’. This notion of a happy customer was also emphasised by Dr Alvarez, and Dr 
Nobel described success in terms of ‘serving the needs of industry’. Further 
comprehension of success included the launch of successful products (Drs Russell, 
Tesla and Mr Singer); in Mr Singer’s words: success as ‘ultimately product on the 
shelf’.  
Actors such Drs Alvarez and Tesla also talked about advancing the UK technology 
base, and uptake of new technologies into application areas, which aligns with the 
original MNT purpose.  
Nearly all of the Centre Directors were identified as having a business logic, which 
describes how they exhibit characteristics which are: commercially-led; lead to the 
development of commercial products, and generation of an income stream. Furthermore 
they are market aware, and are in tune with customer needs (refer to table 8.4). This 
aligns with the notion of collective identities introduced in institutional theory literature 
(Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Reay and Hinings, 2005). 
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8.4.3 The Assimilation of Outcomes by Centre Directors 
This section now discusses how actors of the Centre Director role have taken on board 
individual meanings from their business logics, along with examples of how these have 
manifested in the associated practices/ activities of themselves or the centre. 
Gillette describes how he employed a business development manager on a performance-
related contract (unusual in a university). If the employee doesn’t reach their 
commercial targets, they are relieved of their position. 
Dr Nobel explains how he facilitated a quick exit plan from the university where Liber 
was initially based. Having joined the university from industry he explained how it: 
‘was obvious that actually to run a commercial business operation within an 
academic building was impractical. So one of the main tenets of our proposal was 
that we would be a fully autonomous, commercial centre, run commercially and 
by a commercial organisation’. He added ‘I have no doubt that the commercial 
expansion is not possible within a University environment’ (Dr. Nobel). 
Dr Russell describes how within Concordia he had to separate the management from the 
university; ‘i.e. if [you] allow Uni[versity] to make decisions about what we do..[we’ve] 
got no chance!’ Included in this was the need to separate Concordia’s finances from the 
university system. Russell further explained how the original business plan for 
Concordia was unrealistic. He was driven to re-focus the business plan. He talked about 
his commercial plan to: 
‘make a large amount of money in a short amount of time.. [and his] personal 
passion .. to sell a product. May sell up to corporates .. (but doesn’t benefit UK).. 
[so why develop?] because you generate thousands every time [you develop an 
incremental product]’ (Dr. Russell). 
Dr Tesla made the point that ‘R&D is no use unless [it] results in income generation of 
some kind.. otherwise we’re just messing about aren’t we! Just giving Universities loads 
of money for just messing about’. In terms of agency, Tesla does continually invest in 
R&D and collaborations to keep ahead of the game, but he is clearly focused on 
generating income from it. Unlike the other centres, Rhea is run by an established 
manufacturing host which he set up. He is very open when he describes his bias toward 
maintaining the sustainability of the host business, when nearing the end of Rhea’s 
grant period. 
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Cardia was the only centre acting as a brokerage in my sample. Mr Singer was highly 
driven by enabling ‘business to business’ (b2b) collaborations, which would result in 
products on the shelf. His business logic is shown when he actively markets the benefits 
of MNT for making money. 
Industrial Actors not following the Business Logic 
As is often the case with data, there were a few anomalies in terms of industrial actors 
not following the business logic. Mr Cole and Dr Alvarez provided such examples. Mr 
Cole was driven to create jobs. He said ‘It’s not about the technology, it’s about the 
people, the softer issues, where they live etc’.  
Dr Alvarez runs the Bacchus MNT centre within a major global organisation. Bacchus 
itself sits within a research centre with hundreds of employees, and only received a 
fraction of grant funding in comparison to other centres. Dr Alvarez explained that this 
was due to the host organisation’s existing infrastructure (i.e. this concept links back to 
the leveraging of existing capabilities in the UK). 
Alvarez talks of himself and a senior colleague keeping ‘most of the people away from 
the normal company drudgery that upsets a lot of people and they tend to be in the lab 
90% of their time I would say’. He is driven more by a problem-solving reasoning than a 
business logic. He is dismissive of how the host company accountants treat each unit as 
a little business which has to generate money. He gives an example of how product x 
took longer than people thought, and how ‘actually things don’t need to come in as 
quickly as people think. We were always told every Christmas on product x, if it doesn’t 
work by the end of this year we have had it..’ but in the end product x became an 
incredibly important safety product, and is now in a large number of cars. 
8.4.4 The Assimilation of Failed Outcomes by Centre Directors 
This section discusses how actors of the Centre Director role have taken on board 
individual meanings of failure from their business logics, along with examples they 
provide which illustrate their associated practices/ activities. These examples were used 
to discover a number of themes, which now follow: 
8.4.4.1 Communication – Poor communication between organisations; tasks and 
understanding the deliverables. Mr Gillette firstly describes a failure to win the 
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business, and then having won the business failure to understand the task properly as a 
centre or as a customer of the centre. This leads to a ‘failure to complete the task’ 
described by Dr. Tesla as a failed outcome. Dr Apgar, having experience of both 
academia and industry added that this stems from ‘a lack of clarification of expectations 
from both the centre and the customer..Why? issues of expectations, and effort on 
something that isn’t really important’. There is a need to really understand what is 
trying to be achieved. From a brokerage perspective, Mr Singer describes how failure 
results from not bringing people together in order to collaborate and increase new 
technologies.  
8.4.4.2 Business not Sustaining (financially) – Dr Nobel describes failure as the 
‘business doesn’t survive beyond 5 years: complete failure’. Dr Tesla adds a sobering 
view on the whole purpose of this government intervention when he states ‘the route to 
sustainability might mean: actually forget the UK, and concentrate on overseas sales. 
The reasons for setting up the MNT Network in the first place – which is market failure 
and missed opportunity – it would be an acceptance that the market had failed in the 
UK’. 
8.4.4.3 Lack of Business People Leading/ Working in the Centres – This was a 
common observation made by industrial actors associated with Mercury. Analysis of the 
cross-field actors shows that it is also a major concern for them; although, it should be 
noted that the majority of actors in table 8.5 are categorised as ‘industrial’, which is 
likely to bias their view of non-industrialists running or working in the centres. 
Mr Gillette is particularly dismissive/ disparaging of academics when it comes to their 
commercial ability. In terms of his actions he employs one academic out of 31 staff in 
the whole of his organisation. The academic (a Professor) is the Director of Lucretia, 
and Mr Gillette is the next in line in terms of responsibility. This centre is based on a 
university campus. Comments such as describing the university as ‘care in the 
community for the terminally gifted’ – although voiced jovially - give an indication of 
his underlying beliefs. He presented a paper for the UK Trade and Investment which 
discussed the interface between commercial organisations and academia. The alternative 
title he gave it was ‘cat-herding for beginners’. An anonymised version of this can be 
seen in the transcripts addendum.  
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When asked to elaborate more on his views of employing academics/ researchers within 
Lucretia, Mr Gillette explained that training was one of the major issues: 
‘In order for us to function we can't take time to train people to that extent.  And 
that's actually what it boils down to.  It's people we need to be able to hit the 
streets at a dead run.  We don't have the luxury of... The standard university 
model is that you employ somebody and then you train them to do the job. That's 
actually how [our] University works. If you want to be a senior librarian they'll 
bring you in and then they'll teach you how they want you to be a senior librarian.  
And therefore they inculcate you with their own culture and their own 
methodology etc. Here, we take exactly the opposite stance. We go to the 
marketplace and say ‘We need an engineer with background in these processes 
using this type of equipment with this type of experience’.  And that's who we 
recruit.  So on the first day he arrives here he is actually starting to contribute to 
... And we are covering his wages frankly’ (Mr Gillette). 
When asked about sharing of research projects/ ideas with the university, Gillette gives 
a recent example: 
‘For example.. we got a nice little research contract last year, and it's not 
anything the University does per se, but it was something we were interested in, 
and we took it forward and got some funding. we were accused by one of the 
academics of stealing his funding! And we said well ‘firstly we didn't know about 
it, and secondly you're not doing that!’.. ‘yes but I could have been, if I'd known 
about that!’. [big laugh]. You can't dispute that logic, so we don't try’ (Mr 
Gillette). 
 
Dr Russell inherited a number of problems when taking over Concordia. From his 
account the major issue appears to have been that the original business plans were 
written by academics. Russell describes how when preparing the business plans ‘lots of 
due diligence took place.. large OEMs [were on-board]..[there was] ..strong.. industry 
support [and] the reasoning seemed sound’. The university tried to stick to this plan, 
even after the original focus on large pharma companies became problematic  after a 
few years. At this point Dr Russell was recruited to address the concerns of the TSB. 
The TSB was concerned on two accounts; firstly, whether the university would deliver/ 
would intend to deliver; and secondly if they had no inherent interest. Similarly the TSB 
imposed an industry-facing CEO on Mercury in order to turn things around to their 
understood purpose. 
Dr Russell described Concordia as a ‘bit of a mess’ when he joined. Reasons he gave 
were that ‘academics’ were given a free hand when designing the original businesses 
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model. The organisation was subsequently overseen by a science advisory group with 5 
university board members on it. ‘When I joined they had asked for a machine z tool 
[based on] an academic view of what industry needs’. The problem here being that the 
actual market need was not considered, purchases were against a technical need. ‘If a 
commercial person [saw business plan..they would say] there is nothing to sell, no 
service, no product.. nothing to sell’.  
He had exhibited a strong example of associated practice in terms of his focus on 
people, and more specifically recruitment. He addressed some of the above problems 
with a careful selection of ‘capable’ people with a balance of commercial and technical 
skills. Russell appeared to be strongly driven by getting the right people in with strong 
attitudes to what they do. He didn’t rule out academic staff involvement, and actively 
encouraged university staff to spend time working with Concordia to share expertise, 
and gain industrial knowledge/ skills. Along with the chief technical officer (CTO) he 
strongly believed that there was a large potential for new technologies and IP to be 
developed from within universities. 
Mr Singer described how it was important in his brokerage centre to employ those with 
industrial experience; ‘if took young post doc/ young graduate and put in front of British 
Aerospace, to talk about the commercial value of nanomaterials, you haven't got a hope 
of getting their attention. If you were previously the Business Development Director for  
a mineral company and you stand in front of them and tell them that they will listen’. 
A key issue for Mr Cole was employing people and creating jobs. Interestingly his view 
of academics applying for the MNT grants mirrored his own activities which centred on 
people; ‘you are an academic at uni.. desperately try and pay wage for your team, so 
you will do anything so you can go to the conference next year. You’ll promise 
anything, fill any piece of paper’. Mr Morgan – occupying a state role - describes how 
one of the roles of the TSB is to prevent such hijacking of the government funding: 
‘Further University investment is not the aim. It is not about subsidising Uni/firm 
development projects, they need to go out and charge a commercial rate. The aim of the 
centres is to move to standalone businesses to a greater or lesser degree’. This 
demonstrates the clear tension and contestation within the MNT field. 
Of the field actors interviewed, the industrialists were quicker to criticise their opposite 
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numbers in universities, than was observed the other way around. However, Professor 
Hertz makes an important point when asked whether running the university centres with 
actors with more business acumen would have been better? ‘This whole technical area 
is very complex.. a lot of the technology is at the leading edge.. and the people who 
understood it and even now understand it are academics… You’ve got this delicate 
balance between people who understand the technology and people you want to 
commercialise it’ (Professor Hertz). Mr. Rubik does also point out that ‘In 90% of the 
centres, they haven’t done anything different from what they said they would do’ (Mr. 
Rubik). This perhaps begs the question why the proposals were accepted if the resulting 
network is felt to be ‘notional’ according to Mr Morgan.  
8.4.5 The Assimilation of Outcomes by Actors with a Hybrid Background 
This section discusses Centre Directors as well as other roles occupied by actors with 
hybrid backgrounds (i.e. those how have worked across multiple institutions). The way 
they assimilate findings is now discussed to see if any common themes emerge. 
Dr Apgar and Prof. Pelton were interviewed concerning their centre Ulysses. They have 
both worked successfully within academic institutions and industrial institutions. Apgar 
describes how success for him is helping companies grow through using the services of 
Ulysses. Pelton concurs by describing success as helping companies get up and running.  
When commenting on the more commercial nature of Ulysses in comparison to his 
experience of university departments, he says: ‘as far as delivery goes, it might be the 
biggest difference is that our deadlines are daily, and research deadlines are yearly!’ 
Pelton adds: 
‘Market need is what I'm driven by. I don't think that the UK has spent enough 
money or effort on addressing market needs. I think we put too much funding into 
basic science and not enough into applied science and engineering. .. 
unfortunately this is interpreted by ..um .. academic scientists as being ’anti-
science’. I'm not, I just don't see why 90% of our budget should go on pure 
science and 10% on applied’. He is also referring to his role as the science park 
manager when he says this. Professor Hertz reinforces this: ‘[the UK] always had 
very good research going on in nanotechnology, but not very much 
commercialisation…[the MNT programme is] Purely commercially focused. 
Research is well looked after. For last 10 years.. the equivalent 110Million 
pounds today is being put into nanotechnology research by the research councils’. 
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Apgar and Pelton are both clearly driven by business logics as are the industrial actors.  
However they don’t mention financial issues as much as other actors (bearing in mind 
each actor was interviewed according to the same interview template). However Apgar 
did refer to generating revenue in terms of covering staff costs. Ulysses was one of the 
measurement centres in the MNT network, and as such is less likely to generate large 
amounts of revenue like those centres able to develop products/technologies for sale/ 
licensing. Table 8.1 shows how the TSB doesn’t require metrology centres to be self-
sustaining. However, Apgar does treat the centre as a business, and Ulysses was nearly 
self-sustaining at the time of interview. 
When asked about failure, interestingly both actors said that failure could lead 
development in other directions. So essentially failure is not a bad thing. Professor 
Hertz explained that ‘Some failed projects can be used as the basis for a different 
project in a different market’ (Prof. Hertz). This aligns with the academic views found 
in Mercury.  
Prof Hertz was instrumental in setting up the MNT government intervention. His 
comments refer to the overall government intervention. In terms of success, he referred 
mainly to the financial leverage the government achieved for the government 
intervention: ‘I give great credit to Government.. if they hadn’t  put that sort of money 
up then the other money would never have been leverage’. He also describes how 
investment is still continuing in this area, which is a successful outcome for him. When 
asked about specific examples, Professor Hertz mentions a number of outstanding MNT 
centres. One of which is Lucretia, managed by Mr Gillette; the other was not accessible 
for this research. In terms of failure, Professor Hertz said he was ‘very disappointed that 
there haven’t been more collaborations to date’ between the centres. This is likely 
linked to the other failure that he mentions: ‘The idea was they were going to be co-
ordinated [but] with the disintegration of the DTI, and loss of funding in that.. that 
never happened.. the remnants transferred to TSB’. Professor Hertz touches on a 
common finding here across the field; numerous accounts were given of how the MNT 
network added value to the centres, but when it was dissolved and replaced with the 
Nano KTN (knowledge transfer network) this co-ordinating role diminished. 
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8.4.6 The Assimilation of Outcomes by State Actors 
The state actors included both Mr Rubik and Mr Morgan, both of whom are employed 
by the TSB to oversee the MNT government intervention. They have a strong influence 
on the Centres and it is important to further understand their logics and actions. They 
are both management consultants recruited to oversee the MNT programme; Mr 
Morgan is seconded to the TSB, and Mr Rubik works externally for Ernst and Young. 
They have both been employed to – in their own words – ‘look after the public purse’. 
Rubik and Morgan both describe success as the MNT centres within the intervention to 
be classed as Internationally competitive, and ‘World Class’ (which is a classic example 
of business logic). Unfortunately, Mr Morgan describes the reality of this: ‘we do not 
have a network of World class facilities.. [we have] a collection of World Class centres; 
including technology available to people, which wasn’t [there] before and delivering a 
notional supply chain’. He explained that ‘If [the government] want[ed] to build truly 
World Class Network of Centres [there was] too little money, too thinly spread to 
consider something World Class’. Mr Rubik refers to this ‘thin spreading of money’ and 
blames this on the fact that the RDAs became involved in the original planning of the 
centres, ending up with nearly 4 times as many centres as originally planned: ‘[The] 
original call for 5 or 6 internationally competitive centres..[the] RDAs were why the 
UK ended up with 23 half-baked [centres]..they might be regionally competitive as 
small businesses’. This is an important point when considering the context within which 
the MNT government intervention developed. 
To summarise the failed outcomes of this government intervention, Rubik bluntly 
states: ‘good thinking and policy [led to] a pot of money.. then no longer joined-up 
thinking’. This is a very simplistic view of a very complicated government intervention, 
however Mr Rubik does have access to all of the audit review documents of the centres, 
and as such has more data than most field actors on which to base his analysis. The 
same applies to Mr Morgan, although Mr Morgan was more reserved with his answers. 
Both management consultants appeared to follow the logic I have called ‘state’. That is, 
they feel driven to manage the risk to public money (i.e. the risk to the state). They see 
their role as governance of the MNT government intervention. Both act as gatekeepers 
to the audit data and recent Yole review data concerning the centres.  
248 
 
 
8.5 Context 
A number of important findings in relation to context of the MNT centres have emerged 
so far in this cross-comparison review. This section will explore this disjuncture in more 
detail by exploring a number of emergent themes in relation to specific contexts. 
A number of general themes emerged when analysing transcripts according to the 
context construct. Table 8.7 presents these along with the findings that help to illustrate 
them. For completeness, corresponding examples from Mercury and other field actors 
are included to enable further comparison. Each section of the table is split into themes, 
and below each theme are the direct quotes or descriptions to illustrate the theme from 
interviewees. The context each individual comes from is also given to show their 
framework of reference. In some cases actors such as Professor Hertz, or Mr 
Archimedes are not given a context as they are not associated with one specific MNT 
centre. A real tension between contexts is apparent in table 8.7. The main themes from 
this table are now discussed further. 
8.5.1 University Context versus Industry Context 
Considering the clear commercial purpose of the MNT government intervention, a 
number of actors purport that companies would have been a better starting point for 
them. Dr. Tesla explained why he believes this is the case: 
‘Companies do not start from scratch, they pull on existing resources, and have 
been working in the field for years..Anyway that’s why companies should have 
done this because if you get a university doing it, although they will have argued 
that they had the same background as a company, they don't.. you know that’s not 
true, that most universities run on the basis of a clever professor, and then he 
brings in fresh young PhDs and Post-Docs to do all the work, and somehow it 
works, but is not as effective as a whole team of people, and that's why 
universities have struggled and companies have found it easier’ (Dr. Tesla). 
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Table 8.7 – General Themes Emerging from ‘Context’ for the Cross-Field Actors 
Embedded Centres versus Standalone Centres – Using the capital facilities grant to leverage the development of existing MNT facilities 
Context  Organization 
pseudonym / actor 
Illustration/ comment from actor 
Existing SME Rhea/ Dr. Tesla  additional R&D facilities to compliment the manufacturing facilities 
Cost-centre in global 
organisation 
Bacchus/ Dr. Alvarez  more space and facilities provided by the grant, and ability to work with external customers 
(although they only worked with 10 or 11 during the grant) 
University Lucretia/ Mr Gillette  occasional use of spare university capability.  
University Mercury  wider use of host department’s technologies 
Commercial Credibility to Customers 
Science park (RDA) Liber/ Dr. Nobel  Sited on commercial science parks 
 ‘I believe that the commercial expansion is not possible within a university environment’ 
 Universities & research institutes or big organisations: ‘inertia, lethargy’ 
Science park (RDA) Concordia/ Dr. Russell  Sited on commercial science parks; ‘Concordia is in one of the UK’s largest bioscience 
incubators’ (Mr Archimedes, local RDA manager) 
 Importance of being a ‘commercial operation’ & Universities not being suitable for this 
University 
 
Mercury/ Dr. Newton 
Mercury/ Dr. Dickson 
 Importance of being a ‘commercial operation’ & Universities not being suitable for this 
 Mercury charges too little: industry see universities as ‘bargain’ places 
Existing SME 
 
Rhea/ Dr. Tesla  Importance of being a ‘commercial operation’ & Universities not being suitable for this 
University Lucretia/ Mr Gillette  Lucretia is on a University campus, but essentially standalone in the way it looks and 
operates. 
N/A Mr Neumann (former 
RDA director) 
 Success: ‘those that look & feel like industry…blend & interface: porous walls between 
industry and research’  
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Keep Control Separate from Larger Organizations - Bureaucracy of universities or global companies can restrict the commercial operation 
required of the MNT centres 
Science park (RDA) Liber/ Dr. Nobel  As Liber is a private Ltd company and not part of a University, Nobel describes how they 
can make commercial decisions that are reactive, rather than being delayed by going 
through finance departments etc.  
 He can quote, accept orders, invoice, sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), and benefit 
from the financial and operational autonomy that being a Limited company affords them. 
This improves timeliness, ‘which is not possible with the timelines in a university setting’ 
 He describes how universities work on different timelines and deadlines to commercial 
organisations.  It’s all about commercial responsiveness. 
 
University Mercury/ Dr. Rubin 
Mercury/ Dr. Plunkett 
 Rubin refers to this as academic style versus industry style. 
 Plunkett describes HR policies at Universities which prevent re-organisation of staff to a 
more suitable profile (i.e. can’t sack people if not perform)† 
Science park 
(university) 
Ulysses/ Dr. Apgar  E.g. ‘daily deadlines versus yearly deadlines!’ 
University Lucretia/ Mr Gillette  Mr Gillette describes problems with university HR policies – difficulty employing people 
on a performance-related contract. 
 However, ‘If you manage the environment, it’s not too bad’ 
University Context versus Industrial Context 
Existing SME 
 
Rhea/ Dr. Tesla  ‘Companies do not start from scratch, they pull on existing resources, and have been 
working in the field for years’ 
 ‘Anyway that’s why companies should have done this because if you get a University doing 
it, although they will have argued that I had the same background as a company, they 
don't.. you know that’s not true, that most universities run on the basis of a clever 
professor, and then he brings in fresh young PhDs and Post-Docs to do all the work, and 
somehow it works, but is not as effective as a whole team of people, and that's why 
universities have struggled and companies have found it easier’. 
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Cost-centre in global 
organisation 
Bacchus/ Dr. Alvarez  Bacchus was set up in order to leverage existing facilities, client-base etc. However, Dr. 
Alvarez did say that they did not access as many external customers as they originally 
thought. 
Science park 
(university) 
Ulysses/ Dr. Apgar  ‘People in research groups especially high end.. focused on own research: don’t look 
outward. We [in a science park] look outward.. otherwise no business’  
 Professor Hertz  ‘The maturity of the organisation that put money into the first place is a consideration. E.g. 
Nevlin Nanotechnology.. had money to commercialise existing equipment.. it blossomed. 
Lucretia.. significant organisation to start with. Very successful at raising money on the 
back of the grant (4 x multiplier on the DTI figure) now a significant player in nanotech. 
world’. 
Centres Should not be Managed by Academics - A number of interviewees expressed this as an important issue. 
N/A Professor Hertz  ‘..you need to get the balance right between the ‘people who understand the technology and 
the people you want to commercialise it’. 
Note: Examples where academics passed over the reigns (Prosperina, example of a customer of a start-up company of Rhea; and Concordia). The 
academics did their essential bit and then allowed actors with a stronger business logic to do their bit. 
Clusters/ Locations for Centres? 
N/A Ulysses/ Professor Pelton  ‘Technology should have been kept where the clusters where, rather than politics of RDAs 
wanting a centre each’ 
N/A RDA Team manager/ Mr 
Archimedes  
 Move away from the regional thinking to where best in the nation should the centres be? 
(AM). 
N/A RDA Senior Manager/ 
Mr Strauss 
 ‘relationship within Universities changes dramatically from [one] organisation to [next].. 
So no preconceived ideas.. because wanted as wide an MNT provision as we could to 
satisfy the needs of UK business’. 
Organisational Schizophrenia – confusion of centre purpose related to its institutional context. 
University Lucretia  Clearly commercial, but still underwritten by University. 
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University Mercury  Doesn’t know what it is trying to be. Majority of staff focused on academic careers, only 1 
or 2 focused on commercial. 
 University view: ‘hope earn some money from industry’ (Dr. Dickson). 
 Difficulty of a university starting from scratch, compared to Rhea, for example. 
 Bureaucracy- Use of academic staff for a commercial centre. 
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Tesla’s comments agree with Professor Hertz’s view that the maturity of the 
organisation you put the money into in the first place is a consideration. 
Professor Hertz adds: 
‘What we found.. the organisations that have tended from scratch, tended to be in 
Universities, and they have had problems and struggled; they have struggled 
because people in Universities.. the people who ran them in Universities, were 
initially not commercially aware people. They were sometimes academics. It’s 
been very important to divorce those activities from the research activities within 
Universities. Though there’s a lot to be done still to do that.. about 8 or 10 of the 
23 organisations came from those origins’ (Professor Hertz) 
Dr. Tesla further questions the financial forecasts made at the beginning of the 
intervention, and the ramifications of setting up centres in universities: 
‘The reason why there shouldn't have been any universities involved in the MNT 
network and intention was that there wouldn't be, was that the 40 million was 
meant to then lever extra money from elsewhere.. so if you got 2 million [from 
the] government  and you say well you really know how to do this don’t you 
[Rhea’s host company].. and we say ‘kind of’ … well if we give you 2 million will 
you make your expertise available to the rest of the UK? Hmm.. is that a good 
deal?. interesting offer? So by us accepting it, you have a win-win situation in 
theory, [Rhea’s host company] gets a boost in the arm where it needs it in capital 
equipment, and in return makes available its existing equipment and all of its 
know-how available which is the valuable bit.. and government [is] happy that it's 
got all our expertise …[when the alternative was]...that it would have had to give 
[the money to] a Greenfield site… the money to develop…[such a site] would 
probably have cost a darn sight more than 2 million’. 
These comments once again illustrate the movement from Taylor’s recommendation for 
a number of core centres (Taylor, 2004) in the original review, to a number of smaller 
centres to leverage more value from the limited budget. 
In Dr. Apgar’s experience of working in both industry and academia ‘People in 
research groups especially high end..[are] focused on own research: [they] don’t look 
outward. We [in a science park] look outward.. otherwise no business’. 
Conversely, if companies, and mature ones at that, are the better place to run MNT 
centres, then Bacchus presents somewhat of a quandary Bacchus was created on the 
back of existing micro- and nano- technology facilities within a major global 
manufacturing company. Compared to the other centres, a relatively smaller investment 
was made because of the establishment of the existing facilities. The investment 
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bolstered facilities with a view for more collaboration with external customers (typically 
the host organisation concentrates on internal customers). Dr. Apgar explained that his 
centre did not access as many customers as they originally thought they would. He 
talked of working with 10 or 11 external customers over the three year project duration, 
however he did say that Bacchus had achieved the initial financial targets of the centre. 
8.5.2 Commercial Credibility to Customers 
One of the significant observations from Table 8.7 is the perception that MNT centres 
should be commercially credible to entice customers. Mr Neumann (a former RDA 
director) describes his perception of success as coming from integration: ‘those that 
look and feel like industry.. blend and interface.. [have] porous walls between industry 
and research’ (Mr Neumann). Dr Dickson (Mercury) made the point that the university 
charges too little for services, and subsequently industry sees them as ‘bargain’ places. 
The business plan for Liber was deliberately created to move the MNT centre away 
from the university as soon as possible; Dr. Nobel explains: ‘I believe that the 
commercial expansion is not possible within a university environment’. He believes that 
universities and research institutes or big organisations exhibit inertia and lethargy. 
When he describes Liber, he talks of how it benefits from being in science park, and 
from its flexible, close-knit team. 
When Dr. Nobel was asked about the perception that customers may not have seen 
Liber as being very serious when it was originally in the university, he stated: 
  
‘It's a big issue for us, and I went to University E from Industry, and I went there 
specifically to set up a commercial operation; and after two years of that 
operation it was obvious that actually to run a commercial business operation 
within an academic building was impractical. So one of the main tenets of our 
proposal was that we would be a fully autonomous, commercial centre, run 
commercially and by a commercial organisation’ (Dr. Nobel). 
 
The non-university based centres from my cross-field sample appear to be the most 
customer-facing, and commercial. Lucretia on the other hand, appears to have been an 
exception to the rule. It is based on a university campus, in a university building, and a 
wholly owned subsidiary of the university. In spite of this, Professor Hertz describes 
Lucretia as ‘outstanding’, and says it ‘is a significant player in nanotechnology in the 
World now’. Mr Gillette also explains how the recent Yole review placed Lucretia in 
the top few, when ranking the centres for the most successful (in terms of world class 
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facilities and meeting the DTI/TSB purpose). When Prof. Hertz was asked about which 
contexts in his experience were the best for the MNT centres, he said ‘I wouldn’t like to 
differentiate between those in academia, or real world or large corporations. With 
hindsight, it depended on the maturity of the organisation that we put money put into in 
first place’. Following this thread, he explained how Lucretia ‘was relatively large, one 
of the significant organisations when we started the process. They have been very 
successful at raising money on the back of the DTI funding. The figure was a 4x 
multiplier on the figure the DTI gave them [i.e. the centre generated 4 times the initial 
grant amount given to them]. That has had a major boost to their activity on the back of 
the their DTI funding. 4 times multiplier’. So the maturity of the contexts to begin with 
may well have been one of the crucial success factors. 
8.5.3 Embedded Centres versus Standalone Centres 
The maturity (i.e. whether the centre had an established history in MNT already) of the 
existing contexts used for the MNT centres ties in with the theme which emerged 
concerning the leveraging of additional resources. One of the original ideas of creating a 
larger distributed network of MNT centres stemmed from the idea that more leverage 
could be achieved by building on existing facilities. Moreover by doing this, the idea 
was that funding could stretch further, and make a larger impact on the UK micro- and 
nano- technology industry. 
Rhea is an example where funding created an MNT centre to complement an existing 
SME. The funding afforded Bacchus, albeit relatively small in comparison to other 
centres, enabled the large global host to build more facilities. The aim of this was to 
expand their offering to more external customers. For Mercury, the initial intention was 
to use the host-university’s resources to offer a more complete MNT service. However, 
the TSB altered this by requiring Mercury to be ‘ring fenced’ as a limited company. 
One of the reasons being that the boundaries were too blurred between what was 
university research work and what was Mercury work.  
8.5.4 Keep Control Separate from Larger Organizations 
Of those MNT centres based in larger organizations, there were many comments 
concerning how bureaucracy can restrict their operation. These are also illustrated by 
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observing those centres which are not in larger organisations. Actors such as Dr. Nobel 
with experience of both large and small environments described the advantages of not 
being part of a large University. Nobel describes how his team can make commercial 
decisions that are reactive, rather than being delayed by going through finance 
departments. These include quoting, accepting orders, invoicing, and signing non-
disclosure agreements. He describes how it is all about ‘commercial responsiveness’ 
which is not possible in universities which work in different timelines. Dr. Russell of 
Concordia describes how there is ‘better communication, knowledge, awareness in the 
company’. He ensures cross fertilisation of teams and R&D staff who also work in 
production. This appears to avoid the ‘lack of respect’ he says is often seen from 
information channels in large organisations. 
Those in large organisations such as Mr Gillette of Lucretia, describe how he has 
problems with the university’s HR policies, and employing people on commercial 
contracts. Although, he does take the view that ‘if you manage the environment, it’s not 
too bad’, suggesting that a common path can sometimes be found. 
 
Dr. Alvarez’s problem-solving logic surfaces in his description of the issues his centre – 
Bacchus - has to contend with:  
‘..it is all about business.  Or what us cynics would call, playing at business, 
pretending we are a business.  It is a bit silly to say that a research centre within 
a huge company should be a business, but they are saying it should be.  It is the 
mindless, slice everything down type of approach.  The way they sell it to us is, 
you will be safe as long as you make a profit, nobody is going to say we want to 
close you down.  But you could produce fabulous science but if you are losing 
money somebody might say, we will close you down because we don't care what 
the science is like’ (Dr. Alvarez). 
8.5.5 Organizational Confusion 
The concept of organizational confusion is an important theme in the major case 
Mercury, and describes how the purpose of a centre can become confused when 
organising principles of the host institution are taken into account. 
In terms of the cross-field centres, Rhea is a good example of where this concept is 
observed. Dr. Tesla talks of the confusion often caused when customers come to Rhea 
through their collaborative networks. He talks of ‘people coming in and saying ‘what's 
this Rhea thing?’ .. are you Rhea’s host or Rhea?.. well we’d like to deal with Rhea’s 
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host,  because we know you. Why would I want to deal with Rhea then’. This was 
compounded when Tesla had to talk about sub-contracting work to Rhea: ‘most 
companies get concerned when you say you're going to sub-contract.. they go ‘what’.. 
[they] worry about if going to get cowboys to do it. They worry about whether [Rhea is] 
capable of doing the work..’. This is one of the difficulties of running a centre within an 
existing organization. Due to the grant funding and state-aid rules, it would be very 
difficult to work around this, because money couldn’t just be seen to go to a host 
company to bolster its facilities. Due to the strict state-aid rules, it is sensible that there 
needs to be a separate, accountable entity. 
In sum, a range of different MNT centre contexts clearly bring their own advantages 
and disadvantages in terms of meeting the purpose of this MNT government 
intervention. Generally speaking the more commercially focused centres appear to find 
it easier to meet the commercial purpose of the intervention, whilst the university-based 
centres are considered to be inappropriate by many cross-field actors. However, 
Lucretia is clearly an outlier in this respect, and Mr Gillette and his team appear to have 
created a commercial micro climate within a traditional university setting. 
8.5.6 Collaborations 
The collaborations construct concerns how the formal and informal relationships among 
innovation group members; other firms & groups influence the function of the MNT 
government intervention (and Mercury more specifically). 
Needless to say, due to the heterogeneity of the MNT centres, a wide range of 
collaborations were witnessed, with an equally wide range of actors’ views of their 
usefulness. Those which appeared to be the most common are now described, with 
examples from relevant cases.  
8.5.6.1 Closing of MNT Network and Replacement with Nano KTN 
One of the main observations to note is that the co-ordination of this government 
intervention was lost with the morphing of DTI to TSB and subsequent MNT Network 
to Nano KTN.  
258 
 
In the main Professor Hertz had an extremely positive view of the MNT government 
intervention that he spearheaded. However when it came to the overall collaboration 
and co-ordination of the network he raised a few concerns: 
‘The intention of DTI was that the facilities would all be coordinated and 
managed. They had to have commercial independence [even though] there are 
state-aid rules and issues. The idea was they were going to be co-ordinated. But 
with the disintegration of the DTI, and loss of funding in that.. that never 
happened. The remnants transferred to TSB. TSB just monitor the public funding 
that’s been put into them. They do that through Ernst and Young… what they 
don’t do is co-ordinate activity.. there is nobody.. Tsar saying.. this company is 
doing this.. so why don’t you do this with them, or try to attract other funding, e.g. 
venture capital’ (Prof. Hertz). 
Hertz continues that he is disappointed that more collaboration hasn’t happened to date. 
Just before Mercury was closed down, he was heavily involved in linking Mercury with 
another one of the MNT centres, as part of a last ditch attempt to save Mercury. 
Unfortunately – according to Dr. Rubin - this collaboration was not approved by the 
TSB. 
Hertz further criticises the Nano KTN; he states it is: 
‘there to represent the whole of ‘nanotechnolgy’…[however]… it pays lip service 
to micro systems technology .. they don’t feel well represented. [It is] not there to 
lead the industry, or manage or co-ordinate the industry. It’s there [as] an 
information provider for the whole of industry (not for the network or the 
‘facilities’ as they’re called). It has a completely different remit. [The] MNT 
Network.. was there to create the network.. to fund and create the strategy and all 
those kind of things…which is what the MNT did and was paid to do’ (Hertz). 
Dr. Alvarez (Bacchus) agreed with Hertz’s negative view of the Nano KTN; 
‘I mean one of our complaints in this programme was that, it was called the MNT 
Network was dissolved and morphed into the nano KTN.  And the nano KTN 
virtually ignores the micro side whereas in the MNT Network you had guys who 
were trying to promote nano and they were trying to get the customers and the 
facilities together, they were really doing their job but it was in the early days but 
they were just dissolved. So we didn't get the help from the DTI that we thought 
we were going to get’ (Dr. Alvarez). 
Dr. Tesla described the KTN's as ‘rubbish’.  
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8.5.6.2 Importance of Collaboration for some Centres 
Of the centres, Ulysses and Cardia were particularly active in terms of collaborations. 
Dr Apgar explains that for his metrology centre:  
‘Collaborations are really, really important, because I don't think we could exist 
in isolation. If we can collaborate with a company to do research and 
development that is more.. product orientated than just pure research which 
would obviously be in the University, then I think those sort of collaborations are 
really important. And…they have a greater impact on our bottom-line. So all of 
those.. you can't do it alone, we don't make anything, we examine things here.. 
well we make some things, but we don't really make; my group doesn't really 
make things. So we have to collaborate’ (Dr. Algar)..  
He also describes how there is a need to have strong industrial collaborations and 
relationships in order to know what is going on at the cutting edge of industry. 
Mr Singer explains how Cardia’s initial job: 
‘was to manage some key bits of capital assets which was seen as de-risking and 
reducing cost of entry for people.. into nanomaterials’. Through this they had 
their starting partners in an industrial alliance. Following this, their ‘role was to 
bring in other non-funded people who could help by making available to potential 
entrants to the nanomaterials world, their technology, albeit on a paid-for basis. .. 
so .. steadily expanded the number of members of the alliance to about 30, 32’ 
(Mr. Singer). 
As such, Cardia must have strong collaborations through its alliances in order to bring 
customers and suppliers together. Singer explained that at the time of interview they had 
around 150 business-to-business collaborative business programmes going on. 
Collaboration was also an essential part of Dr. Tesla’s focus for Rhea and its host 
company. He describes one European funded network which linked up a number of 
MNT organisations in order to complete the supply chain. He describes ‘Research and 
Technology Development’ projects (RTDs), which have features known as service 
actions in them: 
‘the service action on the whole is where you have proven processes.. and offer 
them to anyone as open access service provisions. RTD is when you don’t know 
the answer yet, it’s Research. So the idea of Integral Plus.. is that you have within 
the same collaborative group of partners.. R&D going on to do the things that you 
don’t know how to do, but as soon as you do know how to do it, it becomes part of 
the service of the things you do know how to do. So Integral Plus was effectively 
part of Fluence during that period, because the bits that we didn’t know how to do 
were developed in Integral Plus, once we knew how to do them they were offered 
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Integral Plus but also offered through Fluence. So, all the time Rhea is also 
through the projects improving its capability, and its relevance for its capability, 
and is using both itself and either Integral Plus or other networks to sell’ (Dr. 
Tesla). 
 
Mr Gillette described a range of collaborations underway with Lucretia, including; 
membership of the 15 out of the 25 government KTNs; framework 7 programmes (EU 
funded programmes); work with large companies on developmental programmes; 
relationships with other universities; and relationships with other MNT centres. Lucretia 
can also take advantage of spare capacity within the university departments to their 
benefit; ‘It doesn't happen all the time but where there is spare capacity in the 
university, we can take that up and charge competitive commercial rates’. Likewise the 
university can use equipment at Lucretia. 
8.6 Reflections on using the MIRP Constructs 
Rather than structure the cross-case comparisons around the MIRP constructs as in the 
main case study chapter, this chapter presented the findings in a more inductive way. In 
some instances this included the use of comparisons, e.g. university versus industrial 
contexts, or business actors versus professional academic actors. This approach has 
enabled the dynamics of the MNT field to be explored in a less constrained fashion. 
This approach coupled with viewing the MNT field through an institutional theory lens 
has helped to highlight some of the shortcomings of the MIRP constructs. For example, 
if the MIRP constructs had been religiously adhered to, then some of the findings such 
as the assimilation of outcomes from different actors and the importance that logics 
have on the contestation produced within the MNT field, may not have been realised. 
The findings from the data collected in this study and those of the MIRP programme are 
discussed in more depth in the ‘Discussion’ chapter next. 
8.7 Summary 
The conceptualisation of the MNT network as an organizational field of actors has been 
introduced in this chapter. In doing so the theoretical notions of actors having logics 
which inform their actions (agency) has enabled a deeper investigation of how the 
MIRP constructs influence the MNT government intervention. Furthermore the 
interplay between an actor’s logics and the context they are in has highlighted some 
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unusual findings. For example, Mr Gillette (of Lucretia) is seen to have a very strong 
business logic and industrial background, however he is in a university. Compare this to 
Drs Rubin and Plunkett in Mercury, who were in a similar position. If Mercury was a 
typical example then one would expect Mr Gillette to have been overcome with the 
bureaucracy of his university, and the predominance of academic actors with opposing 
logics. Surprisingly, not only is Lucretia reported to be in the top two successful MNT 
centres, it is also described as ‘outstanding’ and ‘world experts’ by Professor Hertz. 
Having used the MIRP constructs combined with institutional theory, reasons behind 
such contradictions emerge. That is, in Lucretia of the 31 staff employed, only one (the 
Director) is an academic. It would appear that Mr Gillette has created a standalone 
commercial centre within a university environment. 
The following chapter will draw together examples such as these and use the MIRP and 
institutional logics combination to discuss the implications of this research, and how 
this approach has been used to understand the MNT government intervention further. 
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Chapter 9 - Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
The reviewed literature spanned a number of disciplines so as to fully comprehend the 
government intervention under scrutiny and to place it into its proper context. The 
framework for the MIRP research programme was then adapted and augmented. 
The objective of this chapter is to open up a dialogue around the study’s findings in 
relation to the academic literature used to investigate the research questions. 
Furthermore, the academic contributions which result from this study are discussed. 
9.2 The Academic Contribution of this Study 
A new method that helps us understand the innovation process in a recent government 
intervention has been developed, by working across disciplines and synthesising 
different methodologies. To understand innovation it is necessary to see how it is made 
possible in a meaningful (real world) context which is why the MNT government 
intervention was conceived using organisational field theorisation, with ‘local’ and 
‘extra local’ contexts (Hallet and Ventresca, 2006). 
In addition, the Minnesota Innovation Research Programme (MIRP) constructs have 
been used to gather data on a recent UK government intervention. The methodological 
approach adopted is that of the Interactive Process Perspective (IPP) as described by 
Slappendel (1996), and also what was effectively used in the MIRP programme. This 
approach overcomes the limitations of perspectives concentrating solely on individual 
action or objective structures.  
The method used has synthesised the Interactive Process Perspective with an 
Institutional Theory (IT) approach, and has been used to further explain the 
complexities of the innovation process by demonstrating the co-operation and 
contestation between actors from different interest groups. 
The Interactive Process Perspective pays attention to the understanding of how action 
and structure interrelate. The importance of this approach is recognised by others such 
as Edwards (2001) in assessments of similar government interventions. Table 1 displays 
a further contribution of this research in relation to Slappendel’s findings. That is, the 
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main features of the approach developed in this PhD add another viewpoint to the 
perspective of researchers investigating innovation at the organisational level. 
Table 9.1 – Main Features of the Novel Approach using IPP & IT Theorisation in 
Comparison with the Interactive Process Perspective 
 
 Interactive Process 
Perspective 
IPP & IT process (with MIRP 
constructs) 
Basic Assumptions Innovation produced by the 
interaction of structural 
influences and the actions 
of individuals   
IT theorisation further explains 
the complexities of the 
innovation process in terms of 
structure and action. In 
particular it demonstrates the 
co-operation and contestation 
between different categories of 
actors (i.e. different interest 
groups). 
Conceptualisation of 
an innovation 
Innovations are subject to 
reinvention and 
reconfiguration. 
Innovations are perceived.  
Actors hold different 
orientations 
Conceptualisation of 
the innovation 
process 
Complex process  Complexity: IT introduces 
logics which represent 
interactivity. This explains the 
complexities of the process by 
demonstrating the role of co-
operation between collective 
identities. 
Core concepts Shocks; proliferation; 
innovative capability; 
context. 
Context: IT also shows the 
differentiated or contingent 
nature of social relations within 
a given context. Local and 
Extra local contexts. 
Research 
methodology 
Case studies; case histories. Case studies; case histories. 
Main authors Van de Ven et al.[MIRP] - 
 
Source: Author (adapted from Slappendel, 1996, p.109) 
9.3 Adding to the Empirical Data Store 
Denrell (2003) argues that one of the main barriers associated with developing effective 
policy interventions is the lack of empirical studies in the literature which concern 
themselves with failed examples. The literature reviewed in this study confirmed an 
evident reliance on data gathering from successful cases alone.  Denrell (2003) argues 
that this is due to the economic process which means that unsuccessful firms are 
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replaced by individuals and firms with good performance, resulting in a limited sample 
of firms for research.  
The main case study (Mercury) in this study provided evidence of failure in terms of 
achieving the purpose of the MNT intervention. The main objectives for each centre 
were to be open-access, and generate commercial revenue in order to be self-sustaining 
at the end of the grant funding. Coupled with this is the importance of providing a boost 
for UK manufacturers wishing to develop MNTs. Such an in-depth look at a failed 
organisation contributes to bridging this identified literature gap by adding a new and 
useful example of failure to the plethora of successful examples already in the literature. 
9.4 Establishing Relationships between the Findings and Initial 
Research Questions 
9.4.1 Findings in relation to Research Question 1 
In response to the first research question (how do government interventions such as the 
MNT network function?) a picture of a nascent field was developed using a novel 
approach combining the interactive process perspective with that of institutional theory, 
outlined in the previous section. This approach made it possible to understand how the 
MNT government intervention functioned. 
9.4.2 Findings in relation to Research Question 2 
In answer to the second research question (How can we describe stakeholder values and 
understanding in relation to the role of a nascent government intervention?), the 
understanding of the role (in particular what constitutes ‘success’) of a government 
intervention, has been shown to vary greatly amongst actors and their local 
environments. This deduction describes the situation which needs to be addressed in 
national intervention policies (in particular technology policies) where state actors have 
an understanding of the local environment in which they are trying to achieve 
objectives. The findings from this study highlight the importance that local 
environments have on the original purpose of the intervention. 
Kelley (1976) describes how the goals (i.e. ‘success’ for the MNT centres) of an 
organisation or organisational network are not monolithic. They are multiple and 
contradictory reflecting the dynamics of internal contestation and the interests of 
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organisational actors. ‘This process is one of continuous conflict, with goals of 
programmes constantly in the process of negotiation’ (Kelley, 1976, p.67). 
9.4.3 Findings in relation to Research Question 3 
In relation to the third research question (How do the the following aspects of 
innovation management: purpose, process, people, collaborations, context and 
outcomes influence the success of emerging technologies in different organisational 
settings?) more detailed findings were identified in relation to the MNT cases under 
investigation. In the main case Mercury, an in-depth analysis has provided particular 
evidence showing that – for the MNT intervention studied - these aspects have a 
particular affect on the local context and function of organisations which are part of a 
government intervention.  
The study began by using an existing theoretical framework to gather and analyse data 
for the MNT government intervention; that is, the Minnesota Innovation Research 
Programme (MIRP).  Constructs were used from this framework and more were added 
to cover the specific nuances of the intervention under investigation.  
A gap in the extant literature concerning the links between the MIRP constructs became 
apparent. The use of an IPP perspective, and IT and IL theorisation enabled this gap to 
be further explored. This has been achieved by investigating the actions of actors within 
the local context and extra local context which they inhabit. 
This added theoretical insight highlighted the importance that action and structure have 
on the constructs outlined in the third research question. Those of particular importance 
for the MNT government intervention were shown to be purpose, people, context and 
outcomes (success/ failure). 
The principal links between individual constructs and institutional theorisation are 
identified in the following text. Context is discussed first, as the MNT centres in this 
study highlighted a number of important issues relating to the development of a 
government intervention comprising of many distributed local contexts. 
9.4.3.1 Context 
The context within which a centre was based had associated institutional logics which 
actors could not avoid. Mercury exemplified a centre with deeply-ingrained professional 
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academic logics, which caused internal conflict with the state-actors and actors with 
business-oriented systems of reasoning. 
In the main case, this conflict was a key factor in the centre’s failure. Greenwood et al. 
(2010, p.15), described a growing interest in ‘why and how organizations interpret and 
respond differently to their contexts’ in their discussion of the concept of homogeneity 
and heterogeneity. The MNT centres investigated were viewed as quite heterogeneous. 
The discussion of competing institutional demands from centres within this MNT 
government intervention added to this enquiry concerning organisational context. The 
differing actors, systems of thinking and reasoning, roles and contexts, all impacted 
significantly on the centres’ outcomes. 
Context is a large influence on the function of an system of innovation. The distinction 
between ‘local’ and ‘extra local’ contexts introduced by Hallet and Ventresca (2006) has 
contributed to a far deeper understanding of a contemporary government intervention. 
This study provides further empirical evidence of the new and unfamiliar forms of 
organisational arrangements which result from cross-sectoral interventions as discussed 
by authors such as Garrett-Jones et al. (2005).  
9.4.3.2 Purpose 
Institutional reasoning has provided an understanding of the competing logics within 
many of the MNT centres under investigation. Moreover, the dissonance evident 
between the state actors from the governing body and the main case study, called into 
question the difficulties of embedded agency when actors have ingrained and opposing 
organising principles, institutional thinking and reasoning processes. 
Authors such as Mass and Tessa (2008) have investigated the different perspectives held 
by actors within SMEs. They described how ‘sometimes, these views show diverging 
goals among the stakeholders and consequently, contrasting opinions on effective 
supporting policies’ (Mass and Tessa, 2008, p.393).This PhD has cast new insights into 
the problems highlighted in this area; in particular, how the views of the actors within a 
government intervention show diverging goals, and as a result contrasting views on how 
such intervention should be run in different contexts. 
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9.4.3.3 People 
Institutional logics provided a tool for understanding the organising principles of actors 
within the MNT field, and insight into why they carried out the actions they did. The 
concept of ‘roles’ was also investigated, leading to a cross-case analysis of the ‘Centre 
Director’ role. 
The linking of the people construct in a more nuanced way with outcomes, illuminated 
the interaction between actors and structure and the importance that the organising 
principles of individuals play in a government intervention. The differing actors, 
systems of thinking and reasoning, roles and contexts all impacted significantly on the 
centres’ outcomes. 
A new category has been put forward to categorise those actors with multiple points of 
reference and frames of meaning, i.e. ‘hybrid’ actors. Hybrid actors were those observed 
with experience of working in business and academia. These ‘hybrid’ actors were able 
to bring different understandings to their MNT environment, and appeared able to move 
across institutions. This may indicate the need for such cross-disciplinary experts from a 
range of sectors, due to the nascent nature of the MNT field. Harvey (2010), raised the 
associated idea of industries being accountable for their own reasoning and judgements.  
The nascent MNT industry may be held accountable for its own system of institutional 
thinking and reasoning, due to the high mobility of experts required across different 
institutions who have experienced different institutional thinking and reasoning 
processes. 
9.4.3.4 Outcomes 
Examples of successful MNT centres (in terms of the original DTI purpose) were those 
whose actors were driven by a common purpose and had associated inherent and 
common business thinking, reasoning and judgement processes. 
Conversely, the main case study provides an example of failure. This failure can be 
linked in part to the differences in the perceptions of objectives and the defining of 
success for key innovation stakeholders (Mass and Testa, 2008). The existence of very 
deeply ingrained and different perspectives led to diverging goals and outcomes. This 
study also builds on the work of Garrett-Jones et al. (2005) who investigated the 
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common purpose and divided loyalties observed for academic and government 
researchers in a government intervention which set up collaborative research centres. 
9.5 Reflective Discussion: MIRP Literature and Government 
Interventions 
The framework from the MIRP programme was used in this study to provide important 
constructs with which to gather data about the MNT government intervention. The 
findings from the MIRP programme are now discussed and compared with those from 
the main case and cross-case comparisons. 
9.5.1 Contribution to the MIRP Findings 
The MIRP framework and key concepts used to guide this study were:  people; context; 
transactions (collaborations) and outcomes (success & failure). This section will now 
discuss how the MNT government intervention data have the potential to contribute to 
this framework.  
The overall findings associated with each construct were discussed by a variety of 
scholars in Van de Ven et al.’s (2000) work. Indubitably, different researchers adopted 
different methods for their data collection and analysis. For example, in his work 
concerning ‘psychology and organisational innovation’ Angle (2000) presented his 
findings as a number of propositions. In contrast, Dornblaser et al. (2000), took a more 
qualitative approach to presenting their findings in relation to ‘innovation outcomes, 
learning and action loops’. In harmony with this latter approach, my contributions are 
founded on the qualitative research methods which I adopted. 
9.5.2 People and Context 
Angle’s work (2000) developed a number of propositions when evaluating the data 
collected across MIRP studies for the people and context elements of its framework 
(reproduced in table 9.1). This section now discusses the way in which these 
propositions relate to the findings from this PhD. 
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Table 9.2 - Propositions Resulting from Angle’s Findings from the MIRP 
Programme (Angle, 2000). 
No. Angle’s Proposition 
1 Organizational innovation is a joint function of members’ personal attributes and 
the context for innovation in their organization. 
2 Organizational innovation occurs in organizations that have a context containing 
enabling and motivating conditions for innovation; innovation will not occur 
where either factor is missing. 
3 Innovation effectiveness is positively associated with frequency of 
communication among persons with dissimilar frames of reference.  
4 Innovation effectiveness is positively related to the extent to which the 
organization integrates creative personalities into the organizational mainstream. 
 
9.5.2.1 Findings in Relation to Angle’s First Proposition 
This first proposition was found to be important in relation to the findings from my own 
study. My study contributes further to this proposition with its discussion of institutional 
theory. This discussion illuminated the importance of the relationship between 
institutional logics (which linked to personal attributes) and structure (i.e. organisational 
context) for the MNT government intervention case. Many examples have been 
provided to reinforce this contribution in Chapters 8 and 9.  
For example; in Mercury, it appeared logical for policy makers to build on an existing 
academic centre-of-excellence in order to offer industry micro technologies. However 
as my research shows, integrating a university context and associated academic actors 
with an intervention driven toward commercialisation, led to failure. Specifically, if one 
observes the professors who wrote the proposition for Mercury and its technologies, 
they apparently have the skills; however, they lacked the required business acumen. 
This highlighted how the ‘interaction between people and context will result in 
outcomes not fully accounted for by people and context taken separately’ (Angle, 2000, 
p.138).  
9.5.2.2 Findings in Relation to Angle’s Second Proposition 
The data from the main case (Mercury) provided in-depth findings which displayed how 
a context deficient in enabling and motivating conditions led to a failed environment for 
organisational innovation. As per Angle’s second proposition, this demonstrates how 
innovation will not occur where either enabling or motivating conditions are missing. 
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The conflict created between industrial and professional academic actors within their 
local context led to poor innovation conditions:  
‘...In the same respect that organizations can create a de-motivating climate, they 
can through a number of mechanisms, create systems and structures and an 
organizational climate that impede the innovation process’ (Angle, 2000, p.144). 
                                                                                                  
Data from centres similar to Mercury do however show that actors can work within the 
constraints of a ‘university’s slow moving, bureaucratic management structure’ 
(Lambert, 2003, p. 64). Examples within the MNT case example included Lucretia, 
Liber and Ulysses. Ulysses, for example, was created on a Science Park, which 
‘encourages people in different specialties to interact by location and arrangement of 
meeting rooms, eating facilities etcetera’ (Lambert, 2003, p.144). 
 
9.5.2.3 Findings in Relation to Angle’s Third Proposition 
The third proposition Angle put forward (Innovation effectiveness is positively related 
to the extent to which the organization integrates creative personalities into the 
organizational mainstream) resonated with examples provided from Concordia and 
Rhea. They suggest that actors with strong viewpoints (and possibly different 
institutional logics) were beneficial to the innovation development process.  However, 
more important were the findings from Mercury and Bacchus, which showed the 
possible negative impact on an innovation process when these ‘dissimilar frames of 
reference’ were polarised.  In both cases, there was an element of the host organisation 
being “mechanistic, bureaucratic organizations…the type of organization who may 
stifle the spontaneity of its members by over-routinizing all aspects of organizational 
life’ (Angle, 2000, p.145).   
In the case of Mercury, the issues were also significantly localised in the subgroup (i.e. 
the MNT centre).   
‘...If the goals of the subgroup [Mercury] are completely congruent with those of 
the organization [i.e. the host university], it may not matter which attachment is 
formed. On the other hand, if the values and goals of the group are antithetical to 
those of the larger organization, then it matters indeed where loyalty lies’ (Ibid. 
p.158).   
 
So on the one hand, the professional academic actors were aligned with the goals of the 
university, i.e. research and teaching; however on the other hand, the goals of the 
business actors (i.e. revenue generation) were antithetical to those of the university.   
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However with Lucretia, this did not appear to cause any major problems.  Significantly, 
the explanation for the differences between Mercury and Lucretia may lie in the way 
that the MNT network was theorised through an institutional lens perspective in this 
thesis. That is, there were competing logics, with business and academic actors working 
together in close proximity in Mercury; this was in contrast to Lucretia, which was set 
up with a majority of business actors and distanced from the host university.  
 
Lucretia’s Director was very clear on what his Centre’s boundaries were:  
‘Lucretia is a wholly-owned business unit... a 3rd strand activity. Although we are 
commercially facing, we have a board of management, and people with 
recognisable job titles outside of academia...we are a School in the faculty...’ (Mr 
Gillette).  
 
He also demonstrated a more productive working relationship with the multiple values 
and goals of his MNT Centre and the host University:  
...the [host] University supports Lucretia…we are an incubator in the University 
so I am a University employee... they support us. But we have to find our own 
money…  
 
To address the balance of being commercially-focused whilst also within a university, 
he describes how Lucretia’s staff have commercial contracts:  
...they use a system here, where we have a University-graded salary, but it's based 
on what a commercial salary is for my function. So I'm paid what my opposite 
number in BAE systems is paid, effectively... (Mr Gillette). 
 
Conversely, Mercury appeared to have competing logics amongst its actors. It did not 
have commercial contracts and this is likely to have added to the confusion of the 
Centre’s actors: if they are employed as researchers, why then should they do 
commercial work?   
‘Another thing that some people forget about is that Mercury have academic staff 
who are academically driven, they aren’t just research staff because they want to 
publish and they have academic careers to work on..’ (Mr. Anderson).  
 
Mr Anderson, although in a senior position within Mercury, demonstrates his own 
professional academic logic by travelling to an academic conference when the CEO 
explicitly asked him to remain at the centre and carry out commercial work. 
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9.5.2.4 Findings in Relation to Angle’s Fourth Proposition 
Concordia provides an illustration of how Angle’s fourth proposition (innovation 
effectiveness is positively related to the extent to which the organization integrates 
creative personalities into the organizational mainstream) is demonstrated in the UK 
government MNT intervention. The Director described how the original business plan 
for Concordia had been ‘written by academics with a great deal of careful planning 
(e.g. external OEMs were on board and strong industry support was forthcoming) and 
with sound reasoning. However, if a commercial person read the plan, they would 
probably say ...there is nothing to sell...no service...no product...nothing to sell’.   
This plan ran for a number of years, but the TSB eventually became concerned with its 
direction.  Dr. Russell was then brought in to help to rectify the situation as he was 
considered a key stakeholder in the MNT field.  In effect, by bringing a ‘creative 
personality’ into the organisation, it was hoped that the Centre’s overall performance 
would improve.  Dr. Russell further introduced ‘new blood’ into the organization, to 
overcome the issue of ‘groupthink’ described by Pelz & Andrews (1966, p.104) thus:  
‘...cohesive groups tend to homogenize the frames of reference of their members 
... no matter how heterogeneous a research and development team is on its 
formation, the team will (eventually) become homogeneous...’ 
 
To overcome this issue of homogeneity, Dr Russell consciously ensured that the 
Concordia’s environment was conducive to the flow of arguments. This also related to 
another of Angle’s propositions -that of developing a positive relationship between 
innovation effectiveness and ‘bringing issues into the open and working them out’ (Ibid. 
p.160). 
Conversely, in the example of Mercury, the majority of actors recruited for the MNT 
centre at the beginning, were simply transferred from existing research positions onto 
this new ‘project’. Such a move demonstrably, only increased the incidence of 
homogeneity in an organization.   
9.5.3 Outcomes 
One of the important questions that Dornblaser et al. (2000) asked during their 
interviewing process was the question ‘what current criteria are you using to judge the 
success of this innovation?’ The data from this PhD study asked a number of similar 
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open questions which also addressed this issue with the MNT centres who were 
carrying out innovation in the form of MNT technology development. These questions 
are shown in box 9.1. 
 
How would you describe a successful outcome from the development/application of 
your [nano] technology (and/or expertise)? 
 
Conversely, how would you describe a failed outcome or an outcome that results in 
elements of success and failure (i.e. positive and negative results)? 
 
Describe examples of either successful or failed outcomes (where participant can 
disclose). 
 
Your views on the measures that the TSB use to assess your centre - how appropriate 
are they?                                                                                         
 
Box 9.1 – Additional open questions used to understand how actors understood 
outcomes 
 
The findings from this PhD study make a potential contribution to Dornblaser et al’s 
(2000) work by investigating outcomes (success/failure/measures) from the point of 
view of four additional types of situational actors; i.e. professional academics, business 
actors, state actors and hybrid actors.  
9.5.3.1 Management Paradox 
Successful outcomes for the MNT government intervention from the perspective of the 
original DTI remit, described certain revenue-generating centres that develop 
technologies which are then adopted by UK industry.  The findings from this PhD study 
were in accord with Dornblaser et al’s (2000) concept that a central problem in 
innovation management may be the management of a paradox. This was highlighted in 
cases such as Mercury, where opposing/conflicting organising principles were evidently 
in existence and which proved difficult to manage. Similar problems occurred in the 
case of Concordia during its first few years. However, the situation was rectified by the 
introduction of a new Centre Director who shifted the focus towards revenue- 
generating activities.  
These two examples highlighted one of the major paradoxes observed in terms of 
perceived outcomes and context for the MNT government intervention. Centres were 
created using existing MNT facilities (typically in universities) to leverage the relatively 
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small investment for the overall programme
1
.  As such, the government created an 
innovation management paradox from the outset; i.e. developing MNT centres which 
were meant to be revenue-generating in a context that was typically research-led and 
run by research-motivated actors. However, Lucretia provided at least one tangible 
example of where this can be successful. 
9.5.3.2 Resource Controllers 
Dornblaser et al. (2000) also posited the importance of what they called ‘resource 
controllers’ and ‘innovation managers’ in the innovation process. Parallels with these 
actors could be seen in terms of the TSB and Centre Directors respectively:  
‘...when innovation implementation efforts went awry…and [resource controllers] 
where disappointed with results, the external resource controllers tended to focus 
on input criteria... if outcome assessments of resource controllers and innovation 
mangers did not converge, the assessments that mattered in determining the fate 
of an innovation were those of the  resource controller…’     Dornblaser et al. 
(2000 p.202) 
 
The case of Mercury in this PhD study reinforces these findings, and how the 
dissatisfaction of the state actors (i.e. TSB, the resource controllers) led to intervention 
in the centre. That is, an external CEO was firstly required, and then when progress still 
failed to reach an acceptable level, funding was removed. 
However in the example of Lucretia, when the resource controllers requested additional 
reporting measures which Mr Gillette felt where inappropriate, the decision-making 
shifted from the state actors to the Centre Director: 
‘...I put our contract in front of her [TSB actor] and I said...you show me 
anywhere in this contract where I have to follow...I have to provide this [hits 
folder] level of information?’ And she couldn’t... So having  got that out of the 
way, what we then said was... now we've established that this is inappropriate for 
us...we don't want to queer our pitch or your pitch...we will now participate in 
this...we wanted to say ‘we're always going to have a red cross here, until you 
understand what this business is about’. And since that time we've been fine!’                                                                                                          
 
Dornblaser et al’s (2000) results show how different types and levels of criteria were 
used at different times in the innovation process, leading to outcome evaluations which 
became increasingly difficult to judge accurately. The above extract displays evidence 
                                                 
 
1
 In comparison to countries such as Taiwan who invested 21.5 billion US dollars over six years (Hung et 
al. (2004), in comparison to the UK intervention of 90 million UK Pounds. 
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of this, caused by the metamorphosis of the DTI into the TSB and other NDGBs. This 
also demonstrates how an actor with strong business reasoning and judgement was able 
to stand up to the state actors from the TSB and deal with this challenge. 
Actors reconstructing their views - the data from the MNT intervention also agreed with 
Dornblaser et al. (2000, p.202), in terms of how actors can reconstruct their views at 
different points in time: 
[problems such as project slip] led innovation managers to emphasize meeting 
process criteria of solving these problems, achieving technical milestones, and 
meeting deadlines and budgets in order to maintain credibility for their 
innovation development effort...innovation managers tended to reconstruct 
negative information in a positive frame with assurances that they were in control 
of problems and with action plans for addressing the problems (Dornblaser et al. 
2000, p.202).                                                              
 
Further findings from this PhD study show how Centre Directors reconstructed their 
views when things were not going to plan. More importantly however, this data set 
showed how the evaluator/resource controller (i.e. the TSB) actually reconstructed 
negative information, or prevented it from being published. This conclusion is based on 
consideration of the following information: 
1. There was a scarcity of information available in the public sector concerning the 
MNT government intervention programme. The most detailed information often 
amounted only to a list of centres, with associated grant figures. 
2. Added to this was the lack of publicly-available targets for the centres by the TSB. 
3. A recent third-party review of the centres (The Yole Review) was not published.  
9.5.4 Collaborations 
Data from this current study was collected using an adaptation of the transactions code, 
namely the collaborations code. This was to make a distinction from the MIRP 
programme’s method of capturing and recording each individual transaction. The term 
‘collaboration’ is used to emphasise the more macro view of transactions observed in 
this thesis between the MNT network actors. The relevant findings from the MIRP 
study are now presented in comparison to the findings from the MNT government 
intervention. 
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In Mercury, it was shown that particular actors  ‘re-represented’ their Centre’s purpose, 
guided by their underlying world views. As the TSB looked to further commercialise 
the Centre, these actors opposed this as a result of their sense- making process. This was 
demonstrated when comparing Mercury’s original tender document and its clear 
requirement for a ‘commercial’ focus from Professors Stephenson and Pascal. These 
actors almost tried to ‘justify’ their manipulation of the original purpose, which 
appeared to be reinforced through the transactions with TSB actors. This agreed with 
the MIRP findings that: 
‘…the ‘facticity’ derived from a process of understanding often changes as a 
result of experiences in carrying out initial commitments. A mutual agreement 
that two individuals think they have developed and is operational, may not be in 
place or may have evaporated’ (Dornblaser et al. 2000, p.181). 
The concept of a ‘mutual agreement’ between actors was also described in Ring and 
Van de Ven’s (2000) transactions research.  Such mutual agreements were displayed 
between the governing body and the individual centres in the MNT intervention 
example. The findings showed how the initial agreement often seemed to have altered 
over time. This was probably linked to the understanding that grants came with 
‘conditions and not deliverables’ and this could be seen as a loss of the ‘shared world’ 
between the parties:  In the course of innovating, an entrepreneurial unit often engages 
in transactions processes. Innovation processes are inherently uncertain. Parties 
frequently do not fully appreciate or understand their needs (Van de Ven, 2000, p.187).                 
A number of MNT Centre Directors described how a challenging part of the 
development of emerging technologies was creating an understanding of the customer’s 
needs, and that customer understanding what was possible with the new technologies.  
Rhea’s Centre Director described how technological innovation was accelerated by 
engaging in cross-European collaborations; this also provided an opportunity for the 
Centre to offer a wider supply chain. 
9.5.5 Contribution to the Existing MIRP Framework 
A detailed discussion of the findings from the MNT government intervention and their 
relation to MIRP was presented in the Discussion Chapter. Through this analysis and 
the use of the MIRP constructs for gathering data, a number of useful recommendations 
for the future are now made: Firstly, a number of additional categories from the data 
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relating to NSIs facilitated a deeper understanding of them. The most beneficial were; 
purpose (generic, individual); outcomes (success, failure) and sub-groups for people 
(academic, business, state and hybrid).  
The role that individuals (actors) play within a government intervention and how they 
are informed by their institutional thought processes was investigated. This enabled a 
deeper analysis of the adapted MIRP constructs and a better understanding of people 
involved in the innovation process. The linking of this more nuanced people-construct 
to outcomes (in terms of the intervention’s success/failure), further illuminated the 
organising principles and resulting actions. Such categories also provided insight into 
other research involving other innovation processes. The sub-groups of the actors may 
need adapting depending upon the field under investigation and the relevant IT 
literature provides the necessary background information for this. 
Secondly, these adapted MIRP constructs were then incorporated within a logics or 
reasoning framework (i.e. IPP, IT and IL theory). This coupling of systems of reasoning 
to the MIRP framework can be used for future investigations of the innovation process, 
thereby providing a different perspective’s findings to the existing MIRP methodology. 
This method was particularly enlightening when investigating the idea of contested and 
collaborative systems of reasoning within an organizational field (embedded agency). 
Additionally, this study built upon the constructs introduced by the Minnesota 
Innovation Research Programme (MIRP) which was used to investigate innovation 
processes (Van de Ven and Poole, 1990). This nascent innovation field’s findings (the 
micro-and-nanotechnology field) contribute significantly to bridging the gap that was 
identified concerning the lack of empirical examples in the literature. Furthermore, the 
main case investigated provided a detailed and valuable analysis of how actors in a local 
context interacted with each other and perhaps more importantly, the extra local 
context. 
9.6 Reflective Discussion: Emerging and Disruptive Technology (EDT) 
Literature 
This section relates findings from this study with the literature review on emerging and 
disruptive technology.  
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9.6.1 Development Time for New Technologies 
The EDT literature discussed a range of challenges faced by organisations developing 
disruptive technologies. One of these was the long period of time required for the 
development of such new technologies for commercial application. The UK government 
only funded MNT centres for a short period of time; between three and five years. 
Woodside (2005) described how the time taken from successful working prototype to 
commercialisation is measurable in one to five decades, not one to five years. Many 
scholars echoed this view, stating that short periods of time are not long enough to 
develop emerging technologies (Holm 1995: Johnson, & Duberley 2009). The notion of 
the need to develop disruptive technologies with a long-term view in mind, rather than 
merely doing it as a ‘one off’ event, or as a ‘nice add-on’ was discussed in detail by 
Battilana (2009). Interviewees within this study reinforce these views (ref. Dr Tesla, Mr 
Strauss, Professor Pascal, Dr Teller, Dr Alvarez). As such, the need for technology 
policies – like the MNT intervention – to consider longer timescales appears to be a 
potentially overlooked factor in the successful development of emerging technologies. 
9.6.2 Curiosity-Driven Research 
A number of academics interviewed across the MNT field described the need for 
‘curiosity-driven research’, which may have alluded to the idea of development being 
more of an idealistic activity. Foster (1986) described the concept of scientists/ 
technologists (or academics) as being ‘limit-breakers’. That is, they seek novel 
approaches to the norm, rather than just building on standard methods. The very nature 
of a university as an institution for education, learning and discovery fully aligns with 
these observations and aspirations. 
Carlsson and Jacobson (1994) describe the importance that researchers place on the 
need for basic research to be allowed to evolve, leading to new avenues for applied 
research and technical solutions. The argument continues that science plays an 
important part in modern democracy by providing independent knowledge allowing 
important political decisions to be made in an open, transparent and representative way. 
As such, it was unsurprising that institutionalised professional academic actors were 
less driven by commercial incentives. However, the MNT government intervention 
funding was always clearly intended for development with a commercial application in 
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mind. One way in which the DTI and then TSB tried to overcome this hurdle was to 
‘monetize the technology’ (Palumbo, 2001). That is, the development of the technology 
alone was not the goal for the MNT centres. Through developing a technological policy 
that leveraged existing facilities, a consequence was an attempt to turn scientists into 
entrepreneurs. As the examples from the study and literature by Khilji (2006) that 
‘scientists-turned-entrepreneurs… lack commercialization knowledge and are ill 
prepared to convert invention into innovation’ (p.536). Jones-Evans and Klofsten 
(1997) illustrate this further when they describe how: 
‘studies of academic-based technical entrepreneurs frequently demonstrated that 
they had very little exposure to management skills such as marketing of finance, 
and had very little concept of business’ (p.12, 1997). Again, this highlights how 
‘technological innovation may influence a variety of economic actors in a variety 
of ways’ (Abernathy and Clark, 1985, p.4). 
The investigation of state, academic, business and hybrid actors in this PhD study 
provides further evidence of the significance of differing actor views in relation to 
policy interventions. 
9.6.3 Newness of the Technology 
The renowned writer Kaplan (1999) described a number of strategies for developing 
discontinuous technologies. He described the most challenging strategy as that of 
‘industry genesis’ (Kaplan, 1999, p.16). This referred to the development of wholly-new 
technologies, which were largely unknown in nature. When organisations intruded into 
such unfamiliar territory, they had little or no knowledge of who the competitors were 
or may have been, or those customers who may have valued the technology, until it 
actually existed. The MNT government intervention would seem to have fitted into this 
‘industry genesis’ category.  
A review of the centres investigated suggested that the level of ‘newness’ of 
technologies varied, with some centres being said to have developed ‘close-to-market’ 
technologies (e.g. Liber) and others developing  ‘blue-sky’ technologies (e.g. Mercury).  
Holmes and Glass (2004) recommended the development of a portfolio of opportunities 
as a way of dealing with this anomaly. The DTI attempted to do this by having a 
distributed network of centres, rather than the two main centres initially recommended 
by the Taylor Report. Amongst those MNT centres investigated, Concordia 
demonstrated a deliberate strategy to develop a portfolio of products. The Centre 
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Director described the plan as then being enabled to spread their risk over a number of 
technologies, rather than bet only on a single one. 
Another important theme in the literature was how organisations use resources, 
knowledge and ability to learn in order to better focus their efforts. In a number of 
cases, examples were given of organisations that were resistant to abandoning 
incumbent investments in order to move forward in the direction of new technologies 
(Assink, 2006; Tellis, 2006). The MNT centre ‘Concordia’ provided an example of how 
the Centre Director joined the company after 2 years in order to rectify a Centre which 
was considered as moving in the wrong direction by the TSB.  Dr Russell (the Centre 
Director) described how he had to abandon existing investments in capital equipment 
(capex) in order to turn the centre around and to focus on revenue-generating business 
streams. He described how the capex had originally been purchased by academic actors 
without there being a real business case for these purchases. 
9.6.4 Roles 
The idea of actors having roles evolved while discussing the cross-case comparisons. 
Garrett-Jones et al. (2005) investigated how actors deal with their dual roles as part of 
an industry-collaborative research centre. The first emphasis of their role is either as a 
government researcher or academic, and their second as a committed participant in an 
industry-collaborative research centre. Parallels can be drawn from this study in relation 
to the findings from the MNT government intervention. Both studies are focused on 
interventions which go beyond pure research to develop immediately useful knowledge; 
more so in the case of the MNT government intervention which clearly describes the 
focus on commercialisation of technologies. Garret-Jones et al. (2005) describe how the 
reward systems for academic researchers misalign with the goals of the intervention: the 
academics are measured on ‘discovery’, in terms of their research. Conversely, the 
industry-collaboration research centres they are involved in measure ‘application’.  
Findings from this PhD study echo these; however, whereas Garrett-Jones et al. (2005) 
suggest that academics might be deflected by the goals of the centres, the study of the 
main case Mercury suggests that the over-riding institutional logic of the academic 
actors interviewed remained focused on ‘discovery’, and as such was not deflected. 
 
281 
 
 
Herrmann et al. (2006), and Loutfy and Belkhir (2001), discussed the importance that 
key stakeholders – termed promoters - had within an organisation in the sense of 
bringing new product ideas to fruition. The role of Centre Director was akin to such 
influential promoters; the Centre Director was seen as having sufficient levels of 
importance and power to promote new technologies within a centre.  
Robeson (2007) described the gap in research which needed to identify and evaluate the 
motives behind senior leaders’ behaviour and designing organizational mechanisms that 
help guide the appropriate degree of their involvement. This study’s analysis adds to 
this by viewing such promoters through an institutional logics lens perspective, and 
discovered that such actors did not always have a positive effect on commercialising 
technologies. The case of Mercury was a good example of how such key promoters – in 
this case Professor Stephenson - can actually impede development through contestation 
and procrastination.  
Many of the EDT scholars focused on large global organisations for their research data, 
with a view to learning from their success. A number of authors described how large 
organisations (e.g. Hewlett-Packard) made use of cross-linking departments and a high 
level of engagement with the technology/product management teams across business 
functions, in order to be successful in developing disruptive technologies (Collins, 
2004; Hermann et al. 2006).  
9.6.5 Cross-linking between Actors 
Although not on the scale of those firms reviewed in the literature, a number of MNT 
centres in this current study discussed the use of cross-linking between their staff. 
Garrett-Jones et al. (2005) studied a number of cross-disciplinary research centres in 
Australia, which were created with national, social, and economic objectives in mind. 
Parallels can be seen with such centres and the MNT centres. They concluded in their 
study that: 
‘…[Cross-disciplinary Research Centres] appear to be hybrid organisations, 
drawing upon the practices and cultures of all their participants.. [developing 
into] .. organisational styles, perspectives, approaches and mechanisms that are 
substantially different from the sum of their constituent parts… This CRC 
‘culture’ reﬂects, ﬁrst … the need for a consensual approach to marshalling the 
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resources of the CRC towards common objectives. Second, concurrently, it 
requires the CRC to somehow accommodate the disparate ‘cultures’ of the 
participants, comprising the individual researchers, their research units or 
scientiﬁc disciplines and their ‘host’ organisations’ (Garrett-Jones et al. 2005, 
p.543-544). 
Concordia provided an example of such an MNT centre; Dr Russell described how he 
purposely employed a mixture of people in terms of their perspectives, approaches, and 
organisational styles. He did this to create an environment where constructive debates 
could be had, in order to develop their products further. Dr Russell reported success in 
terms of marshalling the resources towards common objectives, and accommodating the 
disparate cultures of participants.  
Rhea was another example where the Centre Director described the complementary 
types of staff who were either focused on problem-solving or manufacturing; both of 
which were required to make their centre successful. In order to overcome issues of 
merely being a small SME, Rhea had strong links throughout various European 
networks, serving the purpose of stimulating innovation, promoting their services, and 
extending their supply chain. This allowed Rhea to provide services nearer those of a 
larger organisation. Lucretia also talked of being linked to over half of the UK’s 
knowledge transfer networks (KTNs).  
9.6.6 Incumbent Firms and the MNT Network  
One of the contributions that this study makes to the EDT literature is the focus on 
smaller organisations rather than larger organisations. 
Incumbent firms and the way in which their bureaucratic structures can stifle innovation 
was a prevalent theme in the EDT literature review (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Tellis, 
2006; Assink, 2006; and Danneels, 2006). The ways in which MNT centres in larger 
incumbent organisations managed to deal (or otherwise) with such bureaucratic 
structures, was further understand in this study. In order to overcome these structures 
and engage in innovative activities, centres such as Lucretia and Liber developed their 
positions of autonomy in the larger host organisations. This autonomy was essential in 
order to make sound business decisions and commercial agreements (e.g. confidentiality 
agreements and so on).  
The IT literature also introduced the concept of decoupling as a: 
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‘rational response to demands for organizational adaptation that are inconsistent 
or harmful to the organization; by decoupling, organizations achieve legitimacy 
through espoused action, but remain efficient or consistent through actual action, 
which enhances their survival prospects’ (Boxenbaum  & Jonsson, 2010, p.81). 
MNT centres such as Liber and Lucretia provided some good examples of this 
decoupling strategy. 
Lucretia and Liber were clearly able to ‘break from the routines and processes’ of the 
incumbent organisations, as recommended by Govindarajin and Kopalle (2006). 
Furthermore, they exhibited a number of common observations put forward by Holmes 
and Glass (2004), as to why some incumbents were more successful than others (in this 
case, universities): 
1. Disconnecting innovation efforts from the corporate bureaucracy allowed them to 
flourish and to adapt a more entrepreneurial spirit. 
2. Use of interdisciplinary expertise was advocated. 
3. Striving for revolutionary inventions was promoted. 
4. Considering IP as currency (both had specific strategies for successfully dealing 
with/ licensing IP) was an enabling factor. 
5. Innovation was not just a ‘nice to-do’, but also a real priority. Great technology was 
the only thing that allowed one to protect the profit margins. 
6. Internal profit sharing helped to spark creativity in firms (in Liber the Directors had 
a significant stake in shares). 
By comparing Rhea to the above list, it was interesting to note that Rhea also exhibited 
all of these criteria. The current study’s findings from these MNT centres contribute to 
the extant literature by providing an alternative view to the development of EDTs from 
that of large OEMs/ global companies which predominated in the existing relevant 
literature. 
9.7 Reflective Discussion: Systems of Innovation (NSI) Literature 
Using the principles from institutional theory, this PhD study framed the MNT 
government intervention as an organizational field - the MNT field. This aligned well 
with the description put forward by Rampersad et al. (2010), of systems of innovation 
networks: 
‘Innovation networks are defined as a relatively loosely tied group of 
organisations that may comprise of members from government, university and 
industry continuously collaborating to achieve common intervention goals’ 
(p.794). 
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This thesis showed how such a network was envisaged at the start of the MNT Capital 
Facilities Programme through the establishment of the MNT centres, and subsequent 
MNT field. Further theorisation from institutional logics showed how the reality of this 
failed to be realised, due to the complications of competing field logics. These 
observations accorded well with the findings from other relevant literature in the field. 
In addition, the findings from this study add to the gap outlined by Edquist (2005, 
p.201) in understanding the institutional rules that influence organisations in carrying 
out activities associated with systems of innovation. In particular the combination of the 
IIP and IT literature with the SI literature further illuminates this gap.  
9.7.1 Effective Technology Policy Interventions 
This study provided further empirical evidence of how governments tried to drive new 
technology into commercial use and for public good (i.e. demand creation). Scholars 
such as Fri (2003) described how creating this demand was hard to achieve. My study’s 
findings subsequently confirmed this.  
The researchers suggested that a clearer understanding of the obstacles of policies 
needed to be further promoted in order to develop effective policy interventions (Fri, 
2003; Harvey, 2010). Quere (2004), identified that there was a dearth of detailed 
empirical data of NSIs. The findings from my study will help in addressing this 
identified literature deficit. 
Harvey (2010), described how NSIs were often set in motion and then the state hoped 
that the market would do the rest. Perhaps this was the case with the MNT government 
intervention. Initially, the DTI created the ‘UK MNT Network’ which acted as a conduit 
between the MNT centres/suppliers and potential MNT clients/users throughout the UK. 
This was a discernable direct effort to stimulate the MNT market in the UK.  
A number of interviewees described how this was a very useful part of the MNT 
Programme, which helped to raise awareness of the new technologies.  
9.7.2 Metamorphosis of MNT Network to KTN Network 
In 2007, the UK MNT Network was closed, and replaced by a Nanotechnology 
Knowledge Transfer Network (KTN). The ‘MNT Network’ in this sense refers to the 
body responsible for raising general awareness of the centres and their technological 
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opportunities in the UK. Activities included trade missions (i.e. activities where key 
technologists from the UK were funded to benchmark the UK MNT technologies with 
global competitors); the creation and publication of databases of services offered to UK 
industry in the MNT sector; and wider dissemination activities such as seminars and 
conferences. The transition occurred in order to bring the MNT Network in line with 
other KTNs which were currently representing UK industry. The NanoKTN’s role was 
similar to the previous network; that is, to be a knowledge-based network for MNTs.  
Unfortunately a number of MNT actors described their disappointment with this new 
incarnation:   
‘It [the MNT network] became more generic and more structured..it had less staff 
and concentrated on nano[technology]’ (Dr Alvarez, Bacchus Centre Director). 
 
‘...since its formation, the nanotechnology KTN emerged and overlaps with a lot 
of activity that we do, but I'm a little bit cynical about the KTN, I don't think they 
work as well as [the RDA MNT group]. Yeh,  I'm pretty negative about this...I 
think the KTN is based in the North East, I think it serves that area very well. 
They don't come to [our area] and talk to [our] centres’ (Mr Strauss, RDA 
Manager). 
 
‘...the MNT Network metamorphed into the nanotechnology KTN. But without 
sufficient resources to undertake a coordinating role for the Centres as part of the 
UKMNT Network...The MNT Network was more equipped than the current KTN - 
its function is not truly embraced in the KTN. It was a hybrid, and only one like it 
at the time...The MNT network had contacts with a range of facilities...[The]MNT 
Network .. was there to create the network .. to fund and create the 
strategy...which is what the MNT did and was paid to do.’(Prof. Hertz, MNT 
architect).  
 
These latter comments suggested that the MNT network originally set up to help to 
stimulate market demand for MNTs was removed and not replaced. 
How well the technological system works is, in part, dependent on how well its 
constituent parts are connected, according to Carllson and Jacobsson (1994). They 
describe how: 
‘…one of the most important functions of technological systems is to facilitate the 
sharing of knowledge among actors… government policy may play an important 
role by improving the connectivity of the technological system and thereby 
enhancing the information and knowledge sharing within the system’ (Carllson 
and Jacobsson, 1994, p.244).  
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Swan and Scarbrough (2005) investigated three cases of networked innovation, each of 
which involved the development of new technologies. Their research showed that the 
co-ordination of networks, rather than simply their formation, is found to play a 
particularly crucial role. 
‘…analysis highlights the need to recognize the importance of the institutional 
context and the role of technology as important influences on networked 
innovation processes. This suggests a need for multi-level analyses, embracing 
not only the politics of the immediate innovation process but also the environing 
constellations of power invoked by technology and institutions’ (Swan and 
Scarbrough, 2005, p.940). 
Considering the findings from this study along with the aforementioned literature, it 
would appear that by replacing a well-recognised and received MNT Network (which 
provided a central focus for the MNT government strategy) with one perceived as 
‘generic’ with limited resources, the government may have inadvertently reduced the 
general awareness of the technological opportunity for UK industry. 
9.7.3 Relation to Institutional Model 
Groenewegen and Steen (2006) introduced an institutional model in his research work, 
in which a number of layers were presented to help understand the layers and dynamics 
of systems of innovation for future policy learning. Key elements of this model were 
described which needed further understanding; the data from this PhD study contributes 
to this identified gap: 
Table 9.3 - Relationship of Study’s findings with Groenewegen and Steen’s (2006) 
model. 
 
Layer description 
 
Findings from MNT Cases in University Institutions 
Layer 1 describes the 
informal institution (i.e. 
culture: values and norms) 
and technology. 
Understanding of the university institution as domain for learning 
and carrying out research. The recent policy focus of 
commercialising university research for socio-economic benefit 
has brought contestation between traditional academic actors and 
external funding bodies (e.g. state actors). 
Layer 2 deals with the 
political system. 
Mercury displayed contestation between leading actors with 
different business logic. The ‘politics’ involved between actors 
with business logics and those with professional academic logics 
were clear in Lucretia and Mercury. 
Layer 3 refers to the formal 
rules of the game (laws, 
regulations, and policies). 
The MNT intervention showed how regulations such as ‘state-aid’ 
have a bearing on the running of NSIs where commercialisation is 
the motivation for the intervention. 
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Layer description 
 
Findings from MNT Cases in University Institutions 
Layer 4 shows the 
institutional arrangements 
(public and private 
organizations, contracts, 
and hybrids like networks) 
Mercury displays how running research centres as private 
organisations can conflict with the traditional university research 
values and norms. Creating commercial contracts for NSIs can 
prove problematic in a university institution. 
Liber provides an example of an MNT centre where the university 
is the main shareholder of the company. Liber started initially in 
the university context, but the centre director deliberately moved 
them to a non-university environment. 
Layer 5 displays creative, 
innovative learning that is 
embedded in habits and 
routines, which includes 
strategic behavior and the 
power base of actors, 
which can block innovative 
developments. 
Classification of actors as professional academic, business, state 
and hybrid link to the concept of norms, and roles. Contestation 
between actors is shown using institutional logics, which can 
effects innovative learning, strategic behaviour, and block 
innovative developments.  
 
 
 
Charles (2006), believed that ‘there is no standard recipe or package that can be 
recommended for an appropriate mechanism for universities in their specific and 
individual regional innovation systems’ (p.128).  This current study’s findings did not 
specifically highlight regional contexts as a major issue for the centres developing 
MNTs. The TSB (2011) published this statement on their website: ‘We are encouraging 
the establishment of links between a number of the facilities so that they will be 
genuinely seen as national capabilities rather than providing a limited regional role’. 
This suggests that the centres were more focused on their local regional context, rather 
than the extra local context. However, further research is needed to confirm this.  
9.8 Reflective Discussion: Institutional Theory (IT) Literature 
This section compared the results of the current study with the institutional theory 
literature. Key papers in this field were introduced in order to view the MNT field and 
related findings through an institutional theory lens. This section built on the most 
important findings from my research and demonstrated how it had the potential to link 
with IT’s theoretical underpinnings and literature. This PhD study added to the cross-
category area of study described in the literature. Tracey et al. (2010) observed how 
researching across categories remained largely an unsolved problem within IT. This 
study used the MNT case in an attempt to help to fill this gap, by presenting a 
comparison of cross-category actors including state agencies, commercial organizations, 
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and academic institutions. This added to the evaluation process of all types of 
organisations, as proposed by scholars such as Zucker (1977) and Powell (1991). 
9.8.1 MNT Centres and Isomorphism 
The notion of isomorphism put forward by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), described how 
pressure was put on organizations to adopt similar structures and forms, resulting in 
them becoming similar. The very nature of the MNT centres belonging to a range of 
institutions and variety of contexts brought into question whether isomorphism was 
possible with such an intervention. Findings across the MNT field showed that 
isomorphism was not applicable to the MNT centres. However, some of the 
mechanisms which aided isomorphism may be applicable to the results of this present 
study. For example, coercive isomorphism appeared to have been used by the main case 
(Mercury) in the sense that the University was able to adopt specific practices to be 
eligible for state aid grants, and to tender for and to win the grant. It was also displayed 
by state actors placing demands on Mercury (and Concordia to a lesser extent), when 
they make it a requirement for the centres to either employ new staff or face sanctions. 
Furthermore with Mercury, they had to make the company a Limited Company. 
This new research work adds to Fombrun’s (1989) criticism of isomorphism that ‘if 
isomorphism obtains, how then are we to explain the apparent variety of organizations 
that nonetheless co-exist within industries?’ (p.439). In addition, the MNT field data 
agrees with the ideas from Meyer and Rowan (1977), that organizations meet 
institutional contexts containing multiple and inconsistent myths that allow for multiple 
yet equally legitimate responses. In Mercury’s case, the professional academic actors 
believed that their organising principles were quite legitimate, citing core principles of 
the academic institution within which they were based, i.e. research, development and 
being driven by curiosity. Conversely, the ‘business’ actors believed their motivation 
and rationales were legitimate, citing the purpose of the MNT government intervention 
as being commercially focused, and revenue-generating.  
The MNT centres also provided examples of Fligstein’s (1985) complex organisational 
organisations, where groups competed for power and selectively appealed to 
institutional pressures to legitimate their claims. This PhD study thus disagrees with the 
notion that organisations eventually become aligned with their institutional contexts, in 
accordance with the concept of isomorphism. 
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9.8.2 Institutional Logics and the Local Context 
The concept of institutional pillars, and associated norms, values and roles was 
observed particularly in the main MNT case, with wider MNT field actors reinforcing 
the concept of different institutional logics - i.e. professional academic, business, state 
and hybrid – which informed institutions. The roles of the MNT Centre Directors were 
in theory meant to be the same, i.e. to develop emerging MNT technologies for the 
UK’s benefit, whilst generating revenue and being open-access. Through understanding 
institutional norms and their associated reasoning and judgements, the actions of 
individual Centre Directors were explored, and reasons given as to why the 
intervention’s purpose became contested. 
An important observation from the MNT field actors was that many actors exhibiting a 
range of reasoning strategies. Such actors were described as having a hybrid of business 
and academic institutional experience and were able to live across institutions, having 
been exposed to different societal ideas and ways of thinking. This particularly 
important finding showed how these actors had multiple identities and systems of 
reasoning and decision-making. This may be a particular characteristic of a nascent field 
developing complex emergent technologies, which requires a range of actors from 
different sectors with different skill sets. Further research is needed to investigate this 
aspect in more detail. 
9.8.3 Legitimacy 
The complexity of the relationship between legitimacy and performance was 
demonstrated by several authors. The perceived legitimacy of each MNT centre by their 
actors and other stakeholders may have had a bearing on how successful they were in 
achieving the state’s goal of becoming revenue generating and commercially successful.  
Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) described how being part of a larger institution was 
important in gaining other resources which are crucial for growth.   
In the case of Bacchus and Mercury, the linking to larger organisations, somewhat 
surprisingly, did not appear to have actually enabled them to become successful MNT 
centres. In the case of Lucretia, being part of a large university did not appear to add 
legitimacy to their operations. Success seemed to be a result of the Centre Director’s 
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business logic and the commercial focus of the centre, rather than being able to access 
resources from a larger host organisation.  
Conversely, for Rhea, legitimacy was clearly important for the Centre Director, and 
Rhea built on the reputation of the host SME.  Often, the Centre Director described how 
it was easier to call the MNT centre by the host organisation’s name to remove 
confusion. 
Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002, p.423) put forward four strategies for acquiring 
legitimacy. Of these, ‘conformance’ was one, and was clearly illustrated by Mercury: 
Mercury conformed to the University as an institution and its associated practice. 
However the contested logics within the centre meant that doing so added to its failure 
as an MNT centre. 
Within Chapter 4 the concept of embedded agency was introduced. This idea arose from 
the difficulty of trying to isolate the impact of agency from other factors. Holm (1995) 
asked ‘how can actors change institutions, if their actions, intentions, and rationality 
are all conditioned by the very institution they wish to change?’ (Holm, 1995, p.398). 
Di Maggio (1988) also outlined a number of ways this could be addressed. The key 
findings from this study in relation to these types of embedded agency are now 
discussed. 
9.8.3.1 Institutional Entrepreneurs 
Mr Gillette (Lucretia) is a good example of an institutional entrepreneur, along with Dr 
Nobel (Liber). Mr Gillette established an MNT centre as a separate organisation within 
a larger university institution. He mobilised resources in terms of only employing actors 
with business logics/ commercial experience, and ensured that the MNT centre, 
although underwritten by the university, acted like a typical commercial business. Dr 
Nobel went even further by making the concerted effort to decouple Liber from the 
university which is the main stakeholder of the MNT centre. Through moving to a 
science park, and focus on business outputs, Dr Nobel presented a clearly different 
organisation from that typically involved with university institutions. Institutional 
entrepreneurs do not always achieve their goal in transforming their organisation. 
Mercury is a good example of this; the traditional, incumbent professional academic 
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logics held through in this centre. This is despite attempts by actors with business 
logics, and those from the state funder (TSB) trying to change things. 
9.8.3.2 Structural Overlap 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) described how elite organizations are more likely to 
come into contact with competing and contradictory logics because they bridge different 
organizational fields. The MNT field conceptualised within this PhD displays an equally 
specialist area that covers a wide-ranging area of technological applications. The actors 
interviewed across the MNT field displayed a range of backgrounds, and in a number of 
cases hybrid logics (i.e. actors with experiences of understanding and having worked 
with a number of organising principles). 
9.8.3.3 Competing Institutional Logics 
Evidence of competing logics between field actors according to their individual 
organising principles, relates to Reay and Hinings (2005) observations of how contested 
and collaborative logics are enacted within an organisational field. Different Centre 
Directors exhibit different interpretations of purpose across the centres, as well as 
outcomes (i.e. conflicting interpretations). In some cases, for example Mercury, there 
are also differences of purpose within the MNT centre amongst actors. 
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006), argued that contact with institutional logical reasoning 
and judgements in multiple and different organizational fields increased the awareness 
of and experiences with contradictions in institutional reasoning. This in turn, lowered 
constraints and embeddedness of actors and enabled central actors to become 
institutional entrepreneurs. The evidence from the main case (Mercury) did not support 
this understanding. This may be because the majority of actors within Mercury 
exhibited institutional thinking which was highly conditioned by the university’s 
environment. Jones (2000) describes how the ‘variety of norms apparent from the 
empirical data provide an indication of how industry and universities adopt very 
different sets of values which inevitably have a considerable influence on their ability to 
co-operate successfully’ (2000, p.171). With a majority of professional academics in the 
MNT centre, the experiences of the business way of reasoning may have been 
overpowered, resulting in the termination of the centre by the state (and before this, the 
resignation of one of the key business actors). Or as Styhre puts it, ‘Institutional actors 
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then [in relation to other non-science activities of the organisation] impose ideologies, 
beliefs, and modes of thinking on their co-workers, thereby reinforcing certain 
behaviours and beliefs’ (Styhre, 2005, p.198). 
The discussion of embedded agency led to a deeper understanding of institutional 
reasoning and judgement within this MNT government intervention. The key logics 
observed were those of professional academic, business, state and multiple-logics (or 
hybrid). These organising principles did not appear to be specific to the context within 
which the MNT centre was established. The important factor appeared to be the 
organising principles of the Centres’ Directors and actors, which led to either agreement 
or disagreement on purpose. Actors with similar logics appeared to follow similar 
actions and organising principles within the MNT field studied. Where a number of 
logics were observed, then conflicting logics were noted, which led (particularly in the 
main case) to failures in terms of a centre meeting the original DTI purpose of the 
intervention. Paradoxically, the initial purpose brought the actors together to set up the 
MNT field as part of the government intervention. However, the reality of individual 
institutional logics pushed them apart. Olsen (2007) described the need to understand 
such conflicts and counterproductive processes based on stakeholder interests in 
technology development, in order to design innovation processes with complementary 
roles and interests. This study suggests a number of propositions/ policy 
recommendations to address this in the following chapter. 
The data presented from the MNT government intervention provided an additional case 
example, which can add to work by authors such as Reay and Hinings (2005) in their 
discussion of a related healthcare field. 
9.9 Summary 
This section opened up a wide ranging discussion around the findings from the MNT 
government intervention examined in this PhD study and in relation to literature used as 
the building blocks for this study. The research questions were addressed, along with an 
understanding of how the data collected has the potential to add to or build on existing 
literature gaps. Throughout this process a number of propositions were formed, which 
are put forward as contributions to practice. These are discussed in the Conclusions 
chapter, along with the limitations of this study. 
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Chapter 10 - Conclusions 
10.1 Introduction 
This study set out to explore a recent UK government intervention which was 
established to develop micro-and-nanotechnologies for optimum technology-based 
economic growth (i.e. stimulation of new industries from emerging technologies). 
While the need for such technology policies is well recognised (Carlsson and Jacobsson, 
1994) there is also however, a need to understand the key challenges that governments 
face in developing effective policy interventions for the innovation process that will 
create sound economic leverage (Harvey, 2010). 
This chapter discusses how the findings from this study make a practice-orientated 
contribution. To begin with a number of the key findings are presented. These are 
preceded by a number of practice-orientated recommendations in the form of seven 
propositions. Evidence from this study is used to support each of these propositions. 
The chapter concludes by discussing the limitations of this study along with avenues for 
future research. 
10.2 Key Findings 
A number of key findings in terms of practice have been made from the analysis of the 
MNT government intervention. As a recap, those of particular importance are now 
listed: 
1. The MNT government intervention failed. Furthermore there is no evidence that 
the DTI considered the issues of local context and organising principles of actors 
when developing this technology policy. The main focus appeared to be on how 
much ‘leverage’ could be achieved by building on existing MNT infrastructure. 
2. There was a central problem of ‘management paradox’ for this intervention. 
That is, within the organisational field conflicting logics were observed, along 
with a mixture of contested/ collaborative organising principles. The central 
problem in innovation management may be the management of such a paradox. 
For example, Mercury provided many examples of conflicting organising 
principles, and in particular examples of actors reconstructing their views. 
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3. Successful centres were those were actors were driven by a common purpose, 
and had associated inherent and common business thinking, reasoning and 
judgement processes. 
4. The notion of conflicted interpretation has been shown to be extremely 
important for government interventions and a significant predictor of eventual 
outcomes. 
5. Context - The associated institutional logics of local and extra local contexts 
could not be avoided when trying to achieve a successful MNT technology 
policy. 
10.3 Contributions for Practice 
A number of practice-orientated contributions in the form of propositions were 
developed as part of the analysis of this study. These are now introduced with 
accompanying evidence from the data supporting them. 
10.3.1 MNT Centre Context 
A number of venues were considered by the DTI’s expert selection panel when selecting 
which organisation would enter the tendering process. These venues - described as 
‘local contexts’ - proved to be an important factor in the success of individual centres 
within the distributed network that resulted.  
This study’s data showed that there were no specific requirements (in terms of venue) 
for applicants to fulfil in order to enter this competition. Decisions were ultimately 
made on a case-by-case basis, and according to the amount of leverage that could be 
achieved from an applicant (i.e. if they had existing facilities or customers from whom 
more value-for-money could be obtained).  In turn, this is a key factor in explaining the 
mixed settings of the 24 MNT centres selected which make up the MNT network 
organisational field. These include: university science parks, existing global 
organisations, regional science parks, existing SMEs and University settings. 
Equally important to this discussion of the mechanisms used as part of a national system 
of innovation, are the local contexts of those mechanisms; i.e. this study’s data 
demonstrated how different MNT centres exhibit different characteristics related to their 
venue and specific actors. These actors evidently bring their own institutional logics, 
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belief systems and associated practices to their centres. Subsequently, success in terms 
of the initial purpose of a government intervention, varies greatly amongst actors and 
their local environments.  Examples from this study which highlight this include: 
(i)   Dr. Tesla (Director of an SME-based centre) clearly stated that his concern was for 
his SME – i.e. the local context.  He emphasised that his business must continue to 
make profit before, during and after the MNT centre has finished. 
(ii) Mr. Cole (Director of a university-based centre) stressed the importance of 
generating jobs for the local region and described how his centre’s main customer is a 
large global manufacturing company in the local region. 
(iii) Dr Nobel (Director of a Science park-based centre) highlighted the necessity of 
moving out of a university venue in order to deliver commercial services. 
The above findings led to the first proposition for practice:  
Proposition 1 - Different MNT centres exhibit different characteristics relating to their 
venue and the specific actors populating them. These actors bring their own 
institutional logics, belief systems and associated practices to their centres.  
Moreover, the contested understanding of purpose of a centre leads to another 
Proposition 2 from this study: 
Proposition 2 - The view of success in terms of the initial purpose of a government 
intervention, varies greatly amongst actors and their local environments. 
Olsen (2007) describes how ‘…bureaucrats, politicians, industrialists, and scientists 
regard technological development as tools for quite different purposes’ (2007, p.465). 
Proposition 2 describes the situation which needs to be addressed in national 
intervention policies where state actors have an understanding of the extra local 
environment they are trying to achieve (e.g. a distributed network of MNT facilities to 
help UK SMEs gain access to emerging technologies in the MNT example); however, 
they have not considered the realities of the local environments that have a major 
bearing on the original purpose of the intervention. This PhD study adds further 
empirical evidence to understanding how actors regard technological development 
policies for quite different purposes. 
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10.3.2 Longevity and Retrospection of Technology Policies 
Proposition 3 – Innovation policy-makers should consider the benefits from having a 
longer-term strategy and funding in place for government interventions, in order to 
nurture the best chance of technological success in terms of application.  
Interviewees described how emerging technologies take decades to develop rather than 
3-5 years as in the case of the MNT intervention (ref. Dr Tesla, Mr Strauss, Professor 
Pascal, Dr Teller, Dr Alvarez). When nations invest such large sums and resources for 
innovation systems, then a long-term strategy is needed. In the case of the MNT 
network, rather than continue the existing MNT Programme, the TSB set out a new 
strategy for developing Nanoscale technologies (TSB, 2009b). This strategy only 
mentions the MNT Programme and Centres a few times, with very little detail. From 
investigations as part of this study, it was discovered that a benchmarking review of the 
Centres was carried out prior to the creation of this new strategy. It is unclear from 
reading the 2009-2011 Nanoscale Technologies Strategy, what has been learnt from the 
MNT network that led to the formation of this new way forward. 
The findings from my data and a review of the 2009-2011 Strategy reinforces the need 
for policy-makers to follow-through long-term strategies, rather than replace them with 
related policies which do not draw clear conclusions on how they build on previous 
interventions. This leads into my fourth proposition: 
Proposition 4 - Policy makers would benefit from the investigation of previous 
interventions. 
In the words of one senior interviewee in the TSB, the MNT programme was regarded 
as a ‘hot potato’, and nobody wanted to take responsibility for it (Dr Dickson). This 
might explain the revised strategy for this area. Garrett-Jones et al. (2005) in their 
investigation of industry-collaborative research centres, purport a number of important 
learning point from such collaborations which would benefit future innovation policies: 
‘This [collaborative research centre] ‘culture’ reﬂects, ﬁrst … the need for a 
consensual approach to marshalling the resources of the CRC towards common 
objectives. Second, concurrently, it requires the CRC to somehow accommodate 
the disparate ‘cultures’ of the participants, comprising the individual researchers, 
their research units or scientiﬁc disciplines and their ‘host’ organisations’ 
(Garrett-Jones et al. 2005, p.544).  
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The findings from centres such as Rhea and Concordia - which accommodate a mixture 
of actors and cultures - highlighted in this thesis, may provide useful learning points for 
those developing technology policies.   
10.3.3 Reconstruction 
Proposition 5 - The ingrained institutional reasoning of certain actors can be hard to 
change for the intended purpose of an intervention, once funding has been awarded. 
An example of this was shown in the case of Mercury’s Professor Stephenson; despite 
writing a tender document clearly emphasising the commercial requirements of this 
centre, he then appeared to change his position in relation to this official document. 
When asked about TSB judging the centre on commercial measures, he said ‘From the 
start- it was not this, there was a lot of other indicators, but in reality they [the TSB] 
are interested in the bottom line which is…the commercial income’.  
The TSB actors (Mr Rubik and Mr Morgan) attempted to redirect Mercury toward the 
commercial purpose the state sought.  However, even the threat of withdrawing funding 
if an external CEO was not appointed, demonstrates how resistant the Centre Director 
was to change. 
10.3.4 Organisational Size 
Proposition 6 - Small organisations developing EDTs benefit from strong cross-linking 
(collaboration) between actors, coupled with an environment where constructive 
debates can occur. 
In the case of Mercury, the strong contestation between the actors with opposing logics 
meant that debates were no longer constructive, and often ended up in ‘stand-up rows’ 
in the words of the Business Development Manager. Proposition 6 may only apply 
when actors follow a similar organisational purpose, as in the example of Rhea. 
A common finding from the focus on large incumbent organisations was that 
bureaucracy was a definite barrier to disruptive innovation in many cases. Researchers 
recommended that those firms wishing to overcome bureaucracy should decouple the 
more innovative business units from the main organisation. Many of the MNT centres 
investigated in this current study were hosted by larger, incumbent institutions; namely, 
Lucretia, Mercury, Minerva and Bacchus. Of these, the first three were hosted by 
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established universities, whereas Bacchus was hosted by a global OEM. Of these, 
Lucretia and Bacchus were estimated by their Centre Directors as becoming self-
funding by the end of the grant period, and hence, successful in terms of one of the key 
TSB criteria. Minerva, although part of a university, was described by its Director as 
dealing predominantly with one large aerospace OEM. However, the Centre’s open-
access nature was perhaps questionable in this case, but further data are needed to 
confirm this. 
Bacchus, in the global context, was described by its Centre Director as reaching its 
financial targets by the end of its life-span. However, only a few of the originally 
estimated ‘new’ customers were reached. The Director cited the problem as not having 
a large enough grant to employ business development managers. 
Lucretia and Mercury were both hosted by universities; however, Lucretia was 
described as one of the most successful MNT centres by Professor Hertz (the architect 
of the whole MNT intervention). There was also a strong indication from Mr Gillette 
that it was in the top two for world-class ranking, in comparison with the other centres. 
Conversely, Mercury was also hosted in a university and became a failure in terms of 
not generating revenue and also being terminated by the TSB. The question of why 
these centres were poles apart in achievement is fascinating, considering they were both 
research centres in large universities.  
The findings discussed in the main case and comparative case Chapters suggested a 
number of reasons why Lucretia was more successful than Mercury and these are 
briefly analysed now.  
10.3.5 Success versus Failure (Lucretia versus Mercury) 
Firstly, the Centre Director of Lucretia (Mr Gillette) was driven by a strong business 
ethic.  He employed staff from industry who had business experience and who were 
able to ‘hit the ground running’.  Mr Gillette ran his centre using a traditional business 
matrix structure; i.e. he had sections for facilities, quality, engineering and finance. He 
described how it looked like ‘a standard commercial structure’. There was a clear 
revenue-generating, commercial ethos within Lucretia. Furthermore, Lucretia – 
although on a university campus – was set up in its own annex, separate from the other 
faculties. On visiting it, one would have considered it to be a stand-alone business 
operation.  
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Surprisingly, Mercury was also in a separate annex to the main university. Although it 
was physically part of an existing research centre-of-excellence, the lines between 
where Mercury began and the research department finished were blurred. Walking into 
the research department did however, provide more of a commercial feel than most 
other university departments.  So the contexts of the two centres were not worlds apart. 
The obvious differences come with the comparison between the Centres’ Directors and 
staffing. Professor Stephenson’s strong professional academic motivation and the 
internal conflict resulting between himself and business actors within Mercury and the 
TSB, have been discussed already. The staffing of the Centre with like-minded 
academic researchers also added to the commercial tensions between the centre and the 
state actors (TSB). 
Proposition 7 - If the need for a government intervention is premised on a high-
technology based economic growth strategy (i.e. stimulating new industries from 
emerging technologies), then the selected actors must be driven by appropriate business 
logics. 
Conversely, if the intervention is to develop a nation’s research base (i.e. science 
policy), then those actors selected to manage any ventures are more likely to be driven 
by professional academic logics. A case of decoupling was exhibited by the MNT 
Centre - Liber. Dr Nobel (Centre Director) described how he went to the associated 
University originally to set up a commercial business:  
‘...after two years of that operation it was obvious that actually to run a 
commercial business operation within an academic building was impractical. So 
one of the main tenets of our proposal was that we would be a fully autonomous, 
commercial centre, run commercially and by a commercial organisation’.  
This neatly summed up the strong business logic driving actors such as Dr Nobel and 
Mr Gillette. In addition, Liber was set-up in a Science Park; the University having 
nearly half the shareholding of the company, and the rest was split between the 
Directors. This autonomy was essential in order to make sound business decisions and 
commercial agreements (e.g. confidentiality agreements and so on).  
10.4 Recommendations to Practice in the Field 
The study’s findings have implications for the development of technology policy in the 
associated field. It helps to work toward addressing the gap identified by Fagerberg 
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(2005) ‘…among policy makers who have been constrained in their ability to act by a 
lack of sufficiently developed framework to the design and evaluation of policy’ (2005, 
p.20). Some important points have been raised concerning the governance of the UK 
MNT government intervention. Firstly and perhaps most importantly, the intended 
purpose of the MNT government intervention was shown to evolve across MNT 
centres; the key influential actors of each centre (the Centres’ Directors) demonstrably 
followed different institutional systems of reasoning, which in some cases resulted in 
internal conflicts. Paradoxically, it was the MNT intervention’s original purpose that 
brought these actors together, but their internal logics pushed them apart.  
There was no evidence that the DTI took into account the type of actor or the site’s 
appropriateness. The main factor appeared to be leveraging the small amount of funding 
provided by the UK government by building on existing facilities, wherever and 
whenever possible. This conflict of purpose between the state actors (i.e. the TSB) and 
the centres caused a particular problem when the state measured the centres’ success. 
This study’s findings highlighted the need for state actors to be completely clear 
concerning their purpose when embarking on NSIs or government interventions. The 
metamorphosis of the DTI to the TSB and associated passing of governance for the 
MNT intervention, added to this confusion of purpose. Actors from the DTI who 
originally set-up the MNT intervention were no longer involved in the TSB, and as 
such, understanding of the original purpose was altered through the introduction of new 
actors and their associated logics. This is potentially one of the problems with the 
cyclical nature of government funding, and how policies change when governments 
change. Without this clarity, it was premised that the effectiveness of such NSIs was 
inevitably bound to be diminished. 
Three main policy recommendations for national systems of innovation or intervention 
are proposed as a result of this research work: 
(i) The purpose and required outcomes of a government intervention should be clarified 
from the outset, so that all stakeholders (actors) understand the purpose of any 
funding they receive. 
(ii) There may still be differences in the perception from actors across an intervention, 
but clearer goals will help to reduce conflict and difficulty. This should be coupled 
with a tender and selection process which takes into account the environment within 
which innovation will be developed. Furthermore, an understanding of the key 
actors involved in the intervention, using recognized institutional theory, has the 
potential to enhance any interventions and reduce potential disagreement. 
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(iii)Issues of regional politics may also need to be considered, in terms of funding 
allocation and support systems. 
In practitioner terms, the novelty value of this research is that it provides new empirical 
evidence that strongly suggests that future innovation policies need to purposely 
consider the economic benefit when developing a national system of innovation.                   
In addition and perhaps more importantly, the local and extra-local contexts where the 
perceived technologies evolve, as well as the actors themselves, were shown as 
appreciably important. As demonstrated in this study, the ingrained institutional 
thinking and reasoning of certain actors can be difficult to change for the intended 
purpose of an intervention, once funding has already been awarded.                                                                                                                                                                    
Although generalisation should not be made from the sample size obtained, the use of 
purposive case sampling (i.e. similar cases) and the resulting findings offer new avenues 
to explore for academics, policy makers and practitioners.                                                                       
The influence that actors/practitioners have on the purpose of an NSI, and how their 
organising principles (and those of the wider institution) can affect this purpose, should 
be part of the process of developing future innovation policies. In addition, the short-
term nature of the MNT programme appeared at odds with the findings from 
participants, who recommended that policy-makers should consider the benefits from 
having a longer-term strategy and funding in place for government interventions. The 
reason for this was to nurture the best chance of technological success in terms of 
application; the newest technologies were reported to take between 10-12 years to 
develop. 
10.5 Limitations of this Study 
Overall, this research work, albeit inherently interesting and ultimately rewarding, 
proved to be both a complex and challenging process for this researcher.  In addition 
and in common with all such research, there were a number of limitations for the 
researcher to identify and to consider. This particular section reflects on the research 
methodology utilised and how it might be improved if the study were carried out again, 
with however, the incalculable benefit of hindsight. 
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10.5.1 Difficulty in Deconstruction 
The development of emerging technologies as part of the MNT network was a dynamic 
and complex process and a framework was used to deconstruct the key aspects 
influencing the function of a government intervention. The majority of these were 
chosen using the example of the well-established MIRP programme, with a number of 
supporting aspects (constructs) included. Whether the right balance of constructs were 
used to understand the MNT government intervention is a question that should be 
asked. The researcher’s belief was that those selected were suitable for developing data 
gathering instruments, which then facilitated thematic analysis to develop the findings. 
Innovation is a complex process, and no doubt a multitude of other aspects could have 
been investigated. However any more would have made the data too unwieldy for one 
researcher to handle. More importantly, those constructs selected were complemented 
by institutional theory, in order to develop a fuller framework for the investigation of 
NSIs. 
10.5.2 Suitability of the Research Methodology 
The methodology section presented the researcher’s ontological and epistemological 
views, along with rationales for the choice of research methods. The question of 
whether this was the right approach for this study’s research questions may well be 
asked. On reflection, the researcher’s answer to this question is an unequivocal ‘yes’. 
The focus on just one government intervention in one technology area, proved useful 
for making cross-case comparisons across a range of contexts. This focus on one area of 
technology was in contrast to the common approach in the literature, which often 
discussed multiple organisations developing a range of technologies across different 
sectors. The purposive sampling strategy used meant that although it was impossible to 
control all variables in such a study, at least each organisation was developing 
technologies within the same sector, in a nascent field, for a common purpose and 
within a common field.  
The use of institutional theory allowed a number of interesting themes to naturally 
emerge. It highlighted the importance of actors within the MNT field and in particular, 
how organising principles coupled with action and structure (in terms of context), had 
an important influence on the success of government interventions. Somewhat 
surprisingly, these factors did not appear to have been taken into consideration when the 
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DTI carried out the tender and selection process for the MNT centres. Overall, the 
approach used supported the examination of a government intervention and brought 
together a number of different areas of literature to build on the MIRP research 
framework.  
10.5.3 Sampling of Data and Access 
This research project’s goal was never to make wide-reaching generalisations, but to 
help develop a method of understanding a contemporary example of a government 
intervention. Access was gained to nine MNT centres out of the possible twenty-four 
MNT established centres. The researcher would have preferred to have gained access to 
more, if that was possible. However, as previously discussed in the Methodology 
Section, gaining access to just nine centres was requiring considerable and repeated 
effort in the face of initial resistance.  
One example of this is where Liber’s Centre Director was contacted early in the 
research process, and access was denied. Despite further e-mail contact, access was still 
continuously denied. However, after interviewing another Centre Director who was 
known to Liber’s Director, a recommendation was then made which paved the way to 
the desired interview.  
The Centre Bacchus, which was located in a large global OEM, was also an interesting 
case concerning access. Once again, perseverance on the part of the researcher was 
rewarded by eventually meeting with this Centre’s Director. These examples were 
typical of the response from many of the centres. They appeared to be a result of ‘audit 
fatigue’ due to the intensive auditing the centres had recently received from the TSB; 
i.e. the actors did not wish to spend any more time being researched or analysed.  
Another conclusion that could be drawn from this was that perhaps the centres were not 
rigorously following the purpose of the MNT government intervention. However, this is 
merely speculation and without any real evidence or information on those centres. With 
this in mind, the purposive sampling strategy ensured that centres covering a range of 
constructs were examined. If time and access had allowed, then the interviews would 
have been repeated six months after the original interviews, to allow for some 
longitudinal data to be collected. 
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In the case of Mercury, interviews with a number of key individuals were carried out at 
different points in time. However, due to limited resources and issues of access, the 
interviews were kept to one, with any ambiguities clarified through follow-up phone 
conversations or email correspondence.  
The researcher might be criticised for only interviewing actors at one particular point in 
time. The researcher’s response here would be that it was a valid and reasonable method 
for researching this sensitive area. A senior and influential member of one university 
described the MNT intervention as a ‘political hot potato’. Considering these access 
difficulties, the researcher was pleased to achieve a ‘snapshot’ of each individual’s 
experiences and views at a particular time, situation and context. 
Coupled with the interview data from additional MNT field actors, the total number of 
interview participants totalled twenty-six.  However, several more were involved in the 
data collection process. In reality, if further access had been granted by additional 
centres, then the amount of qualitative data would perhaps have been too great to 
analyse for one researcher in the limited time period provided. This is illustrated by 
Pettigrew (1990) in the following descriptive text: 
‘Anyone who has used the comparative case study method will know that the 
central problem is dealing with complexity; first of all, capturing the complexities 
of the real world and then making sense of it. For some, there is no release from 
the overwhelming weight of information, from the task of structuring and 
clarifying, from the requirement for inductive conceptualization. The result is 
death by data asphyxiation-the slow and inexorable sinking into the swimming 
pool which started so cool, clear and inviting, now has become a clinging mass of 
maple syrup’ (p.281). 
 
In summary, a purposive, heterogeneous sample (in terms of range of contexts) was 
used, with specific selection criteria. Follow-on telephone interviews and e-mail 
correspondence were also carried out to resolve any ambiguities. The findings from the 
actors were triangulated, when descriptions of similar centres or the MNT intervention 
as a whole, were carried out.  
10.6 Future Research 
The government intervention selected for this study was based only in the UK. It would 
be beneficial to carry out a further study of government interventions which were 
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developing MNTs in other European or even global environments. This would be likely 
to add not only the context of different cultures and practices to other research work, but 
would provide a wider comparison from which to compare this current UK intervention. 
If further research work was to build upon the work in this particular study, then a 
number of suggestions are presented here by this researcher: 
i. More professional academic Centre Directors should be interviewed, along with 
further in-depth university MNT centres, to build on the rich data from Mercury. 
ii. Once the MNT government intervention is complete in the near future, it is 
likely that centre reports and findings which are currently considered 
‘commercial-in-confidence’ will be released, or could be obtained using 
Freedom of Information requests. Through gathering such secondary documents, 
further triangulation of data and the characteristics of professional groups as 
documented in public-documents, would add to the findings from this present 
study. Reay and Hining’s (2005) research paper on the healthcare field in 
Alberta would provide a good methodological direction for this. 
iii. Interviews from customers of the MNT centres would add another view of the 
success of the centres in terms of the DTI purpose. This would help with 
measuring the penetration of the centres into the UK economy (something the 
state actors have admitted struggling with). Users of the centres may highlight 
different organising principles which may inform future policy making. 
iv. The Foster Report suggested that two large centres should have been created, 
rather than a number of distributed centres. Data were collected from a large 
MNT centre in Leuven, called ‘IMEC’, which would be an example of the larger 
centre originally proposed. This data could be reviewed along with other larger 
centres to make valid comparisons between the two models.  
It is important to note that the research questions asked in this study concerned a 
government intervention that was initiated to develop a nascent technology for the 
commercial benefit for the UK economy. If however the grants awarded had been 
allocated for research, then the findings concerning outcomes would have been 
different. For example, university contexts with their predominance of professional 
academics were likely to have been a better setting for ‘blue-sky’ research, whereas 
business contexts might well not have been. This illuminates the way forward for 
potential studies concerning interventions which are focused on research evidence. Such 
studies might however, present the business actors in a less favourable light in terms of 
achieving the research purpose. 
A major conclusion from this study is that the government created an innovation 
management paradox from the outset; i.e. developing MNT centres which were meant 
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to be revenue-generating in a context that was typically research-led and run by actors 
with professional research motivation. 
The ramifications of getting it wrong are exhibited in the main case study (Mercury) 
which had £3 million invested in it, and then had the final few funding payments 
withdrawn just months before the end. The majority of this funding had already been 
invested in capital equipment, which remains in the university department, and is under-
utilised.  Recently the TSB produced a ‘Nanotechnology Strategy’ document for 2009-
2012 (TSB, 2009). However, they only briefly mentioned the previous Centres in any 
degree of a positive light.  From a rather sceptical point of view, it would appear that 
they were presenting only positive information they were happy to share, and 
concealing the information that they deemed as being negative. This suggested the 
deliberate reconstruction of their information into a more positive frame, perhaps to 
maintain credibility with the NDGB. This was also implied by a number of 
interviewees. Future research investigating this new nanotechnology strategy using the 
same methodology would provide valuable data to build on this current PhD study. 
10.7 Summary 
Practice and policy recommendations have been drawn from the case of a recent UK 
government intervention designed to stimulate the nascent sector of micro-and-
nanotechnologies. This research has concentrated on one field only rather than multiple 
sectors, in order to make comparisons across a number of organisations developing 
emerging technologies. The novel method used has synthesised a number of disciplines, 
to inform a different approach in setting up future government interventions. This 
method has helped us understand the implications of the context in which interventions 
are situated. Furthermore the notion of conflicted interpretation has been shown to be 
extremely important for government interventions and a significant predictor of 
eventual outcomes. 
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Appendix 5a – Anonymised Example Map from Pilot 1 
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Appendix 5b – Pilot Interview Template 
 
 
Introduction [5mins-slides] 
 
Transactions [10mins] 
As part of your innovation management process, what relationships/collaborations do you have 
with other organisations /companies/groups? (these can include formal and informal links).  
How were these forged? Any particular drivers? 
How do such relationships help to advance nanotechnology within the UK. 
Are nanotechnology centres –such as this one- technologically ahead of industrial research? 
Do you think that publicly-funded initiatives such as these help industry to exploit emerging 
technologies, such as micro- and nano- technologies? 
 
Industry involvement [10mins] 
 Do you think that government-funded programmes, such as this one, are technologically 
ahead of industrial research? 
 
Technology success [time] 
 How would you describe a successful outcome from the application of your nanotechnology 
(and/or expertise)?  
 Can you describe a recent successful application of your micro technology? 
 Was this process formally managed? (i.e. a formal process has been followed to develop 
these technologies) Yes/No 
 Can you discuss this? Were there key milestones? 
 What were the key activities that enabled this success? What were the key activities 
that created “value” for the customer? 
 Who were the people or groups involved in these key activities (incidents). What 
important roles and activities did they perform? 
 Could any activities have been left out, in hindsight (i.e. “waste activities”). 
 What would have you done differently? 
 If not, do you think this would have helped? 
 
Technology failure [time] 
 Can you give an example where the application of your technology (or expertise) was 
unsuccessful? OR an example with elements of success and failure? 
 Why do you think this failed? Were there any key activities that potentially led to 
this? 
 If so, were any particular groups or people involved?  
 What would you have done differently? 
 
Closing questions [time] 
 Can you suggest any other potential interviewees? 
 Are there any other issues that you have experienced when developing nanotechnologies? In 
particular, focussing on the innovation management side of things. 
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Table 5c – Additional Research Strategies and their Suitability for this Research Study 
Strategy Form of Research 
Question 
How suitable is this strategy for… ? 
The Research 
Questions and/or 
objectives? 
The existing body of 
knowledge/ 
literature? 
The resources & 
time? 
The researcher’s 
world view/ and 
comments on this 
Experiment 
 
How, why? RQs are context specific, 
and the organisational 
environments too complex 
for this strategy. 
Atypical Too intensive, and would 
oversimplify the 
representation of the 
innovation management 
process. 
Organisations are 
extremely complex 
environments, unrealistic 
to attempt to isolate 
variables for study and run 
a controlled environment 
study. 
Survey 
 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
Suitable. Visual Analogue 
Scales and attitudinal 
scales may be of interest. 
For the complex area under 
investigation a survey will 
only capture information 
on the variables included. 
Limited depth of 
information, but good if 
large population surveyed.  
Good. Once a comprehensive 
survey instrument had been 
created, depending upon 
response-rate, this would 
be far quicker than 
interviewing people, and 
any travel this may incur. 
Generally far easier to 
manage. 
Surveys can only provide 
information on the 
questions asked; there is 
very little scope for open 
questioning.  
Controls over security - 
there is no question over 
who is involved in the 
discussion, and the session 
is secure. Again, how do 
you know the boss isn't 
filling in a respondent's 
survey? Also, you don‟t 
have the persons full 
attention, whereas with 
interviewing or other 
methods, you do 
Greenbaum ( Moderating 
Focus Groups) 
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Strategy Form of Research 
Question 
How suitable is this strategy for… ? 
The Research 
Questions and/or 
objectives? 
The existing body of 
knowledge/ 
literature? 
The resources & 
time? 
The researcher’s 
world view/ and 
comments on this 
Archival analysis 
 
Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
Often organisations 
developing emerging 
technologies are at an early 
point in their lifecycle, and 
as such quite small. 
Consequently they are 
unlikely to have 
standardised 
documentation procedures 
of the innovation 
management process in 
place. 
If the appropriate records 
could be found this may be 
useful when analysing 
large organisations (e.g. 
OEMs). Such organisations 
are not the focus of this 
research. 
Desk-based, so low on 
resources, but a large 
amount of time could be 
used in filtering through 
archives of day-to-day 
company records. 
More interested in 
contemporary events, and 
such events, like the 
development of new 
technologies remain 
undocumented to the level 
required by archival 
analysis. 
Case study 
 
How, why? Innovation management is 
a complex process; 
combining this with 
organisations carrying out 
innovation management in 
different contexts, the 
nature of the complexity 
increases. Case studies are 
concerned with 
investigation such 
complexity, they allow 
deep and rich analysis of 
single organisations. 
External validity can be 
questioned when 
investigating single cases, 
however triangulation 
A robust case study 
strategy would add to the 
existing body of 
knowledge. Often cases 
within the EDT literature 
area are published in more 
anecdotal/ narrative forms, 
lacking true case study 
rigour. 
Triangulation is one way to 
increase external validity, 
but takes more time and 
resources. 
The rich, contextual data 
gathered from case studies 
appeals to the researchers 
world view of positive 
realism. By using multiple 
cases more generalisable 
results can be achieved – 
whilst understanding the 
limitations of smaller  
sample sizes. 
Case studies also allow for 
a more pragmatic route to 
data collection; i.e. 
quantitative and qualitative 
research methods can be 
used to compliment each 
other. 
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Strategy Form of Research 
Question 
How suitable is this strategy for… ? 
The Research 
Questions and/or 
objectives? 
The existing body of 
knowledge/ 
literature? 
The resources & 
time? 
The researcher’s 
world view/ and 
comments on this 
using multiple case studies 
can overcome this.  
Action Research 
 
How? 
 
If the author was 
positioned within an 
organisation developing 
emerging technologies, this 
strategy could provide in-
depth analysis of one case. 
 
The research questions are 
interested in generating a 
framework for successful 
development of EDTs by 
organisations; a multiple 
case study approach would 
provide contemporary 
examples of existing 
frameworks for analysis. 
This strategy could provide 
in-depth examples, which 
would contribute to the 
existing literature. 
Due to the nature of 
organisations developing 
EDTs, often access is 
difficult due to issues of 
confidentiality and non-
disclosure. Such immersed 
action research access 
would proved difficult. 
Issues of any 
generalisability if only one 
case is used, and when the 
researcher is immersed in a 
setting, they are often 
having to deal with their 
own agenda and that of the 
sponsor; so pure research 
would be hard to negotiate. 
Grounded Theory 
 
how, why? Would be suitable. Not typically seen in the 
literature for EDTs. 
Organisations prefer to 
have an outline of what the 
research access is for, 
therefore a truly grounded 
theory approach might be 
off-putting (e.g. participant 
observation). 
The author prefers a more 
structured approach to data 
gathering, again displayed 
by his leaning towards 
positive realism. 
Ethnography 
 
How, why? The research questions are 
interested in generating a 
framework for successful 
development of EDTs by 
In-depth examples would 
be of benefit to the 
literature. Very specific 
though. 
Very time consuming. 
Naturalism in the sense of 
being in the environment, 
lots of participant 
This strategy is too 
focussed on the individual 
for the researcher. 
335 
 
Strategy Form of Research 
Question 
How suitable is this strategy for… ? 
The Research 
Questions and/or 
objectives? 
The existing body of 
knowledge/ 
literature? 
The resources & 
time? 
The researcher’s 
world view/ and 
comments on this 
organisations; as such only 
addressing the individual 
would not achieve this. 
observation, and not 
simplifying the complex 
world. 
Processual 
Research 
What, why, how? Suited to the investigation 
of processes within a range 
of different contexts, 
addressing a number of 
different outcomes 
(Pettigrew, 1997). 
Highly relevant to the RQs. 
 Authors such as Van de 
Ven et al. (2000) offer a 
more formulaic approach 
for process research; i.e. 
recording events and 
actions over a long 
duration of time, for the 
observed organisational 
process. Such an approach 
generates vast amount of 
data in order to overcome 
some of the difficulties of 
generalisation which can 
occur with the smaller 
sample sizes typical of 
organisational research. 
This approach is very 
resource hungry*. 
Approach appeals to 
researcher‟s world view, 
with the acknowledgement 
that an adapted method 
without the highly 
prescriptive recording of 
temporal event data. This 
PhD study does not attempt 
to emulate such a depth of 
data collection.   
* e.g. in the Minnesota Innovation Research Programme (MIRP) reported by Van de Ven et al. (2000) 14 studies were carried out, with different research teams. The teams 
comprised 34 people (15 faculty and 19 doctoral students) from eight different academic departments and five schools in Minnesota. 
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Appendix 5d – Meta-Table of Results 
 
[Table not included in electronic version of Thesis due to formatting limitations] 
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Appendix 5e – Ethical Approval Process 
 
Procedure for obtaining approval from Cardiff Business School‟s ethics committee: 
 
1. Complete your proposal, questionnaires, consent and debrief forms.  
2. Complete Cardiff Business School ethical approval form (Appendix A). 
3. Submit two copies of parts 1 and 2 above to Laney Clayton (Secretary to the Ethics 
Committee) by the 15
th
 of the month. 
4.  Await comments, and hopefully approval. 
 
Note: for PhD Research, the following statement is made (see Bragg, 2006). 
„It is the responsibility of the supervisor .. to ensure that a student‟s project is ethically 
sound. If the project supervisor is satisfied that the proposal raises no ethical issues, the 
project may go ahead. However, if the project supervisor believes that there are ethical 
issues, the proposal must be referred to the ethics committee. Similarly all research 
involving participants recruited independently of the Business School must be referred 
to the Ethics Committee‟  
 
References: 
Bragg, S. (2006). Research Ethics Committee. [WWW]  
<URL: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/research/ethcommittee.html> [Accessed 22 
January 2007]. 
 
Further information for the proposal, questionnaire, consent and debrief forms can be 
seen at: 
 
Bragg, S. (2006). Research Ethics Guidelines for Applications. [WWW]  
<URL: http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/research/ethguide.html> [Accessed 22 January 
2007]. 
 
The main code of ethics for management research that I will use can be found at the 
following location: 
http://www.aomonline.org/Membership/Governance/AOMCodeOfEthics.pdf 
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Appendix 5f – Approved Ethics Form 
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Appendix 5g –Interview Ethical Consent form 
 
Cardiff Business School 
ETHICAL CONSENT FORM 
 
 
I understand that taking part in this research will include participation 
in individual interviews regarding my experience of innovation 
management processes for micro manufacturing 
technologies/products. 
 
My identity will be kept confidential at all times and any identifying 
data will be made anonymous.  
 
I understand that I can withdraw from the research at any time prior 
to the submission of the thesis (September 2010) and no reasons 
need to be given for my withdrawal. 
 
The data held can only be traced back to me by the researcher, 
Peter Dorrington, and in line with the Data protection Act I can 
access my information at any time or ask for it to be destroyed. 
 
I understand that at the end of the study I will be entitled to receive a 
summary of the findings of the research. 
 
I agree to the interview being recorded. 
 
I have read and understood the above terms and agree to 
participate in the research undertaken by Peter Dorrington, of Cardiff 
Business School, under the supervision of Prof. Peter Hines & Dr. 
Mark Francis. 
 
 
Company …………………………… 
 
 
Signed …………………………… 
 
 
 
Date ……………………. 
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Appendix 5h –MNT Centre Data Recorded Quarterly by the TSB 
 
The following data are recorded from each centre by the third-party monitors on behalf 
of the TSB. These are taken quarterly. 
 Risk: H, M, L 
 Performanc: H, M, L 
 On-track/ Variance/ Critical 
o Forecast revenue, variance 
o Number of orders, which sectors 
o Number of enquiries (resulting from which types of marketing?) 
 Performance - Risk 
o Supplier/ partnership relationships 
o Financial risk 
o Commercial and market risks 
o HR 
o Facilities and Infrastructure 
o MSL/MEC (CU) Relationship 
o Technology and IPR 
 Performance - Activities 
o Operating Agreements 
o Office/work space identity 
o Business and technology development plans 
o Technological issues (e.g. software development) 
o Website development 
o Accreditations 
o Staff 
o Equipment purchase 
o Strategic Review 
 Industrial Advisory Boards? 
 Performance - Financials: 
 TSB grant claimable 
 RDA grant income 
 Contributions in kind (proposers) 
 Contributions in kind (suppliers) 
 Revenue 
 Total 
 [Total Budget/Forecast to date/ actual to date/ variance £ & %] 
o Performance - Expenditure 
o MATURITY – Vision and Direction 
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Appendix 6a – Archive documents outlining the assessment criteria used for 
selecting suitable recipients of funding for this capital facilities programme. 
Source: 
http://web.archive.org/web/20050212110814/www.mntnetwork.com/assessment.html 
Assessment Criteria 
All applicants are required to submit a Second Call Application Proposal, which 
should provide detailed responses to the Assessment Criteria shown below. 
For information, and in the interests of openness, guidance notes for referees 
allocated for each question is also provided. 
1. Strategic Fit with MNT Network 
2. Provision of Open Access 
3. Potential Economic Impact 
4. Quality of Business Proposition - Market Analysis 
5. Quality of Business Proposition - Business Model 
6. Quality of Business Proposition - Implementation Plan 
7. Contribution from Partners 
8. Quality of Technical Proposal 
9. Quality of Risk Management 
10. Appropriateness of the Organisation that is Applying 
11. Quality of Management 
12. Demonstration of Value-Added Support 
13. Additionality to UK MNT Network 
14. Forward Vision 
15. Value for Money 
Referee Scoring Process 
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Each proposal will be allocated to 5 referees by the management team (TTP). 
The referees will be individually asked to assess the strength of the case 
presented by the application for each of the above criteria and to allocate a score 
for each criterion on the following basis: 
4 a very strong case has been made 
3 a strong case has been made 
2 a weak case has been made 
1 a very weak case has been made. 
 
   
The referees are also invited to provide detailed comments alongside each score. 
These comments should include their views as to why the proposal is considered 
to be valuable and to describe anything that is missing from the proposed 
activity. Referees will also be asked to highlight any key areas of risk or 
uncertainty that should be the subject of particular scrutiny during the detailed 
evaluation in Stage 2. These comments should be constructive, as (unless the 
referee specifically requests otherwise) they will be fed back to the applicant as 
well as to the Executive Panel. 
The results and comments from the 5 referees will be passed on to the Executive 
Panel for guidance and information. The Executive Panel will make the final 
decision as to whether the application passes the criteria for questions 1 and 2, 
which are mandatory. 
The scores for questions 3-15 inclusive, will be collated and aggregated by the 
management team. Where there is a significant anomaly, the referee(s) will be 
contacted for clarification and if necessary, will be asked to reconcile any 
significant differences among themselves. The overall assessment will be used to 
rank proposals and this information will be presented to the Executive Panel, for 
consideration and selection of proposals to progress to Stage 2. 
^top 
1. Strategic Fit with MNT Network 
Tests supporting the objectives of the Capital Projects fund and the wider objectives of the MNT 
Network. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are required to explain how Does the proposal align with the 
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the proposed project: 
 Aligns with the objectives of the 
MNT Network as articulated in 
"What is the UK MNT 
Network?". 
 Aligns with the UK MNT Strategic 
Priorities. 
objectives of the UK MNT Network? 
Does the proposal fit with the 
objectives of the Capital Projects 
fund as described in section 3? 
^top  
2. Provision of Open-Access 
Tests whether the facility is able to provide open-access of its equipment and expertise to the UK MNT 
community 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are required to demonstrate 
that their proposal will provide open-
access of equipment and expertise to 
the UK MNT community. 
 How does the applicant 
propose to provide open-
access? 
 How will the facility allocate 
resource between competing 
demands? 
 What steps are proposed to 
market the facilities to the 
wider community? 
 Is there a clear interface with 
customers? 
 Can the service described be 
delivered within the 
timescales required of 
industry or their proposed 
customer base? 
 Does the applicant have the 
commercial expertise to 
operate an industry-facing 
facility? 
 Are there competing demands 
on expertise and 
infrastructure that may have 
a significant impact within 
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the facility? 
 Has the applicant clearly 
demonstrated how they will 
manage competing 
demands? 
^top  
3. Potential Economic Impact 
Assesses the extent to which the proposal demonstrates supporting commercialisation of MNT and the 
anticipated scale of economic impact which will result. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are required to explain how 
the proposed project: 
 Supports the commercialisation of 
MNT 
 Has a positive economic impact on 
the UK and Region it is located in 
 Supports industry in achieving a 
competitive advantage for the UK. 
The focus of the Fund is to 
increase economic activity in the 
UK. 
 How does the applicant 
propose to deliver this 
successfully? 
 Does the proposal 
demonstrate how it will 
support industry in achieving 
a competitive advantage for 
the UK? 
^top  
4. Quality of Business Proposition - MARKET ANALYSIS 
Tests the robustness and appropriateness of the market analysis. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
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Applicants are requested to provide 
details of the following in sufficient detail 
to demonstrate the quality of the 
business proposition: 
 Details of market analysis to 
demonstrate existing demand and 
future demand, in the specific 
sector that the applicant is 
targeting. 
 Does the proposal identify a 
genuine market demand? 
 And if so will the project be 
effective in accessing and 
meeting this demand? 
 Does the applicant 
understand and explain what 
their specific target market 
is, and how they will address 
this customer base, or do 
they just provide generic 
market data? 
 Is the business case product 
and/or application-driven? 
^top  
5. Quality of Business Proposition - BUSINESS MODEL 
Tests the robustness and appropriateness of the business plan. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are requested to provide 
details of the following in sufficient detail 
to demonstrate the quality of the 
business proposition: 
 Business model, in particular 
explaining access and intellectual 
property (IP) provisions. 
 How complete is the Business 
Plan? 
 Is the proposal financially 
viable based on the 
requested level of support 
through the Capital Projects 
fund? 
 Do capex and opex profiles 
look realistic? 
 Does the revenue profile look 
realistic and link to expected 
technology outputs? 
 Does the Business Plan 
recognise the need to be 
flexible should demand not 
meet expectations? 
 Does the Business Plan 
recognise risk and link to a 
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Risk Management Plan? 
 When does the facility expect 
to break-even? 
 Is this consistent with the 
rest of the application? 
 Does the cost model 
correspond adequately to 
the rest of the business 
model and to future plans? 
 Does the proposal articulate a 
convincing model for IP 
development, ownership and 
access? 
^top  
6. Quality of Business Proposition - IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
Tests the robustness and appropriateness of the implementation plan. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are requested to provide 
details of the following in sufficient detail 
to demonstrate the quality of the 
business proposition: 
 Implementation plan, clearly 
illustrating the treatment of risk 
and key implementation and 
output milestones. 
 Are the implementation plans 
complete and feasible? 
 Have the necessary planning, 
environmental and other 
consents been identified and 
are they being progressed? 
 Does the plan include 
sufficient (stage gate) 
controls? 
 Does it identify 
implementation risks and 
adequately address their 
management? 
^top  
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7. Contribution from partners 
Explores which organisations (including RDA/DAs) are prepared to make a financial or strategic 
contribution to the project. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are required to demonstrate 
evidence of the level of financial 
contribution from all partners. 
The financial breakdown of contributions 
must be provided on the proforma, with 
any accompanying explanation on the 
free-form application document. 
If partners bring non-financial benefits, 
then this should be clearly demonstrated 
too. 
 Which organisations will make 
a financial contribution to 
the project? 
 How far advanced are the 
approvals procedures? 
 Will they impose operational 
constraints on the project? 
 Are there any non-paying 
partners who bring strategic 
benefits to the project? 
 Has the applicant consulted 
or partnered with the UK 
leaders in this field? 
^top  
8. Quality of Technical Proposal 
Assesses the technical feasibility of the proposal and its exploitation potential 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are requested to provide 
details of the following in sufficient detail 
to demonstrate the quality of the 
technical proposal: 
 Technical feasibility of the 
proposition 
 The management of technical risks 
 Staffing requirements 
 Are the proposals technically 
feasible? (e.g. access to 
technology, support 
facilities, relevant expertise 
and will it deliver?) 
 Are the technical 
risks identified and how are 
they being managed? 
 Is open-access realistic for 
the equipment proposed 
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 Exploitation potential. (e.g. is set-up time 
feasible)? 
 Are there any potential 
contamination issues? 
 If so, which equipment falls 
into that category and how 
is this addressed by the 
applicant? 
 Does the delivery of technical 
outputs look feasible? 
 Are there sufficient technical 
resources allocated? 
 Does the proposal articulate 
the exploitation potential of 
the technology and the 
projected scale of this 
impact? 
^top  
9. Quality of Risk Management 
Assesses the robustness of the proposals risk management plans through implementation and 
operation for dealing with technical and business risks and liabilities. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are requested to provide 
details of the following in sufficient detail 
to demonstrate the quality risk 
management proposals: 
 Identification of potential risks 
 The proposed management 
strategy for each risk 
 Identification and plan relating to 
the management of liabilities. 
 Are key technical, business 
and other risks (e.g. 
statutory) identified? 
 Is the proposed management 
of these risks robust with 
clear roles/responsibilities 
and mitigation strategies? 
 Are key potential liabilities 
identified and is there a plan 
to manage them? 
^top  
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10. Appropriateness of the organisation that is applying 
Assesses the technical, commercial and financial credibility of the applicant(s) / consortium. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are requested to provide 
details of the following in sufficient detail 
to demonstrate the quality of the 
applicant organisation(s): 
 Technical and commercial expertise 
 Financial stability of applicant(s) 
 Robustness of contractual 
arrangements between 
applicant(s) 
 Does the proposal 
demonstrate that the 
applicants have the right 
expertise to deliver the 
project? 
 If not, where will they source 
this from, and is this 
realistic? 
 Do they have credible size to 
manage an open-access 
facility of national 
significance? 
 If this is not the 
organisation's usual core 
business, then have they 
produced a convincing 
explanation to confirm the 
reason for diversification into 
this area? 
 Is the applicant financially 
stable? 
 If the proposal is from a 
consortium, are all consortia 
members appropriately 
contractually bound? 
^top  
11. Quality of Management 
Assesses the competency of the management team, process and controls to ensure efficient operation. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
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Applicants are requested to provide 
details of the following in sufficient detail 
to demonstrate the quality of the 
proposed management team: 
 Qualifications and experience of 
team 
 Adequacy of resourcing - 
ability/experience of working 
together 
 Robustness of management and 
operational efficiency controls 
 Does the proposal 
demonstrate that 
management team is 
competent, experienced and 
adequately resourced, both 
technically and 
commercially? 
 Are proposed management 
and operating controls and 
processes adequate? 
 Does the proposal address 
how they will monitor 
achievement against a plan? 
 Do they have quality 
assurance plans in place? 
^top  
12. Demonstration of Value-Added Support 
Assesses the extent to which the proposal provides value-added support to industry through training, 
consultancy, etc. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Please explain how the project will seek 
to support transfer of technology and 
knowledge into the UK's MNT 
community, in addition to the direct 
provision of open access technical 
facilities. 
Where appropriate, please include 
comment on the provision of: 
 awareness raising 
 technical training 
 educational courses including CPD 
 access to background IP and 
 support for the creation of new 
business ventures. 
Does the proposal demonstrate value-added 
support to industry and users? (e.g. through 
training, learning, consultancy, etc.) 
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^top  
13. Additionality to UK MNT Network 
To assess whether the proposal adds to existing UK MNT assets and where it overlaps or provides 
additionality to the UK MNT asset base. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
To assess whether the proposal adds to 
existing UK MNT assets and where it 
overlaps or provides additionality to the 
UK MNT asset base. 
Applicants are encouraged to adopt a 
collaborative mindset and to build critical 
mass, where appropriate, to deliver an 
open-access facility of national 
significance. 
Applicants should thus provide their own 
assessment of whether the proposal 
adds to or duplicates elements of the 
existing UK MNT asset base. 
If necessary, how would applicants work 
with other players in the MNT 
community? 
Does the proposal demonstrate how it will 
add to the national (not just regional) UK 
MNT capability in 
 prototyping, 
 development and 
 manufacturing facilities? 
^top  
14. Forward Vision 
Assesses the sustainability, flexibility and adaptability of the facility's functionality to meet long-term 
and changing market requirements 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are required to demonstrate 
the sustainability of the proposal and 
how flexible and adaptable the proposal 
is with regard to responding to changing 
 Does the proposal describe 
how the project will evolve, 
beyond the first 3 years, to 
deliver to the developing UK 
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or increasing market demands and how 
the business model supports such 
requirements. 
MNT requirements? 
 Does the business model 
demonstrate sustainability, 
and support flexibility and 
adaptability? 
 Is there potential within the 
proposal to add breadth to 
its proposed functionality? 
 Does the proposal address 
the potential need for 
physical expansion and 
adaptation? 
^top  
15. Value for Money 
Assesses value for money offered by the proposal from the evidence provided by the Applicant. 
Information Requirements Guidance for referees 
Applicants are asked to provide evidence 
to demonstrate value for money in terms 
of delivery outputs, throughout the 
length of the proposed project, through 
benchmarking or comparator cost 
models. 
 Does the proposal provide 
adequate evidence to 
demonstrate value for 
money in terms of delivery 
of outputs? 
 Do all major purchases and 
infrastructure costs 
demonstrate value for 
money? 
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Appendix 6b - A graphical overview of the MNT centres accessed, along with the cross-field actors. 
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Appendix 6c - A Graphical Overview of the MNT Centres Accessed, along with the Cross-Field Actors, and with Details of the Data 
Collected (duration shown in circles, in minutes). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Rubik 
-E&Y 
Prof. Hertz 
-Architect of centres 
Government 
Advisor 
Government 
Bodies (e.g. TSB, 
Nano KTN) 
Mr. Daimler 
-TSB Director 
Dr. Dickson 
-TSB steering 
group (& CU VC) 
Third-party (e.g. 
E&Y auditors) 
Mr. Morgan 
-MNT Operations 
Director 
Dr. Teller 
- Manager, 
NanoKTN 
MNT centres 
Regional Bodies 
(e.g. RDAs) 
Mr. Strauss 
-RDA Manager 
Mr. Neumann 
-Former RDA 
Director 
Mr Archimedes 
-Team Manager 
(EMDA) 
Mercury 
-Cardiff Uni 
Staff CEO 
Prof 1 
Prof 2 
Business Dev. Mgr. 
Production Mgr. 
Former Steering 
VC of University 
 
Suppliers Luna 
 
 Customers BVG 
Gyroscope 
  
 
 
Rhea 
-Epigem 
Director 
Prosperina 
(CEO) 
Concordia 
-Nott‟ham 
Lucretia 
-Newcastle 
Business Mgr. 
Cardia 
Director 
Minerva 
-B‟ham Uni 
CEO 
Bacchus 
Director 
(Scientist)/ 
Adv. Tech. 
Centre 
Ulysses 
Manager 
&  
Science 
Park 
Director 
Vulcan 
(MD &CEO) 
(mapping data) 
 
competitors 
CEO* 
 
Liber 
MD 
 
IMEC 
-Leuven 
70 
10 30 
60 
40 
60 
30 
45 
10 
90 
40 
103 
51 
77 
62 
50 
20,20,66 
70 
66 
30 
60 
60 
60 
82 210 
180 80 56 40 87 38 
83 
90 
45 
TOTALS:- 
 2091minutes PhD specific interviews/discussions =  35 hours [28 stakeholders] 
 180 minutes pres-PhD interviews = 3hours [3 stakeholders] 
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APPENDIX 7a 
Extract from one of the TSB’s ‘micro- and nano- technology centres 
communications documents’ 
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APPENDIX 7b  
- TABLE OF ADDITIONAL SUPPLIER/ CUSTOMER INTERVIEWS 
Table 7c – Descriptions of Mercury’s customers and suppliers interviewed 
Organization 
[supplier/ 
customer] 
Organization 
type [staff] 
Organisation 
size 
Nature of 
business 
Interviewee 
(s) 
[role] 
Date of UK 
Incorporation 
[turnover] 
Company A 
[Customer of 
Mercury] 
Part of global 
group 
[180] 
Private Limited 
Company 
(global group) 
Medical 
diagnostics 
Manufacture 
medical, 
orthopaedic 
equipment 
Mr. Slash 
[Senior 
Materials 
Analyst] 
Mr Burns 
[Engineer] 
1989 
[?] 
Lunar 
[Supplier for 
Mercury] 
Small SME 
[<50] 
Private Limited 
Company 
(global group) 
Laser 
micromachining 
systems and 
imaging 
systems 
Founder 1977 
[<10M Euro] 
BVG Airflo 
Group 
[Customer of 
Mercury] 
Small SME 
[<50 local site] 
(now sold off?) Manufacture & 
sales of sports 
goods 
Production 
Director 
1997 (that is 
BVG Airflo 
Group) 
 
[No longer 
trading] 
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APPENDIX 7c 
Extracts from Mercury’s tender document relating to context. 
p.2 The [university host department] has its own purpose-built facilities, which were 
part funded by [the] University with match funding from [other government 
exploitation funding], managed by the [local] regional development agency. 
These include office space for all commercial staff, a reception area and a 
meeting room for presentations and discussions with customers. 
p.7 By setting up the proposed facility alongside the existing micro-tooling and 
fabrication capabilities at [Venus] the proposed programme will dovetail into the 
existing ISO 9000 infrastructure… This reduces significantly the operational risk 
associated with this capital project [emphasis added]. 
p.12 [the university host] has unique and dedicated facilities for the machining of 
micro-tools in … materials and has managed and participated in National and 
European projects with a total value in excess of £25M. 
...the [university host] has the experience and infrastructure to provide a 
development-manufacturing-prototyping service and a  route to commercial 
exploitation. 
p.13 Mercury … will draw on the expertise of the [university department‟s] business 
development team.. 
p.13 The existing approach for managing open access manufacturing facilities, 
outlined in Section 2, will be adopted in delivering the Mercury service. This 
management approach is a result of a 10-years continuous improvement 
programme at the [University department]. A Quality Management System (ISO 
9001:2000 accredited) is in place to guaranty the consistency of micro-
manufacture services to industry. 
p.15 The Mercury service will build upon the university‟s recognised expertise in 
micro-machining and microtoolmaking 
and is a natural evolution of the already established open-access MNT facilities 
at the Centre… 
The service will dovetail into an existing ISO 9000 business infrastructure that 
reduces significantly the operational risk and the required initial funding to 
create such a service provision within the UK MNT Network. Thus, the project 
represents very good value for money when considering the additional 
investment and time required to start the proposed Mercury service. 
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Appendix 8a – Table 8-5 - Role-ordered matrix: linking actors, roles, logics and agency (complete version) 
ROLE 
/ Category 
or actor 
 
CONTEXT 
/ Centre 
Assimilation of OUTCOMES for their MNT centre LOGICS 
/belief systems 
/Exclusive or not exclusive 
Examples of associated 
practices/ activities  
Success Failure 
Centre 
Director 
/Hybrid  
 
University 
science park 
/Ulysses 
 successful companies 
growing on back of 
Ulysses‟ services 
 Repeat business 
 lack of clarification of 
expectations from both the 
centre & customer: there is a  
need to really understand 
what is being achieved. 
 Some customers set out in 
one direction, then realise no 
money to be made and change 
product line accordingly. 
 Business 
 
[Not exclusive] 
 
 Collaborations 
 Target-driven 
 Employing high skilled 
individuals 
 Helping start-up companies 
 Run the centre to generate an 
income stream (cover staff costs) 
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Centre 
Director 
/Business  
 
University 
/Lucretia 
 Happy customer: 
 Repeat business 
 In top two of the Yole 
review 
 Don't win business ..or having 
won it, fail to complete the 
task. Why? We/ or customer 
didn't understand it/ scope it 
properly/ communication 
breakdown between 
organisations.  
 Caveat: failure is a valid 
outcome of research. 
 Business 
 
[Exclusive] 
 
 Employs his staff to achieve 
market targets. Avoid research, 
that‟s for the academics.  
 TSB tried to change objectives; 
Mr Gillette invited the TSB board 
in to „explain‟ Lucretia‟s contract 
to them and how Lucretia did not 
have to pander to their added 
requirements. 
 Example of new business 
development manager being paid 
for results, and if he doesn‟t 
perform he is out. Uni HR had a 
different view on performance-
related contracts, but Gillette tells 
them this is the way it is (like 
industry). 
 Target-driven 
 Rebellious 
Centre 
Director 
/Business  
 
Science Park 
/Liber 
 Viable, profitable 
business; serve needs of 
industry; add value to 
MNT void. 
 advance UK technology-
base 
 „we‟re world leaders‟ 
 Business doesn‟t survive 
beyond 5 years: complete 
failure. 
 Business 
  [Exclusive] 
 
 Separate from university 
 Facilitated quick exit plan from 
university environment 
 Core staff, closely-knit 
 Flexibility, responsiveness 
 Problem solving 
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Centre 
Director 
/Business 
 
Global 
organisation 
/Bacchus 
 Happy customer when 
devices reach proof-of-
principle. 
 Uptake of technologies 
into application areas. 
 
 Not working with external 
customers in non-allied 
industries. 
 Some developments too 
difficult, or technology 
inappropriate. 
 Some items can cost too 
much (i.e. „you mustn’t 
underestimate the power of 
an incumbent technology and 
making things cheap. Some 
items you get for  £1000 to 
£2000 are really very 
complex and making them 
cheaper in micro systems can 
be very difficult‟) 
 Not achieved similar 
examples as seen on trade 
missions in other countries. 
Business.. (but leanings toward pure 
research for industry) 
 
[Not exclusive] 
 
 Increased internal capacity 
(doubled floorspace). 
 Resistance to large hosts‟ 
bureaucracy where it may stifle 
innovation.  
 Optimism: when iteration fails,  
'it is not the end of the world, you 
go, right we need to iterate 
something, what was wrong with 
it? But you have to believe that 
what you are doing is right at the 
time‟. 
 Patriotic 
 Problem-solving: „Ours is not 
always to understand, just to do 
it‟.  Scientific/Technology 
development logic coming 
through…  
 Comfort resulting from being in 
such a large host: organisation.  
 Darwinian 
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Centre 
Director 
/Business 
 
 
Science park 
/Concordia 
 Examples of commercial 
products launched. 
 Demonstrator and pilot 
plants built to supply [i.e. 
production]. 
 Using skills of academic 
actors and giving them 
knowledge of production. 
 Getting products to market in 
pharmaceutical sector (as an 
SME). 
 Business 
 
 
 [Exclusive] 
 Part of original DTI selection 
panel 
 Re-focussed business plan from 
pharma to another sector with 
lower entry barriers. 
 Cross-fertilisation of team: e.g. 
academics placed in Concordia 
for a short placement, share 
knowledge. 
 Careful selection of capable 
people (balance of commercial 
and technical skills) 
 R&D people have to engage in 
production and have to deliver. 
 „Rebuilt pilot plant to be separate 
entity. The scientists cannot 
wander in [and fiddle]‟. 
 Brought in industry people, and 
sales people (previously 
academics) 
 Separate management from 
university 
  This includes separating finances 
from the university system. 
  Target-driven 
 People: (keep expertise inside). 
Use of „do-all‟ people. Everyone 
is in the same space. Lot of 
arguments!..very particular 
people..with strong attitudes to 
what they do. Get a balanced 
team‟.  
 Motivator (of staff, keep them 
achieving something all the time). 
 Problem-solving 
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Centre 
Director 
/ Business 
 
Existing 
SME /Rhea 
 
 Success in the marketplace 
 Benefits for existing SME: 
enhanced reputation; bring 
in more business; benefits 
by association 
(University); case 
histories. 
 Successful components 
developed for company 
Prosperina, using Rhea‟s 
services. Led to repeat 
business for Rhea, and 
successful products for 
Prosperina. 
 Fail to complete task. 
 High casualty rate „some 
ideas won't make it and some 
will.. difficult.. no [way]..to 
bet on sure-fire winners..so if 
Rhea is not sustainable…[we] 
have bet  on the wrong 
horses..this is the biggest 
downside to innovation‟. 
 Supply-chain example, given 
where a collaborator let Rhea 
down. 
 Business. 
 
 
[Exclusive] 
 Part of original committee with 
Taylor report (which 
recommended a number of major 
centres) 
 Continual investment in R&D and 
collaborations: to keep ahead of 
the game. 
 Patriotic: (examples of overseas 
buy-outs where only the R&D 
offices remain in UK) 
 Darwinian 
 Problem-solving 
 Collaborations 
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Centre 
Director 
/Business 
 
RDA centre 
/Cardia 
 Ultimately product on the 
shelf. 
 As an intermediate, 
success is the amount of 
work businesses do 
together (including R&D). 
 Getting to functional 
prototype – to enable the 
uptake of new technology. 
 Being able to demonstrate 
to potential MNT users 
that money can be made 
out of the technology. 
 „nobody bothers to get 
together, and after some years 
no increase in the amount of 
nano enabled materials 
coming into the market - 
difficult to measure‟ 
 
 Business: „market-pull‟ & 
awareness of technology push; 
„cash is king‟. 
 
[Exclusive] 
 
 Active marketing; role is to 
champion the cause. 
 ‘E.g. there are these technologies 
around.. these features, functions, 
characteristics that you can 
exploit. which is why the 
conference is about exploitation. 
How do you exploit the properties 
to give you money. "We're 
constantly evangelising the 
benefits" for getting involved with 
- particularly -  nanomaterials, 
and trying to widen peoples eyes’. 
 Set-up conferences to build 
collaborations & network events. 
 People: industrial experience 
required to gain credibility from 
organisations. 
 Target-driven: (e.g. number of 
business to business 
collaborations) 
 Collaboration: Cardia acts as a 
brokerage 
Centre 
Director 
/ Business 
 
University 
/Minerva 
 
 Jobs created 
 Cover wage for your team. 
 Don‟t Know [DK]  State (job creation) 
 
[Exclusive] 
 Patriotic 
 Darwinian: one major OEM as the 
customer. Appeared to be the 
focus of Minerva‟s efforts 
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Science park 
manager 
/Hybrid  
 
University 
science park 
/Ulysses 
 Assisting companies to get 
up and running 
 Then getting them to IPO 
and beyond. 
 Project not meet expectations 
 If company goes broke 
 Failure= also valid (can be 
used elsewhere) 
 
 Business 
 [not exclusive] 
 Example given from a company 
he set up that started off along the 
technology push route, but learnt 
that market need is essential to be 
successful.  
 Open-minded ‘I think it doesn't 
matter what peoples' education, 
background of position is every 
person is capable of a good idea.. 
so we should listen’. 
 Problem-solving 
 Patriotic ’I'm not a person that 
wants to become wealthy.. 
[about] creation of jobs‟. 
 ‘job creation within the UK is my 
main driver’ 
 Collaboration 
Architect of 
NSI 
/ Hybrid 
NA  Having leveraged £233M 
out of £40M for the MNT 
programme. 
 Investment still 
continuing. 
 „Lucretia I think is 
outstanding‟. 
 Having the technology and 
ideas coming through to 
industry. 
 The centres were meant to be 
co-ordinated. Nobody is co-
ordinating them anymore. 
 „ We did lose a lot through 
the demise of the DTI‟. 
 „..very disappointed that there 
haven‟t been more 
collaborations to date‟. 
 
 Business:  
 /beliefs: good research but not 
much commercialisation. Hence 
the need for the programme. MNT 
programme is purely commercially 
focussed. Research is well looked 
after) 
 [Exclusive] 
 Led selection committee 
 Chair of the MNT network 
 Trade mission 1999 
 Formed the Micro systems and 
nano technology Manufacturing 
Association (MMA) 
 Lobbied government 
 Taylor Report resulted. This said 
the UK was slipping dangerously 
behind all its competitors in the 
World in Microsystems 
technology and nanotechnology. 
 Patriotic 
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MNT 
Operations 
Director 
/State 
NDGB 
/ TSB 
 Self-sustaining 
 Leg-up to UK industry 
 Open-access 
 Technology has reached a 
certain level that it is 
going somewhere. 
 [to be World class like a 
Fraunhofer or a Leti] 
 Referring to the TSB‟s 
purpose (see Table 8.1): [we 
are] a long way from that‟. 
 No collection of World Class 
facilities.  
 Business 
 State  
 Management consultant 
 
[Exclusive] 
 Mercury closed early: governance 
structures must be created and 
jurisdictional claims defended – 
often with the aid of the state – if 
professional power is to be 
realised (Scott, p.129). Show the 
TSB serious.  
 Patriotic 
 Community reach 
 Target-driven (sets targets & 
evolved strategy) 
Management 
Consultant 
/State 
NDGB 
/ TSB 
 To be Internationally 
competitive facilities: put 
UK on the map as a 
destination for 
nanotechnology work. 
 If the centres are true to 
the vision and providing a 
service, then „Income + 
orders + revenue = should 
be equal‟, i.e. break even. 
„But if hybrid, centres 
look to develop own 
product, then there is the 
difference of commercial 
revenue 
 
 „Good thinking and policy 
[led to] pot of money…then 
no longer „joined up thinking‟ 
 Management consultant (i.e. 
project management/ consultant; 
dismissive/ superior view over the 
centres)  
 State 
 
 
 
[Exclusive] 
 
 Is this the common view of the 
other E&Y auditors? Would 
explain some of the concerns 
about auditing from other centres 
(i.e. too business like?, too 
frequent).  
 to manage the risk to public 
money 
 when discussing monitoring of 
centres: ‘[E&Y] are helping them 
justify their existence‟  
Rubik views the centres as open-
access research development 
service providers: in terms of 
ROI, they should not be 
developing technology to exploit 
themselves. 
